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(SECOND SERIES)

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LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.
RUSKIN HOUSE, 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C. 1
NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

irst published in

Great Britain by
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To
F. H. BRADLEY, O.M.

TO WHOM BRITISH PHILOSOPHY OWED
THE IMPULSE THAT GAVE IT NEW
LIFE IN OUR TIME

EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE SECOND SERIES

FOR the general idea of this book as a statement by representative writers of leading philosophical theories current at the present time in Great Britain the reader is referred to the Preface to the First Series published a year ago. With regard to the writers included in it I merely wish to repeat that the division into a First and Second Series has nothing to do with their age or standing, but is solely due to the different times at which their contributions became available for publication. Even now there are conspicuous omissions in a list that claims to be representative of living British thinkers. It is hoped that it may still be possible to supply at least some of these in a further series, or in a subsequent edition of the present ones. The order here, as in the former volume, is alphabetical, with the single exception of Professor James Ward's article, which, with the approval of other contributors, has been placed first, as a tribute of respect to the writer whose death since he wrote it has deprived this country of its oldest and most distinguished psychologist. As in the case of Bosanquet's article in the First Series, Ward's may be regarded as his last will and testament to his contemporaries on the subject of general philosophy, to which the latter years of his life were chiefly devoted. It was the general wish of the writers in the former series that the book should be dedicated to F. H. Bradley, and it was only Bradley's own modesty that prevented this being done. Writers in the present series have felt that his death in the interval has altered the situation, and that they could not better express their sense of what British Philosophy owes to him than by inscribing his name on the fly leaf.

I desire to use the space which it may be permissible to occupy

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with a second Preface to deal shortly with some of the chief criticisms that have been made upon the earlier volume as a specimen of what may be expected from such an enterprise as a whole. I shall confine myself to two which are closely related to each other.

The first rises out of what was said in the former Preface of the relation between a writer's personality and his philosophical opinions. The second refers to the closely allied point of the multitude of conflicting views that are represented in these volumes, and to the proof it seems to afford of the absence of any real progress or assured results in philosophical speculation.

1. In the Preface to the First Series I referred to Fichte's saying that "the kind of philosophy that a man chooses depends on the kind of man he is," and added that in this respect philosophies were comparable rather to poetry than to science. Though these statements were expressly guarded against misunderstanding in the sentences that followed, they have been taken by critics as giving countenance to the view, associated with Positivism in all its forms, that speculative philosophy represents an effort of the creative imagination calculated to give satisfaction to the emotions rather than, as William James calls it, a particularly obstinate effort to think clearly for the satisfaction of the reason. In view of this misunderstanding I wish to repudiate, on the part both of myself and I think I may say the whole of the contributors, the view that individual temperament and circumstances of education and environment of thinkers constitute the determining factors in the ultimate shape which their opinions take in philosophy any more than in other departments of investigation. There is, indeed, one great difference between philosophy and the special sciences. While these deal with some one particular department of experience, philosophy is condemned to concern itself with all departments and with experience as a whole. It is, therefore, vital for anything approaching to success in it that the student should be endowed by nature with a certain sensitiveness to all the rays that come to him out of the heart of the real world, and

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further that circumstances should have favoured the development in him of this sensitivity. We are familiar in particular departments, whether of science or art, religion or politics, with thinkers and writers to whom apparently truth is unable to enter save by a single gate, or who are open to the touch of reality only at a limited number of points. We know, moreover, from such frank confessions as that of Darwin, how exclusive occupation with one or another department of experience may dull or destroy the specialist's capacity of entering sympathetically into others, without injury, perhaps even with advantage, to his work of investigation or interpretation in his own chosen field. But in philosophy it is safe to say that this is not so. In some sense, within the limits of human finitude, the student here must be "the spectator of all time and all existence." Any spiritual colour-blindness, any gap or one-sidedness in his actual experience, is inevitably reflected in a distortion of the view he is likely to take of the reality that is revealed through it. If therefore by personality we mean the comparative open- or close-mindedness of a writer in philosophy, it is true enough to say *quot personæ, tot sententiæ*. But to admit this difference is one thing, to maintain either that the favourable conditions are never present or that, when they happen to fail, it may not be possible for individuals to allow for and so rise above their limitations, is quite another. The most fundamental fact in the life of the mind, which even the most sceptical have to admit in one form or another, is the instinctiveness and immediacy with which it transcends all subjective limitations. Common sense and science alike are founded on the instinctive assumption not only that the Cosmos has created us after its own image, but that it has created us with the power to know it as it is. Sense knowledge may have to undergo a certain rectification, the results of science may have to be stated with a certain provisionality; but that the human mind is incapable in the last resort of "pure thought," in the sense of submission to *the truth as it is in things*, is a view to which, it is safe to say, it could only reconcile itself at the price of self-extinction.

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There is no ground in philosophy any more than in sense perception or scientific investigation to believe that the personal equation must vitiate any claim to objectivity in knowledge. Like science, philosophy holds the mirror up to Nature, and equally with science has the right to the assumption that the mirrored image can be a true reflection of it. It is for this reason that (as it has been finely put by a writer, unfortunately not yet represented in these volumes) "some of us who believe philosophy to be science, an attempt at truth, are troubled when we hear philosophy described as merely a work of art, the lyrical outpouring of the mind of a philosopher; beautiful, perhaps, but not knowledge; only comparable to a statue or picture or poem; making no doubt the impersonal appeal to human feelings, but not itself a reasoned account of the simplest things."¹ If, as I think is true, philosophy may be said to contain more of a man's soul than a scientific theory, it does so because it is an attempt to bring a wider range of experience into harmony with itself, and so to contain more of the world as it really is.

2. The second line of criticism is more difficult to deal with for reasons which I have mentioned in the Preface to the First Series. Of the general trend of philosophy in our own time each writer would probably give a different account and most would experience a certain satisfaction in discovering that it was in the direction of the establishment of his own particular opinions. There are not many who, with the candour of the late James Fitzjames Stephen, would say that they would be sorry to think that the mass of mankind were doomed to hold the views at which they themselves had arrived. For this reason I feel now, as I felt in writing the former Preface, that I have no right to prejudice the reader by my own particular interpretation of the trend of contemporary philosophy, or to presume here to pass what might appear to be judgment on the contributions of individual philosophers. Nevertheless, I believe that I am expressing the mind of the great majority of the writers in these

¹ Professor S. Alexander, "The Artistry of Truth," in *Hibbert Journal*, January 1925.

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volumes in rejecting the view that there are no common tendencies traceable in the thought of our time and country.

Of the existence of deeply marked divisions founded on difference of approach and on the results arrived at there is, of course, no question. There is the difference denoted by the terms Idealism and Realism, however unsatisfactory these may be to denote it. On the one hand we have thinkers who approach philosophy from the side of the great comprehensive faiths of mankind, as embodied in its art and poetry, its heroisms and its religions, and who have sought (and think they have succeeded in finding), if not the letter in which these faiths have been encased, yet sufficient assurance of their validity to be able to maintain them in face of the apparent brutality and unpromisingness of fact. On the other hand there are those who approach philosophical problems from the side of the facts, pledged only to the simplicity of the truth as it is revealed in them. William James has characterized the distinction as that between the tender- and the tough-minded, the white-robed and the dark. In reality it is the difference between those who start from the concrete experience of the ordinary man with its comprehensive interests and seek by a process of criticism the grounds and the extent of its validity and those who, imbued with the analytic spirit of modern science and of the economies that are enjoined by it, seek to plough their way through the jungle of fact to what of light—or of darkness—may be found at the other side.

There are further divisions in these two main streams. In Idealism there is the distinction between those who take their start from the world that is experienced as containing something of which the process of experiencing is a revelation—something-in-itself, if no longer conceived of Kant-wise as an impenetrable *Jenseits*, yet as something which, while revealing itself through appearances, carries us beyond them. And there are those who would find in the temporal processes of the mind's own thinking, willing, and feeling the clue to what men mean when they speak of truth and reality in the sphere of knowledge, beauty and good in that of feeling and action. The first are drawn to lay emphasis

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on the element of permanence or non-temporal unity, the second on the plurality with which a world whose essence is change is necessarily infected.

There is a similar and even more confusing diversity among professed Realists. There are those who take their start from the theory of knowledge, and are chiefly concerned in maintaining the existence of things independent of knowledge whether sentient or conceptual as against all forms of subjectivism. And there are those who, starting from the world as it presents itself to science, occupy themselves rather with analysis and description of its contents. Of the former Professor Laird and Professor Dawes Hicks may be taken as examples, though they would deny that knowledge theory is the sole or even the most important department of philosophy. Of the second, Mr. Bertrand Russell and Professor Lloyd Morgan are representative in the first, Professor J. Arthur Thomson in the present series. But the first of these last mentioned writers differs *toto cælo* from the others in his conception of the kind of world that is revealed to analysis. In his Logical Atomism the whole emphasis is upon its plurality: "the original manifold of events." Matter and mind are defined in terms of the "compresence" of "events." In the Philosophy of Evolution of the others the emphasis is upon integration and system reaching ever higher levels as we pass from matter to life and from life to mind, and only explicable as the manifestation of what the former of them calls "one immanent Causality."

All these separate lines of thought are clearly traceable in the essays in these volumes. Yet it would be strange if, in the ferment of thought which they represent, there were no lines of approximation, no tendency for extremes to meet, no precipitate that could be said to bear the character of an assured result or be a sure mark of progress. As examples of what seems to me to be actually taking place, I shall venture to mention some definite points on which, if there is no general agreement of interpretation, there is among thinkers a far more sympathetic understanding than ever before of the problems to be solved, and a far deeper conviction of the necessity of reaching the

"synopsis" in which, according to Plato, true philosophy consists.

(i) No controversy has gone deeper during the last century and a half than that between Realism and Subjective Idealism: the doctrine that we have immediate knowledge of a non-mental world and the theory that we know nothing immediately but our own subjective states. Yet the controversy as so stated may be said to be a thing of the past. To quote the writer of the first article in the present series: "The duality of experience as involving both a subject and an object, an *experiens* and an *expertum*, is no longer questioned by any competent thinker."¹ How we are to interpret the ultimate nature of the reality which is known or with what right we take the physical objects of sense-perception as the type of the real world—the question of the relation between what has been called perceptual and logical objectivity—may still be subject of keen controversy. But that knowledge is in some sense an immediate revelation of a reality other than that of the knowing activity itself, and that this activity is not the creator of its own world, may be said to be the starting-point of all recent British philosophy. The ground on which such realism walks may still be somewhat boggy owing to the survival of subjectivist terminology, as in the ambiguous use of such terms as "sensation"; theories of perception may be a perfect tangle of perplexity; what is clear is the general admission of the essential polarity of experience. Even pragmatists, who are most closely identified with the "creationism" that finds favour elsewhere,² acknowledge in some sense the mind's allegiance to what James calls the "matrix of experiential circumstances," and are prompt to disown subjectivism in the older sense.

(ii) Equally out of date may be said to be the old controversy between materialism and spiritualism. Philosophers are far from agreed as to the status of spirit in the Universe. On the other hand there has grown up in the present generation, owing chiefly to the great developments in biological and psycho-

¹ *Hibbert Journal*, October 1924, p. 176.

² E. G. in *Creative Intelligence*, New York, 1917.

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logical science and the recognition of the unique parts that life and consciousness play in evolution, a profound distrust of any attempt to explain phenomena in terms of "matter" and mechanical action alone. What might be called the hierarchical or nodal view of the world as at once continuous and at certain points in the order of complexity self-transcendent, in the sense of permitting the emergence of entirely new qualities not resolvable into anything that went before, may be said to be the common property of Realism and Idealism in all their forms. Whatever may be true of water in the physical world, the water of life seems to be capable of rising above its own level. There are still doubtless those who hope to be able to produce life from the lifeless, or, again, who would seek to explain the phenomena of consciousness in terms of subconscious physical movements. But among British philosophers, at any rate, so far as they concern themselves with this problem, it is generally recognized that chemico-mechanics furnish a method of approaching vital phenomena rather than the basis of a satisfactory theory as to their nature. Even although life could be produced from the apparently lifeless, the conscious from the unconscious, it would still remain true that at the higher level we have something entirely new. What would be proved, if anything, would be that matter and life were more than we took them to be. If Shakespeare's brain wrote *Hamlet*, it was more than a brain. There has thus resulted a growing recognition that the world is a house of many mansions, each with its own key, and that the attempt to find in physics a skeleton-key that will open all locks is bound to fail. There is indeed nothing more characteristic of contemporary British philosophy than the common sense that leads it to refuse a place to extreme behaviouristic theories founded ultimately on the denial of the variety in unity that pervades Nature. ¹

¹ The feature here referred to as characteristic of British thought in general philosophy has been noticed as characteristic of it also in special departments. The theory, e.g., of the existence of a criminal type, which has graced (or disgraced) criminology elsewhere, is conspicuously absent in England. With modifications, the same may be said of extremist theories of social reform. This has not prevented other countries looking

(iii) Going along with this conception of a hierarchical order of different levels of being in the world is the growing recognition of the necessity to assume the operation of an underlying *nisus* or urge in Nature not only to maintain itself at any particular level which it may have reached ("to persevere in its own essence"), but to advance to ever higher levels. We have learned to associate this doctrine with the philosophy of Bergson, but it finds independent support in recent biological research. Vitalism in the older sense of belief in a soul infused from without as an entity or entelechy independent of the body is generally rejected, but the facts of organic life, as expounded by such writers as J. S. Haldane, J. Arthur Thomson, Julian Huxley, have forced into evidence the presence of an integrating, self-transcending principle not resolvable into any mere chemically acting aggregation of biophores. The "Rubicon" between mechanism and life thus crossed, there is less reason to hesitate over the line which separates life from spirit. As on the basis prepared for it by chemico-physical action there "emerges" in *life* something not resolvable into it, yet triumphing in and through it,¹ so out of the natural instincts, owing to the presence of *mind*, there arise interests and relationships transcending their origin both in content and in their power to subordinate it to other ends.

It is only a generalization from all this to see in evolution in general, as thinkers belonging to all schools now do, the operation of a creative principle precipitating ever new and higher forms of life on the stage prepared for it by the lower. Whether philosophers as yet sufficiently realize what is involved in the conception of a *nisus* in Nature towards forms of reality, which include while they go beyond what has gone before, is another question. I have tried elsewhere² to show that a more general recognition of the change in our conception of reality,

to Britain for a lead in the reform of prisons or of the social system in general. The diffusion of common sense in philosophy in all its departments may well be taken as both a sign and a cause of progress.

¹ A phrase of R. B. Perry's in *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 344.

² *Philosophical Essays* presented to John Watson (Queen's University, Kingston, Canada). "Emergent Realism," pp. 336 foll.

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which results from assigning to the Universe an immanent purpose, in other words an *εἶδος* or ideal form, to which it is in some sense pledged (for it is this that the doctrine of the *nisus* must mean if it means anything), would go far to reconcile the differences between Realism and Idealism as represented by leading writers of to-day.

(iv) Arising out of this there is a further feature of contemporary British philosophy, on which, if there cannot be said to be general agreement, there is a remarkable approximation among thinkers otherwise at the opposite poles of the philosophical firmament. Corresponding to the levelling view for which the mechanical philosophy stood, there was until recently a general tendency to express the object to which Nature strove, if not, with Lucretius, any longer in terms of pleasure, yet in terms of social survival. To be valuable meant to be of aid in securing the permanence of social types. Here also by a general widening of outlook philosophers have come to recognize that as there may be trans-individual so there may be trans-social values. Whatever the origin of the sense of duty, devotion to truth, love of beauty, these objects, once apprehended, mean not only the opening up of new sources of enjoyment but a quickening of insight into the nature of the world, of which they are an effluence, and thus acquire a status and value of their own, by which our conceptions of reality are extended and enriched. Philosophers are indeed far from agreement in their interpretation of the meaning and criteria of beauty, truth, and goodness. But before problems can be solved it is necessary to have them stated in all their depth and range, and it is this widening of men's ideas as to the content of experience and the difference that is made in it by the advent of mind and spirit that is one of the most hopeful signs of British philosophy as reflected in these volumes.

Under these circumstances it is not at all surprising that this widening has taken the form of a revival of Platonism, the great meeting-point of Realist and Idealist. No philosopher was ever more insistent than Plato on the reality of a world independent of the processes by which we come to know it, or more convinced that knowledge was essentially a revelation. Yet none more

clearly recognized the distinction between the temporal and spatial appearance or show of things, and the permanent non-spatial reality that is revealed through it. To Plato the type of the reality, which was independent of mind, was not the sense-datum of ordinary perceptual experience, nor yet the Pythagorean numbers and shapes of which he held the matter of the world of sense to be built up, but the unsensed world of essences of which beauty and goodness were the highest expression. It was these in the end that claimed the soul's allegiance as at once beyond it, soliciting it as from another world, and yet its own surest possession here and now.

As a form of Mysticism nothing would seem more alien to the common sense I have already claimed as a feature of modern British philosophy than Platonism so interpreted. In other countries, notably in America, the newer schools both of Realism and Idealism have little in common with it.¹ In this country, where the Platonic tradition has never been wholly lost, there is a recognizable difference. Common sense itself has never been more sensible than in the recognition of the greatness and ineffableness of the deeper phases of human experience. The poetry of last century, with Coleridge, Shelley, and Wordsworth at its fountain head, has been Platonic to the core. What inspiration the idealist movement in the sixties and seventies did not draw from these and from the mysticism of Carlyle it drew from the revived study in Oxford of the Platonic Dialogues. The new forms of Realism and Empiricism of the eighties and nineties were indeed largely reactions against the literary bias of this movement in the direction of scientific analysis. But these too had another side. The enemy against which the pluralism that was common to both was directed was not literary taint, but the leaning to an abstract monism which seemed to threaten the whole fabric of scientific truth. In their best representatives, both here and in America, Henry Sidgwick, William James, and later Mr. Bertrand Russell, ample room was left for the reality of the supersensible. As it has developed in its younger

¹ G. P. Adams's *Idealism and the Modern Age* is an energetic reassertion as against them of the "Platonic Thesis."

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representatives,¹ Realism in particular, while starting from the "atomism" of the last-mentioned writer, has found itself constrained to extend its idea of reality from the simple substances to which analysis leads so as to include the substance that is revealed through but not by sense, and, like the Platonic *εἶδη*, constitutes the stable element in space-time events.

There is, indeed, no better illustration of the widening of outlook, of which I am speaking, in contemporary British Philosophy than the current application of the term "experience" to other fields than those covered by sense-perception—carrying with it as it does the implication of the existence of a real object essentially *sui generis*. This holds not only of moral and æsthetic but also of "religious experience." In the latter part of the nineteenth century it would not be too much to say that, with the exception of a few idealist writers, philosophy was divided between the attempt to buttress orthodox theism, mainly in the interest of practice, against the attacks of materialism and the denial of the reality of anything corresponding to popular conceptions of God. The God-consciousness was either something brought in from without, as in the *soi-disant* "revealed" religions, or something without real significance for human life, as in so-called "natural" religion. Writing of the whole attitude of philosophy to this subject in 1893, Bradley could say, "We have but little notion in England of freedom . . . we fail through timidity and through a want of simpleness and sincerity. That a man should treat of God and religion in order merely to understand them and apart from the influence of some other consideration and inducement is to many of us in part unintelligible and in part also shocking. And hence English thought on these subjects, where it has not studied in a foreign school, is theoretically worthless."²

Bradley may have underestimated the difficulty of the "disinterested" study of theology, but it is undeniable that since these words were written there has sprung up a wholly new appreciation of the independent and permanent significance

¹ See e.g. the paper of Mr. Joad in this volume.

² *Appearance and Reality*, p. 450.

of religious experience in human life. It is not merely that the "psychology of religion" is being explored as never before. Psychological and historical interest in religion as a phenomenon in the individual and the race is quite compatible with philosophical neglect of it as a mere survival. What is of importance is the recognition of it as representing a level of human experience (perhaps the highest) at which new aspects of the world of reality reveal themselves to the soul. Idealist writers like Bradley and Bosanquet, realists like Professor Alexander and Professor Lloyd Morgan, pragmatists like Dr. Schiller, are all at one upon this. If what they have in view is to be called "natural religion," it is only natural in the sense in which Wordsworth speaks of "natural piety"—the sense of community between man and the greatness and beauty of Nature, including the justice and loving-kindness that man finds in himself. If philosophers are still far from any theoretic agreement as to the terms in which the object, "*natura sive deus*," of religious experience is to be interpreted, or as to whether there is any single object at all, still further from any agreed policy as to religious education, yet their attitude to these problems has undergone in recent years an entire revolution which contains the promise of new and hopeful developments in what Aristotle called "the First Philosophy."

The conclusion to which all these tendencies as reflected in the writers here represented, when impartially considered, point, is not, I venture to think, the despair of progress in speculative thought, but rather the extreme hopefulness of an enterprise that marshals such a company from all the ends of the intellectual world for the common purpose of exploring the frontier provinces of human experience, and perchance bringing back authentic tidings of what lies beyond.

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A THEISTIC MONADISM

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**Born 1843. Educated at Liverpool Institute ; Spring Hill College ;
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PRINCIPAL PUBLICATIONS

Naturalism and Agnosticism; 1899. Fourth Edition, 1915. A. & C. Black, Ltd.

The Realm of Ends, or Pluralism and Theism; 1911. Third Edition, 1920. Cambridge University Press.

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A Study of Kant; 1922. Cambridge University Press.

A THEISTIC MONADISM

HEGEL described philosophy as '*die denkende Betrachtung der Dinge*'; his contemporary, Herbart, described it as '*die Bearbeitung der Begriffe*.' These descriptions, in spite of their homeliness, are among the best. But "the world is so full of a number of things" that the philosopher nowadays would be hopelessly bewildered were it not for what the sciences have accomplished in *systematizing* the 'things' within their several departments. The philosopher's problem is to *understand* the world as a whole—that is what his thinking is about. All the museums and laboratories of science together fail, however, to provide *das geistige Band* which he is seeking. The sciences classify the contents (the *what*), and exhibit the processes (the *how*) of things—in detail; but they never grasp either their unity or the purpose that runs through the whole (the *why*). Nay, they do not completely understand themselves: every science involves concepts and principles taken for granted without criticism, Hence the need for their *Bearbeitung*: in other words, a theory of knowledge (epistemology) is the preliminary requisite of philosophy in the stricter sense, *i.e.* as *die denkende Betrachtung* concerning the *what* (ontology), and the *why* (teleology) of the world as one.

These three main inquiries are obviously closely connected: the solution of the first—a tentative one, it may well be—will go far to determine the treatment of the other two, and the solution of the last in like manner will affect and be affected by the solution of the second. The earliest attempts to philosophize began and ended with that; but they were too crude and dogmatic to have any lasting value, and serve only to mark the attainment of a stage of thought which was outgrowing the childishness

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of myths. There is, however, but little historical connection between those early and one-sided philosophies : they originated for the most part independently, and were generally mere episodes in the progress of thought. It was otherwise when the threefold inquiry just described was taken up by individual philosophers. Some historical continuity is then apparent ; though in the first instance such philosophies were designated merely by the names of their authors, as, for example, Platonism, Aristotelianism, Epicureanism, etc. So regarded, these were notoriously not only conflicting in their various solutions, but cumbersome from their mere number. Happily historians of philosophy have classified these systems according to the primary divisions just mentioned : (1) in respect of epistemology as empirical, rational, sceptical ; (2) in respect of ontology, as materialistic, spiritualistic, and again as pluralistic, singularistic ; (3) in respect of teleology, as tychistic, melioristic, theistic ; and we may add, (4) in respect of such amalgamations compatible with any of them as they may turn out to imply or allow. Every new philosophical inquirer must orientate himself to these, or he increases his risk of being either misunderstood or ignored.

In reviewing theories of knowledge what strikes one most is the general recognition of what may be termed two poles of certainty. We are certain that, *e.g.* $2 + 2 = 4$, and again, when we see, we are certain that it is light. Certainty in the first case is called knowledge of a *truth*, or thought-knowledge : certainty in the second is called knowledge of a *fact*, or sense-knowledge. But whereas any sense-knowledge involves something '*actual*' occurring at a given place and time in a particular individual's experience, mere thought-knowledge involves only relations of ideas. But these ideas, or '*concepts*,' as we nowadays call them, have neither date nor place marks, nor do they imply any '*given*' experience, that is to say they are not, as such, actual, or facts at all. In short, pure thought-knowledges are described as universal, rational and *a priori*, in other words as true apart from experience : sense-

knowledges as particular, contingent and *a posteriori*, in other words as actual only in experience. It seems not unfitting, then, to describe such knowledges as polar opposites. Yet both are ours, and we are conscious of precisely the same necessitation to assert as we do, in both cases alike. They cannot then be radically independent; for if so, it should be possible

To think that two and two are four,
And neither three nor five,

before we have actually distinguished *this* and *that*. Nor can they be radically disparate, for if so, what could be meant by saying that pure truths are universally valid, *i.e.* are always applicable to matters-of-fact? But though radically neither independent nor disparate, there is still between these 'poles' a certain opposition in respect of order. Whereas, *for us*, sense-knowledges are chronologically prior; in themselves or *absolutely*, thought-knowledges are logically prior, as Aristotle long ago pointed out. Facts are unintelligible without ideas; but, for all that, facts for us precede them; and the abstract universals of the one never supersede the contingent particulars of the other. Moreover, psychology seems clearly to show a continuous advance from the lower level to the higher. We seem, therefore, justified in beginning our epistemological investigation with some analysis of sense-knowledge.

What have we here at the outset, we may first inquire? A bare cognition or sensation, it is said. But this, if we disregard heredity, can hardly be called a knowledge¹; for the bare sensation brings no 'what' with it. Hence the psychological paradox: all cognition is recognition. We can imagine a sentient creature undergoing a series of such *Erlebnisse*—to use a happy German term—as those which we now describe in saying: "It is lightning," "It is raining," etc.: still, if similar *Erlebnisse* never recurred, no amount of mere differentiation without the possibility of assimilation would ever yield know-

¹ To call it feeling, as is frequently done by many writers on epistemology, is to confuse two well-differentiated factors of experience, and that no philosopher has the right to do.

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ledge or permit of any advance in experience. Yet these existential 'positions' disclose the fundamental duality of experience, a subject confronted by an object. If so, Descartes' existential position *Ego sum* implies the correlative *Id est*, the *Id* or It being the objective continuum, as we may call it. But these correlative 'positions' are *actual* for experience only when there is change, either in the differentiation of the objective continuum, or in the attitude of the subject, or in both. These primary differentiations, which we come presently to perceive, have given rise to the first and oldest problem with which epistemology has attempted to deal—the problem of external perception, as it is commonly called—*i.e.* of the perception of an external world.

As of events in general, so of these events which we have called primary differentiations, it is asked: What are they, and how are we to account for them? So stated, the problem has hitherto proved to be intractable: no solution has as yet found general acceptance, and these questions are still keenly discussed without much sign of positive agreement. Now many times in the history of thought it has turned out that inveterately insoluble problems involve questions that should never have been asked.¹ This seems to be the case with the problem of external perception. To the question: "What are these *posita*?" the only answer seems to be: "They are just what they are immediately known as, the immediate objects of an individual subject." This correlation or duality of subject and object is then to be taken as the bed-rock of experience. Those who like may call it an inexplicable mystery; but at any rate, historically regarded, there is nothing earlier or plainer. Some agreement, however, has perhaps been reached as to what the primary objects of experience are not; and so far we may admit there has been some advance. 'Subjective idealism,' *e.g.* is becoming what the Germans call *ein überwindener Standpunkt*. There are few, if any, who now confidently maintain that sense-data—as we are still wont

¹ Cf., *e.g.* the problem of squaring the circle, or that of the possibility of perpetual motion.

metaphorically to call them—are verily ‘subjective modifications.’ Feeling and activity are doubtless modes of the self and both are involved in the perception of objects. But they do not constitute such objects: on the contrary, they presuppose them. Again, these primary objects of experience cannot here with any propriety be called phenomena, still less epiphenomena: this, too, is coming to be generally recognised. These terms involve not only perception but conception, and their premature employment has led to much confusion.

More debatable is the further question: How are these facts to be explained? Well, if it be right to maintain that as such they are ultimate, then obviously this question, too, is one that ought not to be asked: they cannot be explained, if there is nothing plainer. But surely, it will be urged, they must have some cause. This question, however, as it stands, is ambiguous. It may refer either to the particular differentiations of our continuum as they severally occur, or to the continuum as a whole, in other words to all its differentiations collectively. But now the sole function of the category of cause and effect is to establish a specific connexion between one event and others, a restriction which does not justify its application to the primordial relation of Subject to Object, which is plainly presupposed. It is true that the perception (*Vorstellung*) of an objective change entails a subjective change (*Selbststellung*): of such actions and reactions experience, as complete, primarily consists. Still the immediate awareness which mediates this interaction seems to be neither the effect of the Object alone nor the product of the Subject alone.¹

Before passing to the epistemology of thought-knowledge it is important to note what has frequently been overlooked, *viz.* that there are certain categories which we discover on reflecting about sense-knowledge, to wit, quality and quantity (as intensive and extensive), together with certain perceptual relations of comparability and compatibility, as well as relations of temporal and spatial order.²

¹ Cf. the writer's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 4th ed., 1915, pp. 409 ff.; earlier eds., ii, pp. 117 ff.

² Cf. the writer's three articles on ‘Sense-Knowledge’ in *Mind*, 1919–20.

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The continuity in the development of experience from the sensory level to the level of thought is, as already said, rendered reasonably probable—to say the least—by genetic psychology ; and the advantages of this way of approach are great. Still the gap between the lowest existing races of mankind and the highest species of anthropoid apes now extant is far and away the widest breach of continuity known to the biologist, considerably lessened though it has been at both extremes by pre-historical research. It is not surprising, therefore, that our two poles of certainty have been and are even now regarded as not only distinct but as essentially disparate. Nevertheless the advance of every normal human being *living in society*, from the one level to the other is only a recapitulation of the advance very gradually achieved through the 'social medium' by the race as a whole. This fact was overlooked altogether by Kant and earlier thinkers in the eighteenth century. Yet it is entirely through the inter-subjective intercourse thereby attained that what thought-knowledge we have has arisen.

In being communicable, thought-knowledge differs from the so-called sense-data of individual experiencers: and yet, if there is continuity between them, thought-knowledge must be at least implicit at the perceptual level. And this appears to be the case. The conceptual relations which are on all hands recognised as absolutely certain are those of the closely connected exact sciences of logic and mathematics, and of none beside. But these relations all have their perceptual counterparts. The behaviour of sentient creatures would otherwise be inexplicable.¹ The primary difference between sense-knowledge and thought-knowledge lies then not so much in the relations as in the *relata*. In the first place, percepts present the actual, ideas or concepts do not ; a thought can never 'posit' an existent, though it can postulate one. Again, the ideas of logic and mathematics are either mere ideas of the form, or of the formal relations, of things. As such they are intellectual constructions. These constructions involve abstraction, but this—an incidental consequence of our 'limited span

¹ Cf. Arts. on 'Sense-knowledge' quoted above, II, pp. 447 ff.

of prehension'—entails only a 'distinction of reason,' not a dissolution of things. These constructions further involve what may perhaps be called idealisation, meaning thereby not merely that time and place marks are eliminated, but especially that such ideas are what Locke called 'archetypal.' Lastly, as a matter of fact—again a consequence of our psychological limitation—these constructions also involve symbolization. So far the whole of exact science may be, as it has been and is, called computational or logical. But though we have a symbolic logic we cannot have a symbolic philosophy.

We come then at length to that region of knowledge which lies between the two poles of certainty just described—the domain of the concrete or real sciences. Exact knowledge and archetypal ideas we have now left behind us. We still have, however, a common fund of empirical data resting on the certainty of matters of fact; but we find no universal, rational, or *a priori* 'laws of nature' connecting these, none which have an unrestricted range or which cannot, without involving contradictions, be modified by further experience. Yet it is in this domain that the twin categories of substance and cause first emerge, and emerge solely as the result of intersubjective intercourse. These concepts doubtless presuppose the acquisition of that perceptual acquaintance with things, which—as already said—the behaviour of merely sentient experients implies. Such perceptual acquaintance, however, consists merely in *recognising* what Hume called 'collections of simple ideas,' or rather qualities: these we presently observe to be 'closely and inseparably connected by the relations of contiguity and causation.'

But there is only a single instance in which such a 'constant union with each other' of certain definite qualities is presented always, *viz.* in the case of our own body. All other 'things,' such as chairs and tables and external objects generally, are presented only intermittently. Qualitative identity, then, is the most that perception can suggest in their case; but at the self-conscious level we come to ascribe to them numerical

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identity as well. And this we seem to do solely on the analogy of our 'bodily self.' In other words, in interacting with perceptual things we attribute to them an individuality and a persisting actuality like our own. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same account holds good of the source of the category of Causality: indeed, as has been often said: 'Substantiality is through and through Causality.' It is so, that is to say, when by 'cause' we mean an efficient, primary, cause or agent, and not merely the secondary or 'occasional causes' that we are said to perceive. Here, again, then we return to the category of subject (or substance), assuming with Leibniz that 'activity is of the essence of substance in general.' Temporal and spatial contingencies, or circumstances, of course, still remain, or the activity would be indeterminate. But so-called 'positive science' recognises only these, and professes to repudiate the real categories of substance and cause: since they do not help it in systematically *describing* nature, which is its one concern. And that is true; but what suffices for positive science cannot content philosophy, which is bent on *understanding* and appreciating this nature which environs us.

In all sentient life we may say there is something akin to this understanding from the first; and when life has reached the level of the untutored mind of the child or the savage, such understanding has become literally an almost indiscriminating animatism or anthropomorphism. Things for primitive minds are much nearer to what we call 'ejects' than to the seemingly inanimate objects which we now discriminate from these. The term 'eject,' then, may be regarded so far as covering the two cases—that of things personified and that of actual persons; and the assumption of the former seems to be implicit before the recognition of the latter is explicit. But in the former case, as already said, the assurance of numerical identity is always lacking. Not so in the case of persons; though, like things, they, too, come and go in our environment. But mutual intercourse may here place personal identity beyond question even when changes in outward appearance prevent immediate recognition. Finally—what

utterly bars solipsism—is the fact that it is only through inter-subjective intercourse that we reach the level of explicit self-consciousness at all. Now it is this intercourse that best deserves to be called understanding as distinct from mere intellection; and it is a defect of language that these two terms are so commonly used as synonymous. For the 'sympathetic rapport' or *entente*, which obtains between persons—and is not wholly wanting even between them and the domesticated animals—makes possible a kind of 'interaction' ¹ that mere intellection or the positive sciences can never explain.

We find, then, that there is a part of the world which we can understand, while the rest of it we can *prima facie* only more or less systematically describe. Knowledge of the first kind we may surely rank as at once more real and more valuable. If we could interpret the world throughout and strictly in terms of mind, we should have accomplished more than if we had only achieved a complete systematic description of it. The one, established in principle, might practically be sufficient for us, which is more than the other, though completed in the utmost detail, could ever be. Meanwhile much remains to be done from both these epistemological standpoints: the world is for us not yet completely intelligible nor has positive science as yet succeeded in systematizing it completely. So far, then, the old Cartesian dualism seems still to stand.

Leaving epistemology aside for a time, we may now therefore turn to the ontological theories which this dualism has entailed. The one is what is commonly called idealism, or—as it seems

¹ This Kant sometimes called *mutuum commercium*, but it is not to be confused with 'the equal and opposite action and reaction' of dynamics which he had chiefly in view in his third analogy, treating of *Wechselwirkung* or *Gemeinschaft*. The kind of interaction here meant is that reciprocity in action (*Wechselwirkung*) which intercourse (*Gemeinschaft*) alone makes possible. It is not the 'transeunt causation' which Hume and Lotze between them have discredited. Intelligent intercourse is never a physical process. All the activity which it entails is the immanent activity of the experients concerned: in this there is nothing comparable with the two sides of a physical 'stress' algebraically represented by an equation (Action — Reaction = 0). Cf. *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 4th ed., pp. 527 ff., earlier ed., vol. ii. pp. 237 ff.; also *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 215 ff.

clearer to say—spiritualism: the other, formerly known as materialism, is nowadays more commonly styled naturalism. The fundamental difference between them is that whereas naturalism, as distinct from materialism, allies itself with agnosticism, and so professes to deal solely with phenomena, spiritualism assumes that persons are not phenomenal but real: in other words that the categories of substance and cause which positivism discards find in personality their source and paradigm.

Now a phenomenon *per se* is an obvious contradiction: as Kant rightly maintained, "something must correspond to a phenomenon which is not itself a phenomenon." Naturalism, too, is forced to admit this, but insists, as Kant also did, that this 'independent something' is itself unknown and unknowable. But whether the reality 'corresponding to phenomena' be one or many, that reality in any case must be the ground, the *ratio essendi*, of the nature which naturalism claims merely to describe. Is it not, then, plain that the so-called 'laws' of nature are due entirely to the one reality, if there be but one, or to the many realities collectively, if there are many? Again is it not plain that whether this *ontal* 'corresponding to' the phenomenal be one or many, phenomena—so far from concealing it—in fact reveal it, partially at least—though, so far as we know only in part or imperfectly, such real being can never be completely knowable? If so, then the technical meaning of phenomenon, as a special *kind* of object entirely distinct from the object which is partially known through it, seems so far philosophically superfluous. The objective whole of experience—Kant's 'transcendental object'—whether regarded as one or many—is actually just as real as the subject of experience—Kant's 'transcendental subject.' In short, we reach again the fundamental duality, *Ego sum et aliud est.*¹

We must retain this duality of subject and object; but need we also retain the Cartesian dualism of matter and mind?

¹ Meanwhile, however, we have only suspended our epistemological inquiry: when we resume it, this concept of the phenomenal will meet us again in another context. Cf. below, p. 44.

In the duality the Ego or subject on the one side is a unity, and the Non-Ego or other confronting it, a continuum. The question we are now raising, then, is whether the differentiations of that continuum, so far as we individuate them, correspond not merely to objects but to ejects also, *i.e.* to other subjects. If they do, may we not say that herein we have ground for a complete understanding of the world? If they do not, still must we not say—the moment teleological questions arise—that at least ‘nature is organic (*i.e.* subservient) to mind’? Between these alternatives we cannot, in the present state of our knowledge, dogmatically decide. The latter alternative corresponds in the main to the systematic occasionalism of Berkeley and Lotze: the former carries us back to a monadology resembling that of Leibniz. Either way stark dualism is avoided: matter and mind cease to rank as ontologically on a par; for both these alternatives are definitely ‘idealistic.’ Yet the monadist’s can claim to be older and simpler, and to have the completer continuity. Moreover, occasionalism postulates more than from the pluralistic standpoint we are as yet prepared to admit.

But can a pluralistic ‘personalism’ be conceivably made to work? Not unless we can substitute ‘bare monads’ for the inert matter of Newton’s third definition, still retained in what is nowadays known as ‘the old classical mechanics’; *and commonly regarded* as real. The new ‘molecular dynamics,’ however, may be said to imply a Leibnizian distinction which Newton, in talking only of bodies and particles, entirely ignored: the present outlook, in consequence, is considerably changed. Both bodies and particles are simply aggregates, what Leibniz called *materia secunda*: this, in being ‘*phenomenal*,’¹ differed essentially from his monads, which he held to be all alike real. In accordance with his position that what does nothing is nothing, reality is here taken to connote both individuality and activity or behaviour. We are ourselves personal agents and we have grounds for assuming a continuous series of such agents ranging indefinitely higher and indefinitely lower in the

¹ Cf. below, p. 44.

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scale of being than ourselves; though the latter are still 'personal,' *i.e.* experients, in some sense. In short—to use the words of Pope, which, by the way, he owed to Leibniz—we find ourselves 'midway 'twixt nothing and the Deity.' We have admitted that we cannot say what the reals are corresponding to the physicist's concepts of molecules, atoms, electrons and ether—if there are any; for long before we get so far towards the lower limit we are aware of a disparity which precludes any direct intercourse. Positive science, too, as we have seen, proclaims that the things *per se* behind its phenomena are unknown. Accordingly it contents itself with an abstract analytical scheme of numerical coefficients as its ultimate basis. But none the less the concepts which it invariably employs when '*applying*' or specifying its formal symbols—as, for instance, action and reaction, force and energy, potential and actual, attraction and repulsion—belong primarily to our immediate experience. They are, in fact, analogical attributions to the objective of what is fundamentally subjective: in other words, they are tantamount to regarding the objective as ejective, even beyond the range of direct verification.

As to the concept of inertia, the bed-rock of dualism¹—it is used on the one hand as synonymous with inactivity (cf. the German *Trägheit*) and on the other as equivalent to persistent duration through time (cf. the German *Beharrung*). Here assuredly, on looking closer, we discover a covert contradiction; for 'enduring,' 'persevering,' 'persisting,' and other variants for what is technically called 'conservation' all imply activity, and have their source in the experience of a living and acting self. But this experience involves 'interaction'. For of a Self without its correlative Other—a subject with no environment—it is all one whether we say that it would be inactive or that it would be non-existent. Again, the reals of the world, be they what they may, have not 'come together' from nowhere: they have always been together. So, then, whatever the

¹ Cf. Kant's saying: "On the law of inertia . . . the possibility of physics proper entirely depends."

mathematician in his pure science of dynamics may assume, the physicist, who seeks to apply it, finds nothing answering to inert *individuals*: here all is actually interaction. Now interaction for the psychologist rests ultimately on appetite or aversion; for the physicist it rests ultimately on actual attraction or repulsion. So long as we can 'understand' the facts confronting us, so long, that is to say, as we have direct evidence of mind, we interpret bodily movements as due to motives, in other words, to appetite or aversion. Even in plants, where there is evidence only of life, we find adjustments to environment which are at least analogous to behaviour. Is it not then simpler—to say the least—to regard the ultimate 'reals' as entelechies like the bare monads of Leibniz rather than as inert particles of the dead, brute matter of Descartes' abstract *res extensæ*, hypothetical entities which in molecular dynamics are found inadequate to describe the facts? In short, the concept of inertia, suggested in the first instance by Galileo's experiments with tangible masses has since been tentatively and gradually transformed into an *a priori* law of conservation implying both substantiality and causality, *i.e.* the precise contrary of what it meant at first.

Returning now to epistemology, there are two closely related problems which Descartes has bequeathed to us—that raised by our belief in an external world and that of the connexion between body and mind. In dealing with the first we naturally begin with the categories derived from sense-data (cf. above, p. 32). Two of these, intensity and protensity, present no difficulty to the pampsychist. It is otherwise, however, with extensity and sensible qualities: they are applicable only to matter, which is said to occupy space and to be characterized further by the so-called secondary qualities, 'phenomena' which again imply extensity. This, it is allowed, is just what cannot be said of minds. When, then, it is maintained that 'occupation of space' involves that what is called matter is a substance co-ordinate with, and yet wholly disparate from, the minds that perceive it, we have the Cartesian dualism again, coupled

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with the duality of subject and object. But we have seen that such unmitigated dualism cannot be maintained, and we have found positive science advancing so far to meet Berkeley as to allow that matter, as we *perceive* it, is only phenomenal, since its *esse* is unknown. And if we consider the development of knowledge—so far as it has been orthogenetic—we find the earliest judgments we can frame, our so-called existential judgments, attribute reality, *i.e.* individuality and activity, to the one continuous objective environment; and at length, when definite objects are discriminated within this, they, too, are regarded as active individuals.¹ The question then remains: Of what nature is that real which external phenomena in part reveal? One answer only is precluded: such real is not something inert or passive. As already said, it *may be* a Supreme Mind directly intervening, or it *may be* the collective action of bare monads or entelechies (Leibniz's *materia secunda*). Before attempting to get any further, it will be well to try to deal with the second problem, *viz.* that concerning the connexion of 'body and soul,' as we commonly say.

We know nothing of disembodied souls. But embodied souls, according to Descartes, imply a 'substantial union or blend' of matter and mind; for sensation cannot pertain either to matter alone, as by him defined, nor to mind alone, as by him defined, *i.e.* as 'pure thought.' This asserted unity of incompatibles was then tantamount to a miracle; and Locke so far agreed with Descartes as to maintain that God at any rate *could* have annexed thinking to matter.² It may fairly be said that this and all discussions of the so-called psychophysical problem on the basis of an absolute dualism of this sort have proved incomprehensible. Something intermediate was therefore soon felt to be indispensable. We may leave aside 'the systematic occasionalism' previously mentioned; for that is incompatible with materialism. A favourite *via media*, incompatible, however, with spiritualism, was found in the ancient

¹ As the existence of intransitive and transitive verbs in connexion with every sense seems plainly to shew.

² Cf. *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, IV, iii, 6.

hypothesis of a spontaneous generation of life—a costly first step, yet one obstinately maintained, because it seemed to make the subsequent advance to mind easier. Such *generatio equivoca* is, however, no longer scientifically accredited. And in any case, if there is really no inert matter, there can be no abiogenesis; for there can be nothing altogether lifeless.

Meanwhile, the whole problem, looked at so to say from the other side, wears altogether a new face. Here what strikes us first is that life implies function, and it is its function alone which makes a structure intelligible. But function is a teleological concept entirely beyond the mere physicist's horizon; it is also a concept which essentially differentiates an organism *as such* from what it appears to be when observed only externally. Internally regarded, an organism has been described as a structure in which the whole and the parts are reciprocally means and end to each other. Leibniz interpreted this to mean a teleological unity consisting of a dominant monad and subservient monads. At the same time he maintained that all monads are 'windowless.' It seems possible, however, to put a simpler and more consistent interpretation upon the facts by rejecting this part of his theory. In keeping with our present knowledge about sensation and movement we may assume that certain subservient monads discharge a receptive and others a reactive function: these together we may call their functional relation to their dominant monad. But beside this, these monads must have a further and quite different relation to the common environment of monads generally: this we may call their foreign relation. Under the more familiar names of internal and external, we have just recognised these relations as they figure in dualism. For the physiologist, what corresponds to our ministering monads is that minute part of his external world which he calls a brain: for the psychologist, what corresponds to them is the entire world without restriction, as it is from the standpoint of their dominant monad. It was, in fact, just the incompatibility of these relations, when divided between two disparate substances, which gave rise to dualism,

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and so led Descartes to the shocking inconsistency of maintaining that animals are only machines, but that man, on account of his reason, was a miraculous exception, an inconceivable blending (*mélange*) of pure thought with such an automaton.

The pampsychist believes that such difficulties are avoided (1) by recognising only one kind of reality, *viz.* that of experients ranging continuously between two limits, an upper and a lower, both inaccessible to our direct apprehension; (2) by observing, so far as that is possible, with what this diversity of rank or standpoint, as Leibniz called it, is correlated; and (3) by assuming in accordance with the principle of continuity that the same kind of correlation, *mutatis mutandis*, holds good also between bare monads. The first of these positions we have already discussed: it is the second that we have now to consider.

The fact of what is known as psychoneural parallelism, *viz.* that the more complex the organism the more advanced the experient to whom it pertains, at once presents itself. But what precisely is the *real* connexion which this invariable parallelism must surely imply? In this inquiry we cannot do better than Plato did in a like case—turn to where such a connexion is ‘writ large.’ The analogy between an organism and a social community is at once old and obvious. Now the main characteristic of an effective social medium is the promotion of the mutual convenience of its members, in other words, a complex ‘sympathetic *rappor*t.’¹ The relation which we all sustain to our domestics and to public servants is of this sort: it is, that is to say, a functional relation of which we are ordinarily unconscious. On this analogy, then, we seek to interpret the relation of dominant monads to their subordinates. Through the foreign relations of these, each dominant monad is, we suppose, kept *au courant* with its own objective world, and the more complexly this immediate

¹ Not, of course, a pre-established harmony nor a final one, but a routine, which, so far as it is effective, is unobtrusive and taken for granted.

entourage is organized, the more the dominant monad can know and do.

But the analogy of an artificer and his tools (*ὄργανα*) which Aristotle has taught us to employ, fails to represent the intimacy of the functional relation we are now considering. A tool is always an object, however closely, so to say, the artisan may live himself into it while it is in his hands. But a *neuron* is never an object for the *psyche* it subserves; though it is always an object for the physiologist who can never get beyond its foreign aspect. Hence my brain, which is opaque, windowless inwards, is, so far as it functions, diaphanous outwards for me. So far, it is, as we say, 'secondarily automatic' though doubtless such action was only gradually achieved by a long process of trial and selection. I only now become aware of failure to function through the organic pain produced thereby. But a neuron, too, is an organism, and its functioning depends in turn on its own organization; and so on down the long descending scale of life till we reach the unicellular organisms or *Protista* of the biologist. From these we pass to our third position.

Here the attempt is to be made, *mutatis mutandis*, to interpret the relations to each other of bare monads on the analogy of the behaviour of living and sentient organisms. The difference is that bare monads have no organism, no especial ministering *ménage*. There can then be no talk here of psychophysical parallelism, and the distinction of functional and foreign relations also lapses. There is no longer any 'division of labour' and so the two relations are not yet differentiated. The sole remaining resemblance is that this 'naked,' or elemental monad is regarded as an entelechy, or inchoate soul. This is what Leibniz meant in asserting that the principle of continuity 'destroys atoms.' But what exactly, it may be asked, is an entelechy? It is a subject endowed with what Spinoza meant by 'the *conatus* which animates every individual thing'—not by an incongruous *vis inertiae* but by a *vis perseverantiæ*, a concept more in keeping with the 'modified dynamics' of to-day. It is true that we cannot

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ear-mark these ultimate entelechies or psychoids, as they have also been called, nor therefore directly observe their behaviour.

But if we cannot perceptually identify bare monads, what exactly is the reality partially revealed in sensible qualities? In raising this question we return to the problem of external perception where we left it just now (p. 36). The pampsychist, we found, preferred to regard sensible qualities as corresponding to the activity of an aggregate or complex of bare monads rather than to an inanimate 'system of nature' divinely devised as to serve an instrumental medium of intercourse in 'the realm of ends.' In resuming this discussion we have to bear in mind the distinction between sense-knowledge and thought-knowledge: with the latter we have here, in the first instance, nothing to do. Leibniz, in describing *materia secunda* as a phenomenon *bene fundatum*—inasmuch as it made science possible and was thereby distinct from illusions and phantasms, which lead neither to system nor to prediction—was going too fast. At the sensory level illusions are percepts and phantasms do not arise. Again, percepts are *posita*, the objectively real in the duality of experience: the subsequent *superposita* of thought-knowledge, of which the concept of the phenomenal is one, do not, we repeat, as yet concern us.

For our present inquiry as to the nature of the real, which is partially revealed by sensible qualities, Locke seems to offer a better start. If our sight were some hundreds of thousand times more acute, "we should," he supposed, "come nearer to the discovery of the texture and motion of the minute parts of corporeal things." But, as Leibniz reminded him, if matter is infinitely divisible—as they both thought—we should still never get beyond percepts that were 'confused,' that is to say, consisting, according to Leibniz of *petites perceptions* that we were unable to discern separately. Here both Locke's supposition and Leibniz's stricture are based on the assumption that experience begins with a 'manifold' of isolated presentations which is gradually 'synthesized' as experience advances. This 'atomistic psychology' is certainly a one-sided and

imperfect account of the facts. Experience, it is now contended, begins not with the integration of a manifold but with the differentiation of a continuum. In another respect, however, these two thinkers differed. Locke maintained the existence of sensible *minima* or 'simple sensations,' which vary as the organisms of the percipients varied. Leibniz admitted the variation but denied the simplicity. *A propos* of this we find Pope asking: "Why has man not a microscopic eye?" and answering: "For this plain reason, man is not a fly." The plain reason is, of course, that microscopic eyes without micrometric hands would be utterly useless. But now all the organisms with which we are acquainted are in this respect more or less macrobian—to invent a word. The lower we descend in the scale, however, the more microbian is 'the life and mind' concerned, the less the range in time and space, and generally, the less the differentiations of the environment become.

We find, then, everywhere a certain correspondence between living organisms and their specific environments: as regards intercourse, a man understands men, a mouse mice, and a mite mites; and as regards interaction, each interacts with the rest of the common environment in accordance with its perceptual scale. So far the monadist may claim to have set forth one way of solving the two problems which proved hopeless for the Cartesian dualism. But the crux of the whole lies in its lower limit—the bare monad.¹ Here we have little beyond analogy to guide us; for, on the one hand, the bare monad *ex hypothesi* has no organism distinct from itself;² and on the other, its environment appears, at first sight, to be just an undifferentiated continuum, the common matrix of all. Since, however, no two monads are supposed to be altogether alike, to that extent for no two will be precisely the same environment. Otherwise it might be supposed that at the outset the universe was everywhere in complete static equilibrium, so that nothing

¹ And it is the more serious since bare monads must enormously preponderate in the sensible world, *i.e.* in the 'constitution' of what is called 'inanimate matter.'

² Hence Leibniz called it an *entelechy*, but not a soul.

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could happen save by the intervention of some *Primum movens* from without. But assuming that monads are all conative, that they are never isolated, and that no two are alike, it would seem that the supposition of any intervention is superfluous. A change in A's environment due to his appetite or aversion would, if it affected B, be merely contingent for him, and might itself be due to some prior purposive action of C, which was similarly contingent for A. Keeping in view these two aspects of events—subjective selection and the 'chapter of accidents'—it seems possible for the monadist to account in general for the stability and the epigenesis that we find in the historical world.¹

This is as far as actual knowledge, eked out by analogy, will carry the pluralist. Though a world of elemental monads in interaction may be his last word on the historical method, there are two reasons why it does not suffice for philosophy. The first—a theoretical reason—is that such a world is ontologically incomplete.² A plurality of beings mutually independent as regards their existence and yet mutually dependent as regards their experience, a plurality of *finite* beings, that is to say, inevitably suggests the idea of a common ground to account for their existence and for their cosmological unity. So we come naturally to consider what we have called the upper limit of pluralism. Here we are left entirely to general reflexions; for we have no direct knowledge of any beings superior to ourselves; reasonable though it be to assume the existence of many grades of such. But in accordance with the principle of continuity all of them will still be finite, and the upper limit we are seeking will therefore lie beyond them. The vital point is to remember that it is from the standpoint of the Many that we set out: otherwise our whole inquiry becomes meaningless.³

¹ Cf. the writer's *Realm of Ends*, Lects. iii-vi, and for further elucidation of terms see the index.

² For the second, see below, p. 48.

³ Apart from the historical world we may call our lower limit *sero* and our upper transfinite, but save in reference to what is actual, both alike will be indeterminate,

Here again, as in the case of the lower limit, we come upon a sort of crux. We can call nothing absolutely independent which requires a ground for its existence. We can call nothing a real ground which implies no reality beside itself : logical it may be, real it cannot be. We seem, then, to be faced by something inexplicable : this is our crux. We can neither deny the reality of the Many nor assert the absoluteness of the One. But we might call the two together the Absolute, if only experience warranted us so to do. Ultimate facts are all inexplicable, but that is no reason for denying them. Can we, however, dogmatically assert that an Absolute consisting of God and the World is verily ascertained fact ? Surely not in view of the many ' radical empiricists ' there have been and still are who deny it. All they find is continuous correlation, but nowhere anything absolute : for them our Absolute is but an illegitimate hypothesis, since it can never, they maintain, be scientifically verified. Such an objection betrays just that failure to appreciate the difference between science and philosophy, characteristic of an exclusively empirical or positivist standpoint. Philosophy is not directly concerned with matters-of-fact : it cannot, of course, contradict experience ; but its one aim is to understand this as a whole, to find a unity and a meaning in the entire sum of things beyond the so-called system of nature as science describes it. If the theistic ideal provides these it will be philosophically justified, though it be not empirically verified.

It remains, then, to consider this ' flawless ideal ' as Kant called it. We start from the freedom of the Many, for as Kant has said : " Freedom is the only one of all the Ideas of pure reason, whose object is a thing of fact (*Thatsache*). " It is this fact which disposes for us of the singularist's assumption of an absolute One and his reduction of the Many to mere modes of that. Again, in assuming God to be the real ground of the world, we speak of it as His creation ; and this bars out pantheism, for it implies a transcendent activity. Finally, we cannot identify this creative activity with transeunt causation, for that presupposes an alien something : a chaos to be shaped into a cosmos, as people were wont to say. But God is no

artificer : there can be nothing outside Him to determine His pure activity in 'positing' the world. We, too, talk of 'positing' our Non-Ego ; but in so doing we are receptive rather than active : we cognize but we do not create. Nevertheless among what may be called our *superposita*, especially in the relative creations or syntheses of human genius, we find a helpful analogy in our attempts to interpret the world as the self-laid foundations of the divine experience.¹ But experience at our level involves personal intercourse and co-operation. So we come back to the fact of freedom from which we started : we may now define our Absolute as 'the realm of ends,' 'the Kingdom of God' in which He is supreme yet all His subjects free to work together with Him.²

The mention of a 'Kingdom of God' brings us to the second, a practical reason, for regarding a merely pluralistic world as philosophically insufficient. Such a world might be a commonwealth of experients, but there would be no complete experience embracing them all—a Providence immanent in the world and identical with the Creator, who is its ground. It is true that the history of the world in the widest sense reveals a steady 'tendency to progression,' as even Darwin, in expounding natural selection, allowed. But the humanitarian ideal which this progress prompts us to entertain must ever remain indefinite in character and uncertain of attainment, unless the theistic

¹ Cf. Kant's *Intellectuelle Anschauung*, already foreshadowed by Thomas Aquinas.

² Here a question arises which has been much discussed : Can personality be attributed to God ? That it cannot be attributed to the Absolute is in general allowed ; but that it must be attributed to God, as by theists it always is—seems obvious, if to say 'God is a Spirit' means anything at all. The difficulty often felt in doing so is largely due to forgetting that 'there is none perfect save God.' This truth seems best expressed not by calling God 'super-personal'—whatever that may mean—but by recognising that human personality, though the highest that we know, is still imperfect and incomplete. It is by intercourse with others that we have come to know ourselves, but this acquaintance is never more than partial. We know *that* we are ; but our restriction to one standpoint in the whole sum of things—whence we have only a perspective view—makes it impossible for us to know completely what we are. In this respect our personality is at best, as Lotze truly said, "only a pale copy of the perfect personality that pertains to God alone." Cf. his *Microcosmos*, Bk. IX, ch. iv.

ideal can also be accepted as verily flawless and assured. Then finite experiences and the divine experience will both have always been and will both always continue to be real factors in the history of the world. Now in this history there is one idea which, implicitly or explicitly, is valid and operative throughout: Plato called it the "Form of the Good," and we nowadays include it as foremost among the categories of value. Between these and the teleological categories there is a close connexion. But this axiological category is fundamental, as is evidenced in the common saying, *quidquid petitur petitur sub specie boni*. There is, however, a vast distance between the diverse *species boni* of individual experiences and the essential Form of the Good which theism regards as eternally present to God alone. This, from our temporal standpoint, is the distance that history has to traverse.

It was from this temporal standpoint that we began our study of the historical world in which teleological and axiological categories first emerge. And here we come at once upon the radical antinomy—inseparable from dualism—between science and history, the mechanical and the moral aspects of things, an antinomy which carries us back to the very dawn of Western speculation. Starting, however, as we do from freedom as fundamental, this antinomy is for us no longer a live question.¹ It is useless to think of interpreting nature save as there is something in it germane to life and mind.

But there are other questions which both sides of this antinomy suggest; for the law and order of the system of nature entails so-called physical evils; and the freedom and finitude of self-conscious agents involve fallibility and peccability—in a word, the possibility of moral evil. This possibility has become actuality in this world of ours, the only world we know. In discussing these questions, then, it has to be remembered that we cannot assume the existence of God so long as they stand

¹ It has been discussed by the writer in *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Lect. xix, and in an Adamson Lecture entitled *Mechanism and Morals: the World of Science and the World of History* (*Hibbert Journal*, vol. iv (1905), pp. 79 ff.

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in the way, and the extent to which that assumption is justified will depend on the solution of them we may reach. If we fail to justify it, we are left with the difficulties of radical empiricism already discussed; we must then content ourselves with the 'fighting chance of safety' to which Huxley and William James referred. But so far we have seen that those are precisely the difficulties which theism would remove: so far, then, we start with, at any rate, a presumption in its favour.

The devastations wrought by storms and earthquakes, the ravages of plagues and parasites, in which the highest forms of life are sacrificed to the lowest, these are commonly regarded as the physical evils most damaging to theism, for they seem to the ignorant so wanton and so incompatible with beneficence. But it is obviously useless to attempt to estimate the significance of such facts—if they have any—apart from their place in the organization of nature as a whole. Here, as to the facts, we must take science as our guide, though we may demur to its competence to interpret the whole. We learn, then, from science that in the order of nature what we call its higher stages are dependent on the lower; in other words, further development pre-supposes a certain fixity and stability already attained. So we come from our temporal standpoint to regard the whole course of the world as epigenetic: *natura naturans*, further 'creative synthesis,' emerging from the *natura naturata* previously achieved. We call this synthesis creative because the whole has now new qualities and relations, and is thus always more than the sum of its parts. Otherwise we should have only lability, where a new configuration replaces an older which is then no more. But here the old still persists, and so there is the stability implied in *epi*, but there is also the further organization implied in *genesis*.

It is in the light afforded us by this growing structure and its functions that we must estimate the significance of such physical evils as those just now alleged. The physicist's conservation of energy, his attractions and repulsions, gravitation, heat, etc., are here fundamental. The solid ground of nature, the chemical composition of land and sea, the circulation of

the atmosphere, wind and rain—on all which the very possibility of any life depends—are thereby determined. Earthquakes, droughts and storms are also incidental consequences of these : to prevent such 'relative evils' would mean to forego all the possibilities of good that life brings. Bacteria, again, are the first stage in the organization of life ; and infectious diseases arise as their incidental result, emerge, that is to say, in certain artificial conditions, where man meddles with nature or neglects her laws ; for they are seemingly unknown in 'wild nature' left to itself. Finally, the case of parasitism would be a serious objection to theism if the pre-Darwinian view of the origin of species were accepted ; but when that origin is found to be due to germinal variation and natural selection, the existence of parasites is seen to be merely an occasional consequence of these evolutionary factors. It again is an incidental result of 'the struggle for existence' which in general insures 'the survival of the fittest.'

But there is an ambiguity in the term 'physical evils' which here obtrudes itself. They do not pertain to nature, as science regards it, that is to say as a system of law and order. There is nothing whatever that can be called *bad* in this. When, then, we talk of physical evils we are regarding the world in a wider sense than the natural sciences do. Such alleged evils are relative solely to further stages of evolution beyond them : in other words, they can be called evils only for those on whom such further progress devolves. From this wider standpoint, then, the problem of all such evils seems to resolve itself into this : Which is preferable, a continuously evolving world where every stage in itself is good, or a perfect but ready-made world, a 'block universe' where there could be nothing for finite creators to achieve ? In fact, however, we cannot imagine a real world so utterly different in type from ours, in which neither progress nor history could find a place.

Mutatis mutandis, the same reflexions are suggested by moral evil. Here not natural law and order, but—as already said—the freedom of self-conscious agents is the fundamental fact, if moral law and order are to ensue. Here the social

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medium intervenes between the individual and nature, bringing manners (*mores*) and their guardians (*custodes*) on the scene ; but thereby imposing restraints where nature imposed none. Thus the ideas of duty and right emerge. The 'state of nature,' from which we start, is a 'state of innocence,' doubtless : that is to say, it is blameless, just because it is non-moral ; but for the same reason it is brutish too. It will hardly be denied that a knowledge of good and of evil is an advance on this ; for it opens out new possibilities. But the two are not on a par. It was, however, of old, commonly, and is still too generally, assumed that good and evil (along with truth and error) are co-ordinate as well as contrary. But there is no unity, no principle, of evil (or of error) and no permanence of evils (or of errors) to set over against such conservation of values (both intellectual and moral) as we find. Such evils flourish only disguised *sub specie boni* : the more clearly their true character is recognised, the less eager becomes the pursuit of them, and the more whole-hearted the struggle against them. The good like the true then tends to 'prevail' ; and herein lies the essence of moral progress.

But progress means gradual advance, and there are degrees in what is good and what is bad as there are degrees in what is false and what is true. Moral evil consists in preferring a lower good while yet conscious of a higher.¹ It means, in other words, that a man succumbs to temptation, the beginning of all moral evil according to the Mosaic legend. But surely temptation is in itself evil—a mysterious evil for theism, it will be urged ; for now, as the result of it, "the whole world," it has been said, "lieth in wickedness," and human nature, it has been maintained, is 'radically bad.' How, if that is so, can anyone speak of God as its ground ? We may retort : Is it after all so certain that such temptation as we experience

¹ The possibility of such a state of mind is psychologically plain enough. The good refused has a positional superiority in a system of values, and so is acknowledged to be higher ; whilst the lower good which is chosen, is—in spite of its narrower range—the more urgent and imperative as an immediate motive, and calls for no renunciation or effort on the part of the self.

is really evil? If it were such as to make moral failure inevitable then, indeed, there could be no talk of a theocracy: our vaunted freedom would be a mockery, for moral progress would then be impossible. But that is not what we find. The opposite extreme, a world in which there was no real temptation, would mean either that men found nothing in it to 'try' them, or that they began endowed with a degree of moral perfection which they had done nothing to acquire—if that were possible. Such a world would not be an 'evolving' world in which new values were continually created, even values making so-called 'self-sacrifice' a duty. On the contrary, it would be at best but a ready-made world of indolent ease, destitute of all the moral fibre which the word virtue connotes. There is, then, we may conclude, 'some soul of goodness in things evil' but there is nothing incompatible with its Creator's presence in a world for the course of which finite creators find they have some responsibility.

There is, then, as Kant has shewn, 'room for the faith' in God, which is for religion a perennial source of confidence that the Supreme Good is assured, a confidence which for radical empiricism is avowedly lacking. But what is here meant by faith is not that our reflexions have brought us to entertain the existence of God as a more or less probable hypothesis, with which as Laplace maintained, science can dispense. This faith is not an opinion (*δόξα*) which meanwhile may eke out a gap in our knowledge that is still awaiting verification. It is rather a certain trustfulness (*πίστις*) of a kind which is implicit throughout all life and makes knowledge itself first of all possible. It is the highest phase of that continuous striving that conation involves; the highest because it emerges as a motive only at the self-conscious or rational level of experience.¹

When Kant talked of room for faith, he was thinking only of the rational justification of this 'interest' of what he called the practical reason. The reason, which is here appealed to, is just that in us which prompts us to philosophize, leads us,

¹ Cf. *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 413 ff., 448 ff.

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that is to say, to 'the thinking consideration of things.' Starting from what has been well called 'a synoptic view' of the whole we reflect about the meaning of it all. In other words, our philosophy takes account not only of the real categories implied in the world of science, which lead us to seek the proximate ground of things; it also takes account of the teleological and axiological categories of the world of history, which lead us to ask: Why, what for, *cui bono* are these things there? The answers which these questions receive will depend upon the character of the person considering them, *i.e.* on the system of values which determine his conduct. Happily the best of men, whether theists or atheists, have long agreed that the Supreme Good—whatever it be—should inform the whole course which the historical world has to traverse, if that course is to prove itself intelligible and satisfactory. Now if such a being as the God our reflexion leads us to conceive verily exists, we can believe that "there is good in everything," and that "all things work together for good": we can trust that the Good is the 'one increasing purpose' which shapes our ends. The way to this faith in the presence of such a being in the world is not closed to any—so much we may claim to have found—though to many it is not as yet clear. Till we are led to walk by this way, "we remain without assured hope in a world that is then without clear meaning." To realise these alternatives is to see the rational justification of faith.

It will be seen that this *attempt to understand the world as a whole* is very closely allied to the philosophy of Kant, is in line with what the Critical Philosophy might have been but for its lack of historical sense. The writer also owes much to the teaching of Lotze, who in common with Kant was much of a monadologist. Like both Kant and Lotze again he has been from youth up an interested student of the natural sciences though he has been more than once accused of 'attacking' and 'reviling.'

THE ANALYSIS OF REALITY

By E. BELFORT BAX

Born 1854. Privately educated

THE ANALYSIS OF REALITY

My early philosophic days were cast in Mid-Victorian times, and as was natural to a Mid-Victorian student of philosophy I began my speculative career as a zealous Empiricist. The "Associational School" represented to my youthful mind the quintessence of philosophic wisdom. I swore by Lewes, Bain, Mill, and their colleagues in the popular philosophy of the day. A little later Herbert Spencer captivated me as he did most of my contemporaries, although his reference to Time and Space as products of psychological evolution in a sense puzzled me with the thought what sort of consciousness—what sort of a world—it was that was going on before time and space had evolved or while they were in process of evolution. Spencer's confusion here between the percept of sense with its form and the concept based thereupon by reflection, I was too unsophisticated to grasp at the time. But a hopeless misunderstanding of Kant was characteristic of British Mid-Victorian Empiricism. I next took to the study of Kant at first hand, my chief acquaintance with whom previously had been in the pages of Lewes's *History of Philosophy*. My thoroughgoing Empiricism suffered a shock, but not sufficient to upset it completely. I nevertheless began to see in *Erkenntnisstheorie* a "discipline" distinct from the empirical psychology to which I had been accustomed. Newer movements in philosophy of what would be termed an Idealist character now sprang up. They chiefly took the form of expositions of the Kantian and the post-Kantian movement in Germany centering round the so-called "Young Hegelian" school, which at this time (the early eighties) became popular at the English and Scotch Universities. My studies in this direction and my independent thought combined convinced me of the essential superficiality of the empirical view of the

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Associational School. I saw that mid-nineteenth century Empiricism failed to grasp the fundamental question—What is Reality and what is its meaning?

The grand principle of so-called Idealism in philosophy—to wit: that all that *is* and appears, that all reality, is in and for Consciousness—meant that, critically viewed, to speak of aught as obtaining outside the fundamental principle of consciousness, was to use a meaningless phrase. For it was clear that the very words we employed to express this or any other thought indicated nothing but immediate determinations of consciousness or their relations. It was plain to me that outside the determinations of consciousness there could be no Reality, no existence in any intelligible sense whatever. This is, of course, a commonplace position to those at all versed in philosophic thought at the present time, but to a mid-nineteenth century British Empiricist, when stated in so many words, it often sounded either unintelligible or as a revelation. The man of the period in question knew nothing, of course, of the "New Realism," which had not then been invented, but he was commonly unable to divest his mind of Locke's primary qualities of matter as existing in themselves. Of course, the doctrine of Idealism in one or another form runs implicitly through the whole history of philosophy before Idealism was explicitly formulated by Berkeley and subsequently, with a new and wider connotation, by Kant and his successors in Germany. As regards myself, I began to see in the early eighties that it was the only basis possible of any coherent view of the Universe regarded in its deepest and widest aspects.

What is termed then in general the idealistic position in philosophy became henceforth for me the presupposition of all my thought in metaphysic. Apart from suggestions, more or less indirect, in the Introductions to my translations from Kant and Schopenhauer, published in "Bohn's Library," also in my *Handbook to the History of Philosophy* (First Edition, 1886) in the same series, my first statement by way of a philosophical formulation of my own is contained in a little book pub-

lished in the early nineties entitled *The Problem of Reality*. This, I may say, was a very slight and imperfect sketch. The view therein put forward was next embodied with much greater elaboration and further development in a larger work, *The Roots of Reality* (Grant Richards, 1906). The last and most complete form in which I have given my philosophical position to the public is *The Real, the Rational, and the Alogical* (Grant Richards, 1920).

As already stated, the so-called philosophic Idealism which for me formed the bed-rock of any rational view of the Universe was the basis of my interpretation of Reality. But while accepting the Idealist position as my basis, I was by no means satisfied with the form it had assumed in its statement by most of its academic exponents. In their expositions I found they assumed that Absolute Idealism meant the hypostatization of thought or the relational element in knowledge, while the other element in conscious experience, the immediate data, the terms of the whole synthesis, was ignored or treated in the manner of Hegel himself as an imperfect form of thought-relation. The result seemed to me to be that the Universe was interpreted as a *Pan-logical*¹ abstraction. The Hegelian system was in my view vitiated by this fallacy. The primordial synthesis of "consciousness-in-general" I found to consist in (1) a subject which feels, (2) a *somewhat* felt, a *sensum*, and the reciprocal *relation* termed thought, i.e. the reaction of the former on the latter, and *vice versa*. The interrelation of the two primary data in this original synthesis of consciousness *per se* thus gives us three elements, two immediate data, and their connecting form of mediating relation. This interrelation between them is what we term Thought, or the Logical. I found that this primordial synthesis, consisting of thesis, antithesis, and the relational activity uniting them, constituted the original framework of all Reality, or, in other words, the basal synthesis of all concrete experience. I found, further, that in this synthesis, which practically embodies the

¹ I use this form in deference to the editor, though the analogy of *πάλλευκος* suggests pallogical pallogism, etc.

essential features of the Hegelian method, has for its foundation the first mentioned: i.e. the *that* which feels, the *Ego* which *becomes* conscious; for the second element the *somewhat* felt is seen to be no more than the projection or inversion of the feeling or sensating *Ego*. It has no meaning save as a determination of a conscious subject. This primary synthesis, it may be noticed, which embraces all actual or possible knowledge, furnishes me with my ultimate test of truth—namely, the self-consistency of consciousness. It gives us, I maintain, the clue to truth throughout the whole range of Reality.

I have stated it above, of course, in its most abstract form as a synthesis of metaphysical elements.

Analysing further Reality or Experience in its more concrete aspects, we find new elements corresponding to those of the original abstract synthesis. In the latter it is easy to distinguish the first two elements from the third, i.e. Feltness (*Sensum*) and the *That* or Subject which feels from the logical activity that relates these elements. In this way we arrive at the antithesis of *Alogical* and *Logical* as at once the deepest and most wide-reaching antithesis in conscious experience. This antithesis, it is necessary to bear in mind, in no sense amounts to a dualism as implying mutual independence of its terms. It is the antithesis of the elements constituting the synthetic unity of conscious experience itself. The very relating activity, the outcome of which is the thought-form, is the activity of the *per se* *alogical* subject of consciousness, while it is only relatively and not absolutely distinct from the discrimination of agreement and difference within the region of feltness or of objective sensation.

In order to make my fundamental position unmistakably clear, it is necessary here to formulate at greater length what I contend are the basal postulates of consciousness on which all our knowledge is founded. When I use the word *Alogical* I include under it all that element in our consciousness which is not embraced under the term thought or reason. Thus it connotes the purely sensuous element in perception, also feeling *per se* in all its modes together with the element of *Nisus*, or impulse,

as such, apart from the definiteness given it by thought. Again, as regards the primitive synthesis—i.e. the basis of all Reality viewed as the determination of conscious experience—the expression Alogical covers the “pure ego” and its self-contained opposition, the “moi premier et eternal” of Jaurès with the “Anstoss” of Fichte, unified by thought as the original synthesis of Consciousness-in-general and hence of Reality. I have emphasized the fact that although in the concrete world of our real experience there is no such thing as a purely alogical element any more than a purely logical element, yet in some phases of Reality the alogical is predominant and in others the logical. It is noticeable that the two terms correlate themselves to a large extent with the Aristotelian antitheses of matter and form and potential and actual—matter and potentiality always falling to the alogical side, while form and actuality are usually identified with the logical in every real synthesis. It is further to be remarked that all change, movement, evolution, etc., has as its driving force that which is primarily alogical. Speaking generally, we may say that the alogical side of Reality is dynamic, and the logical side, that of thought-determination, is static. It is the recognition of the above which forms the basis of Schopenhauer’s system. Schopenhauer saw that the “urge” of things could not be furnished by thought. Hence as against the *Idee* of Hegel, he postulated his alogical *Will* as the *prius* of reality.

In the antithesis of alogical and logical in its application to concrete experience I found four main *Modes* of its manifestation. These four modes are: *Particular and Universal*; *Being and Appearance*; *Infinite and Finite*; and *Chance and Cause or Law*. There are, of course, numberless minor antitheses within the system of experience, but they are all of them, I think, reducible to one of the four pairs in question, either directly or indirectly. These last will be found to form the main framework into which the cardinal antithesis of the Alogical and Logical falls in the world of real experience.

Let us briefly examine them in the order given. (1) In the case of *Particular and Universal* we may notice that one element

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of the antithesis—to wit, the *Particular*—is itself double-sided. It has an intensive or qualitative and an extensive or quantitative character. As intensive Particularity it is identical with the *this-ness* of intuition—with the absolute self-centered uniqueness of the content of any given moment of actual consciousness. The intensiveness of this *Particular* knows no limit as such. But there is also another and opposed aspect of particularity, its quantitative aspect, which consists in a potentially infinite repetition in Time and Space. This is what mediates the particular with its antithesis the universal. Nevertheless, the Particular remains through and through alogical just as the Universal remains through and through logical. Hence the Universal, as a purely logical element in Reality, however it may approach the concrete, can never *per se*, i.e. except in conjunction with the Particular, reach the concrete. It always remains abstract. (2) The Second *Mode* of the antithesis of the alogical and logical in the real world has given rise to much confusion in philosophical discussion, the terms being used in various senses. When I employ the word *being* I merely mean the *that* of the object in contradiction to the *what*. On the other hand, the term *existence* with me connotes not being *per se*, but the synthesis of being *and* appearance of the *that* and the *what*. “Being,” as I have pointed out in my book, *The Real, the Rational, and the Alogical* (p. 75), really means the imputation of the principle of subjectivity to the object. In other words, it imputes an *ego* to the object. This may have its bearing on the animism of primitive man. It is noteworthy also that the materialism of modern science would attribute a “subjective side” to all matter. The expression often heard, “blind, unconscious matter,” opens up a further point of interest—the distinction between the *un-conscious* and the *extra-conscious*. Consciousness and un-consciousness are both alike within the world of subjectivity—in other words, of possible consciousness. Unconsciousness is not *extra-consciousness* in the sense that an abstract idea or a bare quality is *extra-conscious*. The latter is *extra-conscious* as having no principle of subjectivity in itself, but as being merely the appanage or object of the conscious

being in whose consciousness it *appears*. A stone, on the other hand, is assumed as having a being in itself. This is at least the assumption of the ordinary or common-sense consciousness whether valid or not from the point of view of philosophy.

In the *infinite* and *finite* we have our third of the salient Modes into which the all-embracing antithesis of the Alogical and Logical falls. Infinity in itself is always alogical. This statement may surprise some readers who have been accustomed to regard the logical Universal as representing the "true" Infinite. Critically viewed, it will be seen, I think, that the Infinity attributed to the logical Universal falls, correctly speaking, to the side of the "limitless repetition of instances" for which the Universal stands, but is not. In other words, it falls to the Particular in its quantitative aspect. The Universal as such is purely connotative. It *excludes* as necessarily as it *includes*. Infinity can only be given in the potentiality of particular instances it covers. It will be observed from this that I do not disdain the current usage of the word Infinite as meaning a possible limitless repetition in Time or Space or both of any given content of time and space.

Our fourth Mode of the cardinal antithesis of the Alogical and Logical, that of Chance and Law (or cause), has entered into popular thought more than the others. We commonly hear the remark that there is no such thing as chance in the world, chance being merely a term which covers our ignorance. But it must here be observed that we are dealing with the quantitative aspect of the Particular, that is, we are dealing with infinite time and the infinite collocations of the content of time. The popular notion is that an omniscient being might conceivably grasp the whole content of past, present, and future time in an "eternal glance." Now, an "eternal glance" may mean the immediate apprehension of the *content* of an infinite time, or it may conceivably mean an intelligible apperception that has nothing to do with time or its content. Since, however, we are dealing with particular happenings in a time-process it is quite clear that it cannot be used here in the latter sense, It must mean, therefore, in connection with chance and law

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the immediate apprehension as *this-ness* of an infinite time content. But an immediate and actual apprehension of an infinite time-series is clearly self-contradictory. A limitless time-content plainly requires limitless time for its apprehension. Such is the Particular in its quantitative aspect which is the realm of chance. Chance is the element of flux in the reality of change. It is irreducible to the category of true cause or law. Every fact, every happening in time is conditional as consequent on an infinite series of other happenings in time, each of which might not have happened or might have happened otherwise. Hence, in tracing back any event we are confronted with an infinite regressive series of circumstances or events without the occurrence of any of which the event in question would not have happened and each of which other events is equally and similarly conditioned by antecedent events without which it would not have happened, and so on to infinity. There is an element of law or true cause in each of these events, but the actual happening, when, where, and how it did, is not reducible to cause or law *per se*, but merely to immediate antecedent and consequent—in a word, to pure chance. This element of pure chance is as much part of the total *reality* of any happening as its antithesis, that of cause or law.¹

Though literary and philosophical convenience may necessitate breaking up our subject into sections, it must never be forgotten that there is, strictly speaking, no break in the conscious process which is the subject of our analysis. From the ultimate metaphysical elements to the concrete consciousness here and now, the process is unbroken. The elements constituting the lowest terms to which analysis can reduce the conscious synthesis—to wit: pure subject, object and the interrelational thought-activity—reappear in a transformed guise at every more concrete stage of the conscious process. Each stage of reality may be analysed into a synthesis of a double alogical and a

¹ This antithesis of chance and law will be found more fully discussed in *The Real, the Rational, and the Alogical* (pages 79-89), where instances are given in illustration of the main thesis.

logical (the connective activity of thought). I can find, however, no tendency anywhere for the thought-relation to absorb the terms related, or such tendency, even if there be such, certainly never realizes itself. For the Panlogists at the head of whom in modern times stands Hegel, the alogical is a mere *sich selbstaufhebendes Moment* of the logical. But were this the case it must ultimately be absorbed without remainder over in the logical, which it certainly is not.

In the timeless "transcendental process" (as the classical philosophy of Germany had it) there is no break. In metaphysics, theory of knowledge and analytical psychology we have, *au fond*, the same subject-matter before us. We cannot trace any sharp line separating analytic psychology from theory of knowledge, or either from metaphysic as the word is used in Modern Idealism. The world as given in common-sense consciousness, the reality of the ordinary man, is the primary subject of investigation proper alike to metaphysic, to theory of knowledge, and to abstract psychology. To common-sense perception it appears complete in itself. All the aspects it assumes over and above the bare perception of "common sense" are attributed to the individual mind apprehending it, and are not supposed to reside in the object itself. Such aspects at once assume the form, therefore, of psychological additions. This distinction, good and useful as it is from the standpoint of common sense, largely loses its justification from that of philosophy as understood by Modern Idealism. But in any case the distinction between what is below the level of minimum common-sense consciousness and what is above it certainly obtains, and is valid even though not amounting to a separation or distinction in kind. The true distinction between conscious experience in its lowest and barest form—to wit: the world as ordinary common-sense perception—and higher forms is that in analysing the former we are confronted with mere elements, whereas in analysing any more concrete department or object above the primitive conscious synthesis the elements into which we analyse it are not *merely* elements, but are themselves otherwise viewed concrete wholes. As Aristotle pointed out, that

which is at one stage of experience a synthesis of matter and form assumes the rôle of bare matter regarded as element in a higher stage, though *in itself* it remains none the less a real synthesis.

The specially psychological superstructure which in its later developments becomes Consciousness in its higher scientific or philosophic aspects is, at least in its elementary stages, closely interwoven with the mere consciousness of common-sense perception. A familiar illustration may be taken from the difference between the aspect of a town on first entering it (common-sense consciousness) and after we have resided there for a length of time, and have become familiar with it (psychological addition to sense-perception). After residence in it the streets of the town are no longer the same to us as they were at the beginning of our sojourn. In other words, the individual psychological consciousness has modified the raw material of the original common-sense consciousness. The whole of what is termed the higher consciousness, the æsthetic, the ethical, and even philosophical, although based on the original common-sense consciousness, implies a modification of the latter, increasing in its higher phases to a complete transformation of its primitive basis. The intellectual side of the higher consciousness is concerned with the transformation of the reality of ordinary perception into the scientific or philosophical "value" we term Truth. The æsthetic side is concerned primarily not with logical values, but with the alogical values of a consciousness dominated by feeling or immediate apprehension, which we term, in general, Beauty. The ethical consciousness again has to do with values as regards social relations and has as its standard what is termed "Goodness"—that is, a principle of conduct which has as its aim the negation of the opposition between the interest of the individual as a separate entity and the community into which he enters.

The higher consciousness, though starting from the consciousness of common sense, nevertheless, as already said, transforms the Reality of common-sense perception into values which give it a new meaning having a new reality of its own. The

problem of the higher consciousness, concerned as it is specially with values rather than with facts or (except in science or philosophy) with abstract relations, has always been to disengage the quantitative particular, the mere many-ness of the world, from the essence of its reality. This is the real sense of human culture in all its three great branches—philosophic, æsthetic, and ethical—notwithstanding that the value of each is different. Philosophy and science strive to accomplish its aforesaid aim by the reduction of the world's many-ness to the unity of abstract thought; art, to the unity of potentiated feeling (æsthetic emotion); a similar aim appears in the practical department of human-culture—namely, ethics. The goal here is the reduction of the many-ness of particular, independent, contradictory human interests, to the universal common interests of humanity. Here also, therefore, the problem is the disengaging of the aim of human conduct from the quantitative particularity of countless individual aims and its reduction to the unity of a common standard. As already said, the general term for the specific value of philosophy (and science) is comprehended under the term Truth; for value in art or æsthetics the most general term is Beauty, understanding thereby the object of æsthetic emotion generally; in conscience or ethics such specific value is covered in general by the term Goodness.

But all these three specific values for the higher consciousness may be resumed under the phrase Harmony—that is, self-consistency or satisfaction within the synthesis of the higher consciousness. It may be observed that even the respective terms used for the three values above mentioned may be interchanged. Thus we often speak of truth in art or goodness in art, when to be strictly accurate the most adequate expression would be Beauty. Again, we often hear the expression “beauty of moral character,” when the more correct phrase would be goodness. But the interchangeable usage of these terms in this connection may be excused or even justified when we consider that they are all three resolvable into Harmony or adequate achievement of end within the synthesis of the higher

consciousness in the sense of Plato's 'Αγαθόν. This is the undoubted common ground uniting our old friends "*le vrai, le beau et le bien*," and constituting them into a true trinity in unity.

And now let me be permitted a word on the significance of that much abused expression and its corresponding notion—to wit: the Absolute. Among the *données* common to all systematic thinkers of the present day, outside the "new realist" school, the principal is the conception of Reality as connoting a complete synthesis. This again, as commonly interpreted, culminates in the conception of the Absolute as final expression of content of all kind. Such is the position, as I take it, of the late Bernard Bosanquet, of Professor Pringle-Pattison and of most present-day thinkers of the Academic School. As stated by them, it is, I think, substantially identical with what I term Panlogism, and as such it is obnoxious to the criticism contained in my book *The Real, the Rational, and the Alogical*, and also to that of Bergson and his followers. The Absolute of the Academic thinkers in question is undoubtedly *au fond* the hypostatized form of Thought or the Concept as we find it in varied modifications from Plato to Hegel. Like all Panlogists, these thinkers will have nothing to do with the notion of the *Pure Subject* (in contradiction, of course, to the individual Ego as empirical fact). Thus Professor Pringle-Pattison¹: "It was the substantiation of the logical form of consciousness . . . which led to the idea of the universal subject which thinks in all thinkers." The writer goes on to object to this "unification of consciousness in a single self" as he terms it.

To the above it may be replied that the primal Subject of all consciousness, the Ego as *first principle*, does not mean, as Professor Pringle-Pattison asserts, "the substantiation of the logical form of consciousness," but, on the contrary, is a recognition of the Alogical matter as the basis of "consciousness-in-general" (*Bewusstsein überhaupt*). It is strange that though, like the other exponents of his school, objecting to this "unification of consciousness in a single self," Professor Pringle-Pattison is insistent on the Absolute being regarded as a

¹ *The Idea of God*, pp. 389-390.

self-contained experience, at once the primal postulate and final result of philosophic thought. But these thinkers nowhere explain how they arrive at an all-embracing *whole* of experience without a *that* which experiences, i.e. the experiencing centre of the whole—or, otherwise put, the common Subject of this complete experience. We surely have here a circumference without a centre. It is an experience which, so to say, hangs in mid-air. Now, of such experience I contend we can have no possible notion.

If the word "experience" or "consciousness" is to retain any meaning at all, it can only be that of the modification of an experiencing Subject. Hence, granting their assumption of the Absolute as the self-contained and completed totality of all experience (an assumption which, for other reasons, I cannot accept), it could only be related to us finite conscious *foci* in so far as it is identical with ourselves as experiencing—in short, with the *ultimate Subject of our conscious life*. To retain the Absolute as universal consciousness, while denying it as universal Subject of consciousness, is surely in effect a *contradictio in adjecto*. If conscious experience is in the last resort *one*, then its Subject must necessarily be *one*. The present writer would reverse this procedure of our academic metaphysicians. Abandoning the notion of completeness or wholeness in the Absolute, he would treat the latter not as finished experience in itself, but rather as the eternal principle of experiencing or knowing—that is, as being the eternal Subject of all concrete consciousness whatever. This problem is crucial for a constructive metaphysic. Are we to postulate the Absolute as a definite, so to say, wound-up, sum-total of all reality, transmuted or otherwise, or are we to think of it as an eternally completing yet never complete process of the self-realization of the ultimate Subject of our consciousness and of all possible consciousness? Here we have the true issue. If we regard the Absolute as in the last resort a statically complete synthesis, we necessarily have a dualism, since it resolves itself into a somewhat, not as a *basis of*, but as *over against*, our present consciousness. The Absolute, so far from being the unchangeable eternal, is, on the

contrary, for me, the eternal principle of change. It is eternally realizing itself under ever new forms to which we can assign no finality. Viewed, if we will, time apart (*sub specie eternitatis*), it is surely, as far as metaphysical analysis is concerned, a bare principle and no more. But this question as to the ultimateness of time—as to the validity of the introduction of time-considerations into the deeper problems of metaphysics—is a problem in itself.

The question is, can we eliminate Time as a mode of the Absolute? M. Bergson apparently would say emphatically No. The writers just criticized would say as emphatically Yes. M. Bergson's *durée* is in fact difficult to distinguish in his writings from the Absolute itself. On the other hand, the complete elimination of time from the Absolute would seem to land us in the hopeless *impasse* of Panlogism. One recalls in this connection the remark attributed to the late Professor Sidgwick when he was dying: "I have never been able to understand the relation of Time to the Absolute!" Time would seem the inseparable condition of the Alogical side of Reality. As such, the Alogical, as we have endeavoured to show, being the basis of all reality considered as determination of consciousness, it is difficult to envisage the Absolute otherwise than as in some way directly involving, or, shall we say, giving birth to, time—(M. Bergson's *durée*).

As already stated, for my part, while getting rid of the idea of completeness or wholeness in the Absolute, I would treat it, not as in itself a finished and exhausted experience, but rather as the eternal *principle* of experiencing or knowing, or, in other words, as the eternal Subject of all consciousness. This problem of constructive metaphysic I cannot but regard as crucial for the immediate future of serious philosophic thought. Are we to conceive the Absolute—I must repeat the question—as a definite sum-total of all reality "transmuted" or not, or shall we think of it as an endless completing yet never completed process of realization of the Subject at the root of our consciousness as of all possible consciousness? Turn the matter as we may, there can be no whole in the content of Time any more than in the form of time, and yet the Absolute admit-

tedly unfolds itself in infinite Time. All things considered, Schopenhauer's "Will," while doubtless open to criticism, is perhaps a better expression for the Absolute than any other single word. It seems to indicate that the will-striving, the urge of life, or the evolutionary process, is never lost in the full fruition to which, nevertheless, notwithstanding Schopenhauer, it unceasingly approximates. The conclusion arrived at by the famous pessimist is, as a very little consideration will show, quite unessential to the metaphysical formula itself. It should be recognized that in deprecating the attempt to conceive the Absolute as involving a static completeness of actual perfection, and in contenting ourselves with its postulation as potential merely, treating perfection, all-embracing Harmony, etc., as for us simply asymptotic tendencies, we are accounting for all that with which the analysis of our conscious experience can furnish us. What lies beyond belongs to the region of the unknown. Its consistent statement even, let alone its solution, is unattainable in the formulæ of reflective thought. We here neither affirm nor deny the possibilities of its solution in terms of the æsthetic or ethical consciousness. We merely maintain the invalidity of any other view than that given, either as postulate or result of philosophical analysis itself.

The foregoing considerations naturally lead us up to the question of the meaning and character of human destiny as implied in the process of social evolution. From the period when civilization began to break down the primitive group society of early man the tendency of human thought-aspiration has been in the direction of what may be termed the mystical ideal, which has seen the *telos* of human existence in a direct relation between the finite soul of the individual and the infinite world-consciousness. The evolution of this notion has passed through many stages between the crude animism of primitive man and the visions and half-inarticulate conceptions of the full-blown mystic of the later period of antiquity and of the Middle Ages. But the direction has been there all the time from the earlier periods, and may be traced in the mystery-

cults of India and of the already decaying ancient world of the Græco-Roman period before its definite formulation by the Neoplatonic thinkers, and later in the esoteric forms of the Christian religion. The mystical tendency spoken of manifests itself in the department of ethics, as what I have termed the "introspective morality" for which the standard of conduct does not imply a reference to social welfare or happiness, or if it does, only does so indirectly, in the last resort basing itself not upon the individual in his capacity as part of a corporate social entity, but as standing in a special relation to a Divinity with whom he has a direct inner connection as "a searcher of hearts." The ultimate standard of conduct is the God supposed to be revealed to the inner consciousness of the individual personality. The supreme end of life for early man, on the other hand, had nothing to do with a personal relation of the individual to any author or soul of the universe, but presented itself socially as the glory of clan, tribe, or people thought of as a continuity of deified ancestors, living tribesmen, and their descendants. The individual member of the social group had, as such, little significance in himself. His importance consisted mainly in his relation to the social Whole. Accordingly his ethical standard of conduct as a rule was exclusively social, concerning the life and welfare of his group-society and his attitude towards it.

What we have called the mystical religious ideal has, together with its introspective ethical standard, more or less dominated the serious thought of the later periods of civilization. In our day, however, we find another and a different notion of human destiny gradually supplanting the one in question with its introspective individualism. This newer conception of human destiny and the ethical standard based upon it, is, in a sense, a reversion on a higher plane—a reversion with an enormous difference of course—to the naïve attitude of primitive man in the matter.

Early society itself constituted the highest end of life to the individual members constituting it, a view gradually supplanted by the notion of a spiritual side of the individual in direct relation

to a more or less mystical God. The growing modern view spoken of, on the other hand, reverts in a manner to the early view of society and its welfare as the ultimate standard and *telos* of individual personality. This to me seems to indicate a real advance. The ultimate barrenness of the older introspective attitude, with its cardinal doctrine of the direct *rapprochement* between the individual soul and the world-principle (whether personified or not) as the salient feature of human life in its relation to the *telos* of Reality, is written on the history and present fortunes of this line of thought. The traditional religious systems embodying it are, one and all, tending to become crystallized, and to lapse consciously or unconsciously into mere politico-economical agencies for the maintenance of the *status quo*, while with some of those who attempt to galvanize them, the old standpoint is explained away in accordance with the newer attitude of thought in these matters. Thus the social side of Christianity generally, especially in the alleged teachings of Jesus, is deliberately exaggerated, and introspective precepts, presented with a social colouring which there is every reason to believe did not originally belong to them.

Unlike the mystical attitude with its introspective ethics, the newer view spoken of does not claim to state the ultimate world-purpose within the limits of any formula. Its Ideals have not the hall-mark of finality attaching to them. Once attained they are seen to lead to something beyond themselves, which something cannot be foreseen save in the vaguest outline. Thus he for whom Socialism is the ideal will, if he is a clear thinker, recognize that any form of Socialism he can envisage, though it may be an end for the present generation, is in itself but the opening of possibilities beyond itself. Nevertheless, as I have pointed out elsewhere, happiness, if not *per se* a concrete ideal or the *telos* itself, is at least so *per aliud*, i.e. it must necessarily enter as integral element into any possible ideal. Now, happiness to endure as happiness we have seen cannot be a finality, it cannot be a something fixed once for all and unchanging. What applies to happiness as element of the *telos*, applies also to the *telos* itself viewed as concrete, and to the

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Absolute, of which it may be conceived as the highest expression. Pursuing the above line of thought, the question arises as to whether we can arrive at any formulation of the *summum bonum* as the *telos* of the process of Experience or Reality. Our whole discussion, I think, shows we cannot. We have already pointed out the fallacy into which all our theorizing has hitherto been apt to fall; i.e. hypostatization of one side of an antithesis, which side by itself and out of relation to its correlate, is but an abstraction. Pleasure or happiness viewed *per se* is an unrealized abstraction. As such, i.e. as an abstraction, it cannot become a *telos* of Experience, but only as entering into a concrete synthesis involving elements other than itself. Thus we see in every-day life that the man who attains happiness does so by postulating his end in life as something irrespective of happiness or pleasure which seems to enter it merely as incidental to it.

We find thus the same principle here in this question of Reality considered as end-value that presents itself in our analysis of the other departments of reality. Reality we have found as such always presents itself as involving at least two antithetic elements and their reciprocal connection, the elimination of either of which leaves us with an abstraction and no Reality, and which abstraction, when closely viewed, evinces itself as practically meaningless; "the light that never was on land or sea," a light without darkness, which would indeed be a light that was indistinguishable from darkness. A *good* which had completely absorbed evil, and with which no evil was to be contrasted, could not enter into consciousness as a *real* good. A God "too pure to look upon iniquity" would be a *caput mortuum* no better than a "bloodless category." A beauty with no shadow of ugliness, actual or potential, to set it off would not enter into any conscious synthesis as beauty. Similarly, an absolute truth out of all relation to falsehood or error would be a colourless and worthless platitude, and would forfeit its higher character of truth in any intelligible sense.¹ Most of our Ideals are, at least as traditionally presented, little more than hypostatized abstractions.

¹ See *The Real, the Rational, and the Alogical*, pp. 73-74.

In discussing the nature and conditions of the supreme end of life and *a fortiori* of Reality itself we are confronted with the rival theories of Optimism and Pessimism. Here also the foregoing remarks have their significance. The Optimist, if he is thorough-going, contends that Human destiny involves the ultimate realization of complete perfection. In so far as this is the case he renders his position obnoxious to the above criticism. On the other hand, the Pessimist is equally and perhaps more one-sided in his denunciation of life as regards value. Though we fully recognize that mere abstract *happiness*, albeit it does not by itself constitute any *telos*, yet undoubtedly enters as necessary element into every *telos*, and therefore affords us a touchstone by which we may guess the value of any *telos*, proximate or ultimate. Now, the Pessimist contends that the sum of misery in the world not merely outweighs the actual sum of happiness, but tends to do so in an increasing ratio. But it should be noted here that even if we concede this assumption in itself, as an argument it involves three questions which are begged. (1) It is assumed that happiness and misery can be stated in the form of a hedonic calculus, and that the question can be treated indeed adequately from that standpoint alone. (2) That the problem can be formulated in terms of individual feeling as though the individual were exclusively concerned therein. (3) Human evolution during the historical period, a period during which civilization has been developing from its beginning to the present time, is assumed as the absolute Norm for all further developments. Now, with regard to the first point mentioned, happiness is regarded abstractly as *per se* an independent Reality rather than the element of a synthesis. It is regarded as a somewhat fixed once and for all, whereas as realized happiness is continually subject to change as regards quality, this being determined by the general content of the synthesis into which it enters. It is a common observation that the animal cravings, which constitute the lowest form of happiness, once satisfied, are normally succeeded by a craving for a happiness involved in the satisfaction of the higher interests.

With regard to this distinction of quality in happiness, the conviction we have, that what we term the higher interests *are* higher, namely, nearer the assumed ultimate *telos* of consciousness than the lower, and their happiness correspondingly higher, seems to be an ultimate postulate, i.e. an assumption involved in the last resort in the self-consistency of consciousness. But if the element of happiness or pleasure runs through all momenta of the life-process, no concrete end can be conceived as such in which it is not included. The second fallacy referred to is based on the assumption that the organic individual, the particular human being as unit, is the sole and ultimate natural form in which self-consciousness may be embodied. Now, this is a pure assumption, and I have ventured to suggest a speculation based on the trend of evolution in the past as to the possibility of a new social *persona* emerging in the fullness of time, having for constituent basis the individual personality, just as the latter has for basis the cell as constituent of his animal (human) body.¹ The third of the points mentioned is the assumption of the Pessimist that progress, or, if you will, change, must proceed in the future on exactly the same lines as in the past, and that seeing that hitherto different periods of historic development have seemed to show rather a shifting in the distribution of happiness and misery than alteration in their relative amount, so it must be in the future. For this assumption, founded as it is on the short period of civilization and history, short that is as compared with that of the existence of man on this earth, we have, I submit, no warrant whatever. It may well be that the period of development of civilization throughout all its stages can only be properly judged by that which succeeds civilization, and this may show us quite different results and a quite different trend from that which the known past exhibits.

The antithesis of good and evil, in general including happiness and its reverse, seems one of those ultimate oppositions lying deep down in the nature of Reality which cannot be transcended in itself. But admitting this does not alter the fact that the evil as particularized in the concrete, i.e. as realized as "this

¹ See *The Real, the Rational, and the Alogical*, pp. 110-117.

evil thing," must necessarily pass away, perishing no less than arising being inseparable from the world of particulars which form the time-content.¹ The term "good" means any content of consciousness that suggests or makes for the ultimate *telos* of life of which pleasure or happiness is an essential element. All pleasure or happiness is good in the abstract and *per se*, but not necessarily in the synthesis including other elements than itself. It is the whole in which it is realized that determines the true *value* of happiness, and therewith the question of preference as embodied in the old query anent the hog happy and Socrates miserable. We said above that evil as particularized must necessarily pass away as being a part of the time-content, but the same remark also with equal necessity applies to the "good" when realized as part of the time-content. All particularized good is therefore in a way no less transitory than particularized evil, but this does not necessarily imply, as might seem at first sight, merely a perpetual see-saw of Ormuzd and Ahriman. For though concrete good and concrete evil may in themselves be equally transient, yet as elements of the time-process in its general movement there is a difference. In the dialectic of this movement the concrete evil appears as the first term of any process of evolution, the good, on the other hand, acquired by elimination or transformation of this evil evinces itself as the End or fulfilment of the cycle in question. This is the principle of progress. It means that a "point" is always realized on the side of the good in the sense that all concrete evil issues in a concrete good and not conversely. Thus the trend of all evolution is towards the "good," notwithstanding that we cannot conceive "good" in general ever exhausting all possibility of "evil" in general. The potentiality of "evil" as of "good" always remains. It is undeniable also that out of the very realized good itself, which has overcome the precedent evil, a new and different evil may arise which in its turn has to be transformed or eliminated by a new Ideal issuing in the manifestation of a new realized "good." Hence the tendency of evolution is always in favour of the good, though the tendency

¹ See *The Real, the Rational, and the Alogical*, pp. 183-185.

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may never reach its goal in the final conquest of evil, i.e. evil as potential or as general principle. The good then would appear as never reaching "full" fruition, notwithstanding its eternal approach thereto.

The foregoing is fully in accordance with the principle elaborated in connection with the theory of Knowledge in its metaphysical aspect and otherwise. The principle enunciated from a metaphysical viewpoint in the abstract applies *mutatis mutandis* throughout the whole range of conscious Reality. Every department shows us a pair of alogical antitheses realized in a synthesis by the formal logical activity of thought. In reflective thought, the abstract thought of psychology, we have seen the alogical element of consciousness-in-general never enters. This is the basis in psychology, of its radical distinction between subjective and objective. In the object, i.e. the determination of consciousness in its "first intention" (to employ the old scholastic phrase), the alogical element enters directly, while in the consciousness of reflection it can only be indicated indirectly by means of a conceptual symbol. This is the crucial distinction between the mental or ideal (in the psychological sense) and the real—between Reality as immediately given and its reflection in the individual mind. It is hence the basis of all abstract thought whatever.

I have already pointed out that there is no side of our conscious experience that is exclusively alogical, or exclusively logical, or exclusively potential, or exclusively actual. But the fact remains that there are some sides which are predominantly alogical in their character and others which are predominantly logical, or again, as we may formulate the matter in the present connection, some in which potentiality is predominant and others in which actuality is the leading element. Speaking generally, we say that in reality as apprehended immediately, i.e. in reality as experience given, the alogical element by a long way out-balances the logical. In all that concerns life, organic, animal, or social, it is the alogical in the sense of the potential which is of importance, the actual is quite subordinate. This point has been abundantly emphasized in other terms in the philosophy

of Henri Bergson. In fact it is not too much to say that while in all first-hand reality the alogical in some sense is dominant, that life as life is alogical (in the sense of potential) *par excellence*. It is not any given actual moment in life, but its ceaseless becoming, its infinite possibility, which is its essential point and gives to it its character and value.

On the other hand, in all knowledge as knowledge, it is the logical with which almost exclusively we have to do. Knowledge is concerned almost entirely with what I have elsewhere termed the *frozen* actuality of logical generalization with its concept forms. Its aim and end is not reality or life with its ceaseless becoming, but logical completeness and coherence. Its material is not Sensibility, Will or Feeling, in a word the Alogical, but thought-forms and their relative articulation. Knowledge which is not directly perceptive or equivalent to experience immediately apprehended, but knowledge as the highest result of the function of reflective thought, is never identifiable with reality. Reflective thought interprets reality in its own medium, and in so doing transforms it into something other than its original self. In itself reality is, as we have seen, predominantly alogical. As transformed by reflective thought into knowledge or truth it has become predominantly logical.

We have to give up as far as philosophy is concerned the notion of finality. The idea of infinity based on the alogical side of our consciousness gives us our only clue to the Reality we have been endeavouring to analyse. Many cosmological theorists have made shipwreck on their unwillingness to recognize the notion of infinity. Herbert Spencer, for instance, seems to conceive the evolutionary process of the material universe as change in a determinate *quantum* of matter in motion, this system of change having a definite beginning and a definite ending in time and occupying definite position in space. The necessary conclusion from Spencer's utterances is that though the successive steps of the evolutionary process may take untold æons to accomplish themselves—since Spencer regards evolution as a process starting and finishing and followed similarly by the contrary process, that of dissolution—we are

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bound to postulate a never-ending recurrence of the same evolutionary cycle. This banal result of Spencer's cosmological theory is only to be got rid of on the hypothesis of the infinity in space of such world systems as ours. On this assumption the evolutionary process will not simply repeat itself but will always be modified by systems outside itself, just as within our own cosmic system the evolution of individual objects, be they suns, planets, animal bodies, or what not, is determined by objects outside themselves and ultimately by the whole cosmic system of which they form part.

In the foregoing I have merely attempted to give a bare sketch, in its fundamental points, of what analysis discloses of the inner process and the inner meaning of that consciousness which is the raw material of the system of its determinations we call Reality.

I will conclude by quoting the final paragraph of *The Real, the Rational, and the Alogical* (p. 244).

"If there be one thing that we must learn to give up, it is the notion of finality. Yet eternal process can never be formulated in thought. It can be dimly apprehended in feeling, that is all. The notion of direction, of tendency, must take the place of actualization. Full realization is not for us, even as ideal, in that stadium of consciousness in which we, finite individuals, with an animal body basis, live and move and have our being. The suggestions given us by our higher consciousness with its ideal values of a 'something beyond' must for us ever remain merely glimpses of possibilities, passing echoes, indicating direction. This should never seduce us into futile attempts at a dogmatic construction of the nature of the final goal of all things. So far as this goal is concerned, for us at least, beyond these passing echoes 'the rest is silence.'"

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IMAGINISM

By DOUGLAS FAWCETT

**Born 1866. Educated at Newton College, Devon, and
Westminster School.**

BIOGRAPHICAL

I WAS born at Hove, Brighton, April 11, 1866. My parents were E. B. Fawcett, a "Fawcett of Scaleby," the Cambridge and All-England cricketer, and Myra, daughter of Colonel Macdougall, of the Indian Army. I was educated at Newton College, Devon, and Westminster School (Queen's Scholar). In 1896 I married my cousin, M. B. V. Jackson, and have lived since mostly in Switzerland. My philosophical career dates, I suppose, from talks about Berkeley with two Westminster boys—the eldest fourteen or fifteen years old—one of whom is now a distinguished Oxford professor. But I was not stirred seriously till the age of seventeen when, on my father's decease, I happened on Louis Figuier's well-known *Day After Death*. This book defends belief in the plurality of lives: the attractive, but so far unverified, hypothesis shared by Orphism, Plato, Plotinus, Drossbach, Schopenhauer, Pezzani, Professor McTaggart, Dr. Schiller, and many others, and upheld so stoutly by French "re-incarnationists," and the theosophists and kindred mystics whose doctrines derive from the East. The problem of life became interesting, and I began a long course of self-education in science and philosophy. In philosophy Plotinus, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Herbart, Lotze, Mill, Bain, Martineau, James, Bradley, Schiller, and Western and Eastern mysticism all made effective appeal. Coming as a young man into touch with the theosophists and their "Indian wisdom," I was asked to revise the philosophy and science of Madame Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine*, a syncretistic and fanciful work, but full of suggestion; a popular version or advance-guard, as it seemed, of an Eastern cult whose intellectuals were yet unborn. But there dwelt here merely a "religion manquée." Leaving the theosophists disillusioned, I wrote a monadology, *Riddle of the Universe* (Arnold, 1893), resembling what is now called "spiritual pluralism," on independent lines. The experiment, while educative, was unsatisfactory. There followed in 1909 *Individual and Reality* (Longmans), but time once more brought dissatisfaction. However, with *World as Imagination* (Macmillan, 1916) the beginnings of a satisfying world-hypothesis rose into view, and the long and tedious process of trial and error was to bear fruit. So radical was the change of standpoint that all preceding works and essays, etc., had to be withdrawn. In 1921 appeared *Divine Imagining*, and the series thus initiated is being continued to-day. The standpoint is now generally known under the name of "Imaginism."

IMAGINISM

" God for His own joy sings many-voiced this world.

" Time is but the lilt of His song and space the breadth of His harmony. Save in His art, they are not.

" All the beings of the world are the words of His voice, all that is substance, energy, and mind, all men and grains of sand, all birds and beasts and trees, and all stars."

OLAF STAPLEDON, *God the Artist*.

" . . . our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness, as we call it, is but one special type of consciousness, while all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there are potential forms of consciousness entirely different. We may go through life without suspecting their existence, but apply the requisite stimulus and at a touch they are there in all their completeness."

WILLIAM JAMES.

" We have to inquire whether imagination combined with consciousness may not be the same thing as memory, wit, power of discrimination, and perhaps even identical with understanding and Reason. Though logic is not capable of deciding whether a fundamental power actually exists, the idea of such a power is the problem involved in a systematic representation of such a multiplicity of powers."

KANT.

(Cited in Professor Norman Kemp Smith's
Commentary, p. 474.)

NATURE, wrote the poet Blake, is imagination ; in philosophy we can go further and think likewise about the universe. And in truth Imaginism, which asserts that the world-principle resembles the imagining with which we humans are acquainted directly, is now a live issue. In 1913 it was otherwise. Imagining, while interesting—though insufficiently so—to

psychologists, had then no standing in current metaphysics, was held to furnish no special clue to the solution of that most weighty of problems, the character of reality at large. Suggestions thrown out by a few thinkers and poets had been overlooked or forgotten. Idealists, the only men who care for this kind of clue, were still interested for the most part in the Greco-Hegelian tradition, as modified by partisans of the Hegelian Right and Left, and had in their opinion quite enough to do battling with the new realists and other critics. "All over Europe before the war academic lecture-rooms only re-echoed, in all essentials and with minor or minimal variations, four great substantive voices of antiquity, two of them Greek, Plato and Aristotle, two of them German, Kant and Hegel, and philosophy, instead of advancing with the steady sureness of a science, rehearsed only the old problems and the old debates. Nor was the situation materially different in America."¹ To-day, however, a hard-pressed Idealism may well reconsider her position and look around for an ally. Nor will she look in vain. Imagining, the mere "case of the association of ideas" of certain psychologists, the Cinderella, as it has been called, of philosophy, is acquiring or re-acquiring metaphysical status. It is discussed now as sampling for us the nature of the world-principle itself. And the debate, it would seem, merits attention. Professor J. S. Mackenzie finds in Imaginism promise of a complete final reconciliation of poetry, religion, and philosophy, and agrees that "imagination is the best name for that central activity by which the creative work may be supposed to be initiated and carried through."² Professor Keightley, of Benares University, himself an imaginist, declares that there is no fighting alternative. He observes further that an unconscious imaginism is becoming very general, and describes this, for example, in the works of Professor Bergson and Dr. Whitehead.³ Professor Ségond of Lyons regards pure imagination as the necessary

¹ Dr. Schiller in *Mind*, October 1917.

² *Hibbert Journal*, January 1923, "The Idea of Creation."

³ In the *Concept of Nature* in particular. Bergson's "Principle of Life," as I have urged elsewhere, is a symbol referring us to Divine Imagining in its creative phases.

presupposition of finite experience. One must suppose then that the hypothesis meets a want and cannot be set aside. It is an experiment seasonable at any rate and emphasizing data that rival theories have overlooked. We have to inquire whether it, too, has overlooked regions of appearance and lacks accordingly harmonizing power and width: a question only to be answered in the course of a long and rigorous testing. Having stated precisely what we mean, we must court objections with gladness. And we have to look for Divine Imagining as active in all quarters respecting which we have knowledge. We must in part carefully infer this presence, but in part also we must be able to intuit it.

Is Imaginism a novel venture or just the revival of an old thesis, forgotten awhile? This is a minor issue; the question of importance is—does it work? However, distributors of "bibliographic information," as James would put it, are answered readily. For the information to be distributed on this head is somewhat meagre. Ignoring the genial utterances of poets, let us ask what philosophical thinkers have had to say. In ancient philosophy Imaginism does not occur.¹ The Greeks are silent, while those great names, Plato and Aristotle, belong obviously to the cult of Reason which culminated in Hegel. Imaginism dawns late in modern philosophy, and the date is an *obiter dictum* of Kant's. Kant suggested that imagination may lie at the root of finite sentient, flowering also in their varied lives which include, of course, the psychologist's imagination, narrowly so-called.² Kant's "fundamental power" re-

¹ A caution here. The Indian Adwaita Vedantist doctrine of *Mâyâ* or illusion must not be confused with imaginist views of Nature and finite sentient. It allows only "practical reality" to the world of division and change, so Sankara, its leading interpreter, informs us. For Imaginism this world is as "real" as the most ardent modern realist declares it to be. The "cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces" are part of the changeful flux established on Divine Imagining; realism and idealism not being at bottom opposed. The *Mâyâ* doctrine is a verbal device. The difficulty was to account for a changing world which shows somehow within an alleged changeless Absolute. This was met by declaring that the world is only "practically" and not "really" real!

² Cf. *Divine Imagining*, pp. 34-5, and *Mind*, vol. xxxi, N.S., No. 122, pp. 157-8.

mained a suggestion and nothing more. With Fichte, however, "productive imagination" is discussed further in connexion with the making of Nature and acquires thus what we may call *cosmic* standing. With Frohschammer, again, "Phantasie" is a cosmic agent, a condition of finite experience manifest in all Nature. But Frohschammer does not seem to allow for the creation of real novelty.¹ And his "Phantasie" itself is, after all, only a power among powers, subsisting, e.g. along with God and the Ideas. It is not an all-explanatory world-principle whose protean forms all appearances alike serve to reveal. In *World as Imagination* I took the further step of discussing Imagining as this sole and all-inclusive world-principle. And the attempt to display this principle at work in Nature and finite sentient life constitutes my contribution to this attractive field of research. It is the old story. The innovator "does but gather in himself the incitations to will which he feels from a thousand sides; the only thing in him which is really new is the original synthesis."² Here, as elsewhere, conservation and creation, those two great aspects of an imaginal system, are found together. The conflict, now so formidable, of existing world-theories, all alike unsatisfactory, opens the way for a new experiment—for what in the language, not of dialectic but, of the imaginal dynamic we call a novel "imaginal solution."³ It matters very little what person voices an illuminating solution first. Truth, as Hegel says, appears when its time has come. What does matter is that the solution should not be left in the shape of a bald affirmation or paragraph, but that it should be tested by application to all quarters of appearance, natural and other. Those who desire it and will test it are the workers

¹ Perhaps regarding it, like the late Professor Bosanquet (*Logic*, 2nd ed., ii, 249), as a "contradiction in terms." "Phantasie" does not seem so much to create as to convey. It is a mediating agent. Professor Lutoslawski informs me that a Polish writer, Karl Liebelt, was among the imaginists, but I am too ignorant of what he wrote to venture to assign him his place in this little group.

² Professor Aliotta, *The Idealistic Reaction against Science*, pp. 225-6. English Translation.

³ Cf. *Logos*, April 1923, "Hegelian Dialectic or the Imaginal Dynamic?" pp. 31-2.

who have toiled over prior experiments, weighed them in the balance and found them wanting, and who yet retain sufficient courage to fare further. Each of us tolerates toil only up to a point.

Philosophical truth is a conceptual scheme which serves in our thinking as substitute for the universe,¹ and this substitute-scheme is a poor thing no doubt, while our own. We shall be wise not to expect too much of it ; in fine, we must moderate our cosmic ambitions and recall that agnosticism is sometimes the better part of thinking. Thus we may come to agree that Divine Imagining is fundamental, that it and its continuing centres furnish the dynamic or "real dialectic" of creative evolution, that causation, including, of course, all cases of "physical" happenings, is imaginal process.² We may even discuss the "initial stage" of this special world-system in which we live and move, may indicate how it fell into the stage of conflict, division, and change, and how it moves inevitably towards the final solution—the "imaginal solution"—of its conflicts in an harmonious Divine Event. But in doing so we glance at reality largely in the block. Although we may throw light on the standing of space-time, on creative evolution, on the origin and destiny of finite sentients and so forth, we shall avoid other once fashionable but quixotic enterprises and more especially that which would set before us the "eternal essence" of the Divine.³ It was the hope of Hegel, by detecting and interconnecting the wider categories, to name the main forms of this quintessence and to reveal with dialectical necessity how they cohere. And it was a vain hope. For, in the first place, the making of this inventory would concern not "categories" or thought-determinations, but rather forms of immediate imagining. Thought and truth are relative to an

¹ There are those who reduce philosophy to the "clarification of thoughts" and despair of attaining true thoughts about the universe. I must simply say here that I regard this position as untenable.

² Cf. "Hegelian Dialectic or the Imaginal Dynamic?" *Logos*, April 1923.

³ The reader will recall the Logic which was to exhibit God as He is in His eternal being before the creation of Nature and finite minds.

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Other, never really ingested and overcome. And, in the second place, this world-system of ours may not be a satisfactory sample of the divine. There may exist innumerable, perhaps infinitely many, other world-systems displaying inexhaustively different relations and types. The variety native to Divine Imagining must surely take shape in these, in which case to want the inventory is to cry for the moon. In the third place, when we discuss eternal essence, we mean really, I suppose, by "eternal" not timeless, but enduring free from change. But, if so, the question arises whether, and if so in what sense, any essence is eternal at all. In a universe in which creation is primary, in a universe of imaginal content, eternally stable or permanent features may be comparatively rare.¹ The "accomplished" Absolute of tradition, "complete, perfect and finished," is surely discredited. Hegel's Divine Idea conceived on the analogy of reason, fully rounded off, only "accomplishing itself" (since time-succession is unreal) from the standpoints of finite sentients, fails us. Divine Imagining, infinitely productive, remains and to this extent there obtains the enduring, the permanent. But within this world-principle, and even beyond it as it becomes incessantly and creatively what at this or that stage it was not, burgeons, and who shall say in what manner of measure, the new.

Thus it is wiser to regard reality largely in bulk, commenting on such of its comprised types, relations, and developments as we can. Elsewhere I have made an attempt to consider the "Initial Situation" of our particular world-system, that system whose scores of millions of suns impress the astronomer, that which is often by a surprising assumption mis-called the universe. The "Initial Situation" of this system is not a stirless heaven of forms, least of all of conceptual forms, a list of the kinds of which might reward patience. It is simply that concrete conservative phase which preceded creative evolution with its real history, time-succession, and novelty. No attempt was made to master its primitive content of relations and types. It was caught vaguely as it may have floated within

¹ *Divine Imagining*, chap. vi, pp. 147-8.

Divine Imagining, a dimly descried, amazingly complex integral poem, of which only the general burthen can be caught and recorded by man. Much will begin and much also will cease during its history. Creation in an imaginal universe is primary ; conservation (as Descartes saw) presupposes creation and is secondary. And most probably in the infinitude of Divine Imagining innumerable like insulated systems, all different from one another perhaps radically, are also the seats of histories, are changing magically and in all sorts of ways. Unable to grasp fully the system which gave us birth, we learn that even agnosticism has its uses ; in taking thought of this possible host of systems we shall be dismayed and lean to silence. An improved simian, separated by some few thousands of years from "helio-lithic culture" and capacities, can hardly hope to sound all the depths of Divine Imagining.

I return to fundamentals. Idealists, with whom we are chiefly concerned here, have mooted various sorts of world-principle, but the most famous and influential of their hypotheses has been that of Hegel. Hegel affirms, both in the *Logic* and in the much less abstract *Philosophy of History*, that Reason is "*exclusively its own basis of existence*," the "energy" and "sovereign" of the world. It passes into self-externality as Nature and closes with itself again as the Absolute Reason or Idea, as Spirit. It is complete, perfect, and finished, in a word "accomplished," but it shows to finite sentient beings as if it were in process of being accomplished. Nature and the sphere of Mind are "applied logic,"¹ human faculties are "specifications" of Reason,² while the self-movement of the constituent notions or pulses of the logical Reason, pure or "applied," is dialectic. Deity is truth, and truth is the whole. It is strange

¹ "If . . . we consider Logic to be the system of the pure types of thought, we find that the other philosophical sciences, the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Mind, take the place, as it were, of an Applied Logic, and that Logic is the soul which animates them both. Their problem in that case is only to recognize the logical forms under the shapes they assume in Nature and Mind—shapes which are only a particular mode of expression for the forms of pure thought."—Hegel, cf. Wallace's *Logic of Hegel*, pp. 41-2.

² Hegel : Wallace's *Logic of Hegel*, p. 39.

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that no one seems to know whether Hegel meant this Divine Idea or Reason to be conscious or not, and that his followers are free to interpret him in this matter as they list. But, waiving this point, we have before us the original Hegelian message, pure and undefiled, and we can use it conveniently as a foil over against which to announce our own. Hegel's message, of course, is largely ignored by his modern sympathizers and admirers. Thus the late Professor Bosanquet reduced Reason to a "nisus to unity"¹ and Logic to the science of the "mental construction of reality" in the building of finite experience.² Similarly there has obtained a tendency to whittle down Hegel's dialectic, which is of cosmic scope, into a dynamic which marks the thinking of men (more especially philosophers) and social groups.³ Hegel becomes in this way a mere *nominis umbra*. It is needful, therefore, to assert clearly that we have the original, not the bowdlerized, Hegelian message in view.

Hegel's Absolute is "unaccomplished" only as contemplated from the standpoints of finite sentient. James called this kind of Absolute something to rest on and, again, the block-universe; and even writers like Belfort Bax, in sympathy with the Hegelian Left, declare against it, substituting for it an "eternal principle of change."⁴ The Italian neo-idealists turn away from it and accent history. Nevertheless a renewed and gallant effort was made recently to defend this Absolute. Its static character was denied almost contemptuously; it was discussed, not as a block-universe but as a whole which is essentially "active." But with this pronouncement embarrassments begin. Activity, which is *conservative* or

¹ Letter to the writer who had asked for the meaning he attached to the term. The definition seems an unhappy one. "Nisus" implies surely timelapse in which the unity comes after something else!

² *Essentials of Logic*, pp. 4 ff. "Psychology treats of the course of ideas and feelings; Logic of the mental construction of reality."

³ Whereas for Hegel, an objective idealist, dialectic is a "universal and irresistible power" ruling on the cosmic scale as well as in "everything around us," including, e.g. a shower of rain or the moon's movements.

⁴ See his *The Real, the Logical, and the Alogical*.

allows the Absolute and its possessions simply to endure; the contents that are sustained actively show no addition or loss. A symphony, comprising all possible variations, persists; no novel melody rises or can rise into being. On the other hand, if activity is *creative*, real time-succession, in which alone novelty can emerge, is implied. Conservative activity, then, leaves the "accomplished" content on our hands; activity that is also creative introduces real time. But this is not all. In mobilizing the activity-notion absolutists must have a care. For, if their ally, F. H. Bradley, is right, the notion is a "mass of inconsistency"; and, as false appearance, cannot be affirmed of the Absolute.¹ Incidentally, too, it implies "the change of something into something different"—happening and sequence in time—which absolutists, discussing ultimate reality, must reject. Thus the campaign in favour of the "active" whole, as against the block-universe, is unconvincing.

Do we desire now to escape (*a*) from the concept of the block-universe which still holds the field, and (*b*) from the further concept which identifies this block-universe with Reason? We can do so by supposing that the world-principle is (*a*) at once conservative and creative, and (*b*) that it resembles, at a distance, what is conspired as pure imagining in ourselves. I say "pure" imagining, since imaginal constructs which are used to represent *other* reality, which are thus under the control of this "other," have become, in virtue of their function, portions of instrumental conceptual thought. They belong thereby to the story of reason which opens in connexion with the needs of finite sentients adjusting themselves tentatively to surroundings in a divided world.

Man's imagining narrowly so-called, the imagining which interests a writer on psychology, is, of course, only a phase of his psychical life, one phase among the many in which the "fundamental power," or basic imagining suggested by Kant, seems to have flowered. But the "fundamental power" appears in this particular phase less transformed, less concealed

¹ Cf. *Appearance and Reality*, chap. viii, "Activity."

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—like the lava stream beneath its slaggy surface—by products of creative evolution. The phase, as exemplified in memory, is conservative. A Turner, as we say, can evoke from the past even the rich fullness of a sunset. The phase is also, as innumerable experiences reveal, creative. The *proprium quid* of this creative imagination, observes Professor Ribot, its spontaneity, resembles instinct; a craving and power to create which constructs in the very heart of perception, takes shape in games and myths, and underlies all reasoning as well as industrial invention and art. Now the most “fundamental” of “powers,” Cosmic Imagining, like the surface-phase most nearly resembling it in our psychical lives, can also be discussed as both conservative and creative. Let us add withal that in the deepest depths (as urged already), creation is primary. Conservation there, as in the case of the finite sentient, is recreation; there is no fixed precipitate of content and content relations which exists inertly and by itself. Conservation implies sustaining activity; to be is to be created or create or both. This has a bearing on a time-honoured controversy about “eternal connexions,” in which some have descried the “logical” foundations of the universe. For “logical” it were better to read stable or conservative. Most “eternal verities” at any rate reduce to statements about conservative connexions that *endure* indefinitely; they hardly refer us to *timeless* relations which seem to be fictions of the study.

Reality cannot be thought of apart from time, which, let us be careful to note, covers duration and simultaneity as well as succession. A conservative Divine Imagining would resemble the traditional “accomplished” Absolute in that the contents present to it would not change. (An Absolute with changing contents changes itself and accepts history.) But these contents would be actively sustained or endure, and their differences, stably compresent, would be simultaneous. Thus duration and simultaneity cannot be suppressed even within a conservative Absolute. What do we posit as the sustaining activity? We say that the world-principle is conscious—in a word, that

activity is no other than *consciring*.¹ So far from being a "neutral light," *consciring* is the active Divine Imagining. Given this *consciring*, to which contents or *conscita* are present, we understand at once on what duration and simultaneity depend. Simultaneity, as between events datable by different finite observers, has aspects which puzzle physicists, but in the present regard the concept is as simple as that of sensible simultaneity to the plain man who sees.

And succession? Its standing is not far to seek. Divine Imagining, in virtue of its eternal character (we can hardly be sure that anything else endures for ever) is actively creative. Creation is primary. There can be no fixedly determinate contents for imagining: and time-succession is just the form in which additive creation occurs. Why does time-succession with its novelty enter our experience at all? Professor Taylor considers it as perhaps an insoluble problem *why* time-succession should be a feature of this experience. And if Hegel's or Bosanquet's Absolute is to be accepted, I agree. If, on the other hand, Divine Imagining is the world-principle, the insoluble problem disappears. If Divine Imagining is real, its mode of manifesting its reality—the *Form of Creation*—is real as well! Indeed, time-succession is *among the greater experiences by which our Imaginism is to be verified*. Given the initial hypothesis, time-succession is precisely what deduction would derive from it, and precisely what we find actually given when the said deduction has to be tested.²

"If time is not unreal, I admit that our Absolute is a delusion," writes Bradley. But if it is real, as modern realists hold in agreement with so many idealists, and certainly common sense, then surely our hypothesis must be very seriously weighed? The world-principle seems to be revealing itself in the very world which it creates. What more do you want, or wanting can get?

¹ See *Divine Imagining*, Foreword, xxvii, xxviii and chap. iv. Divine *Consciring* is Fichte's "infinite activity" regarded as also aware of its *conscita* or contents; the "*conscious energy of the universe*, that which at once conserves, creates, and grasps together all contents"; the active aspect, in short, of Divine Imagining.

² *Divine Imagining*, pp. 108-10.

Activity (consciring) without change would be the activity of conservation by which the enduring and the simultaneous exist: the ἐνέργεια ἀκινησίας which Dr. Schiller has stressed so forcibly.¹ Activity with change yields time-succession—creative evolution. Something like this view stirred Plotinus when he wrote that time is “the activity of an eternal soul, not turned towards itself nor within itself, but exercised in creation and generation.” Are we to be obsessed by the “accomplished” Absolute of India, Greece, and Germany, when a natural solution of the time riddle, almost self-evident, is within our reach?

Primary space-time features obtain within Divine Imagining; and elsewhere I have sought to discuss how they belong to our particular world-system, both as it pre-existed to, and after it had fallen into, creative evolution.² We must not, with Professor Alexander, promote space-time to the position of a world-principle; these mere manners of appearance of contents cannot be exhaustive of the wealth of primitive contents; are too bloodless to draw upon for the filling of a world. Nor, again, must we allow scientific relativity to disturb us. There is nothing metaphysically startling in the relativists' search for more exact physical concepts, and nothing of course new to metaphysics (though probably to many men of science) in the discrediting of absolute space and time. The liberal mathematical physicist is aware of his limitations. The “empty shell” of physics, as Professor Eddington calls it, concerns knowledge at most of structural form, while “all through the physical world runs that unknown content which must surely be of the stuff of consciousness.”³ When we get clear of the “empty shell” and explore in thought this psychical “stuff” of Nature, we reach at last space-time-contents as they are present to Divine Imagining. And there, indeed, is the domain to which the relativistic experiences of all sorts of finite perci-

¹ *Riddles of the Sphinx.*

² *Divine Imagining*, chap. ix, “The Evolution of Nature.”

³ *Space, Time, and Gravitation*, p. 200.

pipients belong in unity.¹ If, in view of the extreme complexity of this domain, we are at first staggered, we do well to remember this. The defects and helplessness of mere human beings concern only themselves. The world is inevitably complicated, and does not exist merely to be understood easily.

The space aspect of space-time has been modified, if not produced, during creative evolution and stands, perchance, for one of the first great novelties in the imaginal dynamic.² But I must fare forward.

Ought the world-principle to be described as "reason," "thinking," or "thought"? For Hegel Deity, the rational Self-thinking Idea, was equated with *truth*—"the truth is the whole." And certain critics of Imaginism have urged that our Imagining also is just a form of thinking, and that the expression Divine Imagining proclaims loudly that the world-principle thinks. But this objection rests on a misapprehension. Divine Imagining is reality rather than truth; the thinking, which has as its aim truth, and which is, of course, indispensable to finite sentients, presupposes a relation which, on the level of the world-principle, cannot obtain.

We think, when checked by an obstacle, we are trying to bring to pass some practical result or, again, to fight our way to true theoretical knowledge: knowledge, be it noted, which is always representative, always of or about something other than itself. There is no truth which does not presuppose a relation. In his *Meaning of Truth* (p. 98) James notes this, but urges, it seems, too narrowly that the relation obtains only within the private mind. "Theoretical truth thus dwells within the mind, being the accord of some of its processes and

¹ "... the thoroughgoing relativity of space-time *prima facie* indeed disintegrates the universe into individual time-systems, estimated primarily from bases within themselves, and entirely relative in their character when determined *ab extra*; but . . . when the matter is pressed home it seems evident (such I take to be Professor Alexander's conclusion) that a common world is implied in which the worlds of the two [all possible] sets of observers are unified." "The world is a unity of movements, but not a single movement."—Bosanquet, *Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 151.

² *Divine Imagining*, pp. 200-1.

objects with other processes and objects"; elsewhere the relation is said to hold between the "conceptual parts" of our experience and the "sensational parts" (p. 82). This form of correspondence-theory applies only to special assertions. I can assert truly even about my doubtings and wishes; the assertions being true because the facts represented make them so. I can also make assertions about the moon; and the facts in this case have a standing without as well as within the particular centre of consciring or "mind." The correspondence, however, between "conceptual parts" of my experience and facts independent of, but penetrating, it holds good. It is this relation that we are concerned primarily to stress.

In the case of the moon there obtains a correspondence-relation between "conceptual parts" in my experience and facts established on Divine Imagining. The concepts, again, are substitute-facts, products of my imagining invented to stand for other facts, as economy demands. A truth about the moon is not "self-verifying," as Hegel, in the high theoretical manner, wanted truth to be. It is true if it represents sufficiently well, in respects relevant to our purposes, what exists in imaginal Nature. It is true, also, if it represents merely what is or was present to other human and animal percipients; provided that my purpose is to simulate this and the purpose is fulfilled. The substitute-conceptions may be highly symbolic, but, even if they represent abstract but relevant factors, they suffice.

Truth implying a relation, we see at once why Divine Imagining cannot be discussed as thinking and truth. It cannot stand to itself in a relation of correspondence: there is no cosmic thinking because there exists no other which confronts it, and makes it false or true. Reality is wider than truth. Shining in its own light Divine Imagining does not require truth-shadows. It is immediacy which conscires itself; not the truth "about" the universe, but the very reality so-called. Within this immediate imagining there are relations—wherever there are differences conscired there are relations—but there is no place for "conceptual parts" or substitute-facts. Incidentally we may refer to a current theory for which thinking is judging,

and judging "reference of an ideal content to reality." This theory was devised, I suppose, primarily with an eye to the finite sentient and without ambitions of cosmic scope. But, whatever value we attach to the theory in connexion with finite sentients, we should agree no doubt that the world-principle cannot possibly "think" or "judge" in *this* way. "Reference" of ideal to real, in this connexion at any rate, will never do.

On the imaginal hypothesis thinking or reasoning obtains only in finite centres. It is one of the forms in which Kant's "fundamental power" at the roots of finite sentients, that is to say, the fontal imagining, contrives to flower. It arises during a time-process in the storm and stress of creative evolution and, having served its turn, will cease to be. In its simpler forms in the sphere of practical inference, reasoning is patently a form of tentative imagining, whereby we adjust ourselves to events.¹ According to Professor Prescott in *What is Poetry?* voluntary thought "is a secondary and specialized development, in the way of practical adaptation, growing from the first [the imaginative operation of the mind which is primary] as the arm and hand grow from the body." Quite independently of my own researches, Professor Eugenio Rignano urges in *The Psychology of Reasoning* that reasoning is always imaginative experimenting, involving reproduction and production (conservation and creation) alike. Here we have the ground prepared for that "psychologic" of which Dr. Schiller dreams. And as we rise to the levels of theoretic knowledge, imagining is found to penetrate everywhere still. Thus a symbol, like the electron, is an imaginal construct, and the laws of science, urges Professor Karl Pearson in *Grammar of Science*, are "products of creative imagination." Thus "the whole of Mathematics consists in the organization of a series of aids to the imagination in the process of reasoning," writes Dr. Whitehead in *Universal Algebra*. Professor Ribot in his *Essay on the Creative Imagination* contends that "underneath all the reasoning, inductions, deductions, calculations, demonstrations, methods, and logical apparatus of every sort, there is

¹ *Divine Imagining*, pp. 235 ff.

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something animating them that is not understood, that is the work of that complex operation, the constructive imagination." Thought arises, writes Dewey similarly, in a situation of conflict which checks response ; a conflict of habit with habit or of habit with surroundings. Thought, experimenting imaginatively with different lines of action, opens the way to adjustment. Logic—historically it was evoked by eristics—supervenes when the imaginal experiments, issuing in too many conflicts and blunders, give rise to the need for policing this treacherous reason as much as possible. Creative developments, in which practice may be quite ignored, come late. A consideration, relevant to important discussions, deserves mention here. It is possible that there exist conservative connexions which can be used as premises and called axiomatic logical principles, but their claim to be called "logical" would, if we are right, depend on their adoption and utilization in the process of reasoning. In themselves they are merely stable aspects of reality, and have no bearing on the greater problems of first philosophy.

The higher thinking or reasoning presupposes the decree—let there be imaginative representation with its substitute-facts. It is a flat, bloodless symbolizing which often disgusts even the suffering thinker himself. And its achievements, notoriously fallible, require, even such as they are, much helping out. In fact, to know of things by concepts is a precarious business rendered possible, one may say, only by language. "Thinking—as a permanent activity at least—it may be fairly said, owes its origin to the acquisition of speech."¹ "Such an analysis of a particular object as is required for its description would be impossible without language."² "What is called thought consists mainly (though I think not wholly) of inner speech."³ It is with no regret that we have to regard the world-principle as standing above this speech-propped makeshift : a device by which creative evolution meets the rude needs of our cognitive and practical life. In Divine Imagining all

¹ James Ward : *Psychological Principles*, p. 286.

² Professor Stout : *Analytic Psychology*, ii, p. 178.

³ Russell : *Analysis of the Human Mind*, p. 152.

that the makeshift carries would be present and indefinitely more which thought's narrow selectivity and partiality condemn it fatally to exclude. No one once free of that ocean would seek the swamps of thinking again.

Imagining, Kant's fundamental power, certainly underlies the sphere of our "free constructive thinking," though it takes form there in the familiar concept. Indeed, as Professor Ribot writes: "It penetrates every part of our life whether individual or collective, speculative or practical—it is everywhere,"¹ as on the lines of Imaginism we should expect it to be. But note that it shows sometimes in a salient and specially instructive way. Take the domain of that "logical imagination" on which Mr. Bertrand Russell rests pure mathematics. When the method of ordinary rational thinking fails and we are brought to a halt and marking time, "direct philosophic vision," which is often necessary, may be enjoyed.² This "vision" may convey discovery or creation; reveal existent connexions in the world-imagining or be the place of birth of something new; the point of main interest is that it comes to, and does not originate from, the thinking. Intuitive imagining, shall we say, has shone clear momentarily through the veil of concepts.

I have urged that our higher thinking is bloodless; it is contrived with an economy of content so strict to be almost forbidding and, failing the crutches of language, could hardly move. Hence we note that J. M. Ellis McTaggart, a distinguished admirer of Hegel, will not allow that thought, raised even to cosmic power, can hold all the wealth of the world-principle. Something which can include all contents is wanted. The new synthesis, he writes, whatever it may be, must reconcile the oppositions of knowledge, will, and feeling, and overcome "the rift in discursive knowledge and the immediate for it must no longer be the alien. It must be as direct as art, as certain and universal as philosophy."³ His difficulties, if I

¹ *Essay on the Creative Imagination* (Open Court Co.), p. 332.

² *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 241.

³ *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, 2nd ed., p. 229. Cf. also F. H. Bradley on the dependent and secondary standing of thought, *Appearance and Reality*, ch. xxvi.

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may say so, are the opportunity of the imaginists who seek to show that their world-principle covers all sorts of appearances impartially. In making adequate the concept of Divine Imagining—a substitute fact which must be sufficiently rich to guide our living—we have to take our clues painfully from what the world-process reveals, imagining nevertheless adventurously when we can do nothing else. Unable to undertake the task now, I must refer readers to the Positive Vindication of Imaginism furnished elsewhere.¹ In the opinion of Dr. Schiller, himself a pluralist, Divine Imagining “can really afford to be what other metaphysical principles falsely claim to be, viz. all-embracing. It can be represented as including not only all reality, but all unreality.”² And this is perhaps the best thing that can be said about it. Further, it evades no problems. Thus, if the real is rational and the rational is real, a solution of the riddle of evil cannot be found. The man eaten alive by ants is ignored by Hegel. But precisely because the world-principle is Imagining, we appear able to furnish a solution which is complete, which makes appeal not only to the dialectician but to the plain man.

A word on a much-discussed topic. There is no necessary opposition between idealism and realism. Thus Imaginism is idealistic in respect of its world-principle; it is also realistic in respect of the vexed question of the “physical world,” the storm-centre of recent controversy. Realism asserts that the things of this world—things, we must add, that are found and not merely delimited by our interests—exist, endure, and interact independently of their appearance to finite percipients. There are forms of idealism which are incompatible with this belief, e.g. those that extradite things from the “medium” of private mind. But Imaginism accepts and endorses it, adding, however, a significant and indispensable rider.

What of the moon? The moon (like Drossbach’s atom, Faraday’s force-centre, and Dr. Whitehead’s electron) is not located merely where popular opinion places it. It penetrates

¹ *Divine Imagining*, pp. 31-64.

² Cited *Divine Imagining*, p. 43.

with its "relations of influence" all quarters of our world-system. And penetrating thus, it can be perceived, duly modified, in any of the regions penetrated, provided always that the region is the seat of finite conspiring. Suppose that the region is a cerebral cortex. The moon can appear there and, under suitable conditions, may be perceived (conscired). But its appearance there, as a perception, is not all the rest of its appearances in the world-system. And if the cortex and the perceptions allied with it vanish, these residual appearances persist, including those present where astronomers place the moon.

Thus realist and imaginist equally believe in independent things which merely announce their reality to finite sentient. But let us note now an outstanding contrast. The realist is apt to discuss these things *without any further reference to mind*. The imaginist establishes them on Divine Imagining, of one of whose arrangements of space-time-contents they form a part.

In concluding these remarks I must urge that, in my opinion, Imaginism must provide satisfactory solutions, not merely of problems of cosmic scope, but of those concerning the standing and prospects of the individual or finite sentient. Happily we are rid of the philosophies of the Unconscious, of world principles, like Schopenhauer's Will or Schelling's Immemorial Being :—

. . . like a knitter drowsed,
Whose fingers play in skilled unmindfulness,
The Will has woven with an absent heed
Since life first was ; and ever will so weave. ¹

Accepting such a principle, we could understand, with Hardy's Spirit Sinister, why "rare dramas" occur, and could agree also that :—

Howsoever wise
The governance of these massed mortalities,
A juster wisdom his who should have ruled
They had not been.

¹ "Spirit of the Years" in Hardy's *Dynasts*.

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It remains, however, for those who reject "unweeeting Mind," who regard the much trumpeted evolution of the conscious from the subconscious as nonsense, to try to deal seriously with the colossal problem presented by the history of mankind. To what end is this long martyrdom, not only preponderantly painful but in large part offensive, squalid, and foul? This is the question now being asked in so many quarters, and an answer, not wholly unsatisfactory, will in the long run have to be made. Schopenhauer and von Hartmann did not expect any early revolt of man against his life-conditions. But the centuries fly apace, and with increasing knowledge the time for the great decision draws nearer. Economic progress and a wealth of inventions will only free man for thinking, and bring him nearer to the fateful crisis. To multiply or cease multiplying? Even to-day one-third of the male population of Thibet will not mate, and there is no power which can exact from us a posterity against our will.

In certain academic circles it has been fashionable to treat belief in continuance with a certain indifference or even contempt. But Professor McDougall (*Body and Mind*, Preface, xiii) strikes a truer note. "It seems to me that the passing away of this belief would be calamitous for our civilization." It would later, I submit, prove calamitous also for mankind. But we require not only the confirmation of this belief (which some surface-discovery in psychical research might furnish) but a more or less satisfactory account of the world-setting in which it has to be accepted. No future metaphysical system, which proves unequal to this task, will be worth the "proofs" which precede its printing. Imaginism then must fulfil, as thoroughly as possible, the duty which is imposed by this need. Let me add that most of its labours in this adventure lie ahead.

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FROM IDEALISM TO REALISM

By G. DAWES HICKS

Born 1862. Educated at Guildford Grammar School ; Owens College, Manchester ; Manchester College, Oxford ; University of Leipzig. Professor of Philosophy at University College, London.

BIOGRAPHICAL

MOST of my boyhood was passed in Guildford. I attended the Grammar School there, and was nurtured in the classical tradition. But during my school-days I became interested in problems of science and philosophy, mainly through reading books in my father's library. My father was a solicitor ; and, after leaving school, I spent three years in his office. My taste was not, however, for the Law. In 1884 I obtained a scholarship, which enabled me to proceed to Owens College in Manchester. Here I studied mainly under Professor Adamson, to whom I owe a deep debt of gratitude. I attended also classes in Chemistry, Physics, Biology, and Physiology, and did a fair amount of laboratory work. I graduated with Honours in Philosophy in 1888, and then proceeded to Manchester New College, as it was at that time called, which moved from London to Oxford in 1889. In Oxford I attended regularly the lectures of William Wallace, R. L. Nettleship, and Cook Wilson. I obtained a Hibbert Scholarship in 1891 ; and in 1892 went to Leipzig, where for four years I was engaged in research work during the period when Wundt and Heinze were the leading teachers in the Department of Philosophy. Throughout those years I was largely engaged in the experimental work that was going on in the Psychological Institute. I graduated at Leipzig in 1896. On my return to England I was appointed minister of Unity Church, Islington, and continued in that position until 1903, when I retired from the ministry. In 1904 I came to reside in Cambridge. In the same year I was chosen to fill the Chair of Moral Philosophy in University College, London, the title of the Chair being changed to that of Philosophy in 1911. I have also lectured in Cambridge on psychology and philosophy since 1910.

FROM IDEALISM TO REALISM

THERE is a well-known saying of Lotze's to the effect that it is only inquiries conducted in the spirit of realism which will satisfy the aspirations of idealism. However that may be, I think no worker in philosophy will regret having passed through at some period of his history an idealistic phase of thought. It is a great advantage to have felt for a while at least the strength of the idealist position through having viewed it from within, from the vantage-ground of one who is convinced of its truth. For I doubt whether the strength of the case that can be made out for an idealistic interpretation of the world is ever realized by those who survey it merely from the outside, and whose attitude towards it is that of hostile critics engaged in demolishing now one and now another of its various tenets.

The idealism within the boundaries of which for several years my own thought turned was reached from a careful study of the Kantian philosophy. In my undergraduate days (at Owens College, Manchester) I worked under the guidance of Robert Adamson, probably the greatest Kantian scholar whom this country has so far produced ; and, by the time I had taken my degree, he had convinced me that "if we are to connect our knowledge into coherency and system, and to understand, so far as it may be given to us, the significance of the universe in which we find ourselves, we must resume the problem as it came from the hands of Kant." When, through having obtained a Hibbert Scholarship, I was enabled to proceed in 1892 to Germany, and to spend four years at the University of Leipzig, the opportunity was afforded me of concentrating attention upon

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the text of Kant, and of becoming acquainted with the vast literature that has gathered round the Kantian writings. Naturally, I passed on to a study of the Post-Kantian idealists ; and it is not surprising that, at the end, an idealism more or less on the lines of Hegel's seemed to me the one legitimate outcome of Kant's speculation.

For the truly critical mode of reflexion leads indubitably to an interpretation of knowledge radically opposed to the subjectivism into which Kant, in his unguarded moments, was perpetually lapsing. After having laid down the maxim that experience must be construed in terms of mind, he was constantly tempted to take that maxim as implying that the experience of a finite subject consists of complexes, syntheses, of *Vorstellungen*, mental elements. Yet a subjectivism of this kind was not only uncalled for, it was positively inconsistent with the critical theory. A more hopeless position before the problem of knowledge is scarcely conceivable than that of the thinker who endeavours to combine the contentions (a) that our experience consists merely of mental elements, facts of mind, and (b) that the very essence of an act of knowing involves a reference to that which is other than and independent of the individual thinking mind. Not only so, Kant himself was strenuous in maintaining that the individuality of the finite subject is no less certainly a part of the world of experience than any so-called material thing, and that the modes of its being and growth, instead of determining the nature and relations of the world of experience, are themselves determined thereby. When he laid it down as the principle upon which the critical method was founded that all so-called facts of experience must be interpreted in accordance with the forms of apperception, and that apperception, the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, must be distinguished from the empirical existence of the finite subject, he was drawing, with whatsoever imperfection of phraseology, the all important contrast between *Vorstellungen*, conceived as facts of mind, and that which was apprehended through or by means of *Vorstellungen*, that which relative to them was objective. That is to say, he was virtually drawing the contrast which in Hegel's

philosophy became fundamental between thinking as a subjective process of the finite mind and thought as objective. The thought-relations, the categories, which were regarded by Kant as giving the intelligible aspects of the realm of empirical fact, were taken by him to be and were expressed by him as being in no sense accidental forms, not even invariable ones, of the particular mechanism of thinking in finite minds, but forms which rendered finite minds themselves possible. And to defend the position no more seemed to be requisite than recognition of the fact that the finite subject may become aware of his own empirical and determined existence as part of the sum total of his experience. That such a distinction should be possible for him, that he should thus in the very act of knowing transcend the limits of his own finitude, was obviously a characteristic of human knowledge not to be ignored, and which remained inexplicable so long as attention was confined to a succession of mental states as making up the subjective existence of the individual mind.

In short, the fundamental principle, disguised under many a strange fashion of speech, of the Kantian theory of knowledge, may be said to be the principle of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness was the condition of consciousness and not *vice versa*. All knowledge, all experience, is only for self-consciousness—such was Kant's general standpoint. But self-consciousness so conceived could not be regarded as an individual existent. Rather was it the common factor in all consciousness, that in virtue of which consciousness is what it is, that in and through which individuals *are* and are connected with one another. Self-consciousness, or thought, was not, that is to say, to be looked upon as a product, the nature of which was due to a set of antecedents mechanical in character, even mechanism of the kind described as psychical; on the contrary, it was ultimate. When, however, Kant came to work out the implications of the theory, a number of conflicting considerations were allowed to intrude. By an analysis of experience, as it presents itself in ordinary, empirical consciousness, he sought to ascertain the features in that experience due to the presence of the central principle. Yet, in consequence of his unfortunate method of

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dealing with the elements of experience in isolation from one another, the central principle tended in his treatment to be lost from sight. While insisting that experience is possible only as a synthetic combination in the unity of self-consciousness, and that nothing can enter into experience save what is in harmony with the conditions of such combination, he would have it that the matter of experience was extraneously given, and was in itself a chaotic manifold of passively received impressions. The result was failure to bring the subordinate forms of apprehension into organic connexion with the fundamental principle of cognition. The forms of intuition were, for example, placed in no intimate relation to the unity of self-consciousness. The finite subject was declared to be receptive ; but how or why it should appear to itself receptive, how or why it should be receptive in the forms of space and time, were questions left by Kant wholly untouched. So, too, while doubtless an effort was made to show that the categories are implied in self-consciousness, it was not shown how or why they are so implied, nor how they are connected with one another and constitute a system. And since intuition and understanding were throughout regarded as disparate faculties, there was always, in any concrete fact of experience, an opposition between the universal necessary form and the particular contingent material ; the fusion of these in a concrete object of knowledge was never other than mechanical.

I cannot say that I ever felt quite at ease with Hegel's mode of surmounting the obvious defects of the Kantian treatment of experience, but for a long while it certainly did seem to me that we had in the Hegelian metaphysic the critical method developed with a full recognition of its true import. And I think still that the Hegelian idealism, or something akin to it, is the terminus towards which one trend of Kant's reflexion may legitimately be said to carry us. Hegel was, at all events, in earnest with the conception of self-consciousness as Kant had formulated it ; he was resolute in attempting to determine the conditions under which its realization was possible and to trace the evolution, in strict logical sequence, of the elements

which he took to be embraced in it. The Kantian categories and Ideas presented themselves to him as an imperfect adumbration of that system of pure thoughts or notions whereby the nature of self-consciousness (the principle of all reality), when laid out in the abstract, might be disclosed. The effort was at last made to bring these pure notions into essential relation with Mind or Self-consciousness ; to exhibit them as constituting its inner being or structure, so that in their completeness they were but the unfolding of what Reality is in itself. They were accessible to our thought, so he conceived, by simply letting reality itself reveal them ; and when we did so, our thought must necessarily be *of* the real, and, incomplete though its grasp of the real at any one stage may be, it will be driven onwards to ever increasing fullness.

Objection has frequently been taken to Hegel's procedure on the ground that he was assuming that "thought out of its own abstract nature gives birth to the reality of things." The generalities of thought were, it has been contended, conceived by him as forming a species of absolute structure or organization, in regard to which concrete reality had no other function than that of exemplification. And not merely, it has been urged, does a view of that sort conflict with the demands we are entitled to make for independence on the part of the individual subject, but it rests on no more than an utterly false abstraction of our own. For the real is the concrete, and is not exhausted in the abstract thoughts by which we express its nature ; nor is it possible to understand how the abstract nature to which a quasi-existential mode of being is assigned could find realization in concrete entities. I doubt whether criticism expressed in this form is in truth applicable to the view against which it is directed. It was never, it might be replied, Hegel's intention to assign to the pure categories any measure of real existence. He was well aware that the only reality is the concrete, and that, in describing the abstract realm of thought, he was doing no more than disentangling from the conception of reality, as he viewed it, its indispensable elements. Certainly, there is no evading the conclusion that if there be a single ground of

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that ground imposes on the whole development of concrete reality a form which is entitled in the strictest sense of the term to be called "necessary." But it by no means follows that the significance of the term "necessary" must be solely that which is relatively the most familiar to us—such necessity, as, for example, attaches to the connexion between premises and conclusion in a syllogism. It would be, indeed, an extraordinarily poor idea of the richness of real existence to represent it as having no more of necessity in it than the kind illustrated in the instance just given. Moreover, the priority of these abstract thoughts was not intended by Hegel to mean a temporary antecedence or that there was imposed *ab extra* upon the nature of real existence a structure or organization which constrained it to assume in its development a certain form. The priority was merely logical, and indicated no more than that in thus thinking we were laying bare the ultimate structure of reason itself, that reason which is actually real only in the concrete life of mind.

II

I was acquainted from the outset with criticism of the kind just alluded to, and my belief in the validity of the main arguments in favour of absolute idealism was not thereby undermined. The considerations that eventually did occasion doubts and misgivings were of a different order. Let me try to indicate one such line of consideration. That unity of self-consciousness, the mind's realization of itself, is possible only in and through apprehension of objective fact was the simple maxim which Hegel accepted from Kant and applied to the analysis of experience. It is a principle which so far is scarcely open to question. But the notion of the unity of self-consciousness is a slippery notion; it is apt either to assume so thin and unsubstantial a form as to be incapable of bearing the weight that it is sought to impose upon it, or else to become the notion of a unity so substantive and independent as to be debarred in another way from fulfilling the function required of it. Now, obviously the notion of self-consciousness as the ultimate ground

of experience can only be reached by us from the analogy of self-consciousness as evinced in our own experience. The Kantian categories were, it is clear, originally formulated as a result of reflexion on the character of scientific knowledge ; and that in scientific knowledge unity of self is realized may at once be admitted. Yet from the psychological point of view we have no alternative but to regard the self and its unity not as primordial data, but as factors of experience which have come to be under the same laws of change and development that we find to be operative in experience as a whole. If the self and its unity be described in terms appropriate to scientific knowledge, the conclusion is unavoidable that not thus is the self present in the more rudimentary stages of intelligence ; and the intermediate stages will have to be interpreted as the natural steps in advance from the simplest mode of consciousness to the developed type of the reflective apprehension of self. In this process of evolution, the determining factor cannot, therefore, be the activity of the self, equipped from the start with a whole armoury of categories ; to postulate a self of that kind as performing the function of bringing about experience would be a reversal of the actual order of knowledge. Doubtless any apprehension of an orderly objective world is possible only through those psychical conditions which enable a connected consciousness of self to be attained. In saying that, however, we are according the first place not to the unity of self, but to the orderly, connected, uniform character of the given material which the self apprehends. Kant, it is true, was wont to speak as though, whatever the nature of the manifold supplied for the synthetic work of the understanding, the outcome of that work would in any case be a connected and coherent world of objects, whereas the conclusion to which his argument really points is that without a connected and coherent world of objects the understanding could neither arise nor get to work at all.

But if self-consciousness as we are familiar with it is a subjective fact ; if the two correlative aspects, the subjective life of the self-conscious mind and the apprehension of what is objective develop side by side ; if the contents of the self and the meaning

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of its unity vary with the material of which it becomes cognisant, then it is no longer possible to advance by way of analogy from the notion of finite self-consciousness to the notion of an infinite self-consciousness as the sole ground and real essence of the world of nature. "The Absolute Idea," it has been said, "is only the perfect form of the relation which is found at all times between a knower and his knowledge. It was there Hegel found his Absolute, and, in this sense, Hegelianism is a systematized anthropomorphism." If, however, it be true that human self-consciousness implies a contradistinction from nature, and that the human mind only knows itself in knowing a nature that is distinct from itself, such "anthropomorphism" has been badly framed. It would be justified only on the supposition that the human self-consciousness comprised within itself the objects which in knowing it contrasts with itself. The very circumstance, however, that it has come to be by a process of development made possible by an external environment is sufficient to show that any such supposition is unwarranted. The reflective self-consciousness may in a sense take up and absorb the lower forms of consciousness from which it has been evolved, but assuredly it cannot in like manner take up and absorb the objects which it knows. Or, to bring out the point in another way, in respect to the finite self-consciousness, we are forced to distinguish between a universal and the notion or concept of that universal. A notion or concept is a way in which a universal is conceived, the mode in which it is grasped or cognized. It, no doubt, is a product of thought—of thought exercised upon a world of objects which are found to exhibit certain identities of character. Its manner of formation can be more or less psychologically traced. It is obtained by a cognitive process which is at once analytic and synthetic; a process, on the one hand, of singling out what is embedded in a matrix of reality, and, on the other hand, of bringing conceptually what is presented in numerical difference. The unit to which it refers is a quality characterizing a number of particulars, often widely removed from one another in time and space—a "pervasive character of things," to use Alexander's

phrase, appearing here, there and everywhere, under the most varying conditions, and not possessing the kind of unity which belongs to the concept. In short, the conceptual system is one thing, the system of reality to which it refers is another ; and, whatever the relation between them may be, it is not, as Hegel took it to be, a relation of identity. So that, even though it be granted that the nature of Mind or Self-consciousness when laid out in the abstract is just the system of pure thoughts or notions which Hegel elaborated, yet these thoughts or notions cannot as such constitute the structure of existent reality ; that is to say, the logical forms of thought have not, as such, anything strictly corresponding to them in the realm of objective fact.

Such, then, in meagre outline is one line of consideration that has led me away from the idealism of my earlier years. Other considerations to which I cannot here refer have likewise weighed with me. But, although Hegel's main contention seems to me now untenable, I have learnt a great deal from his writings. In particular, his strong and reiterated assertion of the principle that knowledge is knowledge of the real, that no realm of "ideas" interposes between thought and things, has always impressed me as a striking indication of his philosophic discernment. "Thoughts," as his oft-quoted dictum expresses it, "do not stand between us and things, shutting us off from the things ; they rather shut us together with them." On the other hand, the difficulty uniformly felt in wellnigh all realistic theories has been that they have been compelled to interpret knowledge not as knowledge of reality but of some *tertium quid* that intervenes between the knowing mind and reality. Experience has been repeatedly taken to be the result of the action of the real upon consciousness. The metaphor concealed in this mode of statement is that of a quasi-mechanical mode of operation ; and the content apprehended in perception is readily pictured as a product due to the interplay of the real that is other than the mind and the real that is the mind. It is a conception which, in truth, strikes at the root of any explanation of knowledge. There are no means of evading the consequences that follow from such a conception. The world of real things

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and the realm of produced presentations, however much of order and connectedness may accrue to the latter through the circumstance of being comprised in the unity of consciousness, fall inevitably apart from one another; and a certain baffling mode of existence, no less perplexing than that given in the Platonic theory to sense-particulars, comes to be assigned to what are called phenomena as distinct from real things. Frequently, while presentations are thus treated as effects, they are at the same time declared to be "manifestations" of that which gives rise to them. The term "manifestation" is itself beset with extraordinary ambiguity; but how, or in what sense, an effect can be a "phenomenal manifestation" of its cause it is simply impossible to see.

III

So long as realism is combined with a crudely mechanical account of the generation of experience it is certainly not in a position to withstand the fire of destructive criticism. The only realism which at the present day can lay claim to a respectful hearing must, it seems to me, be grounded on a theory of knowledge, in conformity to which it is possible to maintain that real things may be, and are, directly perceived without owing either their being or their nature to the circumstance of such perception. And that means that the content apprehended in perception must not be regarded as either a produced effect brought about by physical stimulation or as a construct on the part of the mind. This further implies that the content perceived must not be confused with, but carefully distinguished from the act or process of perceiving, which is, of course, a state or condition of the mental life itself. I have tried in various publications to work out in detail a view of the nature of perception which fulfils these requirements, and in what follows I propose briefly to indicate the main features of that view.

I start with a distinction which dates indeed from Aristotle, and which, thanks to Bradley, has become sufficiently familiar in current philosophical discussion—the distinction, namely,

between existence and essence or content, between the "that" and the "what" of any concrete fact. The *occurrence* of any act of perception, the occasioning condition of its *existence* as a state of the mental life, is, I have allowed, doubtless traceable to the physiological event of bodily stimulation; its *character* or *nature*, on the other hand, is not thus to be accounted for, but is explicable only by viewing it from within and as in relation to that upon which it is directed.

As regards the mode of occurrence, it will suffice to note certain general considerations. I am gazing (say) at the brown table at present in front of me. On scientific grounds, we are justified in asserting that a complicated network of physical and physiological events has been instrumental in bringing about this mental state of mine. From the table there have emanated modes of energy, and through them my visual organ has undergone impression or stimulation. In consequence of that stimulation, delicate changes, probably chemical in character, occur in the cones of the retina, the fibres of the optic nerve are thereby affected, and the influence, whatever it is, is conveyed by the optic-nerve fibres to the cerebral centres in the cortex with which the optic nerve is connected. What happens then? What is the next link in this chain of events? According to the mechanical theory to which I have referred, it is assumed that then, in a way admittedly mysterious, a transition is made, either in the brain or in the mind, from molecular motion to a so-called sense-quality. Under cover of the ambiguous term "sensation," there is supposed then to be produced both the brown colour and the awareness of it, though why, in that case, the brown should be projected into the object in front of me is confessedly no less an enigma than its mode of production. As a matter of fact, however, this supposed final stage in the sequence of events is nothing more than a gratuitous assumption. All we are justified in asserting is that either concomitantly with or in consequence of the cerebral change there arises, not a brand new quality nor even the awareness of one, but a mental state or activity, in and through which, *when a certain other set of conditions has been fulfilled, and not until*, there ensues awareness

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of a definitely coloured object. The entire sequence of physical and physiological events might have occurred as in this instance, and even have incited a mental act, but unless that act had been directed upon something, in this case the table, the awareness in question would not have come about.

Turn now to the cognitive act itself. In attempting to determine its nature, we have got to dismiss all reference to the way in which it has come about, and to describe it not as it might conceivably present itself to an external spectator, but as it reveals itself to us conducting our analysis, so to speak, from within. A self-conscious subject is able, more or less, to take up this reflective attitude; it is possible for him to turn his attention upon his own mode of procedure in the act of perceiving, and to convince himself as to how it is that the state of mind in which he finds himself achieves its end, and becomes a definite act of awareness. What report, then, does the cognitive act give of itself when thus reflectively treated? Not at all, so far as I can determine, the report which it has sometimes been thought to yield. It does not reveal itself as an act of constructing, or of putting together the parts of, that of which it comes to be aware. Viewed from within, it invariably evinces itself as a process, not of manufacturing an object, but of differentiating the features of an object, of gradually discerning distinctions which were not at first noticed, and of tracing connexions which were not at first discerned. In other words, it evinces itself as in its essential nature an act of *discriminating*. Just as for Kant the act of synthesizing *was* the very act of knowing, so I would maintain that the act of discriminating *is* virtually the act of knowing, or, at all events, the fundamental characteristic of that act *quâ* act. And I am prepared to carry this interpretation right down the scale of conscious existence, and to insist that wherever cognitive activity is exercised it is essentially a process *generically* the same as that which we find the process to be in our own mental lives. Undoubtedly, however, in the history of mind, discrimination exhibits the most varied stages of development—starting with the crudest possible distinction of that which appears as an obscure somewhat from the

vague indefinite background, and extending to the deliberate use of ideas of relation, such as we are familiar with in conceptual thought.

In the situation, then, which we describe as "perception of an object," two concrete facts are involved—on the one hand, the given object, and, on the other hand, the act or process of perceiving it. Each of these concrete facts exhibits the two aspects of existence and content. But, in view of what occurs in this situation—the gradual discrimination, namely, by the conscious subject, of the content of the object—a further distinction is here requisite. It is requisite, that is to say, to distinguish that which I have been in the habit of calling the "content apprehended" both from the content of the object and from the content of the mental act. To bring out the import of this distinction, James Ward's well-chosen illustration (employed by him, however, in a different context) of bestowing in the course of a few minutes half a dozen glances at a strange and curious flower will serve. Assuming that the act of apprehension is directed upon the actual flower, as a concrete fact in the external world, we may assert that the cognizing subject will gradually discriminate a multiplicity of its features—at first the general outline, next the disposition of petals, stamens, etc., afterwards the attachment of the anthers, position of the ovary, and so forth—he will, in other words, become aware by degrees of a variety of features constituting the content of the flower. And this *awareness* of the features of the flower is not, it is clear, something that can be severed from the act of being aware—i.e. the act of apprehending. If one describes it as the content of the act of apprehending at a particular stage of its progress, or as that which gives to the act in question its specific character and enables it to be distinguished from other cognizing acts of the same conscious subject, one will be doing no violence either to language or to the facts. No one would wish to maintain that this *awareness* is that which in the instance we are considering is cognized, that *it* is the object upon which the act of apprehension is directed. No one would, I should suppose, wish to deny that such awareness is a characteristic of the act of appre-

hension, when that act has reached a certain measure of completeness. In contrast with this, the "content apprehended" is that which is frequently designated the "appearance" of the object to the percipient. It, likewise, is not the object upon which the act of apprehension is directed. For the object is, *ex hypothesi*, the actual flower—an object which the conscious subject gradually comes to recognize has a variety of characteristics—shape, size, colours, etc. But the sum of the characteristics which the conscious subject will be aware of at any specific moment will be different from the sum of characteristics which he will be aware of at another moment, and either of these will only be a fragment of the much larger sum of characteristics which there are good reasons for believing the flower itself possesses. Clearly, therefore, the sum of *apprehended* features (i.e. the content apprehended, or the "appearance" of the object) is *distinguishable* from the larger sum of characteristics constituting the *whole* content of the object. Just as clearly the former cannot be an existent fact, be it called a "presentation" or a "sense-datum," or what not. For it is, if one may use the term in this connexion, a selection from the features forming the content of the object, and we have already premised that the content or nature of any concrete fact, such as a flower, is not to be confused with its existence, that its "what" is distinguishable from its "that." So far, then, from this selection of features being there, as an existent fact, prior to the act of apprehension, and in some way calling forth that act, it only comes to be in virtue of the act of apprehension having been first of all directed upon the actual object, and apart from such act would have had no "being" of any sort.

A further point is worth emphasizing. In the threefold distinction just insisted upon, the term "content" has been employed quite consistently and unambiguously. Throughout it has signified a sum of characteristics. The content of the given thing is the sum of its characteristics or properties; the "content apprehended" is, we may say provisionally, so many of these characteristics as are, for the time being, cognized; and the content of the act of perceiving is the sum of those charac-

teristics of the said act which is described as awareness of the features just referred to.

So far I have been speaking of perception, and for the sake of simplicity it was permissible to do so as though it took place on each occasion *de novo*. The conclusion reached as regards its essential character will be in no way invalidated by now introducing a factor I have been deliberately neglecting. The act of perceiving remains from first to last an act of discriminating and of thus becoming aware of the features of its object. But that process is enormously furthered by the circumstance that it takes place in a mind which by dint of long and repeated practice has come to perform such acts more or less habitually and by aid of the facility of retentiveness or revival. Now, if the foregoing analysis be on the right lines, it can alone be the *awareness*—the content, namely, of a mental act—that is capable of being revived or “reproduced.” The “content apprehended” cannot itself persist after the act through and by means of which it has its being has ceased to exist. It cannot persist in and for itself, simply because it is not an existent. And it cannot persist in the mind, because it has never been “in” the mind, in the strict sense of the term. On the other hand, the contents of our own cognitive acts, the awareness, if one may so name them, which we live through, or *erleben*—these are the mind’s own property, or rather go to constitute its very being, and these we are forced to recognize it has the power of retaining in some form, and of reviving, and of utilizing the retained awareness in the life of the present. A well-worn illustration of Hutchison Stirling’s will here suit my purpose. When one fine morning a ship unexpectedly appeared on the horizon, *what* it was was evident at a glance to Crusoe. Yet, what to Crusoe was a ship was to his man Friday only an amorphous blur, a perplexing, confusing, frightening mass of detail, which would not assume for him the form of a definite coherent object. There was, that is to say, a tremendous difference between the contents apprehended by these two individuals confronted though they were by one and the same object. The external conditions were similar; the dissimilarity between what they respectively per-

ceived was largely traceable to their previous mental histories. Crusoe had seen ships scores of times before, and a revival of his former awareness came at once to his aid. What he was actually discriminating at the moment was probably far less than what Friday was discriminating, and yet Friday was at a loss to make out what the mysterious thing out there could possibly be. This instance is typical. In ordinary perception there can be no question, a vast deal of what we suppose ourselves to be immediately discerning is not, as a matter of fact, immediately discerned, it is discerned through the aid of the revival of previous awareness of similar objects. In other words, the perception of a mature mind is interpenetrated with what accrues to it from a long series of perceptive acts.

Thus, as the mental life develops, our apprehension of things tends to become less and less immediate and direct. The contents of what we call our knowledge, of what we are said to know about objects, gradually come to assume the form of an inward possession, constituting almost an instrument wherewith we proceed further to differentiate and to grasp the nature of the world to be known. Consequently, in the case of a familiar object—and the great majority of objects we encounter are familiar—we do not require on each occasion to discriminate afresh its manifold characteristics. The act of perception is certainly directed upon that object, but its familiarity saves us from the necessity of going through the whole process of discriminating anew. It is enough that we discriminate at the moment only a relatively small number of its features; these immediately suggest the awareness of features previously discriminated; and the apprehension in question is attained with an ease and rapidity that would otherwise have been impossible. We have here, in fact, an example of that economy of labour which consciousness throughout its procedure exemplifies. In short, our perception tends to become less and less dependent upon what, at the time, is actually given; we bring to bear upon what is given a wealth of awareness which ensures that no perceptive act is ever, even in its incipient stage, devoid of specific contest.

Pursuing this line of reflexion, I have further tried to offer

an explanation of the content apprehended in the case of memory and imagination. The process of imagining is, in truth, I have argued, of one piece, so to speak, with the process of perceiving, the chief difference being that in imagination a relatively larger proportion of revived factors are involved. It is easy to make the transition from the one process to the other by means of instances in regard to which this is manifestly true. An imaginative child is, let us suppose, gazing at a mass of fleecy clouds in the play of the sunlight. Soon the shapes and forms of its various parts will assume for him the appearance of chariots, and horses, and warriors, like a scene in ancient legend. The child will, that is to say, be apprehending the given object through the medium of his revived experiences of pictures, story-books, tales to which he has listened, and so forth. To put it briefly, there is here, as there is in perception, a certain nucleus, if we may so express it, of actually discriminated fact, although considerably less than what is usually discriminated in normal perception. And round this nucleus of actually perceived fact, there is, in consequence of the revived awareness suffusing, as it were, the act through which the discrimination takes place, a penumbra, so to speak, of features that seem to share with the nucleus the characteristic of objectivity. That a large number of so-called "images" which appear to stand over against the conscious subject as objects are thus susceptible of explanation is, I take it, scarcely open to question. And I believe that it is a mode of explanation which may be extended to a variety of other cases where its applicability is less obvious. It is surprising how readily the phenomena of dream-images, for instance, lend themselves to this mode of explanation, and the same is true, I think, of memory-images in all their variety. The gist of the explanation, it will be observed, is not merely that sense-stimulation is involved, but that in imagination, where objective imagery is present, there is, as in perception, a real object upon which the act of discriminating is directed, and that this accounts for the objective character which the content apprehended seems to possess, although the number of the features of this object actually discriminated is considerably less than in perception, and the

portion of the apprehended content traceable to revived awareness considerably greater and more arbitrary and haphazard. It is necessary, no doubt, to recognize that bodily factors, and not only extra-organic things, may, in many situations, function as objects.

One way of expressing the central position of the theory of knowledge of which I have been trying to give a sketch would be to say that cognition is, in all its various forms, essentially of one piece, essentially of one character, that even the simplest and most rudimentary modes of cognitive activity are already in essence acts of judgment. For no one doubts that an act of judging is fundamentally an act of discriminating. There is, however, a psychological disadvantage in extending too widely the scope of the terms "thought" and "judgment." If it be recognized that the primary function of discriminating, comparing and relating is present from the beginning of cognitive apprehension, the terms "thought" and "judgment" may be restricted to the higher developments of cognitive activity, which involves both this primary function and the results attained by it in the sphere of sense-perception. The terms "thinking" and "judging," as ordinarily understood, denote, of course, an extremely complex reflective act, which depends for its exercise on definite recognition of the distinction between the inner subjective experience of the individual and the real world apprehended by him about which his judgments turn. But in "thinking" as thus understood, there is carried to a greater range of adequacy and completeness just that same activity, the character of which I have sought to exhibit in dealing with sense-perception.

IV

The theory of cognition I have thus briefly described is, it will be seen, thoroughly compatible with the contention that, step by step, the human mind is attaining to a knowledge of the universe as it actually is, a universe which is there to be known, and which is not dependent, so far as either its existence or nature is concerned, upon the mind that knows it. A contrast between

the content known and the actual reality we are doubtless constrained to admit, and it may be urged that this is no other than the old contrast between the phenomenal and the real. But the difference between the two modes of conceiving the matter is fundamental. The content apprehended is certainly to be distinguished from the real, but not as though it were one fact set along side another. It is not a *tertium quid* situate between the apprehending subject and the thing or event apprehended by him ; it is a way in which the latter is known, a way in which knowledge of the latter is had, and this very characteristic precludes us from regarding it as itself an existent. We may call it a " phenomenon " if we please, but in that case the contrast between the phenomenal and the real indicates no more than the contrast between a fragmentary and partial aspect of the real, and the real in its concrete richness and fullness—a contrast, in other words, between reality as it is but incompletely and as it might be completely known. The colours and sounds, and other sense-qualities, which we discern in Nature, are not, according to the view I am taking, creations of the apprehending mind ; on the contrary, they are, what they purport to be, features of the reality which it discerns. The discriminative power of finite minds may be circumscribed and limited in countless ways, but there is nothing, so far as I can discover, in the nature of knowing as such to incapacitate it for the work it has to do, or to prevent it from approximating even nearer and nearer to the truth of things.

The problem with which I have been here concerned is mainly an epistemological problem, and I have left myself no space for venturing into the field of metaphysics. Let me, however, in conclusion, guard against a possible misunderstanding by disowning any attempt that may be made to see in what I have written a defence of the doctrine commonly called dualism. That material things and mental lives are entities fundamentally disparate in character I certainly hold to be true. But to me it seems that the world is full of entities, or modes of being, which are, in their way, no less disparate from one another in character than mind and matter. Nor am I in the least concerned to

dispute that absolute independence cannot be claimed for any of the concrete particulars of the universe, or that ultimately they must together form an inter-connected system. So much I should, on the contrary, be prepared to insist. Yet a bare statement of that sort amounts in itself to very little. The question for metaphysics to answer, if it can, is as to the kind of system that would be compatible with what we know of the contents of reality. I may be blind, but I fail to see why, in order to constitute a system, there must be one matrix from which all qualitative differences have arisen—one ultimate mode of being of which everything else is but a fragmentary manifestation. And in the effort to comprehend the nature of the inter-connected system of reality I am convinced we should do well to heed the great lesson of Kant's *Dialectic*, and recognize that notions or categories which are highly significant when we are dealing with parts of the universe may lose their significance if the attempt be made to apply them to the universe as a whole.

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ON THE WAY TO A SYNOPTIC PHILOSOPHY

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BIOGRAPHICAL

TURNING over the leaves of the three volumes of *Die Deutsche Philosophie in Selbstdarstellungen*, which have suggested to our editor the plan of this book, I find that the task set to each contributor is twofold. He is expected, on the one hand, himself to cast up, as it were, the sum of his philosophical life-work, and, on the other, to give an autobiographical account of the experiences and influences which have made his philosophy what it is. How did his philosophy come to be? And what does it amount to? These are, broadly, the two questions to which, in self-interpretation, we are asked to give an answer.

It is no false modesty if I confess that I undertake this task, for myself, only with great misgivings. There are contributors to these volumes—like my revered and admired friend, Dr. Bernard Bosanquet, whose recent death has robbed English philosophy of one of its few outstanding figures—in whose company I feel like a dwarf amongst giants. And, again, I realize acutely that I have no compact and finished whole of doctrine to offer which I could call “my philosophy.” I feel that, just as I am still in the middle of life, so I am still in the middle of my philosophizing; and though, no doubt, my philosophical thoughts tend in the main towards a type commonly called “idealistic,” yet most emphatically my report will have to be, not so much of achievements and results, as of tendencies and directions. Even so far as I can speak of a distinctive pattern into which my thoughts tend to fall, yet I am fully conscious that this pattern is still provisional and on trial, and that its component elements hold their place, not by any vivid and unshakable conviction of their truth compared with which all alternatives seem patently false, but only because, among many alternatives,

tried out again and again, they commend themselves as best "on the whole" and "all things considered."

How I came to be a philosopher and to adopt the teaching of philosophy as my profession, I can hardly explain adequately to myself, now that I look back on that momentous decision made nearly twenty years ago. It does not seem to me that either my German descent or my German schooling had much to do with it. For, although I can trace my parentage on both sides to the Suabian stock from which so many of Germany's *Dichter und Denker* have sprung, family tradition, had I followed it, would have pointed me rather to the Church or to business in the choice of a career. At school, my training was predominantly literary—Latin, Greek, and German. Comparatively little attention was paid to exact methods of thought, nor were we made aware, even in the upper forms, of the first principles, or at least assumptions, on which the conclusions put before us, or the choice between rival conclusions, rested. There was nothing comparable to the courses in logic, psychology and metaphysics, which, I understand, form part of the curriculum in the top form of a French *Lycée*. This neglect of emphasis on principles was true even of the teaching of mathematics. I was accounted good at mathematics, but I recall vividly that I used to get my results mainly by a happy knack, or ingenuity, in the application of rules or formulæ, the *rationale* of which I was all the time conscious of not understanding at all. Indeed, it was not made clear to me that there was a *rationale* for the procedures which I learned so skilfully to manipulate. Mathematics seemed to me, not so much a supremely logical structure, as a bag of tricks. When, later on, I came upon Mr. Bertrand Russell's paradox that a mathematician never knows what he is talking about, nor whether what he says is true; or when I found Professor C. I. Lewis, in *Survey of Formal Logic*, showing how mathematical logic may, by wilful abstraction, be regarded as merely a kind of game played with symbols according to arbitrary, but strictly defined rules, I realized that this had been exactly my own attitude towards mathematics. Needless to say, I have learnt better since then. I know now

that in mathematical operations one is speaking a language through which certain things are said which cannot be said so clearly or precisely in any other way. I hold now that mathematical symbols constitute a language which appeals to the eye rather than the ear, which has to be read rather than spoken; and that it is a problem of great philosophical interest just what can be said, and said best (if not said exclusively), in this language concerning the nature of the world.

Perhaps my nearest approach to philosophical speculations during my schooldays was through the theological discussions in which with a group of friends I used to engage. We would pace the linden avenue round the playing-fields in the old monastery garden of the *Landesschule* at Pforte, near Naumburg on the Saale, and decide, in hot and eager debate, that the concept of the Trinity, Three Persons in One God, was an insult to logic, and that there was no evidence for the existence of God. We took some of our difficulties to the school chaplain, Professor Witte, son of a well-known Dante scholar, but his attempt to make the doctrine of the Trinity plausible to us by the metaphor of root, trunk, and leaves in a tree—one living thing in three forms of manifestation—met from us a rejection as uncompromising as the doctrine itself. On these, and many other topics, our thinking was more vigorous and challenging than understanding. It was only years later that, through the study of philosophy, and especially of the philosophy of religion, I came to look at religion and religious doctrines with different eyes. The crude literalness, for instance, with which we interpreted "person" on the analogy of distinct human individuals, has had to yield to the knowledge that *persona* means, originally, an actor's mask, and thence an actor's part, whence it was an easy generalization to extend its use to any part that a man plays in life, any function that he performs. In this sense one God may well be, or rather have, three "persons." I have come to see, too, that religion is a spiritual phenomenon without a sympathetic understanding of which any philosophy must remain incomplete; that it is, in short, a mode of experiencing the world which no metaphysical theory of the nature of the

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world can afford to ignore. But of this more below. Here I will add only that if philosophy has helped me to see that the religious attitude towards the world is, in principle, reasonable, it has not led me back to regular membership of any Church. In the demands of any particular orthodoxy I still feel the intellectual prison-house, rather than the truth which makes free.

For two generations my family had been connected with India, where my father, the well-known Oriental scholar, Dr. A. F. Rudolf Hoernlé, Ph.D., M.A., C.I.E., was born. Thus, I, too, am by birth a British citizen, and it was natural, therefore, with a view to my future career in England or in the British Empire, that I should pass from German schools to an English University. When I entered Balliol College, my plan was to prepare for the Indian Civil Service by taking Classical Moderations and *Litteræ Humaniores* ("Greats"). For a long time my interests were equally divided between Philosophy and Greek History, and I cannot now say what finally turned the balance in favour of the former. Partly, perhaps, it was the influence and encouragement of the then Master of the College, Edward Caird; partly, too, the stimulating tutorial hours with J. A. Smith, now Waynflete Professor of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy at Oxford. But, most of all, it seems to me in retrospect, it was the study of Plato and Kant which fixed in me the determination to devote myself to philosophy, after my curiosity had been aroused and whetted by the reading of the works, first, of Nietzsche and, next, of Schopenhauer. Yet, it was not so much that I accepted the positive doctrines of Plato and Kant, as Schopenhauer had accepted them, with enthusiastic acclaim. No, they held me and drew me on rather by baffling and eluding me. So far from their breaking on me like a sudden light, they rather presented problems to me of intriguing difficulty. The more I acquired the sort of knowledge of them which enables one to answer examination questions, the less I felt satisfied that I really understood them. In Plato, I recall, that my questionings and puzzles centred especially around the Form of Good, the relation of the Forms to the particulars of sense, and the discussion of error

in the *Theatetus*. In Kant, the concept of the thing-in-itself, the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, and the criticism of Rational Theology in the "Dialectic" of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, played a similar part as intellectual irritants. This effect was heightened by Caird's treatment of Kant as having aimed at, but failed to achieve, a view which Caird identified, in its general outline, with that of Hegel. This view, which I then knew only through Caird's presentation of it, I found even more elusive, though I acquired the knack of its phraseology sufficiently to bluff the examiners. Thus, it seems to me, I became a philosopher chiefly because my philosophical studies as an undergraduate both aroused my interest in certain problems and offered me answers which I did not understand to my satisfaction. It became clear to me that if I were to gain this understanding at all, I should have to take up philosophy for its own sake. My election to the Jenkyns Exhibition at Balliol College, which was followed by that to the John Locke Scholarship in Mental Philosophy of the University, and a year later, to a Senior Demyship at Magdalen College encouraged me to persist in the choice of philosophy as my life's work.

In the autumn of 1905, I got my first teaching appointment as Lecturer in Philosophy under Professor B. Bosanquet at St. Andrews University. With this appointment began my *Wanderjahre*, which have been unusually varied and prolonged. In January, 1908, I moved on to my first Professorship, at the South African College, Cape Town. There I spent four strenuous but happy years. Much of it was pioneering work, but I found Schiller's saying verified in my own experience: "*Es wächst der Mensch mit seinen gröss'ren Zwecken.*" It was heavy work, too—rarely less than fifteen hours of lecturing per week for thirty-six weeks of the year; and when a Department of Education was started, I acted for a year as Professor of Education, in addition to my work as Professor of Philosophy, until the College funds permitted the founding of a Chair of Education. For a year, too, I held the position of Vice-Chairman of Senate. The Chairmanship being honorary, and the College having no Principal, the Vice-Chairman of Senate

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was the chief administrative officer, and without any relief from his regular teaching duties, found himself engaged in committee-work almost every afternoon. Needless to say, the scholar in me suffered, for the time, from this burden of practical work, which left no leisure for writing and very little for keeping up with current literature. But the man and the philosopher, I think, profited by this experience of affairs and of the handling of men. I seemed to verify in myself what I take to be Plato's teaching, viz. that practical experience is a necessary element in the training, not only of a philosopher-king, but even of a philosopher. There was, moreover, one experience during these years which has proved of great value to me, especially for my understanding of political philosophy. I was fortunate enough to be a close spectator of the movement which culminated in the formation of the present Union of South Africa out of the four independent self-governing colonies. This experience of the birth of a nation, this sense of an irresistible tide of aspiration—uplifting hearts in hope, subordinating selfish and parochial interests resolutely to a large ideal of common good, undoing in generous co-operation the divisions and hatreds left behind by war—have made an abiding impression upon me and given me many a clue for the interpretation of the "idealistic" theory of the State.

In January, 1912, I was recalled to England, to be the first occupant of the newly-created Chair of Philosophy at the Armstrong College (Newcastle-on-Tyne) in the University of Durham. Thence, in the summer of 1914, I moved on to join the Department of Philosophy at Harvard University, having been invited to do so after a visit to Harvard in the autumn of 1913. My six years at Harvard, during two of which I acted as Chairman of the Department, have been among the most instructive of my career. They have brought me into contact with many of the ablest and most active philosophical thinkers in the United States, among whom I must specially mention my colleagues at Harvard, Professors R. B. Perry and W. E. Hocking. They enabled me to study, from the inside, an academic system which presents a most interesting fusion of Scotch and

English with German models. For the Ph.D. system has been adopted from Germany, whereas the education up to the B.A. standard has been modelled on Scotch and English traditions. I gained, too, at first hand, an insight into the various tendencies of philosophical thought in America, and especially into "realism" in its diverse forms. And, again, I owe to America an experience which has illuminated for me the working of human nature in society. I observed there on a large scale, how, under the stress of the war-born demand for unity of action and uniformity of thought and feeling, a free people will deny liberty—even constitutionally guaranteed liberty—to unpopular views and causes; and how democracy triumphant will employ against its critics and enemies, actual or supposed, exactly the same weapons of repression and persecution as those by which autocracy once sought to defeat the spread of democratic ideas.

In the summer of 1920, Armstrong College invited me back to my old Chair, but once more, as I write these lines, I am about to move on—this time, for reasons of my wife's health, back to South Africa, to the new University of the Witwatersrand at Johannesburg. My work at Newcastle, since my return, has been inspired mainly by the thought that a University placed, like Armstrong College, in a centre of business and industry owes a duty not only to its enrolled students, but to the whole community of which it forms a part. It should strive to be the focus of the intellectual life of its neighbourhood, and offer to its fellow-citizens an opportunity to keep in touch especially with those larger movements of thought in science, in philosophy, in religion, which lie behind the visible scene, and make or unmake our civilization. I have tried to do my share towards the realization of this ideal, both by means of courses of public lectures and by the formation of a Seminar in which professional men and women met together for more systematic study and discussion of philosophical problems. The success of this experiment would seem to show that there is here a real need to be met.

In general, the influences of family, school, university, and the varied life of my *Wanderjahre* seem to me to have combined with

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an inborn responsiveness to new impressions and adaptability to new environments in giving to all my philosophical thinking a certain "synoptic" character. Wherever I have lived, I have found in myself a desire to identify myself with the life around me, to enter into it and share it from inside, rather than to stand outside as a mere spectator or even to reject it as foreign to myself. To see a problem, be it practical or theoretical, from a new angle through another's eyes and to appreciate for myself how it presents itself from that side, have for me a peculiar fascination. This attitude rests on no mere whim of curiosity, nor on a mere instinct of sympathy and fellow-feeling. No, it is for me one with the synoptic method of all my philosophical thinking, which itself rests on the assumption that truth has many sides, and that to the whole truth on any subject every point of view has some contribution to make. Moreover, it has led me to emphasize that not only does one-sidedness involve abstraction and partial error, but that the correction of one-sidedness requires the *first-hand exploration* of other points of view—a study of them, not only from the outside, but by genuine acquaintance from within. Philosophical thinking on any subject, if it is to be worth anything, should always be, in Royce's apt phrase, "from the life." No doubt, mere range, mere wealth of data, mere width of experience do not, of themselves, guarantee understanding or insight. Yet, on the other hand, I hold that if we are to think fruitfully and relevantly, we must have something to *think with*, and that, given the power to extract from data by synoptic insight the total truth they have to teach, the more materials we have to think with by first-hand acquaintance, the better is our chance to get near to the truth. This ideal of synopsis dominates all my thinking. It predisposes me, for example, to accept the view that to our perceptual knowledge of a physical object every "perspective" and every sensation has a contribution to make, and that the whole nature of the object cannot be known otherwise. So, again, in all practical matters, where diverse and perhaps even conflicting interests are involved, I am led to assume that, whatever adjustments and even sacrifices may be necessary,

yet each interest has a right to be considered a factor in the problem to be solved. In the same spirit I hold that the philosopher must draw on all types and modes of experience—scientific, moral, æsthetic, religious—in his interpretation of the world, and that his interpretation will depend on the kind and degree of his first-hand acquaintance with each of these types of experience no less than on his synoptic power.

The complexity of modern civilization may well make such an encyclopædic ideal seem unattainable, and even at best, the effort to realize it, within the inevitable limitations of any one philosopher's experience and power of synopsis, carries with it the danger of dispersion and superficiality. But these practical difficulties of realization, which I feel very acutely, do not seem to me to invalidate the ideal as such, or to diminish one whit its value as defining the direction in which philosophy must ever strive.

For me, at any rate, this ideal and this attitude have grown out of the circumstances and influences that have determined the course of my life so far and moulded my thinking. So far as the passing years have brought me "wisdom," it lies in this synoptic outlook which has gradually taken shape and come to clear consciousness within me. It is the philosophical correlate of the cosmopolitan outlook in politics which I owe, not only to the combination in me of German descent and British citizenship, but still more to the lesson which South Africa, above all, has taught me, viz. that the British Empire, judged by its best ideals, is not so much an "Empire" as a Commonwealth of Free Peoples—a working instalment, as it were, of the League of Nations. That one-sidedness and narrowness in thought and feeling furnish an inadequate basis for solving the practical problems of statesmanship, no less than the theoretical problems of philosophy, I learnt from watching the relations of Boer and Briton, and of White and Black, in South Africa. And the same lesson was re-enforced and enriched by my experience of the American "melting-pot" in which fragments of all races and all civilizations are being fused together, not without strain and travail, into a new nation and a distinctive type of culture.

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Such a cosmopolitan outlook—the political equivalent of the synoptic attitude in philosophy—is not incompatible, as I conceive, with patriotism, but it compels the patriot to ground his loyalty to his country on the conviction that, at its best, it stands for ideals which are non-aggressive and non-exclusive. After all, even the chief aims of foreign policy, viz. independence and security, fruitful breeders of war though they have but too often proved themselves to be, yet are not inherently and essentially aggressive. And in the fields of science, art, literature, the best work of each people enriches the culture of all and contributes to a common stock of human achievement. Such work, without ceasing to be national in character, is yet always supra-national in its appeal, and so far as men are responsive to that appeal they are freed from their present obsession by hatred, fear, suspicion, and revenge. For a philosopher, especially, there is no reason why his “spiritual home” should coincide with the political frontiers of his State, or why he should not learn, as I am conscious of having done, from Descartes as well as from Spinoza, Berkeley, or Kant. Émile Boutroux spoke truly when, in lectures delivered before the University of Berlin in the spring of 1914, he argued that the German and the French spirit are complementary to each other and both necessary to the advancement of European civilization. Only, the principle is of general application, and holds for all countries and races which have any contribution at all to make to the sum-total of human achievement.

Again, this lesson which I seem to myself to have learnt from contact with many men in many lands, and with different national cultures, has been confirmed for me also in the field of scientific and philosophical theories. Here, too, an omnivorous interest and an open-minded responsiveness to new ideas and new movements of thought have combined to re-enforce in me the synoptic temper. And by an “open” mind I mean, not a jelly-like mind without structure or stability, but a mind alive, receptive, attentive to as many sides of human experience as possible. Philosophy, it seems to me, demands of its disciples the cultivation of this habit of mind. Certainly, the great

masters of philosophy have had minds of synoptic range, and I try, *longo intervallo*, to follow in their footsteps.

The effects of this synoptic attitude are recognizable in all my work, even in my reviewing of the books of my fellow-philosophers. Some critics are like gardeners who divide all plants into those they are willing to cultivate and encourage for their beauty and use and those they persecute and destroy as weeds. Such critics judge every book by the standard of their own views, treated as truth absolute and complete, and they accept or reject it according as it agrees or disagrees with that standard. My own attitude as a critic is more like that of a naturalist to whom every living plant is an object of interest worthy of study, as illustrating in yet a fresh way the inexhaustible resourcefulness of life. In practice, this means a wide tolerance: "It takes all sorts to make a world," and it certainly takes all possible points of view to exhibit the whole truth. Hence, in reviewing a book written from a new or unfamiliar point of view, I find myself much more interested in seeing the world through the author's eyes, than in criticizing him because he does not see it in my way. This may make, at times, for undue leniency of judgment—a witty friend remarked to me recently: "Your criticism is always like a caress"—but at least it saves me from the inevitable one-sidedness of the polemics of the schools.

Here, too, is the proper place to acknowledge my debt to two English thinkers whose influence upon me has been so pervasive that I find it hard to estimate its extent. Anyone familiar with the writings of F. H. Bradley and of Bernard Bosanquet will readily appreciate that, with my bias towards a synoptic attitude in philosophy, I was strongly attracted towards their kindred method and outlook. I find it impossible to disentangle in my thinking what I owe to them from what is my own. Indeed, where nothing matters except that one should think and utter the truth to the best of one's ability, it would be foolish to stress points of difference or to base on them claims to distinctive originality. Concerning my debt to these two great thinkers, as, indeed, concerning my debt to all the thinkers,

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great and small, of the past and of the present, whose thought has somehow enriched my own, I can only echo Bradley's own words: "If I had succeeded in owing more, I might then perhaps have gained more of a claim to be original." To find one's own impressions of the world endorsed by thinkers greater than oneself is one of the truest pleasures which the study of philosophy affords. There is little opportunity in philosophy for the experimental verification of theories on which scientists so frequently can rely for proof or disproof of their hypotheses. The only kind of verification which a philosopher can generally expect consists in the corroboration of his own conclusions by others. And even the views of acknowledged masters gain something from the testimony of a disciple who, re-thinking them for himself, finds them confirmed. The works of Bradley and Bosanquet offered to me the kind of method of philosophizing and the kind of resulting theory which most completely satisfied my philosophical needs. I say deliberately "the *kind* of method" and "the *kind* of theory," for it is to the general spirit of their philosophizing rather than to the details of their views that I feel myself indebted. Indeed, it is difficult to express such a sense of indebtedness, however profound and genuine, without at the same time seeming to imply a degree of dependence and similarity of view which would justly provoke the protest that I have been a very poor disciple, and that their work must not be judged by mine. Fully aware of this danger, I still must set down that in Bradley's demand for "comprehensiveness" and "systematization," for width of range (indeed, for all-inclusiveness) together with internal coherence and harmony, I am conscious of having, for the first time in my philosophical reading, met with an explicit formulation of just the ideal which I mean by "synopsis"—a term, by the way, which we all owe to Plato, but for the reintroduction of which into the vocabulary of contemporary philosophy we have to thank especially the late Dr. J. T. Merz. On the other hand, though I have felt the force of Bradley's dialectic, which consists in exhibiting the inherent self-contradictions of all thought and inferring, thence, the reality of Absolute Experience as combining within itself

the immediacy of feeling with the ordered articulation of thought, I have never been able to adopt this dialectic, like Bradley, as the supreme method of philosophizing. I have always been more attracted by the positive and constructive programme of thought which is suggested by the ideal of combining a comprehensive survey of the whole field of experience with the tracing of a coherent order or pattern within it. So, again, I accept Bradley's famous definition of judgment as "the reference of an idea to reality," if I may take it to mean that the reality which reveals itself to us in every mode and kind of our experience is what we think it to be (or, has the character which thought ascribes to it). Similarly, I accept the view that we think *truly* when we think *necessarily* what we do think, if I am right in interpreting this "necessity," with Bosanquet, to mean that reality is what we *must* think it to be because, in the light of all the available evidence, we cannot think it to be otherwise. When we can say, "this or nothing," our thinking has the stability and coherence for the sake of which we call it "true." No doubt, Bradley is right in insisting that thought falls short of reality, that feeling and doing are other than thinking and knowing, that no "idea" or theory can ultimately be adequate to the real in its concrete character. Yet, with Bosanquet, I prefer to throw the emphasis on the other side and to dwell, not so much on the shortcomings of thought even at its best, but rather on the difference between better thinking and worse, and on the positive way in which thought at its best brings home to us the nature and meaning of the universe. I agree with him that the aim of philosophy, in the hands of such masters as Plato or Spinoza, Kant or Hegel, has been to give "the quintessence of life," or, in a fuller phrase, "a rendering in coherent thought, of what lies at the heart of actual life and love." I agree with him, too, that such philosophy, both in the deep conviction with which it is held and in the positive import of its doctrines, is not so much a "theory about" the real in opposition to concrete experience of it, but an attempt to express, and make explicit by reflection, just what we experience the true nature of the real to be. Thus, as a consequence

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of this shift of emphasis, I value the method of dialectic chiefly for its power of exhibiting the insufficiency of one-sided and superficial views of the real and thus leading to a fuller and more stable understanding of its nature. So far as I use the method at all, I try to use it, like Bosanquet, as a means of criticizing first impressions and of focusing gradually the evidence of all relevant experience on the problem in hand, giving due weight, moreover, to the experiences which bring the deeper and completer insight. In short, the method of dialectic is an expression of the synoptic attitude, and all synopsis aims at comprehending "the quintessence of experience." Granted that Bradley's use of dialectic is justified for showing that thought, just because it is thought, must ever fail to grasp the real completely, yet, before we face this ultimate self-condemnation of thought, we can find ample scope for the use of dialectic in the service of synoptic thinking. For the best example, in present-day philosophy, of such synoptic thinking, and for the spirit and outlook upon life which go with it, I feel my debt is far greater to Bosanquet than it is to Bradley. After I had left Oxford, I passed through a period of revulsion from the "idealism" which I had been taught by Caird. Or, rather, I should say that I experienced a revulsion from what little I had mastered of that idealism and made my own. For, whatever the shortcomings of Caird's idealism may have been, I can see now in retrospect that my dissatisfaction was really the rebound from something which I had failed to understand. This found expression at the time in an article in *Mind* on Professor Baillie's *Idealistic Construction of Experience*, the reading of which marked the apex of my revolt against "idealism." It was from then onwards that I gradually began, through the study of Bosanquet's writings, to understand "idealism," or rather "speculative philosophy," better, and to recover a sympathetic and appreciative attitude towards it. In this sense, I was able to write, in the Preface to my *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*, that I owed the essential framework of my thinking to Dr. Bosanquet.

ON THE WAY TO A SYNOPTIC PHILOSOPHY

Turning, now, from the circumstances and influences which have made me a philosopher and helped to determine my philosophical method and outlook, I must try to give a brief account of the results and conclusions to which, so far, I have been led.

As the first result, I must set down my conviction, gained through philosophizing itself, of the supremacy of the synoptic method. I would like to supplement what I have already said about this method from the fuller account of it which I have given in the first chapter of my *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*.

It is obvious to anyone familiar with philosophical literature that the field over which philosophical discussion ranges includes, at one end, questions of detail—especially of logical and psychological detail—in which there is infinite scope for minute technical analysis, and that, at the other end, it rises to ultimate problems, to problems of immense sweep concerning the nature of the universe as a whole, which require more particularly a synthetic, or synoptic, power. Within so large a field, there is room for many different kinds of minds. Men not only differ in temperament and experience, but also in their intellectual interests and in the different proportions in which they draw upon the culture—the science, art, politics, religion—of their age. These differences will inevitably be reflected in the contributions they make to the common enterprise of philosophy, in the kind of philosophical work to which they devote themselves, the kind of philosophical theory they adopt. The philosophy of men of mathematical and scientific training, as striking examples among contemporary thinkers show, is apt to differ profoundly from the philosophy of men who draw rather on history and literature, or whose minds have been moulded by the handling of men and of affairs. Few of us, nowadays, have the all-round familiarity with all these sides of life and culture which is demanded in Plato's scheme of advanced education. Hence some are called "philosophers"

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though they only concentrate on some problems of detail within the whole field of philosophy, or specialize, at most, in some section or sections of that field, abandoning the larger outlook and making no attempt to survey the field as a whole. And even when we try to take up the point of view of the whole, or, which is the same thing, to deal with fundamental and all-pervasive issues, our limitations inevitably betray us. We may achieve a relative wholeness, but only at the price of exclusions and rejections which will reflect the sides of experience in which we are defective. It is clearly possible, as measured by the whole task of philosophy, to be *more or less* of a philosopher. And "more or less," here, means "better or worse," in exactly the same sense in which we distinguish a better and a worse in respect of all other qualities or activities of mind, as when we say that one man is a better mathematician, or painter, or statesman, than another. But there is always a danger that, in defining our ideal of the "true" philosopher, we may set up as standard our special interests or preferences, forgetting that by their one-sidedness they are also defects and limitations. The example and spirit of the greatest philosophers of all ages should here keep us straight. Taking their teaching and practice as my standard, I would maintain that the spirit of philosophy, at its fullest, is the spirit of wholeness. Concentration on problems of detail, specialization, selective emphasis on this side or on that, are necessary, no doubt, in their place, but they should be treated, not as final and satisfying in themselves, but as subsidiary and contributory to the central aim of philosophizing in the fullest sense, which is to seek a reasonable attitude towards the universe as a whole. This ideal of wholeness is satisfied only by the synoptic method which rests on two principles. The first may be called "the principle of comprehensiveness": There is nothing in the whole range of human experience which does not, in its own degree and measure, reveal the nature of the universe. The second is "the principle of organization": For the *full* revelation of the universe, "as it really is," all partial revelations have to be brought together, so as to supplement, correct, interpret each other.

Hence, the true philosopher is the metaphysician who seeks to know the real by eliciting from experience as a whole the nature of the real as a whole. He needs both an open mind, which treats all experience as relevant evidence, and a discriminating and ordering mind, which is guided in its interpretation of the nature of reality by the deeper and more central experiences, rarer though they may be than the surface moods and casual first judgments of everyday life. Thus, the metaphysician's theory will be expressive of his experience, and if that experience is narrow in range and inadequate in quality—if he has poor materials to think with—or, again, if he fails to use his materials to the best advantage, the resulting theory will inevitably register such poverty and such failure. And, on the other hand, if the discrimination and selection of the experiences on which he relies to give him the most significant clues to the nature of the real are not, in their turn, guided and supported by philosophical theory, his philosophizing will be the sport of every passing mood or humour of his mind. There will be no progress in insight, no stability of outlook. The synoptic method, on the other hand, whilst treating all experiences as relevant materials, or data, for philosophical theory, does not treat them all as of equal value. It is essential to it to discriminate between experiences which reveal little of the nature of reality, and experiences which have much of this revealing power—which are, as Spinoza says of ideas, "adequate." Thus, the method is not extraneous to the matter handled, nor is it accidental. It grows out of our experiences themselves, in that, coming together in our minds, they play upon each other with their own dialectic which, in philosophizing, comes to its own. Our thinking, in philosophy as elsewhere, is guided by what we think with. And when, reflecting upon the play of thoughts within us, we set down, abstractly, a "method" or a "way of thinking," the main gain is that we learn to do deliberately, and to aim at doing more efficiently, what spontaneously we do anyhow whenever we think at all. Thus, the method yields the theory, and the theory justifies the method—gives the reason why it is the right method.

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Method and result are here correlative. If the nature of the real is revealed, in some degree, in every experience and if the full revelation requires the mutual interpretation and ordering of experiences through the dialectic process of reflective thought, then it is but natural that such a universe, thus revealing itself, will dictate such a method by "the logic of the facts," and that such a method will yield such a universe to the philosopher's "trained insight." In short, the universe is always with us. It is, and manifests itself, in us, for we are parts of it. It is, and manifests itself, also, in all that we oppose to ourselves as "other." Every thrill of experience attests its presence, compels us to acknowledge that "something exists." But *what* this something is—this is a question which, if we are not content to answer it fragmentarily and piecemeal, drives us into the philosopher's enterprise of eliciting from all experience, synoptically considered, a view of the nature of the universe which shall be as complete, coherent, and stable as we can make it.

This synoptic ideal is aptly expressed by the Platonic phrase, "saving the appearances." An "appearance" is any way in which the universe, or "reality," reveals something of its nature, and the programme of "saving" the appearances calls for a theory which, so far from seeking to level all appearances down to one kind, or selecting some as true and rejecting others as illusory or false, acknowledges them all and seeks to assign to each its place in the order of the universe. And "to have a place" in this order, does not mean merely to be there or to occur, but to be there or to occur under definitely assignable conditions. Each thing, no doubt, is itself, and cannot be explained away into other things. But, on the other hand, also, each thing is conditioned by others in existence and nature. And the universe is what it is only as thus manifesting itself in an order of appearances, mutually conditioning each other.

This is the conception which underlies my *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*, and which I have tried to re-state, with less technical detail, in a set of public lectures which have been printed under the title *Matter, Life, Mind, and God*. These

books do not set forth a compact and rounded "system"; they only apply the synoptic method to a number of problems, selected from contemporary philosophical discussion.

Thus, Chap. II of my *Studies*, which is entitled "The Idol of Scientific Method," aims at showing that, if philosophy is to render in coherent theory the real nature of the universe as revealed in our experience, it cannot model its procedure on that of the sciences. I show that the advocates of this view, which has recently been resurrected with much beating of drums, differ among themselves concerning the nature of the scientific method which they agree in recommending. Some propose to model philosophy on mathematics and, therefore, to limit philosophy exclusively to such problems as can be treated by the methods of mathematics and mathematical logic. Others have in mind the experimental method of the natural sciences and, in the name of Pragmatism or Instrumentalism, propose to press all theory into the service of practice. Both methods have their uses, but neither is adequate for the task of philosophy as above defined.

From the consideration of scientific method, there is a natural transition to the philosophy of Nature, in which three problems have attracted my special attention.

The first concerns the ethical neutrality, or, put more generally, the abstraction from values, which are characteristic of the physical sciences. *Die Wissenschaft kennt keine Werturteile*. Here, again, method and result are correlative. In Chap. III of my *Studies*, on "Philosophy of Nature at the Cross-Roads," I examine various forms of this methodological attitude which, in the name of the ideal of "objectivity" and of dispassionate submission to facts as they are, contrasts truth, as the goal of "reason," with the illusions begotten by desire, hope, and fear. I try to show that this attitude in the hands of its advocates changes from the defence of the legitimate self-limitation proper to the technique of scientific enquiry to the denial that moral, æsthetic, religious experiences have any metaphysical import at all, that they have anything to teach us concerning the nature of the universe. Only science—this is what the argument

amounts to—is genuinely “knowledge,” and metaphysics must be the synthesis of all sciences or else nothing. Alternatively, we are told, in A. N. Whitehead’s language, that “Nature is closed to mind,” and that art, morals, religion may throw light on the nature of the human mind, but cannot ever throw any light on the nature of the non-mental universe. The answer to these arguments I conceive to be that mind is part of the universe and conditioned by it, and that, therefore, the nature of the universe must be taken to reveal itself in mind no less than in the non-mental world. And, further, I recur to the undeniable fact that Nature—the world of sense-perception—does not merely live in our experience as an object of scientific study, but evokes and sustains in countless ways æsthetic, moral, and religious responses. Hence, it is an abstraction contrary to the ideal of synopsis, to attempt to deal with the whole nature of Nature (if I may use this phrase) on the basis of scientific experience exclusively.

The second problem in which I am interested is sufficiently remote from the first one, and I owe my interest in it largely to the influence of modern *Gegenstandstheorie*. Starting from the concept of Nature as “what we perceive by the senses,” I try, in Chap. IV of my *Studies*, to make a contribution to the discussion of two questions, viz. (1) how we come to regard the field of sense-percepts at any given moment as a fragmentary part of a “world” which, as a whole, though perceptible in principle, is not actually perceived; and (2) how we select among the objects of sense-perception and imagination those which, as “real,” we include in Nature from those which, as “unreal” (e.g. objects of dreams, hallucinations, fictions), we reject.

The third problem takes me, in Chap. V of the *Studies*, into the intricate field of the analysis of perception and judgments of perception. I call this chapter, “Saving the Appearances in the Physical World,” because its aim, in keeping with the synoptic method, is to frame a theory of the world as we perceive it, which shall not discard sense-data as “mental” (and, therefore, not belonging to Nature), and still less set up an

"unknowable somewhat" as the alleged *cause* of the occurrence of sense-data in our minds, but which shall include all sense-data in such a way that each, in its place and character, may be accepted as a genuine bit of Nature, to be explained by formulating in "laws" the conditions of its occurrence. In this effort to "save the appearances" I find myself at one with thinkers so diverse as Berkeley, on the one hand, and A. N. Whitehead, on the other—an affiliation which is not purely accidental, as I have tried to point out in detail in a paper on "Berkeley as the Forerunner of Modern Philosophy of Nature," which I read at the Congress of Philosophy, at Paris, in December, 1922. Closely related with this problem of "saving the appearances" is the problem of Matter with which I try to deal in a lecture on "The Present-Day Revolt against 'Matter,'" published in the volume entitled *Matter, Life, Mind, and God*. I there try to distinguish four different senses of "matter" and to show how they all arise from different analyses of perceptual experience and its objects. My conclusion, there, is identical with that of A. N. Whitehead in his *Concept of Nature*, viz. that the sense of "matter" as the imperceptible and unverifiable cause of sense-data, conceived as mental sensations and thus divorced from Nature, is the only sense which Philosophy is concerned to deny. It is, in fact, both bad metaphysics and bad science.

From physics and the philosophy of Nature the next step in a synoptic programme is naturally to biology. Here two problems of special interest to the metaphysician are encountered—the problem of mechanism *versus* vitalism, and the problem of teleology. In Chaps. VI and VII of my *Studies* and in Lecture III of *Matter, Life, Mind, and God*, my aim is to support those biologists who, like J. S. Haldane, seek to maintain that in *life*, i.e. in the character and behaviour of the things we call "living," a definitely new *phenomenon* has appeared in the world, with the study of which biology is concerned. Such biologists reject "mechanism," i.e. the attempt to reduce living creatures to "physico-chemical machines" and to employ in biological theory nothing but

the terms and concepts of physics and chemistry. But equally do they reject "vitalism," i.e. the theory especially connected in our day with the name of Driesch, that the characteristic processes and behaviour of living beings are to be explained by the agency of a special factor which is not subject to physico-chemical laws in its operation. The view I seek to defend is that biology is an *autonomous* science, in the sense that it has its own distinctive field of objects and must frame its theories in terms of its own distinctive concepts, not because there is a special vital factor or agent involved, but because life is a distinctive *phenomenon* qualitatively *sui generis*, and to be studied, like any other phenomenon, in the context of the conditions under which its various forms occur, and in the absence of which they cannot occur. Biology is not reducible to physics and chemistry, but uses them so far as physico-chemical processes condition the phenomena of life—a relationship which I seek to express by saying that biology is "logically dominant" over physics and chemistry within its field. Thus, from the synoptic point of view, each science is autonomous within its own field and logically dominant over all other sciences which it uses in dealing with its special subject-matter. In maintaining this view I owe much to the acute analysis and criticism of mechanistic concepts by Professor C. D. Broad. As regards the other biological problem, viz. that of purpose, it is, of course, obvious that biology has no evidence for supposing that the phenomena which it seeks to explain, occur when they occur, and are what they are, because some mind, animal, human, or divine, willed them just so. Yet, on the other hand, as Professor L. J. Henderson has forcibly pointed out, by dropping the concept of purpose we do not get rid of the teleological appearances in Nature which originally suggested the concept of purpose. From this side, therefore, I welcome the extraordinarily interesting thesis of Professor Henderson's *Fitness of the Environment*, in which he points out a large-scale and pervasive adaptation of the environment, in its very physico-chemical structure, for the needs of life. This seems to me to fit in well with a synoptic programme, for it

compels us to acknowledge that the phenomena of life are as much rooted in, and conditioned by, the ultimate constituents and laws of Nature as are the motion of the solar system or the formation of a chemical compound.

From life to mind! A survey of the present welter of theories in psychology (*Studies*, Chap. VIII) leads me to suggest that we may find salvation by adopting, and expanding, the *functional* theory of mind, or soul, which Aristotle first worked out. The synoptic method demands a phenomenology, i.e. a study of phenomena, and, therefore, of mind as a phenomenon—of mind as it displays and exhibits itself, both to an outside observer and to the agent's own self-conscious introspection. Rejecting the metaphysics of a soul-substance, we want to study mind as it appears in the world. Here the behaviourist is right who insists that to have, or, rather, to be, a mind is to *do* certain things—as E. B. Holt puts it, "working or playing, reading, writing, or talking, making money or spending it, constructing or destroying, curing disease, alleviating poverty, comforting the oppressed, and promoting one or other sort of orderliness." Such a catalogue, made complete, of the activities in which man expresses himself as a "*rational animal*," gives a good clue to what mind is and does in the world. But, whilst insisting on this, we have no right to reject the language of "consciousness" which enumerates, as the activities of mind, perceiving, thinking, feeling, willing, imagining, and many more. The important thing is to realize that if mind manifests itself visibly through bodily behaviour to others, it is also open to itself by self-observation, and that both these sources of knowledge, synoptically used, are required for an adequate theory of mind as a phenomenon. Along similar lines I try to treat (*Studies*, Chap. IX) the problems of self, leading up to the principle that the self is what it identifies itself with, focusing, however fragmentarily, the universe in itself.

The last group of problems which I have tried to draw into my synoptic survey is taken from the field of modern philosophy of religion, which has recently been enriched partly by re-statements of the philosophical arguments for theism

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(C. C. J. Webb, W. E. Hocking, H. Rashdall, and others), partly by Professor S. Alexander's strikingly attractive, if unorthodox, theory of "deity" as a quality of perfection, which is the goal of the world's evolutionary nîsus—a messianic hope transposed into the terms of modern thought. My own interest in this field, as shown by Lecture V of *Matter, Life, Mind, and God* and by a paper on "The Treatment of 'Existence' in Recent Philosophical Literature," lies chiefly in the various ways in which modern thinkers have tried to affirm the *metaphysical* import of religion, i.e. to argue that through religious experience or sentiment the supreme character of reality is revealed and becomes known to us. Thus re-stated, the ontological argument escapes Kant's objections. My synoptic point of view naturally inclines me to adopt, and defend, the general principle of this argument, though its conclusion, for me, is rather that the nature of reality justifies the religious attitude of worship towards it, than that it must be conceived in theistic terms. But I am also interested in extending the logic of this new ontological technique from the restricted field of religion to the general field of all human experience. In other words, I apply here the synoptic principle that all experience reveals something of the real, and that, hence, none is metaphysically negligible.

Other problems which have occupied my attention, especially since my return to England from America, have been the problem of *meaning*, and that of the importance for philosophizing of what I like to call "*first-hand* knowledge." To the former problem I had already devoted one of my earliest articles in *Mind*, entitled "Image, Idea, and Meaning" (1907), in which I criticize, more particularly, certain psychological doctrines in Bradley's *Logic*. Recently, in part under the influence of the writings of Husserl and Meinong, I have returned to the problem of meaning in an article which appeared in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* under the title "A Plea for a Phenomenology of Meaning." The topic of "first-hand" knowledge was suggested to me by current discussions of the difference between "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge by description," but, instead of approaching the topic

from this side, I approach it through the question of the best conditions for possessing and realizing the meaning of the terms (words) in which we express our "thoughts." It, thus, brings me back from a fresh angle to the importance for philosophy of having rich and varied experiences "to think *with*." I hope in the near future to work up these papers and others into a second volume of *Studies*, in which I intend also to review the present-day issue between idealism and realism. As a preliminary, I am engaged in writing a brief popular account of *Idealism* for Hodder and Stoughton's Library of Philosophy and Religion.

Mention of idealism suggests, in conclusion, the question: In what sense, if any, am I an "idealist"? I find myself freely so labelled by others, owing, I suppose, to the general affinity of my philosophical outlook with that of Bosanquet. With Bosanquet, I should prefer the term "speculative philosophy" to idealism, for "idealism" means so many different things, and even Bosanquet occasionally uses language which, though it may be "idealistic," I should prefer to avoid. To some, the essence of "idealism" lies in the denial of the existence of the physical world and in the reduction of all objects to "mental states" (a view which, assuredly, was not Berkeley's). To others, it means the theory that reality is a society of spirits (or monads)—a view for which McTaggart claims the authority of Berkeley, Leibniz, and Hegel. A third party, of positivistic leanings, sees in idealism chiefly a philosophical dodge for exploiting the analysis of knowledge as a subject-object relation for the purpose of reaffirming an outworn theology in a thin philosophical disguise, God masquerading as "The Absolute." A fourth party goes back to Plato's Theory of Ideas, or Forms; a fifth seeks its orientation in Kant, or in one of the post-Kantian philosophers, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer. If I am an "idealist," it is only so far as the views outlined above deserve to be called "idealistic," and no further. Not one of these views do I regard as beyond argument or discussion, but they do derive, for me, some strength from their mutual coherence in a pattern which leads me to conceive the universe

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as an order of phenomena in which each kind of phenomenon has its distinctive and irreducible character and place. And all phenomena, focused in the one phenomenon, mind, which can apprehend itself as well as others, seem to me, for a synoptic view, to point to a universe permitting such a union of insight and feeling as Spinoza has embodied for us in his memorable phrase—*amor intellectualis Dei*.

CHIEF BOOKS

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A REALIST PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

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A REALIST PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

INTRODUCTORY.

I FIRST studied philosophy at Oxford during the years 1912-1914, where the prevalent philosophy was that of the English Idealists. To this mode of thought I never took kindly, my natural predilections tending in the direction of some form of Realism. Since, however, the modern realist revival was not at that time regarded with favour at Oxford, I took Greats as a realist of the Platonic type, and contended for the independent reality of universals, with particular reference to the forms of beauty, goodness and truth. When I had nothing more to fear from examiners, I threw in my lot with the modern realists, and in their train gradually advanced from a more or less naïve realism of the Meinong type, advocated in my first book *Essays in Common Sense Philosophy*, to the more extreme position known as neo-realism. During this stage, and, indeed, throughout my philosophical development, I was greatly influenced by the work of Bertrand Russell, to whom I owe more than to any other writer on philosophy.

Under his guidance I endeavoured to apply the principle of Occam's razor to the universe. I made it my business, that is to say, to discover the simplest elements into which knowledge and reality could be analysed and to dispense with whatever appeared to be resolvable into those elements. Proceeding on these lines, I succeeded, as a good realist should, in dispensing with both physical object and consciousness as entities existing in their own right, reducing the former to a series of sense data, and the latter to a collection of sensations and images. The analysis is by now familiar, and I do not wish to recapitulate it here. Suffice it to say that in the end I found myself, so far

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as theory of knowledge went, able to accept and unable to go beyond the position adopted in Mr. Russell's *The Analysis of Mind*, and regarded myself as a cross-section of those neutral particulars or events, which Mr. Russell regards as the fundamental constituents of the universe. If I am asked in what sense such a position is a realistic one, my answer is that the sense data, the constituents into which the universe of objects is resolved, are in no way dependent for their existence upon being known. They are independent of mind, and are observed by mind.

But a philosophical banquet consisting of one course only, and that a course of logical atomism, is apt to prove a somewhat arid and unsubstantial form of diet, and other influences were at work which were destined to put a serious strain on the rigorous economy in the matter of constituents, which I had learned from the new realists. Try as I would to dispense with all but the barest essentials, I found that there were a number of additional conceptions which I simply could not get on without. The most important of these conceptions were, the notion of a vital force whose operations constituted the process known as evolution, and expressed themselves in all the variety and multiplicity of living organisms, and the belief that behind and beyond the change and diversity that characterized the world as known to biology and science there was a permanent, immutable something, outside the evolutionary process, because in some sense the goal of that process, and bearing a remarkable likeness to some at least of the forms of Plato's real world.

I was first attracted to a vitalistic outlook in the sphere of ethics, and in *Common Sense Ethics* contended for the decisive importance of irresponsible impulse as opposed to what is called rational desire in determining conduct. I subsequently endeavoured in *Common Sense Theology* to work out a vitalistic metaphysic, and to illustrate the conception of the life force by tracing its operations in a number of different departments of social and intellectual activity.

The life force and the form of beauty (for it was the nature of æsthetic experience that chiefly drove me to admit a changeless

reality into my scheme of things) are strange inhabitants for a neo-realist's universe, and my chief difficulty has been, and still is, to accommodate them. Wield Occam's razor as I may, I cannot see my way to cut them off, and my task is, therefore, to fit them in as best I can. The following statement aims, accordingly, at rendering compatible a number of beliefs which, though frequently held by themselves, are rarely entertained in company. I am equipped with what seem to me insuperable objections to the abandonment of any one of these beliefs, yet I confess that the effort which I have made to synthesize them seems to me far from satisfactory.

The synthesis which I here offer is, therefore, provisional only, and I am not without hope that in course of time I may be able to effect it with greater economy. I will begin with the Vitalism as lending itself most easily to summary statement.

I. VITALISM.

The criticisms which have been levelled during the last twenty or thirty years against the mechanical conception of the universe have always seemed to me convincing.

That conception, backed as it was in the nineteenth century by all the contemporary sciences, received its chief support from biology and psychology. In biology the crucial question was the origin of variations. Darwin confessed himself unable to assign any cause for their occurrence; they seemed to be fortuitous, and in the present state of our knowledge must therefore be attributed to chance. Lamarck ascribed variations to the influence of external environment. Whether variations in species were held to be due to the gradual accumulation of very minute differences in individuals, or to the sudden emergence of "sports" or mutations, the upshot was the same. A process had been observed which, beginning with living specks in the scum of the intertidal shores, and ascending thence through the amœba, the mesozoic reptiles and the mammals, culminated in man. This process, on the mechanist view, was due not to the active interposition of any vital force or spiritual agency, but to pure

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chance or to the influence of an external, material environment. In so far as the organic could be distinguished from the inorganic—and in the last resort they would probably be found to be indistinguishable—the latter at every stage conditioned and determined the former. If what happened to life, if the emergence of life itself, was not a mere fluke, it was nevertheless true that life was entirely at the mercy of the material forces which had brought it into being. In no sense was it creative.

What was true of life in general was equally true of life in the individual. The parallelist theory of psychology had announced a body and a mind differing in substance yet proceeding on parallel lines. Although there was no point of interaction, there was nevertheless between them an underlying connection, which ensured that for every event in the one there was a corresponding event in the other. It did not take the scientists long to discover that this underlying connection was nothing more nor less than a series of continuous miracles introduced to explain the otherwise inexplicable fact of correspondence between two entities distinguished by a radical difference in kind. Science having little patience with miracles roundly denied the difference. Body and mind did interact, but such interaction, if interaction it could be called, was a perfectly natural occurrence for which no explanation was necessary, since mind was only a rarefied form of body. In the course of the infinite permutations and combinations to which the forms of matter had been subjected, there had occurred one which resulted in matter becoming conscious of itself. This consciousness of self emerged when there occurred that peculiar arrangement of matter known as a brain. The mind was in fact an extension of the brain, envisaged as a sort of environing mist like the halo round the head of a saint. Its function was to mirror or register the events that occurred in the brain, and its activities were strictly confined to the performance of that function. Since it could not mirror what was not there, everything that happened in the mind must first have happened in the brain. Mind, that is to say, was not creative; it could not initiate anything on its own account; it was merely a reflector of cerebral

occurrences. Since what happened in the brain was the result of what had first happened in the body, and since what happened in the body was the result of some previous happening in the external environment, the chain of causation was complete. This causation proceeded always from the less living to the more ; life was a mere offshoot of matter, mind of body. Contributory evidence as to the unimportance of life was afforded by the other sciences. Geology had enormously increased the age of the world, astronomy the size and spread of space, and in the vast immensities of geologic time and astronomic space, life seemed a tiny glow, flickering uncertainly, and doomed one day to ultimate extinction upon the only planet which had known it.

Thus on every side the material and brutal conditioned and determined the vital and spiritual. The universe was like the works of a gigantic clock. Somebody at some time or other had set the clock going, and thenceforward it proceeded to function indefinitely through the automatic interaction of its parts. In such a universe life is of supreme unimportance. Instead of being the key to reality, the conception in terms of which we are ultimately to interpret the rest, it appears as a merely temporary passenger across a fundamentally alien and hostile environment, doomed one day to finish its pointless journey with as little noise and significance as witnessed its beginning.

It is not my purpose here to enumerate even the main features of the evidence which has led to the gradual abandonment of this conception. In biology, in psychology, and in physics facts have come to light which appear to be inexplicable on the materialist hypothesis. On the biological side Bergson, Fabre, Driesch, Geley, and others have catalogued numerous phenomena taken from insect, animal, and vegetable life, for which mechanism is unable to account. The factors classically regarded as those which determine evolution, adaptation to environment, and survival of those who chance to be the fittest, fail for example to explain what is known as transformism, the metamorphoses undergone by the insect, and the more striking examples of mutation. At most these factors serve to explain the direction

taken by the movement of evolution at any given moment ; what they cannot do is to account for the fact of the movement. Hence there is a growing disposition to interpret biological phenomena in a purposive sense. The salmon which swims up-stream to deposit spawn, the crab which grows a new leg to replace the one it has lost, the hydroid *Antennularia* which, when separated from its normal environment, transforms its structure by putting forth long feelers in the effort to find something to which it can adhere, behave not merely as mechanisms reacting to some external change, but as the instruments of some force which, acting through them, seeks to achieve a purpose by their agency.

If this is not the case, it seems impossible, as Bergson has pointed out, to explain why the movement of evolution should persist. A measure of adaptation to environment was achieved many thousands of years ago by creatures in comparison with whom the human being is, from the physical point of view, helpless, unprotected, and ridiculously complicated. Judged merely by success in maintaining life, many inferior organisms are better adapted than ourselves to the conditions of existence. Why, then, did not evolution stop at their level? Why does life continue to complicate itself more dangerously in order to achieve physically inferior beings, whose bodily mechanisms are exposed by their complexity to an increased liability to mischance?

The question seems unanswerable, unless, indeed, we are prepared to agree that adaptation to environment is not the factor that determines variation, and to regard evolution as the process by which some vital force seeks to express itself in more varied and complicated forms, in order that it may through them achieve a higher and more complex order of life. But if this be so, life is not an incidental offshoot of matter, but an independent force working in and through matter, and moulding it to its ends.

The same conclusion emerges from an examination of the mechanist psychology. Mind, we are told, is a register of cerebral occurrences, a mere reflector of the brain ; nothing can, therefore, happen in the mind which does not also happen in the brain. As against this conception there is on the experimental side a

mass of evidence produced by Bergson and others showing that people, whose brains have been impaired by accident or partially removed by an operation, are nevertheless capable of performing complicated mental processes. Feats of memory are exhibited by persons in whose heads the portion of the brain located as the seat of memory is occupied by a tumour; and phrenology, instead of being an exact science, remains a happy hunting-ground for quacks and charlatans.

On the theoretical side there are facts of psychology which seem unaccountable on even the most generous interpretation of mechanist principles. Omitting altogether the vexed question of memory, I will mention two instances as cases in point.

The first is drawn from a consideration of the emotions. The mechanist, true to the reflector conception, interprets emotion as an awareness of physiological changes. The James-Lange theory is invoked, and sorrow becomes our consciousness of the fact that we are crying.

This explanation seems to overlook the complexity of emotion and the subtle qualitative changes which distinguish one emotional state from another. To take a concrete case, it appears that the emotion of fear is in a special and intimate way connected with the adrenal gland. When fear is felt the adrenal gland excretes fluid. Is the fear an awareness of the excretion, or is the excretion consequent upon an emotion of fear excited by mental awareness of an external object? If our answer is that fear is the awareness of, let us say, an x quantity of excretion, more fear of the same kind will be caused by $2x$ excretion and less fear by $\frac{1}{2}x$. But fear shades by imperceptible degrees into a number of qualitatively different though allied emotions, into disgust, repulsion, and horror, between any pair of which as well as between each and fear proper there are again an infinite number of qualitatively different states. What is the physiological equivalent for these varying states? Certainly not $x + 2x$ or $x - \frac{1}{2}x$, since these physiological equivalents are already earmarked for more fear or for less. Since the fear gland will not fill the bill, we shall have to invoke the excretions of some other gland. This conclusion involves a separate gland

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for each qualitatively different emotion. But this assuredly is unduly to complicate the body. The differences in shades of emotion may be infinite, but we cannot budget for an infinite number of glands, if only because the body, being spatially limited, could not contain them. Hence I conclude that though the gland excretion may accompany fear, it is not the sole cause of it; nor are we necessarily to suppose that there is a similar physiological accompaniment for every psychological change.

The second point is really an extension of the first. If mind be but a form of matter, moulded and conditioned by matter in every particular, all mental changes must be ultimately expressible in terms not only of physiological, but of physical changes; they must, that is to say, be ultimately reducible to rearrangements of negative electrons and positive nuclei. Such rearrangements are quantitative only; they cannot, that is to say, account for the emergence of qualities new in kind. Yet mental characteristics as compared with material ones do seem to exhibit a qualitative difference. Matter, for example, can be weighed; yet who can weigh the inspiration which produced a Shelleyan lyric? Matter is a curvature in space-time; yet how are we to think of mind as spatial?

These difficulties are not decreased by modern developments in physics. The mechanist theory requires us to suppose that mind is a configuration of matter, that matter can in fact produce mind. Such a conception was easy fifty years ago. Matter was then a hard, tangible something upon which the horse-sense of the materialist could base his irrefragable convictions. To-day matter is more mysterious and elusive. Mind as a reflection of a solid, tangible something was at least a tenable conception, but the belief that a spatio-temporal configuration expressed in terms of point-instants is able to generate a consciousness of itself and to determine the workings of that consciousness puts a much greater strain upon our imaginative powers. The modern tendency to interpret events in terms of mind rather than of matter is, therefore, the expression of a natural preference for working in terms of the comparatively known rather than in terms of the comparatively unknown.

It is not, of course, suggested that the arguments brought forward in this controversy are conclusive. It is indeed doubtful whether we can ever reach a satisfactory solution of the question whether mind determines matter or matter mind, so long as we proceed on the basis of a conception of matter and mind as distinct and separate entities. I shall return to this question in Section III. For the moment, however, I content myself with emphasizing the point that for me at least the arguments of the vitalists did on the whole carry the day. I agreed with Bergson in holding that mind action could not be interpreted wholly in terms of brain action, any more than the phenomena of life could be regarded solely as mere emanations of what was commonly called matter. On the contrary, I held, in the sphere of psychology, that the mental overflowed and contained the cerebral, and in biology, that, although material considerations might at any moment determine the direction and limit the thrust and push of evolutionary processes, they could not themselves be held to originate those processes. The facts of evolution and psychology were, therefore, to my mind at one in demanding the interposition of some vital or spiritual force acting in and through matter, and in some sense moulding and conditioning matter to serve its purpose.

II. PLURALISM.

So far I had been on comparatively familiar ground. With the exception of the last sentence of the preceding section, there was nothing in my position which might not have been found in Bergson, and indeed the line of thought along which I had travelled had been largely laid down by him. But at this point I encountered a difficulty. For Bergson the vital force was the only thing in the universe. It literally *was* the universe; and what was true of Bergson's *élan vital* was in this respect equally true of Schopenhauer's Will.

Now, my early training in realism had among other things imbued me with a wholesome distrust of the monistic Absolute of the English idealists, which made it impossible for me to accept

any universe which was regarded as an embodiment or an expression of one thing and of one thing only, whether that one thing was the Absolute or not, and my trouble was that the difficulties which I saw in the conception of the universe as a single intellectual unity applied equally strongly to the view of it as a single, indivisible vital force. I will try to state very briefly what these difficulties were.

The view of the universe with which the Hegelians present us is one which represents reality as a homogeneous whole or structure of thought. This reality underlies the world of appearances, and though it is manifested in each one of its appearances, it is not itself appearance, but reality. As such it embraces everything just because it is everything, and nothing can, therefore, exist which is not the Absolute. Since it is wholly present in each of its manifestations, these only appear as isolated and fragmentary parts of a whole to which they inalienably belong, and from which they are unreally distinguished, because of the partial character of the vision which we bring to bear upon them. Differences between things, therefore, are unreal in some sense in which their underlying unity is real, and this apparent unreality is the direct counterpart, indeed, it is in a sense the creation, of a limited and therefore unreal point of view.

Now, while the universe in its essential nature is an intellectual unity, it is agreed that the universe as it appears is nothing of the kind. I appear to be different from my neighbour, and my opinions appear to contradict his. An appearance of difference has, therefore, to be reconciled with the fact of real unity, and to me, at least, the Neo-Hegelian attempt to achieve this reconciliation has always failed to carry conviction.

How, I wanted to know, do these apparent differences arise? They are, we are told, the outcome of the partial view of reality taken by our finite understandings. But does this answer really meet the case? Differences are either real or they are illusory. If they are real, there is not one thing in the universe, but many things. If they are illusory, then the error we make in thinking them real is not illusory. It is not, that is to say, an unreal error but a real one. Error, then, is part of the real and the real is

the Absolute. But how can an Absolute in which perfect truth and perfect reality go hand in hand be saddled with the responsibility for the generation of real error? It is no more possible to account for the emergence of error out of a real which is perfect truth than it is for the emergence of difference out of a real which is perfect unity. And yet, as we have seen, either the difference is real or the error which makes it appear so.

It is precisely this difficulty which in varying forms insists on presenting itself whenever we try to conceive of reality monistically.

The universe, said Schopenhauer, is Will, and all the variety and multiplicity of the world of existence, from chairs and tables to living beings, and from living beings to the objects of æsthetic contemplation, are different forms of its objectification. The differences between them are as unreal as their appearance as separate and isolated entities; on a closer view they will be seen to be merely phenomenal expressions of an underlying unity. But if the unity is really a unity, how comes it to develop the differences which the expression of itself in various forms implies? Even if the apparent multiplicity be merely phenomenal, the potentiality for its development must have qualified the initial unity, just as the potentiality for development into a chicken is a characteristic of the egg. Nor can we stop at the potentiality for developed difference. The Will does not merely objectify itself; it objectifies itself in certain ways and not in others. We must start, therefore, not merely with a bare Will, but with a Will initially qualified by the capacity for developing either particular kinds of differences, namely those which actually appear to exist in the world we know, or—for it comes to the same thing—the illusion of particular kinds of differences.

But what does this mean, if it does not mean that the unity is not a unity at all; that there already exist in an incapsulated form within it all the diversity and finite individualities which it subsequently generates, and that it is not, therefore, one thing but many things?

And now, to bring the argument nearer home, how are we to explain plurality, or the illusion of plurality on the basis of a

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single vital stream or flow? For Bergson, matter, and the appearance of diversity and solidity that matter undoubtedly presents, are illusions due to the cuts made by the intellect across the living flow. But, proceeding as before, we shall point out that the *élan vital* is either in itself entirely featureless or it is not. If it is entirely featureless, then matter and diversity are real illusions; but illusions generated whence and by what means? If reality is not in any sense material but is pure becoming, then the pure becoming which is reality must be made to account for our illusion in thinking it matter. Reality, therefore, contains the seeds of error in itself. It is, therefore, a plurality. If, on the other hand, the differences be real and not illusory, if, that is to say, the real contains within itself some rudimentary flaws which the intellect works up into matter, reality is once again a plurality.

Schopenhauer and Bergson alike think of reality as a broad, flowing river, scattering and dispersing itself for certain special purposes into an infinite number of minute streams. Now, if there exists something which is not the river, but which interrupts the river, such dispersion can be readily understood. Rivers divide when they meet obstacles which split them as it were *ab extra*. But neither Bergson nor Schopenhauer can have recourse to this conception. For them the universe *is* the river; and there is, therefore, nothing to perform the work of division *ab extra*. There remains, therefore, no alternative but the conception of a river dividing itself as it were *ab intra*. But in that event it can no longer be conceived of as a homogeneous flow. Its appearance only is a true unity; its reality is a qualified unity which initially contains the seeds of division and plurality.

You cannot, in short, have it both ways. If reality, as monistic philosophers assert, is a whole or unity, such that nothing short of the whole is real, and anything that impairs the unity is illusory, then you cannot generate out of it variety, error, and multiplicity. If, on the other hand, you do not make the unity responsible for the emergence of variety, error, and multiplicity, then they must exist in some form side by side with the unity, equally real with it and in a sense opposed to it. But in that event the world

is not a complete unity. It must be assumed to be at least a duality, and to sustain not only the unity but some opposing principle other than the unity which causes the unity to break up and express itself in variety.

Once I was prepared to admit the existence of something other than the vital flow, it seemed possible to throw light upon a number of points which had previously been obscure.

I had never, for example, been able to understand why Schopenhauer's Will should take the trouble to objectify itself, or why Bergson's *élan vital* should be at pains to evolve the intellect. Why should they do these things, even if we were to assume that they could? If the universe was in the last resort nothing but a homogeneous flow, the whole process of evolution seemed motiveless. The vital flow, we were told, objectified and manifested itself in temporary individuals, which would in due course be re-absorbed into the all-embracing stream from which they sprang. But this ultimate absorption into the vital flow of all the variety and imperfection of the universe would be merely a reconstruction of the state of affairs which existed before the objectification took place. If, then, the end of the evolutionary process were identical with the beginning, if unity split itself into diversity merely in order that it might again achieve unity, the universe was either a meaningless joke or a vicious circle. Either conclusion was repugnant and reinforced the growing conviction that something more than the vital force was required.

A further difficulty had been the insistence of Vitalists on the comparatively unreal and insignificant character of individuality. Schopenhauer's Will objectified itself temporarily in individuals, but, since the Will was itself homogeneous and indivisible, its individual representations were in some sense illusory, a falsification of its real character. Yet a representation cannot owe the fact of its being to the presence in it of the real, without being endowed, so far at least as its innermost nature is concerned, with the same kind of reality as that which gives it life.

For all these reasons I was driven to the admission of some non-vital element into the Universe, a sort of brute $\nu\lambda\eta$ or

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obstruction which stood, as it were, outside the stream of evolution, and with which the vital force came into collision. This brute substance, which for the present we will call matter, meeting the vital force, causes it to disperse and diversify itself into all the multitudinous forms of organic life, much as a line of rocks will break up and diversify a stream into innumerable channels. But, unlike the stream, which does not itself enter into the rocks, the vital force infuses with the principle of life the very matter which opposes it.

III. THE LIFE FORCE.

So much by way of preamble. Now let me attempt an essay in constructive speculation, admitting that what follows is pure hypothesis, yet at the same time insisting that there are no known facts with which it appears to be incompatible.

I conceive of the universe as being in the first instance purely material. It is chaos and deadness and blankness, without energy or purpose, and devoid of life. In this inorganic universe there appears a principle of life. At first blind and fumbling, a purely instinctive *nisus* or thrust, it struggles to express itself in the endeavour to achieve an ever higher degree of consciousness. With this object it works in and through matter, infusing and permeating it with its own principle of energy and life. The living beings that result from this infusion are to be regarded in the light of tools or weapons, which the life force creates for the accomplishment of its purpose. Like the universe itself, they are formed of a substratum of matter which has been animated by life, much as a length of wire may be charged with an electric current. In so far as we can at this stage endow the life force with conscious purpose, we may define that purpose as the endeavour to eliminate the material obstruction and to permeate the whole universe with life and consciousness.

The life force is far from being all powerful. It is limited and experimental, and its methods vary according to the stage of evolution which it has succeeded in reaching.

Different types of beings best serve its purposes at different

stages. Thus the mesozoic reptiles may be presumed to have passed from the evolutionary stage because they were not fitted to carry the current of life above the level which it had reached in them. Man is the latest evolutionary tool, but not for that reason the final one. If, as Mr. Shaw suggests, he can will to live longer, he may, like the Ancients in the last play of the *Back to Methuselah* Pentateuch, achieve a comparative emancipation from matter, which would constitute a real advance on his present condition. Short of this, however, we may in due course expect to see him consigned to the evolutionary scrap-heap, that he may make way for beings better adapted for carrying out life's next advance.

We must, I think, concede the fact that at present man is at best an inadequate and only spasmodically effective instrument. There is no reason to think that we are all of us for all our time fulfilling the purpose for which the life force created us. If that were the case, the life force, which we should then have to endow with complete control over its creatures, would be possessed of just those attributes of omnipotence and all-pervasiveness against which, in the interests of pluralism, I have tried to argue. Nor indeed does it seem possible to explain all human activity as furthering to an equal extent the fulfilment of the evolutionary purpose, or as being the embodiment of an equally real and direct inspiration from the life force. It must not be forgotten that there is a substratum in all organic life which is infused with the life force, but which is not the life force. This acts as a distorting and obstructing medium, diminishing the force of the vital current that penetrates it, separating the current of life which is, as it were, temporarily located within it, from the main stream, and conferring upon it a measure of independence arising from that separation. Thus, the energy with which we act is that of the life force, but the direction in which we move is in a very real sense our own. It is to this fact, the fact that the substratum of matter of which we are composed interposes itself as a kind of barrier between ourselves and the main stream of life, that I attribute the emergence of individuality and the belief in free will. This belief, though not wholly illusory, seems

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to be true in a negative rather than in a positive sense. Though created to serve the purposes of life, we can in a measure defeat those purposes by apathy and inertia. The material substratum which the life force has endeavoured to infuse may succeed in so completely overlaying the original impulse of life as to frustrate the purposes for which the instrument was created. Hence we get the imbecile, the ascetic, and the pervert. In so far as man is an expression of a dynamic and changing principle he changes, but he changes slowly and uncertainly, and he tends continually to lapse into inertia by settling into the rut of habit and normal behaviour.

In nothing is the limited character of the life force more clearly manifest, in nothing do we see more unmistakable evidence of the conflict and struggle in terms of which I interpret evolution, than in the devices which the life force adopts in order to improve the effectiveness of man, its latest form of expression. I have endeavoured, in *Common Sense Theology*, to describe in some detail these various evolutionary devices, together with the various forms of obstruction which they are designed to circumvent, but I omit them here as lying outside my immediate purpose. They are in the nature of details, with which each will fill in the main outline according to his personal views on such matters as the purpose of education, the object of law and institutions, the function of art and the criteria of æsthetic value. Upon two only of these devices I will briefly touch.

The first is the appearance of the phenomenon known as genius. The genius is sent into the world to give conscious expression to the instinctive purposes of the life force. He acts as a signpost, pointing the way to a higher level of thought, conduct, and aspiration than that which has been hitherto reached, and thus indicates the road along which humanity must travel. It follows that it is the business of the genius, in fact it is his *raison d'être*, violently and persistently to challenge the accepted categories of thought, canons of art, or rules of conduct current in his age. This challenge is bitterly resented at the time by men's natural disinclination to have their beliefs disturbed and their conduct questioned. Since, however, the message of the genius fore-

shadows and makes possible the next stage of evolutionary advance, the coming generation is found to accept and embrace his ideas as vigorously as its fathers opposed them. Hence the genius, who is usually starved or persecuted during his life time, is posthumously ennobled. Advances in thought and conduct are, in short, achieved after the model rather of De Vries' sudden mutations than of Darwin's accumulation of minute variations. Evolution in human beings seems for long periods to stagnate, and then to be suddenly jolted forward by that type of sport that we call a genius, for whose appearance nothing in the previous history of the race has prepared the way.

The other device to ensure advancement to which attention might be drawn is that of the unconscious. Modern psychology has rendered us familiar with the interpretation of human activity as the result of a push from behind, rather than of a pull from in front, and has shown to what extent actions previously attributed to conscious desire spring from unconscious impulse. We rarely know why we act or what we want, and the function of consciousness in the matter seems to be largely confined to the *rôle* of inventing false beliefs as to the objects of our desires. It does not, therefore, seem to be necessary for us to commit ourselves wholeheartedly either to the Freudian conception of the unconscious on the one hand, or to the Behaviourist reduction of psychological to physiological processes on the other, in order to make the very moderate admission that we know much less about the sources of our activity than we thought we did, and to agree further that most of the things we do and desire are the result of the operation of some process within us of which we can give absolutely no rational account.

Having adopted this by no means extreme attitude as to the origin of psychological processes, I could not help being struck by the extent to which it harmonized with my general conception of the life force and of the individual as a localized current of the force. As I have hinted above, the individual appears to possess a measure of free will; he can at least refrain from evolving as consistently and efficiently in the direction of achieving a higher level of thought and consciousness as, we

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may suppose, the life force would desire. Hence the creation of the unconscious to act as a transmitting medium for those thrusts and intimations with which the force seeks to animate its creatures. From the unconscious, we are told, spring the creative impulses which express themselves in art, in literature, and in social and political activity; from the unconscious come the incentive to effort, the spur to achievement and the impulse to seek a mate. The unconscious is, I conceive, that part of us which is in direct and continuous touch with the animating vital current. In it are originated those tendencies and impulses which subsequently appear in the conscious as motives deliberately entertained and desires rationally conceived. Thus the instinctive thrust and urge of life within us is transformed into conscious phenomena, such as beliefs, emotions and desires which we regard as the independent and inalienable creations of our own personalities, and proceed to carry out in action in the full conviction of the freedom and independence of our will. By this means the life force continually renews the stream of life within us, yet allows us to remain in ignorance of its source.

IV. NEO-REALISM.

I had reached this point in my endeavour to construct a working vitalistic hypothesis on the basis of a dualistic universe by pursuing a comparatively isolated line of thought. But there was another strand in my thinking owning a different source, which urgently demanded to be woven into the main structure. I was and had always been a realist: I accepted the conclusions of the modern realist theory of knowledge, and I was faced with the necessity of reconciling these conclusions with the position which I had reached as a vitalist. The task proved easier than might have been expected.

Let me begin by stating as briefly as possible what these conclusions were.

As a neo-realist I believed that physical objects were collections of sense data. These sense data were external, independent existences which our minds observed. I followed Mr. Russell

in holding that they could be further defined as the different appearances which the object would, if it existed, present to all possible points of observation. I held that these different appearances were correlated (1) by their similarity and (2) according to the laws of perspective, and that the object was a logical construction from the series of sense data so correlated. Hence, an aspect of a thing, or in other words the sense datum which is immediately experienced, was a member of the series of aspects which *is* the thing at any given moment.

I further held (1) that the sense data possessed only momentary existence, and (2) that, since the view of the world from any given place was slightly different from the view of the world from any other place, no two people ever saw precisely the same thing.

At the same time, I saw no reason at this stage for identifying the sense datum with the apprehension of it. The arguments (adduced for example by Dr. Moore in criticism of Idealism) for distinguishing the act of apprehension from the object apprehended seemed to me convincing in this respect. The act of direct apprehension was mental; the object, even if it were reduced to a series of sense data, differing for each observer and possessing a merely momentary existence, remained inalienably objective and non-mental.

So far all was well. My vitalism stood the test of my realism without difficulty, if only because the somewhat specialized question of what it is that we know, and what part the mind plays in the knowing of it, seemed scarcely relevant to the main issue in which I was interested. But the next development of neo-realist theory was one which I could not afford to ignore. I had all along maintained a fundamental dualism as the distinctive feature of my view of evolution, yet here was Mr. Russell in *The Analysis of Mind* running sensations and sense data together, and postulating a common subject matter out of which the data both of physics and psychology were constructed. With most of the views put forward in this book I found myself more than ready to agree. The Behaviourist standpoint with regard to desire, which interpreted it as the result of a push from behind rather than teleologically as a pull from in front, was

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just what my notion of the life force as an electric current charging and animating the material moulds which were individuals seemed to require. We were, it seemed, rarely conscious of the objects of our desire, nor were we responsible for initiating the actions which were said to be in accordance with it. Desire, in fact, was the characteristic of a behaviour cycle of actions ; its origin was a feeling of restlessness or discomfort, its object the state of quiescence which brought the behaviour cycle to its conclusion. What could be more consonant with the notion of a force moving its creatures by its promptings to the fulfilment of purposes of which they were ignorant ?

The elimination of consciousness, moreover, as a distinct and isolable entity, a something, that is to say, apart from the experiences of which there was consciousness, pointed to the same conclusion. The life force did not form, as it were, a little vital pool in the individual, a localized and separated portion of itself, which constituted the essence of his personality. It animated him more or less continuously with a series of discrete vital shocks, each of which could be expressed in terms of an experience felt or an object known.

But Mr. Russell's assertion that mind and matter were merely different arrangements of the same fundamental stuff seemed at first sight difficult to reconcile with this view.

I cannot here detail the steps by which certain of the more extreme among the neo-realists have reached this conclusion as to the fundamental identity of *substance* in the universe. Modern developments in physics and psychology have no doubt played their part. Mr. Russell points out how matter has grown progressively less material while mind has grown progressively less mental. A physical object is a curvature in a four dimensional continuum ; an idea, for all we know to the contrary, is simply a collection of movements in the larynx. The existence of mind is not explicitly denied, but it is shown to be at best an inference from bodily behaviour, an inference which, since we can get on without it, it is safer not to make.

Starting, then, from the notion of an object as the set of appearances presented to all possible points of observation, we

have to consider the nature of the appearances presented at the point of observation at which there is a mind. Mr. Russell uses, it will be remembered, the illustration of the appearance of a star at the place at which there is a photographic plate. This presentation is simultaneously a member of two different series. In the first place, it is a member of the series of the appearances presented by the apocryphal star at all possible points of observation, in which connection it is part of the star. In the second place, it is a member of the series of events which are happening at the place where the plate is. This series may be further defined as the sum-total of the appearances presented at the place where the plate is, and constitutes what we know as the plate.

It will be seen that the appearance of the star at the place where the plate is, is, according to the context in which it is taken, at one and the same time a part of the star and a part of the plate. Taken in one context it is a member of the series of appearances which are arranged together to form the star; taken in another it is a member of the series which are arranged together to form the plate. For plate read mind, and we have the conception of a mind as the sum-total of all the appearances presented at a certain place at which there is a brain with sense organs and nerves as the intervening medium. Every member of this series of events, which taken together constitute a mind, is a member of another series which taken together constitute an object. Sensations, therefore, are the same entities as sense data differently arranged. When we arrange together all the appearances presented at a certain place where there is a brain, we call them sensations; when we arrange together all the appearances presented by a so-called object at all places, we call them sense data. Sensations and sense data are, therefore, formed of the same fundamental stuff taken in different contexts. Mr. Russell envisages this stuff as a collection of neutral particulars. Arranged in one context they are mind, arranged in another they are matter, both mind and matter being, therefore, logical constructs from something more fundamental which underlies them both.

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This assertion of a fundamental unity of substance seemed at first sight to cut right across the dualism for which I had been contending. I had felt myself unable to explain the facts of existence on the assumption that the universe was the infinitely diverse expression of one thing ; yet the neo-realists had, to my mind, succeeded in showing how both the apparently mental and the apparently material could be regarded as different arrangements of the same stuff, and in so doing had turned the flank of the otherwise insoluble problem of the manner of their interaction.

But had the principle of difference been eliminated as effectually as at first sight appeared ? The stuff admittedly was the same, but the differences of arrangement remained. And did my theory after all require more than this ? The phenomena of the universe, as I understood them, were to be interpreted as the result of the infusion of a vital force into a fundamental non-living material. Was it necessary to postulate as the result of this infusion anything more than a certain highly specialized arrangement of the material ? To revert once more to the metaphor of the electric current, what is it that happens when an electrical charge passes, for example, through a collection of steel filings ? The filings do not change their substance ; they alter their arrangement. They stand to attention as it were, and marshal themselves in a highly ordered sequence and array. Might not the particulars do the same ? Might not what we call a mind be just that arrangement of the particulars which resulted from an infusion of the vital force ? A mind as the neo-realist conceived it was not a special and unique form of existent. It was a meeting-place of objects, objects arranged together because they were presented at the same moment at a given place, with sense organs and nerves as the intervening medium. Its distinguishing mark, therefore, was not substance but form of arrangement. In precisely the same way the distinguishing mark of that section of the material universe which was animated by the life force would be not substance but form of arrangement. In this way it seemed possible to admit a unity of substance while retaining a duality of arrangement. Once

granted the existence of the vital principle, there was nothing in the neo-realist theory of knowledge which was inconsistent with the assumption of its infusion into the stuff of which the universe was composed in order to form living organisms.

V. TELEOLOGY.

There remains one more element to be fitted into the framework I have tried to construct, and it is one for which I find it more difficult to make room than for any of the others. The history of philosophy bears witness to the attempt to interpret the universe as an expression of one or other of two opposing principles, that of change and that of perfection. To the principle of change I have done more than justice ; but to that of perfection I have hitherto made no acknowledgment.

It is, however, no uncommon thing for philosophers, even of the most empirical tendencies, to find themselves unable to withstand the temptation to introduce some element of permanent and immutable being into their universes, and I confess myself of their number. “ ‘That which is’ cannot become less, nor can it become more than itself.” “Ex nihilo nihil, in nihilum nihil posse reverti.” These and many other remarks of a similar character bear witness to the hold of Parmenides’ conception of a changeless universe over the philosophic imagination.

It is to the phenomena of æsthetic appreciation and to the peculiar character of the objects of mathematics that philosophers have in the main had recourse when seeking to find the type of that which was at once permanent and perfect in the universe. The form of beauty and the characteristics of numbers play the leading parts in Plato’s theory of ideas ; Aristotle informs us that the occupation of the deity is continuous reflection upon geometrical problems ; and that similar views are not held to be inconsistent with a vitalistic outlook upon what I may call the world of appearance, the special significance accorded by Schopenhauer to music, and the pursuits attributed to his Ancients by Mr. Shaw in the last play of the *Back to Methuselah* Pentateuch, bear sufficient witness.

The case of Shaw's Ancients is particularly pertinent. In the ultimate stage of evolution the power of life over matter has reached a point at which life achieves complete emancipation from the material mould into which it has infused itself. A living creature is then described as a vortex whose sole occupation is thought. "I brought life into the whirlpool of force, and compelled my enemy, Matter, to obey a living soul," says Lilith, and the process of evolution is described as one in which a world which began as "a whirlpool in pure force" becomes "a whirlpool in pure intelligence." But the intelligence has still an object, the Ancients following Aristotle's deity in commending the young to "leave women and study mathematics." The necessity for a more or less permanent object which thought may study is felt, therefore, in even the most vitalistic philosophies, and it is felt most keenly, as I have suggested, in connection with the demands of æsthetic experience and the nature of mathematics.

For me this quality of permanence in the universe intruded itself most plainly in connection with æsthetic experience. I had been impressed at an early stage by Plato's conception of the form of beauty, and in particular by his account in the *Symposium* of the nature of the sudden apprehension of the form. This is no place to recount the arguments for Plato's theory. Let it suffice that, for me, it issued in the general view that æsthetic experience was a process of discovery rather than of expression, and pointed always to something behind or beyond the immediate object of the experience, to which the mind penetrated through the experience.

It was in connection with music more especially that this view seemed most insistent. The difference between music and the other arts has always appeared to me far more striking than the likeness, and it is a difference which the current use of the all-embracing terms "art" and "æsthetics" very largely obscures. Literature was for me in essence didactic. It was an expression on the part of the life force of the urge to rise to a higher level of thought and consciousness, and the great writers, teachers, and preachers of the world were those whose function it was to point the way to this next level of evolutionary advance.

They were thus in a special and peculiar sense the repositories of a message from the life force, a message to which we give the name of inspiration. Even poetry was but a device to ensure attention for and acceptance of the message, by clothing it in a form which pleased. The poets said always the same thing as the teachers who had preceded them, but they said it better and men listened.

Literature, including poetry, was, therefore, an expression of the inspiration of the life force. It belonged to the world of change; it was part of the evolutionary process, and its value was relative to its ability to serve the purpose for which it was created. In other words, its value depended on the acceptance of its meaning.

The character of music was different. As opposed to literature, it had no meaning, and its value could not, therefore, depend either upon its success in conveying meaning or upon the newness of the meaning it conveyed. It announced a phrase, pregnant with the possibilities of development, and then, in accordance with laws derived from and imposed by itself, expanded and developed it on lines which were intuitively recognized to be inevitable. Music thus inhabited a world of its own, in terms of which alone its standards were valid and its meaning intelligible. Consequently it did not depend for its appeal upon our experience of this world, nor upon its capacity to evoke emotional reminiscences of our past. Experience of life, necessary for the appreciation of literature, is irrelevant to the comprehension of music, and for this reason a child can enjoy and create music as well as an adult. It is indeed significant that music, chess, and mathematics are the special provinces of the infant prodigy, excellence in these spheres depending not upon a content of emotional experience derived from fullness of life, but upon the capacity for perceiving intuitively the intellectual rightness of certain combinations. The musician and the mathematician inhabit a world containing a significance of its own, which has no counterpart in everyday life, a world which they are privileged to enter in virtue of some special gift of memory or of insight. This I take to be the meaning of Schopenhauer's remark that, if

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the visible and sensible worlds were swept away, music would still remain, and, since the emotion of the mathematician solving a problem seems strictly comparable to the enjoyment of a Bach fugue, we may place mathematics with music as inhabitants of Schopenhauer's real world.

Music, then, is not representative of life; the emotions it evokes are not those of life, and the significance of its combinations derives no validity from and owns no source in our experience. Of what then is it significant? Before attempting to answer this question, let me turn for a moment to painting. Painting, less pure than music, is cursed by the representative tradition. Although its object is the same, namely the creation of significant combinations, the prevalent belief that paintings should be *of* something, and the difficulty of producing pictures which do not contain some element of representation, make it harder for the graphic arts to divorce themselves from the world of appearance. The object of art is, as I conceive it, to transport the soul into another world, and this object is not to be achieved by photographing this one. Yet the artist has usually found it necessary to depict actual objects and scenes through the medium of which the significant form may be disentangled from the overlying material which distorts and obscures it. It is, nevertheless, his object to create æsthetic emotion by representing forms which, like the combinations of music, possess a special significance of their own.

Now what is this significance that lies behind pure form and in æsthetic appreciation can thrill to ecstasy? I conceive it to be that which characterizes and belongs to the real world of forms, real, that is to say, in Plato's sense of the word, which underlies the world of appearance and endows objects of art and combinations of sound with such beauty as they possess. And I further conceive it to be the business of the artist, first to disentangle these forms from the sensuous material which overlays and distorts them, and secondly by so doing to turn the eye of the soul, again in Plato's language, to the contemplation of the reality.

In the *Symposium* Plato describes the process by which the

soul comes to apprehend the form of beauty. It is a process in which several stages are discernible. The first stage consists in the appreciation of the beauty of persons and sensible objects. In this stage we recognize the beauty of a particular person or thing, and notice that this same element of beauty is common to many persons. In the second stage we ascend to the perception of abstract beauty in morals, laws and sciences. We are enabled to disentangle the abstract beauty in things from the material embodiment in which it appears. In the third stage, and only in the third, we obtain a vision of the form of beauty itself. The processes described in stages (1) and (2) are those through which the soul must of necessity pass before the third stage is reached, and for this reason they may be regarded as leading up to the third stage. They are, nevertheless, logically divorced from it. The third stage involves the realization of something that is entirely new ; it is a sudden and immediate apprehension of the form of beauty, an apprehension which is described by Plato in the terms of a mystical vision.

Now all these stages, with the exception of the last, are exemplified in our experience of the æsthetic emotion aroused by painting and music. But music, which is exempt from the outset from the necessity of representing material objects, starts, as it were, higher up the scale than painting. It also advances to a higher stage. Art, as I conceive it, is propædæutic to the study of reality ; it gradually lifts the soul through a presentation of the beauty in the appearances of material objects to a place from which it can discern the reality that underlies the appearances. Yet there are times when the artist has been able to dispense with the ladder on whose rungs he has climbed, and to present a clear vision of the form divested of material embodiment. There are places, that is to say, in music, notably in the sonatas and quartets of the last Beethoven period, where the composer seems, as it were, to break through and to commune directly with the real world. On these rare occasions the artist is for the moment on a level with the mystic. The mystic may be described as one who attains, without the aid of visible or audible symbols, to that vision of the real which the artist can

only hope at best to present through material forms. He contemplates directly with the mind that which the artist dimly discerns through the medium of his senses, and enables us to glimpse in his pictures or his music. Art is, therefore, propædæutic to mysticism, and the level of the mystic is above that of the artist. The mystic's vision is the final one of Plato's account in the *Symposium*, and it is a vision to the directness of which the artist rarely, if ever, attains. When I speak of the directness of the mystic's vision, I mean that it is direct in the sense in which that of the artist, which discerns the changeless in the material setting of the changing, is indirect. And because of this directness in the mystic's contemplation of the changeless, his vision achieves a degree of permanence and security which is beyond the reach of purely æsthetic experience.

How does this acknowledgment of a changeless element in the universe and of its effect upon the mind harmonize with the system of vitalism outlined above? The facts of life and of psychology I have endeavoured to interpret as the expression of an evolutionary force, the outcome of a push from behind, and literature and poetry have been subsumed under this general conception. Yet for the facts of æsthetic experience I am invoking a new and, in a sense, a contrary principle, by interpreting their significance teleologically as due to the pull exercised by a desired goal which lies in front. How are these contrary explanations to be reconciled?

The life force, as I have suggested, is limited and experimental. It works in an alien environment composed of the intractable stuff of which the Universe is made, and it struggles towards an ever-increasing consciousness, seeking to subdue matter to itself and infuse the whole Universe with life. Since it was to the existence of matter that we were led to attribute the dispersion of the life force into separate streams, and its objectification in different individuals, we may suppose that when the goal is reached and the material obstruction is eliminated, the distinction between individual forms of life will disappear. Life in this final stage may be likened to a sea of consciousness divested of the necessity of objectifying itself in individual forms. The elimina-

tion of the obstruction constituted by matter, or rather its complete infusion with life, may thus be regarded as the primary object of evolution.

But, as a realist, I insist that consciousness must be directed upon something. There must be an object for life, or rather thought, to contemplate even in its final evolutionary stage, and, since I have already endeavoured to establish on other grounds the necessity for an element of permanence and perfection in the Universe, it must be upon this element that the contemplation of the life force in its ultimate stage of disembodied thought is directed. There can in fact be no other object. I conceive, then, as the second and final goal of evolution the complete and untrammelled contemplation by life of a perfect and immutable reality conceived after the model of Plato's forms. The question whether there be one or many forms does not for our present purpose appear to be important ; we may conceive of them as a plurality, or as a hierarchy subsumed under, and owing their being to a form of beauty, of truth, or of goodness, according to our predilections. The important point is that these objects of contemplation should not be identified with the thought of the universal consciousness which is directed upon them.

I further conceive that life in its earlier stages of development is unconscious of this ultimate purpose, but that at a certain evolutionary level there is emergent, to use Professor Lloyd Morgan's term, an awareness of the goal which the process of evolution is seeking to reach. Emerging at a comparatively late stage of evolutionary development, this awareness takes the form of an intimation of the nature of the permanent reality towards a complete consciousness of which the life force is struggling. Such intimations have been the special privilege and possession of mystics in all ages. Through them they have seemed to themselves to come most closely into touch with the underlying and permanent reality of the universe. The intimation, which for the mystic is a foreknowledge of the end, expresses itself for most of us in the æsthetic emotion which is aroused by the beautiful, or in other words by that which has

significant form. The special response evoked in us by significant form, a response which in virtue of its arbitrariness and its uniqueness calls insistently for metaphysical interpretation, is for me the expression of the *nisus*, again to use Professor Lloyd Morgan's language, towards the goal, a *nisus* which, occurring spasmodically in individuals, and varying from man to man and from age to age, is most clearly recognizable in the emotions of æsthetic experience. In the appreciation of music and of pictures we get a momentary and fleeting glimpse of the nature of that reality to a full knowledge of which the movement of life is progressing. For that moment, and for so long as the glimpse persists, we realize in anticipation and almost, as it were, illicitly the nature of the end. We are, if I may so put it, for the moment *there*, just as a traveller may obtain a fleeting glimpse of a distant country from an eminence passed on the way, and cease for a space from his journey to enjoy the view. And since we are for the moment *there*, we experience while the moment lasts that sense of liberation from the urge and drive of life, which has been noted as one of the special characteristics of æsthetic experience. We who are part and parcel of the evolutionary stream stand for the time outside and above the stream, and are permitted for a moment to be withdrawn from the thrust and play of impulse and desire, which are our natural attributes as evolutionary tools. For so long as we enjoy our vision of the end, the life force lets us alone. We feel neither need nor want, and, losing ourselves in contemplation of the reality beyond us, we become for the moment selfless. And it is of this I take it that Schopenhauer spoke, when he said that the Will uses the intellect always as its servant except in æsthetic contemplation. When we experience those significant combinations of forms or sounds to which we give the name of beautiful in art, our contemplation is Will-less in its character. We cease for the moment to be individuals, mere tools of the Will, and take on a character of universality from the universal nature of that which we contemplate. The form is pure universal, and he who would know it must in knowing partake of its nature.

But if, in æsthetic experience, we are like travellers resting

on our journey and refreshing ourselves with a view of the goal to which our steps are directed, we may not rest for long. The life force has created us for a purpose, and it cannot afford to have us dallying by the roadside. Indulgence in æsthetic experience is, from the point of view of the life force, a form of idling, a playing truant when we should be at school. "Biologically speaking," says Mr. Roger Fry, "art is a blasphemy. We were given our eyes to see things and not to look at them." Thus life takes care that at an early age we shall attain to a considerable ignorance of the visual appearance of objects. We see and we are meant to see only so much of them as serves the purposes of living. To see them whole and to see them round as the artist does, to see them above all as combinations of significant forms, is a kind of seeing for which those who are preoccupied with the business of living cannot afford the energy or the time.

The æsthetic apprehension is unconditioned by considerations of space and time, and unrelated to the purposes of life. For this reason we are not allowed to indulge it overmuch. And so, before we are even fully assured that the vision of beauty is ours, the life force catches us up and thrusts us back into the whirlpool of want and need, of striving, loving, and fearing which is life. To this circumstance we must attribute the fleeting and ephemeral nature of even the most lasting æsthetic experience; to this it owes its unsatisfactory and tantalizing character. There is no sky in June so blue that it does not point forward to a bluer; no sunset so beautiful that it does not awaken the thought of a greater beauty. The soul is at once gladdened and disappointed. The veil is lifted so quickly that we have scarcely time to know that it has gone before it is re-drawn. But during the moment of lifting we get a vision of a something behind and beyond which passes, before it is clearly seen, and which in passing leaves behind a feeling of indefinable longing and regret.

Only the mystic achieves a vision which is in any degree lasting, and for that vision he pays the inevitable price. By withdrawing himself more and more completely from the service of the life force, he dams the stream of life within himself, raising himself

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to a vision of what is in front, only at the expense of cutting himself off from the animating force which is behind. The time is not yet for more than a fleeting glimpse of the end, and permanent withdrawal from the service of life leads to death.

I have tried in the above sketch to reconcile the teleological view which seems to me to be demanded by the facts of æsthetic and mystical experience, with the vitalist conception of the universe presented in the earlier sections. I am aware that the reconciliation is far from satisfactory, but I do not at the moment know how to better it.

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A DEFENCE OF COMMON SENSE

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A DEFENCE OF COMMON SENSE

IN what follows I have merely tried to state, one by one, some of the most important points in which my philosophical position differs from positions which have been taken up by *some* other philosophers. It may be that the points which I have had room to mention are not really the most important, and possibly some of them may be points as to which no philosopher has ever really differed from me. But, to the best of my belief, each is a point as to which many have really differed ; although (in most cases, at all events) each is also a point as to which many have agreed with me.

I. The first point is a point which embraces a great many other points. And it is one which I cannot state as clearly as I wish to state it, except at some length. The method I am going to use for stating it is this. I am going to begin by enunciating, under the heading (1), a whole long list of propositions, which may seem, at first sight, such obvious truisms as not to be worth stating : they are, in fact, a set of propositions, every one of which (in my own opinion) I *know*, with certainty, to be true. I shall, next, under the heading (2), state a single proposition which makes an assertion about a whole set of *classes* of propositions—each class being defined, as the class consisting of all propositions which resemble *one* of the propositions in (1) in a certain respect. (2), therefore, is a proposition which could not be stated, until the list of propositions in (1), or some similar list, had already been given. (2) is itself a proposition which may seem such an obvious truism as not to be worth stating : and it is also a proposition which (in my own opinion) I *know*, with certainty, to be true. But, nevertheless, it is, to the best of

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my belief, a proposition with regard to which many philosophers have, for different reasons, differed from me ; even if they have not directly denied (2) itself, they have held views incompatible with it. My first point, then, may be said to be that (2), together with all its implications, some of which I shall expressly mention, is true.

(1) I begin, then, with my list of truisms, every one of which (in my own opinion) I *know*, with certainty, to be true. The propositions to be included in this list are the following :—

There exists at present a living human body, which is *my* body. This body was born at a certain time in the past, and has existed continuously ever since, though not without undergoing changes ; it was, for instance, much smaller when it was born, and for some time afterwards, than it is now. Ever since it was born, it has been either in contact with or not far from the surface of the earth ; and, at every moment since it was born, there have also existed many other things, having shape and size in three dimensions (in the same familiar sense in which it has), from which it has been *at various distances* (in the familiar sense in which it is now at a distance both from that mantel-piece and from that book-case, and at a greater distance from the book-case than it is from the mantel-piece) ; also there have (very often, at all events) existed some other things of this kind with which it was *in contact* (in the familiar sense in which it is now in contact with the pen I am holding in my right hand and with some of the clothes I am wearing). Among the things which have, in this sense, formed part of its environment (i.e. have been either in contact with it, or at *some* distance from it, however *great*) there have, at every moment since its birth, been large numbers of other living human bodies, each of which has, like it, (a) at some time been born, (b) continued to exist for some time after birth, (c) been, at every moment of its life after birth, either in contact with or not far from the surface of the earth ; and many of these bodies have already died and ceased to exist. But the earth had existed also for many years before my body was born ; and for many of these years, also, large numbers of human bodies had, at every moment, been alive upon it ; and many of these

bodies had died and ceased to exist before it was born. Finally (to come to a different class of propositions), I am a human being, and I have, at different times since my body was born, had many different experiences, of each of many different kinds : e.g. I have often perceived both my own body and other things which formed part of its environment, including other human bodies ; I have not only perceived things of this kind, but have also observed facts about them, such as, for instance, the fact which I am now observing, that that mantel-piece is at present nearer to my body than that book-case ; I have been aware of other facts, which I was not at the time observing, such as, for instance, the fact, of which I am now aware, that my body existed yesterday and was then also for some time nearer to that mantel-piece than to that book-case ; I have had expectations with regard to the future, and many beliefs of other kinds, both true and false ; I have thought of imaginary things, and persons and incidents, in the reality of which I did not believe ; I have had dreams ; and I have had feelings of many different kinds. And, just as my body has been the body of a human being, namely myself, who has, during its life-time, had many experiences of each of these (and other) different kinds ; so, in the case of very many of the other human bodies which have lived upon the earth, each has been the body of a different human being, who has, during the life-time of that body, had many different experiences of each of these (and other) different kinds.

(2) I now come to the single truism which, as will be seen, could not be stated except by reference to the whole list of truisms, just given in (1). This truism also (in my own opinion) I *know*, with certainty, to be true ; and it is as follows :—

In the case of *very many* (I do not say *all*) of the human beings belonging to the class (which includes myself) defined in the following way, i.e. as human beings who have had human bodies, that were born and lived for some time upon the earth, and who have, during the life-time of those bodies, had many different experiences of each of the kinds mentioned in (1), it is true that each has frequently, during the life of his body, known, with regard to *himself* or *his* body, and with regard to some time

earlier than any of the times at which I wrote down the propositions in (1), a proposition *corresponding* to each of the propositions in (1), in the sense that it asserts with regard to *himself* or *his* body and the earlier time in question (namely, in each case, the time at which he knew it), just what the corresponding proposition in (1) asserts with regard to *me* or *my* body and the time at which I wrote that proposition down.

In other words what (2) asserts is only (what seems an obvious enough truism) that each of *us* (meaning by "us," very many human beings of the class defined) has frequently *known*, with regard to *himself* or *his* body and the time at which he knew it, everything which, in writing down my list of propositions in (1), I was claiming to know about *myself* or *my* body and the time at which I wrote that proposition down. I.e. just as *I* knew (when I wrote it down) "There exists at present a living human body which is my body," so each of *us* has frequently known with regard to himself and some other time the different but corresponding proposition, which *he* could *then* have properly expressed by, "There exists *at present* a human body which is *my* body"; just as *I* know "Many human bodies other than mine have before now lived on the earth," so each of *us* has frequently known the different but corresponding proposition "Many human bodies other than *mine* have before *now* lived on the earth"; just as *I* know "Many human beings other than myself have before now perceived, and dreamed, and felt," so each of *us* has frequently known the different but corresponding proposition "Many human beings other than *myself* have before *now* perceived, and dreamed, and felt"; and so on, in the case of *each* of the propositions enumerated in (1).

I hope there is no difficulty in understanding, so far, what this proposition (2) asserts. I have tried to make clear by examples what I mean by "propositions *corresponding* to each of the propositions in (1)." And what (2) asserts is merely that each of *us* has frequently known to be true a proposition *corresponding* (in that sense) to each of the propositions in (1)—a *different* corresponding proposition, of course, at each of the times at which he knew such a proposition to be true.

But there remain two points, which, in view of the way in which some philosophers have used the English language, ought, I think, to be expressly mentioned, if I am to make quite clear exactly how much I am asserting in asserting (2).

The first point is this. Some philosophers seem to have thought it legitimate to use the word "true" in such a sense, that a proposition which is partially false may nevertheless also be true; and some of these, therefore, would perhaps *say* that propositions like those enumerated in (1) are, in their view, true, when all the time they believe that every such proposition is partially false. I wish, therefore, to make it quite plain that I am not using "true" in any such sense. I am using it in such a sense (and I think this is the ordinary usage) that if a proposition is partially false, it follows that it is *not* true, though, of course, it may be *partially* true. I am maintaining, in short, that all the propositions in (1), and also many propositions corresponding to each of these, are *wholly* true; I am asserting this in asserting (2). And hence any philosopher, who does in fact believe, with regard to any or all of these classes of propositions, that every proposition of the class in question is partially false, is, in fact, disagreeing with me and holding a view incompatible with (2), even though he may think himself justified in *saying* that he believes some propositions belonging to all of these classes to be "true."

And the second point is this. Some philosophers seem to have thought it legitimate to use such expressions as, e.g., "The earth has existed for many years past," as if they expressed something which they really believed, when in fact they believe that every proposition, which such an expression would *ordinarily* be understood to express, is, at least partially, false; and all they really believe is that there is some *other* set of propositions, related in a certain way to those which such expressions do actually express, which, unlike these, really are true. That is to say, they use the expression "The earth has existed for many years past" to express, not what it would ordinarily be understood to express, but the proposition that some proposition, related to this in a certain way, is true; when all the time they

believe that the proposition, which this expression would ordinarily be understood to express, is, at least partially, false. I wish, therefore, to make it quite plain that I was not using the expressions I used in (1) in any such subtle sense. I meant by each of them precisely what every reader, in reading them, will have understood me to mean. And any philosopher, therefore, who holds that any of these expressions, if understood in this popular manner, expresses a proposition which embodies some popular error, is disagreeing with me and holding a view incompatible with (2), even though he may hold that there is some *other*, true, proposition which the expression in question might be legitimately used to express.

In what I have just said, I have assumed that there is some meaning which is *the* ordinary or popular meaning of such expressions as "The earth has existed for many years past." And this, I am afraid, is an assumption which some philosophers are capable of disputing. They seem to think that the question "Do you believe that the earth has existed for many years past?" is not a plain question, such as should be met either by a plain "Yes" or "No," or by a plain "I can't make up my mind," but is the sort of question which can be properly met by: "It all depends on what you mean by 'the earth' and 'exists' and 'years': if you mean so and so, and so and so, and so and so, then I do; but if you mean so and so, and so and so, and so and so, or so and so, and so and so, and so and so, and so and so, or so and so, and so and so, and so and so, then I don't, or at least I think it is extremely doubtful." It seems to me that such a view is as profoundly mistaken as any view can be. Such an expression as "The earth has existed for many years past" is the very type of an unambiguous expression, the meaning of which we all understand. Any one who takes a contrary view must, I suppose, be confusing the question whether we understand its meaning (which we all certainly do) with the entirely different question whether we *know what it means*, in the sense that we are able to *give a correct analysis* of its meaning. The question what is the correct analysis of *the* proposition meant *on any occasion* (for, of course, as I insisted in defining (2), a

different proposition is meant at every different time at which the expression is used) by "The earth has existed for many years past" is, it seems to me, a profoundly difficult question, and one to which, as I shall presently urge, no one knows the answer. But to hold that we do not know what, in certain respects, is the analysis of what we understand by such an expression, is an entirely different thing from holding that we do not understand the expression. It is obvious that we cannot even raise the question how what we do understand by it is to be analysed, unless we do understand it. So soon, therefore, as we know that a person who uses such an expression, is using it in its ordinary sense, we understand his meaning. So that in explaining that I was using the expressions used in (1) in their ordinary sense (those of them which have an ordinary sense, which is not the case with quite all of them), I have done all that is required to make my meaning clear.

But now, assuming that the expressions which I have used to express (2) are understood, I think, as I have said, that many philosophers have really held views incompatible with (2). And the philosophers who have done so may, I think, be divided into two main groups. A. What (2) asserts is, with regard to a whole set of *classes* of propositions, that we have, each of us, frequently *known* to be true propositions belonging to *each* of these classes. And one way of holding a view incompatible with this proposition is, of course, to hold, with regard to one or more of the classes in question, that *no* propositions of that class *are* true—that all of them are, at least partially, false; since if, in the case of any one of these classes, *no* propositions of that class *are* true, it is obvious that nobody can have *known* any propositions of that class to be true, and therefore that *we* cannot have known to be true propositions belonging to *each* of these classes. And my first group of philosophers consists of philosophers who have held views incompatible with (2) for this reason. They have held, with regard to one or more of the classes in question, simply that no propositions of that class *are* true. Some of them have held this with regard to *all* the classes in question; some only with regard to *some* of them. But, of

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course, whichever of these two views they have held, they have been holding a view inconsistent with (2). B. Some philosophers, on the other hand, have not ventured to assert, with regard to *any* of the classes in (2), that no propositions of that class *are* true, but what they have asserted is that, in the case of some of these classes, no human being has ever *known*, with certainty, that any propositions of the class in question are true. That is to say, they differ profoundly from philosophers of group A, in that they hold that propositions of *all* these classes *may* be true; but nevertheless they hold a view incompatible with (2) since they hold, with regard to some of these classes, that none of us has ever *known* a proposition of the class in question to be true.

A. I said that some philosophers, belonging to this group, have held that no propositions belonging to *any* of the classes in (2) are wholly true, while others have only held this with regard to *some* of the classes in (2). And I think the chief division of this kind has been the following. Some of the propositions in (1) (and, therefore, of course, all propositions belonging to the corresponding classes in (2)) are propositions which cannot be true, unless some *material things* have existed and have stood *in spatial relations* to one another: that is to say, they are propositions which, *in a certain sense*, imply *the reality of material things*, and *the reality of Space*. E.g. the proposition that my body has existed for many years past, and has, at every moment during that time been either in contact with or not far from the earth, is a proposition which implies both the *reality of material things* (provided you use "material things" in such a sense that to deny the reality of material things implies that no proposition which asserts that human bodies have existed, or that the earth has existed, is wholly true) and also the *reality of Space* (provided, again, that you use "Space" in such a sense that to deny the reality of Space implies that no proposition which asserts that anything has ever been in contact with or at a distance from another, in the familiar senses pointed out in (1), is wholly true). But others among the propositions in (1) (and, therefore, propositions belonging to the corresponding classes in (2)), do not (at

least obviously) imply either the reality of material things or the reality of Space: e.g. the propositions that I have often had dreams, and have had many different feelings at different times. It is true that propositions of this second class do imply one thing which is also implied by all propositions of the first, namely that (*in a certain sense*) *Time is real*, and imply also one thing not implied by propositions of the first class, namely that (*in a certain sense*) *at least one Self is real*. But I think there are some philosophers, who, while denying that (in the senses in question) either material things or Space are real, have been willing to admit that Selves and Time are real, in the sense required. Other philosophers, on the other hand, have used the expression "Time is not real," to express some view that they held; and some, at least, of these have, I think, meant by this expression something which is incompatible with the truth of *any* of the propositions in (1)—they have meant, namely, that *every* proposition of the sort that is expressed by the use of "now" or "at present," e.g. "I am now both seeing and hearing" or "There exists at present a living human body," or by the use of a *past* tense, e.g. "I *have* had many experiences in the past," or "The earth *has* existed for many years," are, at least partially, false.

All the four expressions I have just introduced, namely "Material things are not real," "Space is not real," "Time is not real," "The Self is not real," are, I think, unlike the expressions I used in (1), really ambiguous. And it may be that, in the case of each of them, some philosopher has used the expression in question to express some view he held which was not incompatible with (2). With such philosophers, if there are any, I am not, of course, at present concerned. But it seems to me that the most natural and proper usage of each of these expressions is a usage in which it *does* express a view incompatible with (2); and, in the case of each of them, some philosophers have, I think, really used the expression in question to express such a view. All such philosophers have, therefore, been holding a view incompatible with (2).

All such views, whether incompatible with *all* of the proposi-

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tions in (1), or only with *some* of them, seem to me to be quite certainly false; and I think the following points are specially deserving of notice with regard to them:—

(a) If *any* of the classes of propositions in (2) is such that no proposition of that class is true, then no philosopher has ever existed, and therefore none can ever have held with regard to any such class, that no proposition belonging to it is true. In other words, the proposition that some propositions belonging to each of these classes are true is a proposition which has the peculiarity, that, if any philosopher has ever denied it, it follows from the fact that he has denied it, that he must have been wrong in denying it. For when I speak of “philosophers” I mean, of course (as we all do), exclusively philosophers who have been human beings, with human bodies that have lived upon the earth, and who have at different times had many different experiences. If, therefore, there have been any philosophers, there have been human beings of this class; and if there have been human beings of this class, all the rest of what is asserted in (1) is certainly true too. Any view, therefore, incompatible with the proposition that many propositions corresponding to each of the propositions in (1) are true, can only be true, on the hypothesis that no philosopher has ever held any such view. It follows, therefore, that, in considering whether this proposition is true, I cannot consistently regard the fact that many philosophers, whom I respect, have, to the best of my belief, held views incompatible with it, as having any weight at all against it. Since, if I know that they have held such views, I am, *ipso facto*, knowing that they were mistaken; and, if I have no reason to believe that the proposition in question is true, I have still less reason to believe that they have held views incompatible with it; since I am more certain that they have existed and held *some* views, i.e. that the proposition in question is true, than that they have held any views incompatible with it.

(b) It is, of course, the case that all philosophers who have held such views have repeatedly, even in their philosophical works, expressed other views inconsistent with them: i.e. no philosopher has ever been able to hold such views consistently,

One way in which they have betrayed this inconsistency, is by alluding to the existence of other philosophers. Another way is by alluding to the existence of the human race, and in particular by using "we" in the sense in which I have already constantly used it, in which any philosopher who asserts that "we" do so and so, e.g. that "*we* sometimes believe propositions that are not true," is asserting not only that he himself has done the thing in question, but that *very many other human beings, who have had bodies and lived upon the earth*, have done the same. The fact is, of course, that all philosophers have belonged to the class of human beings, which exists only if (2) be true: that is to say, to the class of human beings, who have frequently *known* propositions corresponding to each of the propositions in (1). In holding views incompatible with the proposition that propositions of all these classes are true, they have, therefore, been holding views inconsistent with propositions which they themselves *knew* to be true; and it was, therefore, only to be expected that they should sometimes betray their knowledge of such propositions. The strange thing is that philosophers should have been able to hold sincerely, as part of their philosophical creed, propositions inconsistent with what they themselves *knew* to be true; and yet, so far as I can make out, this has really frequently happened. My position, therefore, on this first point, differs from that of philosophers belonging to this group A, not in that I hold anything which they don't hold, but only in that I don't hold, as part of my philosophical creed, things which they do hold as part of theirs—that is to say propositions inconsistent with some which they and I both hold in common. But this difference seems to me to be an important one.

(c) Some of these philosophers have brought forward, in favour of their position, arguments designed to show, in the case of some or all of the propositions in (1), that no propositions of that type can possibly be wholly true, because every such proposition entails both of two incompatible propositions. And I admit, of course, that if any of the propositions in (1) did entail both of two incompatible propositions it could not be true. But it seems to me I have an absolutely conclusive argument to show

that none of them does entail both of two incompatible propositions. Namely this: All of the propositions in (1) are true; no true proposition entails both of two incompatible propositions; therefore, none of the propositions in (1) entails both of two incompatible propositions.

(d) Although, as I have urged, no philosopher who has held with regard to any of these types of proposition, that no propositions of that type are true, has failed to hold also other views inconsistent with his view in this respect, yet I do not think that the view, with regard to any or all of these types, that no proposition belonging to them is true, is *in itself* a self-contradictory view, i.e. entails both of two incompatible propositions. On the contrary, it seems to me quite clear that it *might* have been the case that Time was not real, material things not real, Space not real, selves not real. And in favour of my view that none of these things, which might have been the case, *is* in fact the case, I have, I think, no better argument than simply this—namely, that all the propositions in (1) are, in fact, true.

B. This view, which is usually considered a much more modest view than A, has, I think, the defect that, unlike A, it really is self-contradictory, i.e. entails both of two mutually incompatible propositions.

Most philosophers who have held this view, have held, I think, that though each of us knows propositions corresponding to *some* of the propositions in (1), namely to those which merely assert that *I* myself have had in the past experiences of certain kinds at many different times, yet none of us knows *for certain* any propositions either of the type (a) which assert the existence of *material things* or of the type (b) which assert the existence of *other* selves, beside myself, and that *they* also have had experiences. They admit that we do in fact *believe* propositions of both these types, and that they *may* be true: some would even say that we know them to be highly probable; but they deny that we ever know them, *for certain*, to be true. Some of them have spoken of such beliefs as "beliefs of Common Sense," expressing thereby their conviction that beliefs of this kind are very commonly entertained by mankind: but they are

convinced that these things are, in all cases, only *believed*, not known for certain ; and some have expressed this by saying that they are matters of Faith, not of Knowledge.

Now the remarkable thing, which those who take this view have not, I think, in general duly appreciated, is that, in each case, the philosopher who takes it is making an assertion about "us"—that is to say, not merely about himself, but about *many other human beings as well*. When he says "No human being has ever *known* of the existence of other human beings," he is saying : "There have been many other human beings beside myself, and none of them (including myself) has ever known of the existence of other human beings." If he says : "These beliefs are beliefs of Common Sense, but they are not matters of *knowledge*," he is saying : "There have been many other human beings, beside myself, who have shared these beliefs, but neither I nor any of the rest has ever known them to be true." In other words, he asserts with confidence that these beliefs *are* beliefs of Common Sense, and seems often to fail to notice that, *if* they are, they must be true ; since the proposition that they are beliefs of Common Sense, is one which logically entails propositions both of type (a) and of type (b) ; it logically entails the proposition that many human beings, beside the philosopher himself, have had human bodies, which lived upon the earth, and have had various experiences, including beliefs of this kind. This is why this position, as contrasted with positions of group A, seems to me to be self-contradictory. Its difference from A consists in the fact that it is making a proposition about *human knowledge* in general, and therefore is actually asserting the existence of many human beings, whereas philosophers of group A in stating their position are not doing this : they are only contradicting *other* things which they hold. It is true that a philosopher who says "There have existed many human beings beside myself, and none of us has ever known of the existence of any human beings beside himself," is only contradicting himself, if what he holds is "There have *certainly* existed many human beings beside myself" or, in other words, "*I* know that there have existed other human beings beside myself." But this, it

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seems to me, is what such philosophers have in fact been generally doing. They seem to me constantly to betray the fact that they regard the proposition that those beliefs *are* beliefs of Common Sense, or the proposition that they themselves are not the only members of the human race, as not merely true, but *certainly* true; and *certainly* true it cannot be, unless one member, at least, of the human race, namely themselves, has *known* the very things which that member is declaring that no human being has ever known.

Nevertheless, my position that I *know*, with certainty, to be true all of the propositions in (1), is certainly not a position, the denial of which entails both of two incompatible propositions. If I do *know* all these propositions to be true, then, I think, it is quite certain that other human beings also have known corresponding propositions: that is to say (2) also *is* true, and I know it to be true. But do I really *know* all the propositions in (1) to be true? Isn't it possible that I merely believe them? or know them to be highly probable? In answer to this question, I think I have nothing better to say than that it seems to me that I *do* know them, with certainty. It is, indeed, obvious that, in the case of most of them, I do not know them *directly*: that is to say, I only know them because, in the past, I have known to be true *other* propositions which were evidence for them. If, for instance, I do know that the earth had existed for many years before I was born, I certainly only know this because I have known other things in the past which were evidence for it. And I certainly do not know exactly what the evidence was. Yet all this seems to me to be no good reason for doubting that I do know it. We are all, I think, in this strange position that we do *know* many things, with regard to which we *know* further that we must have had evidence for them, and yet we do not know *how* we know them, i.e. we do not know what the evidence was. If there is any "we," and if we know that there is, this must be so: for, that there is a "we," is one of the things in question. And that I do know that there is a "we," that is to say, that many other human beings, with human bodies, have lived upon the earth, it seems to me that I do know, for certain.

If this first point in my philosophical position, namely my belief in (2), is to be given any name, which has actually been used by philosophers in classifying the positions of other philosophers, it would have, I think, to be expressed by saying that I am one of those philosophers who have held that the "Common Sense view of the world" is, in certain fundamental features, *wholly* true. But it must be remembered that, according to me, *all* philosophers, without exception, have agreed with me in holding this: and that the real difference, which is commonly expressed in this way, is only a difference between those philosophers, who have *also* held views inconsistent with these features in "the Common Sense view of the world," and those who have not.

The features in question (namely, propositions of any of the classes defined in defining (2)) are all of them features, which have this peculiar property—namely, that *if we know that they are features in the "Common Sense view of the world," it follows that they are true*: it is self-contradictory to maintain that *we* know them to be features in the Common Sense view, and that yet they are not true; since to say that *we* know this, is to say that they are true. And many of them also have the further peculiar property that, *if they are features in the Common Sense view of the world (whether "we" know this or not), it follows that they are true*, since to say that there is a "Common Sense view of the world," is to say that they are true. The phrases "Common Sense view of the world" or "Common Sense beliefs" (as used by philosophers) are, of course, extraordinarily vague; and, for all I know, there may be many propositions which may be properly called features in "the Common Sense view of the world" or "Common Sense beliefs," which are not true, and which deserve to be mentioned with the contempt with which some philosophers speak of "Common Sense beliefs." But to speak with contempt of those "Common Sense beliefs" which I have mentioned is quite certainly the height of absurdity. And there are, of course, enormous numbers of other features in "the Common Sense view of the world" which, if these are true, are quite certainly true too: e.g. that there have lived upon

the surface of the earth not only human beings, but also many different species of plants and animals, etc., etc.

II. What seems to me the next in importance of the points in which my philosophical position differs from positions held by *some* other philosophers, is one which I will express in the following way. I hold, namely, that there is no good reason to suppose either (A) that *every* physical fact is *logically* dependent upon some mental fact or (B) that *every* physical fact is *causally* dependent upon some mental fact. In saying this, I am not, of course, saying that there *are* any physical facts which are wholly independent (i.e. both logically and causally) of mental facts: I do, in fact, believe that there are; but that is not what I am asserting. I am only asserting that there is *no good reason* to suppose the contrary; by which I mean, of course, that none of the human beings, who have had human bodies that lived upon the earth, have, during the life-time of their bodies, had any good reason to suppose the contrary. Many philosophers have, I think, not only believed either that *every* physical fact is *logically* dependent upon some mental fact ("physical fact" and "mental fact" being understood in the sense in which I am using these terms) or that *every* physical fact is *causally* dependent upon some mental fact, or both, but also that they themselves had good reason for these beliefs. In this respect, therefore, I differ from them.

In the case of the term "physical fact," I can only explain how I am using it by giving examples. I mean by "physical facts," facts *like* the following: "That mantel-piece is at present nearer to this body than that book-case is," "The earth has existed for many years past," "The moon has at every moment for many years past been nearer to the earth than to the sun," "That mantel-piece is of a light colour." But, when I say "facts *like* these," I mean, of course, facts like them *in a certain respect*; and what this respect is, I cannot define. The term "physical fact" is, however, in common use; and I think that I am using it in its ordinary sense. Moreover, there is no need for a definition to make my point clear; since among the

examples I have given, there are some with regard to which I hold that there is no reason to suppose *them* (i.e. these particular physical facts) either logically or causally dependent upon any mental fact.

"Mental fact," on the other hand, is a much more unusual expression, and I am using it in a specially limited sense, which, though I think it is a natural one, does need to be explained. There may be many other senses in which the term can be properly used. But I am only concerned with this one; and hence it is essential that I should explain what it is.

There may, possibly, I hold, be "mental facts" of three different kinds. It is only with regard to the first kind that I am sure that there are facts of that kind; but if there were any facts of either of the other two kinds, they would be "mental facts" in my limited sense, and therefore I must explain what is meant by the hypothesis that there are facts of those two kinds.

(a) My first kind is this. I am conscious now; and also I am seeing something now. These two facts are both of them mental facts of my first kind; and my first kind consists exclusively of facts which resemble one or other of the two in a certain respect.

(a) The fact that I am conscious now is obviously, in a certain sense, a fact, with regard to a particular individual and a particular time, to the effect that that individual is conscious at that time. And every fact which resembles this one in that respect is to be included in my first kind of mental fact. Thus the fact that I was also conscious at many different times yesterday is not itself a fact of this kind: but it entails that there *are* (or, as we should commonly say, because the times in question are past times, "were") many other facts of this kind, namely each of the facts, which, at each of the times in question, I could have properly expressed by "I am conscious *now*." Any fact which is, in this sense, a fact with regard to an individual and a time (whether the individual be myself or another, and whether the time be past or present), to the effect that that individual *is* conscious at that time, is to be included in my first kind of mental fact: and I call such facts, facts of class (a).

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(β) The second example I gave, namely the fact that I am seeing something now, is obviously related to the fact that I am conscious now in a peculiar manner. It not only *entails* the fact that I am conscious now (for from the fact that I am seeing something it *follows* that I am conscious: I *could* not have been seeing anything, unless I had been conscious, though I might quite well have been conscious without seeing anything) but it also is a fact, with regard to a *specific way* (or mode) of being conscious, to the effect that I am conscious in that way: in the same sense in which the proposition (with regard to any particular thing) "This is red" both entails the proposition (with regard to the same thing) "This is coloured," and is also a proposition, with regard to a *specific way* of being coloured, to the effect that that thing is coloured in that way. And any fact which is related in this peculiar manner to any fact of class (α), is also to be included in my first kind of mental fact, and is to be called a fact of class (β). Thus the fact that I am hearing now, is, like the fact that I am seeing now, a fact of class (β); and so is any fact, with regard to myself and a past time, which could at that time have been properly expressed by "I am dreaming now," "I am imagining now," "I am at present aware of the fact that . . ." etc., etc. In short, any fact, which is a fact with regard to a particular individual (myself or another), a particular time (past or present), and *any particular kind of experience*, to the effect that that individual is having at that time an experience of that particular kind, is a fact of class (β): and only such facts are facts of class (β).

My first kind of mental facts consists exclusively of facts of classes (α) and (β), and consists of *all* facts of either of these kinds.

(*b*) That there are many facts of classes (α) and (β) seems to me perfectly certain. But many philosophers seem to me to have held a certain view with regard to the *analysis* of facts of class (α), which is such that, if it were true, there would be facts of another kind, which I should wish also to call "mental facts." I don't feel at all sure that this analysis is true; but it seems to me that it *may* be true; and since we can understand what is

meant by the supposition that it is true, we can also understand what is meant by the supposition that there are "mental facts" of this second kind.

Many philosophers have, I think, held the following view as to the analysis of what each of us knows, when he knows (at any time) "I am conscious now." They have held, namely, that there is a certain intrinsic property (with which we are all of us familiar and which might be called that of "being an experience") which is such that, at any time at which any man knows "I am conscious now," he is knowing, with regard to that property and himself and the time in question, "There is occurring now an event which has this property (i.e. 'is an experience') and which is an experience of *mine*," and such that this fact is what he expresses by "I am conscious now." And if this view is true, there must be many facts of each of three kinds, each of which I should wish to call "mental facts"; viz. (1) facts with regard to some event, which has this supposed intrinsic property, and to some time, to the effect that that event is occurring at that time, (2) facts with regard to this supposed intrinsic property and some time, to the effect that *some* event which has that property is occurring at that time, and (3) facts with regard to some property, which is a *specific way* of having the supposed intrinsic property (in the sense above explained in which "being red" is a specific way of "being coloured") and some time, to the effect that some event which has that specific property is occurring at that time. Of course, there not only are not, but *cannot* be, facts of any of these kinds, unless there is an intrinsic property related to what each of us (on any occasion) expresses by "I am conscious now," in the manner defined above; and I feel very doubtful whether there is any such property; in other words, although I know for certain both that I have had many experiences, and that I have had experiences of many different kinds, I feel very doubtful whether to say the first is the same thing as to say that there have been many events, each of which was an experience and an experience of mine, and whether to say the second is the same thing as to say that there have been many events, each of which was an experience of mine, and each

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of which also had a different property, which was a specific way of being an experience. The proposition that I have had experiences does not necessarily entail the proposition that there have been any events which were experiences; and I cannot satisfy myself that I am acquainted with any events of the supposed kind. But yet it seems to me possible that the proposed analysis of "I am conscious now" is correct: that I am really acquainted with events of the supposed kind, though I cannot see that I am. And *if* I am, then I should wish to call the three kinds of facts defined above "mental facts." Of course, if there are "experiences" in the sense defined, it would be possible (as many have held) that there *can* be no experiences which are not *some individual's* experiences; and in that case any fact of any of these three kinds would be logically dependent on, though not necessarily identical with, some fact of class (α) or class (β). But it seems to me also a possibility that, if there are "experiences," there might be experiences which did not belong to any individual; and, in that case, there would be "mental facts" which were neither identical with nor logically dependent on any fact of class (α) or class (β).

(c) Finally some philosophers have, so far as I can make out, held that there are or may be facts, which are facts with regard to some individual, to the effect that he is conscious, or is conscious in some specific way, which differ from facts of classes (α) and (β), in the important respect that they are not facts *with regard to any time*: they have conceived the possibility that there may be one or more individuals, who are *timelessly* conscious, and timelessly conscious in specific modes. And others, again, have, I think, conceived the hypothesis that the intrinsic property defined in (*b*) may be one which does not belong only to *events*, but may also belong to one or more wholes, which do *not* occur at any time: in other words, that there may be one or more *timeless* experiences, which might or might not be the experiences of some individual. It seems to me very doubtful whether any of these hypotheses are even possibly true; but I cannot see for certain that they are not possible: and, if they are possible, then I should wish to give the name "mental fact" to any fact

(if there were any) of any of the five following kinds, viz. (1) to any fact which is the fact, with regard to any individual, that he is *timelessly* conscious, (2) to any fact which is the fact, with regard to any individual, that he is *timelessly* conscious in any specific way, (3) to any fact which is the fact with regard to a *timeless* experience that it exists, (4) to any fact which is the fact with regard to the supposed intrinsic property "being an experience," which is the fact that something timelessly exists which has that property, and (5) to any fact which is the fact, with regard to any property, which is a specific mode of this supposed intrinsic property, that something timelessly exists which has that property.

I have then defined three different kinds of facts, each of which is such that, if there *were* any facts of that kind (as there certainly *are*, in the case of the first kind), the facts in question *would be* "mental facts" in my sense; and to complete the definition of the limited sense in which I am using "mental facts," I have only to add that I wish also to apply the name to one *fourth* class of facts: namely to any fact, which is the fact, with regard to any of these three kinds of facts, or any kinds included in them, *that there are facts of the kind in question*; i.e. not only will each individual fact of class (α) be, in my sense, a "mental fact," but also the general fact "that there are facts of class (α)," will itself be a "mental fact"; and similarly in all other cases: e.g. not only will the fact that I am now perceiving (which is a fact of class (β)) be a "mental fact," but also the general fact that *there are* facts, with regard to individuals and times, to the effect that the individual in question is perceiving at the time in question, will be a "mental fact."

A. Understanding "physical fact" and "mental fact" in the senses just explained, I hold, then, that there is no good reason to suppose that *every* physical fact is *logically* dependent upon some mental fact. And I use the phrase, with regard to two facts, F_1 and F_2 , " F_1 is *logically dependent* on F_2 ," wherever and only where F_1 *entails* F_2 , either in the sense in which the proposition "I am seeing now" *entails* the proposition "I am conscious now," or the proposition (with regard to any particular

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thing) "This is red" entails the proposition (with regard to the same thing) "This is coloured," or else in the more strictly logical sense in which (for instance) the conjunctive proposition "All men are mortal, and Mr. Baldwin is a man" entails the proposition "Mr. Baldwin is mortal." To say, then, of two facts, F_1 and F_2 , that F_1 is *not* logically dependent upon F_2 , is only to say that F_1 *might* have been a fact, even if there had been no such fact as F_2 ; or that the conjunctive proposition " F_1 is a fact, but there is no such fact as F_2 " is a proposition which is not self-contradictory, i.e. does not entail both of two mutually incompatible propositions.

I hold, then, that, in the case of *some* physical facts, there is no good reason to suppose that there is some mental fact, such that the physical fact in question could not have been a fact unless the mental fact in question had also been one. And my position is perfectly definite, since I hold that this is the case with all the four physical facts, which I have given as examples of physical facts. E.g. there is no good reason to suppose that there is any mental fact whatever, such that the fact that that mantel-piece is at present nearer to my body than that book-case could not have been a fact, unless the mental fact in question had also been a fact; and, similarly, in all the other three cases.

In holding this I am certainly differing from some philosophers. I am, for instance, differing from Berkeley, who held that that mantel-piece, that book-case, and my body are, all of them, either "ideas" or "constituted by ideas," and that no "idea" can possibly exist without being perceived. He held, that is, that this physical fact is logically dependent upon a mental fact of my fourth class: namely a fact which is the fact that there is at least one fact, which is a fact with regard to an individual and the present time, to the effect that that individual is now perceiving something. He does not say that this physical fact is logically dependent upon any fact which is a fact of any of my first three classes, e.g. on any fact which is the fact, with regard to a particular individual and the present time, that *that* individual is now perceiving something: what he does say is that the physical fact couldn't have been a fact, unless it had

been a fact that there was *some* mental fact of this sort. And it seems to me that many philosophers, who would perhaps disagree either with Berkeley's assumption that my body is an "idea" or "constituted by ideas," or with his assumption that "ideas" cannot exist without being perceived, or with both, nevertheless would agree with him in thinking that this physical fact is logically dependent upon *some* "mental fact": e.g. they might say, that it could not have been a fact, unless there had been, at some time or other, or, were timelessly, *some* "experience." Many, indeed, so far as I can make out, have held that *every* fact is logically dependent on every other fact. And, of course, they have held in the case of their opinions, as Berkeley did in the case of his, that they had good reasons for them.

B. I also hold that there is no good reason to suppose that *every* physical fact is *causally* dependent upon some mental fact. By saying that F_1 is *causally* dependent on F_2 , I mean only that F_1 *wouldn't* have been a fact unless F_2 had been; *not* (which is what "logically dependent" asserts) that F_1 *couldn't conceivably* have been a fact, unless F_2 had been. And I can illustrate my meaning by reference to the example which I have just given. The fact that that mantel-piece is at present nearer to my body than that book-case, is (as I have just explained) so far as I can see, not *logically* dependent upon any mental fact; it *might* have been a fact, even if there has been no mental facts. But it certainly is *causally* dependent on many mental facts: my body *would* not have been here unless I had been conscious in various ways in the past; and the mantel-piece and the book-case certainly *would* not have existed, unless other men had been conscious too.

But with regard to two of the facts, which I gave as instances of physical facts, namely the fact that the earth has existed for many years past, and the fact that the moon has for many years past been nearer to the earth than to the sun, I hold that there is no good reason to suppose that these are *causally* dependent upon any mental fact. So far as I can see, there is no reason to suppose that there is any mental fact of which it could be truly said: unless this fact had been a fact, the earth would not have

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existed for many years past. And in holding this, again, I think I differ from some philosophers. I differ, for instance, from those who have held that all material things were created by God, and that they had good reasons for supposing this.

III. I have just explained that I differ from those philosophers who have held that there is good reason to suppose that all material things were created by God. And it is, I think, an important point in my position, which should be mentioned, that I differ also from all philosophers who have held that there is good reason to suppose that there is a God at all, whether or not they have held it likely that he created all material things.

And similarly, whereas some philosophers have held that there is good reason to suppose that we, human beings, shall continue to exist and to be conscious after the death of our bodies, I hold that there is no good reason to suppose this.

IV. I now come to a point of a very different order.

As I have explained under I., I am not at all sceptical as to the *truth* of such propositions as "The earth has existed for many years past," "Many human bodies have each lived for many years upon it," i.e. propositions which assert the existence of material things: on the contrary, I hold that we all know, with certainty, many such propositions to be true. But I am very sceptical as to what, in certain respects, the correct *analysis* of such propositions is. And this is a matter as to which I think I differ from many philosophers. Many seem to hold that there is no doubt at all as to their *analysis*, nor, therefore, as to the analysis of the proposition "Material things have existed," in certain respects in which I hold that the analysis of the propositions in question is extremely doubtful; and some of them, as we have seen, while holding that there is no doubt as to their *analysis*, seem to have doubted whether any such propositions are *true*. I, on the other hand, while holding that there is no doubt whatever that many such propositions are wholly true, hold also that no philosopher, hitherto, has succeeded in suggesting an analysis of them, as regards certain important points, which comes anywhere near to being certainly true.

It seems to me quite evident that the question how propositions of the type I have just given are to be analysed, depends on the question how propositions of another and simpler type are to be analysed. I know, at present, that I am perceiving a human hand, a pen, a sheet of paper, etc. ; and it seems to me that I cannot know how the proposition "Material things exist" is to be analysed, until I know how, in certain respects, these simpler propositions are to be analysed. But even these are not simple enough. It seems to me quite evident that my knowledge that I am now perceiving a human hand is a deduction from a pair of propositions simpler still—propositions which I can only express in the form "I am perceiving *this*" and "*This* is a human hand." It is the analysis of propositions of the latter kind, which seems to me to present such great difficulties ; while nevertheless the whole question as to the *nature* of material things obviously depends upon their analysis. It seems to me a surprising thing that so few philosophers, while saying a great deal as to what material things *are* and as to what it is to perceive them, have attempted to give a clear account as to what precisely they suppose themselves to *know* (or to *judge*, in case they have held that we don't *know* any such propositions to be true, or even that no such propositions *are* true) when they know or judge such things as "This is a hand," "That is the sun," "This is a dog," etc. etc. etc.

Two things only seem to me to be quite certain about the analysis of such propositions (and even with regard to these I am afraid some philosophers would differ from me) namely that whenever I know, or judge, such a proposition to be true, (1) there is always some *sense-datum* about which the proposition in question is a proposition—some sense-datum which is *a* subject (and, in a certain sense, the principal or ultimate subject) of the proposition in question, and (2) that, nevertheless, *what* I am knowing or judging to be true about this sense-datum is not (in general) that it is *itself* a hand, or a dog, or the sun, etc. etc., as the case may be.

Some philosophers have I think doubted whether there are any such things as other philosophers have meant by "sense-

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data " or "sensa." And I think it is quite possible that some philosophers (including myself, in the past) have used these terms in senses, such that it is really doubtful whether there are any such things. But there is no doubt at all that there are sense-data, in the sense in which I am now using that term. I am at present seeing a great number of them, and feeling others. And, in order to point out to the reader what sort of things I mean by sense-data, I need only ask him to look at his own right hand. If he does this he will be able to pick out something (and, unless he is seeing double, *only* one thing) with regard to which he will see that it is, at first sight, a natural view to take that that thing is identical, not, indeed, with his whole right hand, but with that part of its surface which he is actually seeing, but will also (on a little reflection) be able to see that it is doubtful whether it can be identical with the part of the surface of his hand in question. Things *of the sort* (in a certain respect) of which this thing is, which he sees in looking at his hand, and with regard to which he can understand how some philosophers should have supposed it to *be* the part of the surface of his hand which he is seeing, while others have supposed that it can't be, are what I mean by "sense-data." I therefore define the term in such a way that it is an open question whether the sense-datum which I now see in looking at my hand and which is a sense-datum of my hand is or is not identical with that part of its surface which I am now actually seeing.

That what I know, with regard to this sense-datum, when I know "This is a human hand," is not that it is *itself* a human hand, seems to me certain because I know that my hand has many parts (e.g. its other side, and the bones inside it), which are quite certainly *not* parts of this sense-datum.

I think it certain, therefore, that the analysis of the proposition "This is a human hand" is, roughly at least, of the form "There is a thing, and only one thing, of which it is true both that it is a human hand and that *this surface* is a part of its surface." In other words, to put my view in terms of the phrase "theory of representative perception," I hold it to be quite certain that I do not *directly* perceive *my hand*; and that

when I am said (as I may be correctly said) to "perceive" it, that I "perceive" it means that I perceive (in a different and more fundamental sense) something which is (in a suitable sense) *representative* of it, namely, a certain part of its surface.

This is all that I hold to be *certain* about the analysis of the proposition "This is a human hand." We have seen that it includes in its analysis a proposition of the form "This is part of the surface of a human hand" (where "This," of course, has a different meaning from that which it has in the original proposition which has now been analysed). But this proposition also is undoubtedly a proposition about the sense-datum, which I am seeing, which is a sense-datum *of* my hand. And hence the further question arises: *What*, when I know "*This is part of the surface of a human hand*," am I knowing about the sense-datum in question? Am I, in this case, really knowing, about the sense-datum in question that it *itself* is part of the surface of a human hand? Or, just as we found in the case of "This is a human hand," that what I was knowing about the sense-datum was certainly not that it *itself* was a human hand, so, is it perhaps the case, with this new proposition, that even here I am not knowing, with regard to the sense-datum, that it is *itself* part of the surface of a hand? and, if so, what is it that I am knowing about the sense-datum itself?

This is the question to which, as it seems to me, no philosopher has hitherto suggested an answer which comes anywhere near to being *certainly* true.

There seem to me to be three, and only three, alternative types of answer possible; and to any answer yet suggested, of any of these types, there seem to me to be very grave objections.

(1) Of the first type, there is but one answer: namely, that in this case what I am knowing really is that the sense-datum *itself* is part of the surface of a human hand. In other words that, though I don't perceive *my hand* directly, I do *directly* perceive part of its surface; that the sense-datum itself *is* this part of its surface and not merely something which (in a sense yet to be determined) "represents" this part of its surface; and that hence the sense in which I "perceive" this part of the

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surface of my hand, is not in its turn a sense which needs to be defined by reference to yet a third more ultimate sense of "perceive," which is the only one in which perception is direct, namely that in which I perceive the sense-datum.

If this view is true (as I think it may just possibly be), it seems to me certain that we must abandon a view which has been held to be certainly true by most philosophers, namely the view that our sense-data always really have the qualities which they sensibly appear to us to have. For I know that if another man were looking through a microscope at the same surface which I am seeing with the naked eye, the sense-datum which he saw would sensibly appear to him to have qualities very different from and incompatible with those which my sense-datum sensibly appears to me to have: and yet, if my sense-datum is identical with the surface we are both of us seeing, his must be identical with it also. My sense-datum can, therefore, be identical with this surface only on condition that it is identical with his sense-datum; and, since his sense-datum sensibly appears to him to have qualities incompatible with those which mine sensibly appears to me to have, his sense-datum can be identical with mine, only on condition that the sense-datum in question either has not got the qualities which it sensibly appears to me to have, or has not got those which it sensibly appears to him to have.

I do not, however, think that this is a fatal objection to this first type of view. A far more serious objection seems to me to be that, when we see a thing double (have what is called "a double image" of it), we certainly have *two* sense-data each of which is *of* the surface seen, and which cannot therefore both be identical with it; and that yet it seems as if, if any sense-datum is ever identical with the surface *of* which it is a sense-datum, each of these so-called "images" must be so. It looks, therefore, as if every sense-datum is, after all, only "representative" of the surface, *of* which it is a sense-datum.

(2) But, if so, what relation has it to the surface in question?

This second type of view is one which holds that when I know "This is part of the surface of a human hand," what I am knowing with regard to the sense-datum which is *of* that surface, is, *not*

that it is *itself* part of the surface of a human hand, but something of the following kind. There is, it says, *some* relation, R, such that what I am knowing with regard to the sense-datum is either "There is one thing and only one thing, of which it is true both that it is a part of the surface of a human hand, and that it has R to this sense-datum," or else "There are a set of things, of which it is true both that that set, taken collectively, *are* part of the surface of a human hand, and also that each member of the set has R to this sense-datum, and that nothing which is not a member of the set has R to it."

Obviously, in the case of this second type, many different views are possible, differing according to the view they take as to what the relation R is. But there is only one of them, which seems to me to have any plausibility; namely that which holds that R is an ultimate and unanalysable relation, which might be expressed by saying that " xRy " means the same as "y is an appearance or manifestation of x." I.e. the analysis which this answer would give of "This is part of the surface of a human hand" would be "There is one and only one thing of which it is true both that it is part of the surface of a human hand, and that this sense-datum is an appearance or manifestation of it."

To this view also there seem to me to be very grave objections, chiefly drawn from a consideration of the questions how we can possibly *know* with regard to any of our sense-data that there is one thing and one thing only which has to them such a supposed ultimate relation; and how, if we do, we can possibly *know* anything further about such things, e.g. of what size or shape they are.

(3) The third type of answer, which seems to me to be the only possible alternative if (1) and (2) are rejected, is the type of answer which J. S. Mill seems to have been implying to be the true one when he said that material things are "permanent possibilities of sensation." He seems to have thought that when I know such a fact as "This is part of the surface of a human hand," what I am knowing with regard to the sense-datum which is the principal subject of that fact, is not that it is itself part of the surface of a human hand, nor yet, with regard to any relation, that *the* thing which has to it that relation is part of the surface

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of a human hand, but a whole set of hypothetical facts each of which is a fact of the form "If *these* conditions had been fulfilled, I should have been perceiving a sense-datum intrinsically related to *this* sense-datum in *this* way," "If *these* (other) conditions had been fulfilled, I should have been perceiving a sense-datum intrinsically related to *this* sense-datum in *this* (other) way," etc. etc.

With regard to this third type of view as to the analysis of propositions of the kind we are considering, it seems to me, again, just *possible* that it is a true one; but to hold (as Mill himself and others seem to have held) that it is *certainly*, or nearly certainly, true, seems to me as great a mistake, as to hold with regard either to (1) or to (2), that they are *certainly*, or nearly certainly, true. There seem to me to be very grave objections to it; in particular the three, (a) that though, in general, when I know such a fact as "This is a hand," I certainly do know some hypothetical facts of the form "If *these* conditions had been fulfilled, I should have been perceiving a sense-datum of *this* kind, which would have been a sense-datum of the same surface of which *this* is a sense-datum," it seems doubtful whether any conditions with regard to which I know this are not themselves conditions of the form "If this and that *material thing* had been in those positions and conditions . . ." (b) that it seems again very doubtful whether there is any intrinsic relation, such that my knowledge that (under *these* conditions) I should have been perceiving a sense-datum of *this* kind, which would have been a sense-datum of the same surface of which *this* is a sense-datum is equivalent to a knowledge, with regard to that relation, that I should, under those conditions, have been perceiving a sense-datum related by it to *this* sense-datum and (c) that, if it were true, the sense in which a material surface is "round" or "square," would necessarily be utterly different from that in which our sense-data sensibly appear to us to be "round" or "square."

V. Just as I hold that the proposition "There are and have been material things" is quite certainly true, but that the

question how this proposition is to be analysed is one to which no answer that has been hitherto given is anywhere near certainly true ; so I hold that the proposition " There are and have been many Selves " is quite certainly true, but that here again all the analyses of this proposition that have been suggested by philosophers are highly doubtful.

That I am now perceiving many different sense-data, and that I have at many times in the past perceived many different sense-data, I know for certain—that is to say, I know that there are mental facts of class (β), connected in a way which it is proper to express by saying that they are all of them facts about *me* ; but how this kind of connection is to be analysed, I do not know for certain, nor do I think that any other philosopher knows with any approach to certainty. Just as in the case of the proposition " This is part of the surface of a human hand," there are several extremely different views as to its analysis, each of which seems to me *possible*, but none nearly certain, so also in the case of the proposition " This, that and that sense-datum are all at present being perceived by *me*," and still more so in the case of the proposition " *I* am now perceiving this sense-datum, and *I* have in the past perceived sense-data of these other kinds." Of the *truth* of these propositions there seems to me to be no doubt, but as to what is the correct analysis of them there seems to me to be the gravest doubt—the true analysis may, for instance, *possibly* be quite as paradoxical as is the third view given above under IV as to the analysis of " This is part of the surface of a human hand " ; but whether it *is* as paradoxical as this seems to me to be quite as doubtful as in that case. Many philosophers, on the other hand, seem to me to have assumed that there is little or no doubt as to the correct analysis of such propositions ; and many of these, just reversing my position, have also held that the propositions themselves are not true.

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PHILOSOPHY AS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NOTION AND REALITY OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

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PHILOSOPHY AS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NOTION AND REALITY OF SELF- CONSCIOUSNESS

To attempt to review and summarize the results of a life-time's philosophizing is, as Ibsen says of the writing of poetry, "to hold Doomsday over oneself." Probably what was best in it has long ago sunk beyond recovery into the depths of the mind, constituting there its hidden framework and controlling unseen its attitudes, moods, and ways of operation. The endeavour once more to live through, to recall and record, the steps in the process of its formation, brings back but a mere outline of its history, a brief and abstract chronicle, and the slowly deposited results are, when reviewed in memory, but a meagre harvest of autobiographical material. Yet a would-be or professed philosopher can scarcely decline the challenge to report upon his processes and their results, for, more than his fellows, he has tried to make or remake his mind with open eyes, claims in doing so not to have wasted his time and energies, and to have been all the time engaged in a business of concern to others as well as to himself. Certainly a protected and endowed teacher of philosophy can scarcely disclaim a responsibility to others for the activity which has occupied the greater part of his working days or refuse to justify himself. However modestly he may estimate his own personal part in what, to use Bacon's word, is the essentially 'collegiate' business of philosophizing, he cannot disloyally leave philosophy itself undefended. Nor can he do otherwise than identify the cause of philosophy itself with that particular or personal form of it, which he has perhaps inherited or acquired from others, but which also he has appro-

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priated and deliberately made 'his own'—which he hopes to see others make their own.

Such reflections may serve as an excuse for setting down some of the stages that an individual professor of philosophy has traversed, and for recalling with gratitude some of the influences which have shaped his philosophy, even at the risk of indulging in reminiscences too personal to be of general interest or importance.

During the course of my undergraduate studies, first at the University of Edinburgh and then at the University of Oxford, philosophy offered to my mind no special attractions. Doubtless I felt the enlargement of the intellectual field which the first introduction to its far-reaching problems brings about, but my interests led me rather to look for the subject-matter of my own future work in the domain of linguistic and literary studies. It was little more than chance that diverted my course and brought me back to Oxford and philosophy, nor did I for long regard the pursuit and teaching of philosophy as for me more than a second-best. Even as it was, my conception of it was coloured by my preference for scholarship and erudition, and I accepted, perhaps too readily, the Oxford tradition which directs its undergraduate students and their instructors to concentrate upon the texts of the two great Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, as a propædæutic to philosophy. The chief result of this upon myself was to lead me, with the assistance of the late Professor Bywater and certain of my philosophical colleagues, to pursue to a perhaps unprofitable degree the study of the encyclopædic system of Aristotle into all its ramifications, linking it up through the Renaissance commentators upon his works with the extant Greek tradition of the later Peripatetics. Over-preoccupation with this did in a measure prevent me from recognizing the importance of the problems raised and canvassed in recent or contemporary philosophical literature. Gradually during the nearly twenty years of my work as a college tutor I made myself acquainted with some of the great modern philosophical classics, with Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz and Kant, with Locke and

Berkeley and Hume. Hegel I rather dipped into and occasionally consulted than read. All of these writers I took, and to my pupils presented, as in the main developing and working out competing "Theories of Knowledge," in this following or surrendering to a tendency which still prevails at Oxford. Local conditions constrained me in Logic to pay too much attention to Mill, and it may be because of that, though I had the Logics of Bosanquet and Bradley constantly in my hands, I did not appreciate their lessons. In Ethics I found little to help me; the English Moralists repelled me, Mill and Spencer were used by me and others as mere butts of criticism, Green and Bradley passed over my head, Kant alone seemed to afford a solid framework of ethical theory (but a framework only). I am bound here to refer to the works of John Grote, all of which greatly affected me; in them I found, not indeed a system, but a clear grasp of fundamental principles illuminating a wealth of detail. My reading in 'psychological' literature supplied me with little of value, and of Economics I was almost entirely ignorant. My lack of 'practical' experience left my considerations about Politics excessively abstract. Mere curiosity extended the range of my reading into various non-philosophical regions, but with inconsiderable returns to my philosophy in the form even of problems. Out of all this casually collected matter I made little attempt to shape a philosophy. Looking back upon its disorderly and almost arbitrary collection, what I see most cause to regret was my neglect of History, or the narrowing of it to the history of (a part of) classical antiquity.

The great Idealist tradition which had its chief source in Hegel had reached me only through Green, Caird, Bradley, and Bosanquet (and earlier, in a quite general way, through my tutor R. L. Nettleship). Even Caird's return to Oxford (and my good fortune in enjoying close personal contact with him) did little to increase its effect upon my mind. I made several attempts to lecture upon the Philosophy of Religion (taking Hegel as my guide), but, probably owing to my lack of the relevant experience, without making any advance. At this time I came to enjoy frequent opportunities of discussion

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with many of my philosophical colleagues, who found themselves in a general but somewhat vague agreement with one another. Certainly in the main we were (most of us) agreed in opposition to the 'subjective' or 'personal' forms of Idealism which were current in our immediate neighbourhood, to the psychology which was openly or secretly connected with it, and more unitedly though less concernedly to the Protean forms of the then vociferous Pragmatism. Though I at least would have been prepared, as I still am, to look upon these as forms of un-philosophy, I had no philosophy of my own, and had not explored or defined to myself the basis of my criticisms. The result was not in my own case scepticism (which perhaps it ought to have been). The issue in debate had come to turn upon the nature and validity of knowledge, and for a time, in company with one of my colleagues, I developed and defended a 'realistic' account of knowledge. The principle of this was, in my own case, that the very meaning of 'knowledge' implied that what was known was and was what it was in utter independence of and priority to its being known by any knower. After some years I ceased to hold it and indeed regard it, as it was then stated by us, as error. But I do not regret the time I spent under its spell, for it was then that I learned to know it for what it is; henceforward I find myself well acquainted with it and its numerous progeny. They have multiplied since, and people the contemporary philosophic world of England and America. It was at this time that a long holiday fell to my lot during most of which I let my mind lie fallow, and on my return to Oxford I found myself, through my election to the Waynflete Professorship of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, assigned the task of thinking out a philosophy, and supplied with a larger amount of leisure from personal teaching. But probably I should have been unable to do this even in the small measure in which I may count myself to have done so, but for what was almost an accident. Finding myself in Naples in the course of my return from my holiday, I was struck with the evidence which the booksellers' shops there displayed of a

widespread local interest in philosophy, and purchased two or three volumes by Benedetto Croce, whose name was only slightly known to me. I was not very well acquainted with Italian, but in what I was able to translate to myself I was greatly delighted by the freshness and independence of the views expressed, and by the scholarly manner of their presentation. These impressions were deepened as I increased my knowledge of his works. Ever since that date I have been an assiduous student of all that he has published, and I wish here to acknowledge with gratitude the light and leading which I have derived from them. It was not long before I acquired a knowledge of Italian adequate to enable me to explore the rich and growing philosophical literature of Modern Italy, extending my reading of it around and behind Croce, so as at least to place him in his proper setting and perspective. I followed eagerly and with profit the development of his thought into an articulate system and its multifarious application in diverse fields and to many detailed problems. He made clear to me where lay or ran the main current of modern, that is living, philosophy, gave me a good conscience in throwing overboard masses of antiquated lumber, and steadied my mind upon large, vital, and fertile principles. My Inaugural Lecture was composed under his influence, and I took an early opportunity of calling the attention of my colleagues and students to the importance of this Italian movement. As I continued to familiarize myself with it, I passed (with no abatement of my admiration and gratitude) to criticism of it. The result was to confirm to and in my mind its essential soundness, and to set on foot there a steadily increasing adaptation and appropriation of it to my own needs and ends. It supplied to me a principle which enabled me, as I believed, to achieve a far more satisfactory synopsis both of the history of philosophy (indeed of history altogether) and of the contemporary (which is also the permanent or eternal) structure of the world of human experience. Nor could I do otherwise than accept the main outlines of the map of the world of experience which was offered to me by Croce or, to put it better, his account of the system which is the nature of

Spirit and is manifest or discoverable wherever it is and works. Yet here I was occasionally doubtful and followed him at times with hesitating steps. I could not satisfy myself that I was able so to conceive the whole or unity that it necessarily, and because of its total and intrinsic character, developed into just this system or restored itself to integrity through its self-articulation. Somewhat uneasily I presented to myself and others the quadripartite organization which I took over from Croce as having a sort of pedagogical or didactic character, and so being in a measure 'appearance.' Nor am I yet satisfied that Croce has 'deduced' it. The best way I can put this is by saying that it is an appearance which Reality puts on in the process of communicating itself to whatsoever is learning ever more and more what it is in itself, somewhat in the way in which Hegel speaks of the self-realization of the Notion.¹ This view of the matter is very far removed from any representation of it as an "illusion" or the ascription of its existence to merely human limitations. It is rather bound up with the metaphysical (or philosophical) principle that the whole is not static, nor experience a state in which terms 'stand' in relations, nor knowledge an attitude, but each and all actual only as processes, processes of which that of learning is the least inadequate illustration or prefiguration.

To the grasp of this philosophical principle I was greatly assisted by the works of Croce's ally, Giovanni Gentile, as well as by the development of Croce's own thought partly at Gentile's suggestion. Despite the doubts caused in my mind by Croce's refusal to go the whole way with Gentile, I find myself unable to recognize the full autonomy of the forms of the spirit distinguished by him and to rest in the doctrine that its unity "consists in the very circle of its distinctions." Nor can I feel that the demand for an ulterior unity is inept and due merely to the survival within philosophy of an unphilosophical postulate of and for religion—the "last infirmity" of the philosophic mind, but still an infirmity. On the other hand, I can no longer accept the Absolute which is offered me by

¹ *Encyclopædia*, § 212 and note.

Bradley and Bosanquet as the last word of Philosophy. I am bound to confess that the middle position which I attempt to occupy is in large measure slippery and unstable, and its occupant subject to fits of vertigo, not steadily under control. Nevertheless, it appears to me preferable to stay there and attempt to 'keep one's head' than either to descend to the more foggy levels of empirical philosophy and pseudo-scientific psychology, or to attempt to climb to the still more vertiginous summit of a supra-philosophical mysticism. Compromise is out of court in philosophy, but so also are "extremes," which must "meet" in it and come to mutual understanding and harmony. Nor does it appear how this can be save in a harmony which is a process and a progress, eternally made, unmade, and remade.

All this I essayed to bring before myself and my auditors in my ordinary lectures and instruction, but especially in three courses, one on Croce (dealing mainly with his theory of Art), another on Gentile, and with a more explicit effort at freedom from their mode of presenting it, in a course delivered in Manchester College at the invitation of the Hibbert Trustees on "The Nature of Spirit and its Life." By now the philosophy which I entertain and advocate has assumed in my mind a definite systematic form, and I am prepared to teach it as such and to defend it against antagonists. Novelty or originality I do not claim for it, but rather disdain. On the contrary, it appears to me as something which has slowly formed itself in the great orthodox or catholic succession of modern Philosophy, and it has confirmed and strengthened myself in the renewal of reverential discipleship to the great classics of Modern, Medieval, and Ancient Philosophy. Nor does it make me less but more ready to sit respectfully at the feet of such recent writers as Bergson, Royce, Bradley, and Bosanquet, or less willing to learn from converse with my more immediate fellow-students. On the other hand, I must own that it has made me more deliberately impatient of the loose thinking, the somnambulistic speculations, the slovenly writing which characterize too much of what is offered us as substitutes for philosophy, and it has begotten a special distaste for the

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self-advertisement of the commercial travellers in spiritual wares, who start new movements and push them into public notice. The courts of philosophy are not a temple, but they are equally not market overt for the charlatan and the miracle-monger. In *Vanity Fair* we are flooded with works professing to tell us "what we ought to know about the Mind" (which is not a bad way of describing what philosophy exists to provide). The more ought we to value and cherish those works of those past and present writers on philosophy in which are to be found "the pretious life-blood of a master-spirit, imbalm'd and treasur'd up on purpose to a life beyond life." Nor would I depreciate those humbler works which serve as channels to convey and distribute to a world athirst what springs in these life-giving sources.

It is time to attempt that summary of results, the invitation to produce which has been here, perhaps imprudently, accepted. But what is produced must be taken, as it is offered, under more than one proviso. It disclaims finality (for no philosophizing can reach an end in which it comes to rest); 'results' are naught and null divorced from the processes which lead to them; what is disclosed and exposed are indeed rather presumptions and presuppositions than 'results,' beginnings or principles rather than ends or conclusions. Nevertheless they are also professedly foundations in experience tried and tested, found, and therefore to be reported, sound, stable, and secure, and so relied upon as capable of supporting the edifices which Mind has built and builds upon them in its endless endeavours to construct for itself in the universe a habitable city. Lastly, it acknowledges the vanity of any hope adequately to express in words the self-certain grounds upon which Mind throughout all its busy activity reposes, yet for all that it does not decline to enter upon and pursue some formulation of their nature, some exhibition of their systematic structure, some estimate of their worth and strength. *Alea jacta est*. In form, too, this confession of faith must be largely or prevaingly negative or polemic, and that not from any will to controversy, but for the

deeper reason that it is necessarily a confession of ignorance. Yet here, too, it must be added that the ignorance avowed is no mere or "blank" ignorance, but an ignorance awake to itself, a *docta ignorantia*, an ignorance which has learned what it is and therefore has of itself a doctrine to offer. Hence what is here offered is in plain terms a doctrine concerning what is in itself unknown and unknowable, the inward and secret essence of Mind, and of whatsoever in the universe surrounds it, constituting its whole and sole environment. The account here formulated is neither inventory of contents nor theory nor body of truth, does not claim or aspire to be any of these, but is, as I have said, a disclosure and exposure of what, if any of these be established, underlies them as their indispensable substructure, and if, so disclosed and exposed, it is criticized as paradoxical, the criticism is repelled as at once justified and *nihil ad rem*. Its soundness may be questioned, and indeed ought to be and must be, but the cause cannot be determined before the tribunal or by the jurisprudence of ordinary 'Logic.' There is a superior court competent to try it, and there is no attempt in what is here said to withdraw the claims made for it from the jurisdiction of the intellect or to appeal away from the head to the heart. To be certified sound a philosophical doctrine must pass the bar of intelligence, and can in no way assure itself by pacifying the cravings of feeling or meeting the demands of will. There are demands of intellect which it must comply with, or, as a satisfaction of our whole nature, it is in default and cannot stand.

Of such presuppositions the first and most fundamental—so I begin to state my case—is, that the whole and sole Reality (or, as I prefer to name it more concretely, the whole and sole Real) is not stationary or immobile, but essentially in change or process. For it to be is to become, and to become is to be. There is no static or inert background against which change or process stands out, no changeless fount of existence which itself does not flow. Being does not transcend or outflank existence. To be means to exist, to happen, to occur: the Real is compact of events. This basal assumption I put

habitually to myself and others by saying that the Real is a (or the) History, and every genuine part of it historical. I am therefore obliged to reject the counter-doctrine that "the Absolute" while containing all histories is and has itself no history, and so at the outset of my philosophizing to part company with Bradley and Bosanquet, to whom I have owed and continue to owe so much help.

Bottoming myself upon this doctrine, I accompany it with a gloss which may appear almost to cancel it, viz. that the History which the Real is (and so everything real) is a timeless history. It is an event which occupies the whole of Time, and the same holds of every genuine event within it, so that the time of one does not exclude the time of another, but all such times interpenetrate one another without overlap. Hence its and their 'timelessness' is a synonym of their 'timefulness,' or, as we say, their 'eternity.' 'Eternity' is the reality of which 'timelessness' is the negative or polemic equivalent, the ideal face which it in its self-revelation turns to Mind as its would-be knower. This revealed character of the Real the Mind endeavours to express to itself, and paraphrasing in its native dialect what it learns, states it in terms which represent it as a mutually exclusive successiveness of timed or dated events, or rather plainly misrepresent it so that save by praying in aid "simultaneity" what is said of it would be mere error. Henceforward Mind, embarked upon its course of thus expressing the reality of the Real, proceeds to attempt more and more adequate expressions of it by an adjustment of the competing claims of successiveness and simultaneity. It assumes that in or from the beginning the Real is given to it as an endless plurality of separate events related (that is, disjoined) as Before and After, and yet somehow also united behind their backs (and beyond its reach) in one single and total Time. Thus, divided against itself and unable to recover its lost naïve unity, it strives to ignore the latter element in the reality of the Real and to work with the assumption that what History is is an aggregate of events disintegrated by time relations between each and each of its distinguishable parts. Hence it proclaims that History

means that, and so that 'eternity' is a mere sound, or at best a self-begotten illusion of the Mind which it interposes between itself and the reality or the Real, whose authentic nature it fain would know. Discovering its self-sophistication, but unable to desist from it, it denounces the intrusive veil as mere 'appearance.' 'Eternal,' so we are told, is meaningless, and, attached to 'History,' evacuates it of meaning or degrades the whole combination to its own nonsensical level. My contention is, on the contrary, that 'eternity' is the dominant, not the recessive, factor in the meaning, and that the epithet far from obscuring brings out the meaning implicit in the substantive "History."

The second assumption—for I cannot count what I have said as involving two—is that History, the whole and sole History there is, and therefore every genuine part of it, is spiritual. It is the existence or outcome of a (or rather the) spirit, which in existing undergoes no alteration of its nature. I am obliged to repeat that in accordance with my first assumption the author in no way transcends his works; he is immanent in them, and they leave no unrealized residuum in his being. Thus History is spiritual throughout, and outside or beyond it there is no spirituality. As yet 'spirit,' 'spiritual,' 'spirituality' are but words. But they are meant, and what they mean may be put at first negatively or, as I have said, polemically. The doctrine which the use of them conveys is that what is called 'matter' or 'nature,' etc., is nothing real, not the reality of anything. What positively is conveyed is that the Real is activity, or, to put it more boldly, self-enacting or self-determination. It is true that so to put it is not to express what reality or the Real is as it is in itself, and once more our language is our way of putting it to ourselves, an expression of it necessarily ideal or idealistic. And once more we ignore that part of the total meaning which is the more difficult, omit what signifies it (the prefix "self"), and attempt to proceed with the remainder. Thus we de-spiritualize the meaning and represent (or misrepresent) the Real as a crowd of mere occurrences or happenings. History, we say, is in

itself the aggregate of *was eigentlich geschieht*, what simply befalls, and so we oust the creator spirit from its works and extrude its creative activity from the Real.

A corollary from the doctrine (or dogma) of the spirituality of the Real is that what is 'non-mental' is homogeneous with what is, and the immanent activity of the one the same in nature with the immanent activity of the other. Thus the doctrine rejects the counter-doctrine that in Mind's activity of interpretation, or elicitation of meaning, a work is begun which the extra-mental real had left undone or unbegun. To say so would fatally lead to a severance of reality from meaning, as if meaning came from outside the Real and were imposed upon it. In opposition to this it is contended that the Real in itself has meaning, that for it to be real is to mean, and that Mind in extracting and appropriating meaning neither has to, nor can, undo or depart from its own reality. What Mind is and does is what the extra-mental real is and does at a different level or with a different degree of efficiency. What constitutes the spirituality of Mind is only in degree different from what constitutes the reality of the real (other than Mind). Of both and of the whole which they together form the real being and existence is a spiritual History.

The third assumption which I make and recommend is that spirituality (and so reality) manifests itself—I do not hesitate to say realizes itself—most freely and fully in Self-consciousness. That this word has no meaning I must firmly decline to admit, nor can I for a moment acquiesce in proposals to extrude it from the philosophical vocabulary, on the ground that it "connotes the incomprehensible" or is "an abbreviated expression" for some more acceptable meaning which is not *its* meaning. Here, as with its fellow-offender 'self-enacting,' it is required to purge its offence by omission of the prefix 'self,' and 'consciousness' is admitted into philosophy only through the portals of psychology. Or rather, even so, it is tolerated only if, in shedding its 'con-,' it humbly avows itself to mean no more than "awareness of what is other than what is aware." It is not as the vehicle of any such decapitated meaning that

the term is here employed, but in that full sense, with which it has been meant by our spiritual forefathers in the great catholic tradition of philosophy. The notion of Self-consciousness seems to me the key and clue to spirituality and so to reality, a notion now clearer than either of them and so illuminative of what in them is dark and perplexing. It is in its light that we grasp the meaning of History as it is it which is revealed in and by History.

What it is and what it means are so closely one that it is scarcely necessary to distinguish between them. Taking both in one, what we have learned and therefore can teach about it is this: (1) that it is not a fact but a process, not made but always in the making, (2) that it is a process of self-making or self-creation, and (3) that in making itself and so coming to be it reveals to itself its own meaning (which is its own reality). It may be at once admitted that its nature and meaning cannot be expressed, but that does not mean that they escape the grasp of Mind, and we may listen with equanimity to those who have observed the superficial paradox or the shallow self-contradiction conveyed in its name. These are but trivial defects of its nomenclature, nor should we be seduced by them into the unwisdom of rejecting a valuable *instrumentum philosophandi*.

What their presence teaches us is that what we so fail to express (though not with a total failure) is a notion still, as it must always be, in the making—eternally to be made, unmade, and remade. To wait until its making is accomplished or at an end before availing ourselves of it would be the height of unwisdom. It has always been ours and available for our use, and it can be endlessly improved, or rather, properly employed, it is by use made ever better and better. To deny that such improvement has taken place is to decline the lesson of philosophy, and especially of modern philosophy, and we possess it now in a form the value of which can scarcely be overestimated or easily exhausted.

At this point I must turn in its defence to a prolonged campaign (not to be pursued here) upon its detractors, its depre-

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ciators, and caricaturists. Yet a few words may be permitted. It is a monstrous perversion to impoverish and scale down its momentous meaning to no more than that of "awareness of another 'by a very serious misnomer' called by the same name as that which is aware of it," or that of a mirroring of an object itself the mirror image of the mirroring mirror, etc.

What is wanted (or wanting) is not any description or definition or interpretation of it, but it itself in fuller measure, for, if it is there more fully, it will carry with its presence the fuller meaning we would fain grasp. Happily, as I have said, it is already present and in a measure, if not adequate, yet fuller than we have availed ourselves of: the way also is plain by which to get and make more of it. Its ample resources are at our service in the great classical works which stand out in the history of philosophy—the distilled quintessence of all History and so of all Reality. In them it is not expressed but it is conveyed and offered—materials predigested or prepared which by reflection can be transmuted into its light. There is no way other than this by which Self-consciousness can come to be or its meaning come home, and so none by which what the Real reveals of its reality can be appropriated, and so the Real be further realized.

But though the Mind may thus justify itself in philosophizing, in learning and teaching what can be learned and taught about the Real, and though in so doing it may assure itself that it is advancing the Real to further realization, nevertheless it must duly acknowledge that in this it does so subordinately and indirectly, and that there is a more direct way. The non-mental real at times short-circuits Mind's natural course in ways which contrast within Mind's apparently chosen or enforced roundabout procedure, and seems often to secure a better result with less effort. These ways Mind too uses, but not at will or so that it can observe its own course. What is thus realized are to Mind rather gifts to it than achievements of its own. They, or rather their origination, fall no doubt within the Real or History, but outside Self-consciousness. At any rate we must acknowledge that they fall outside *actual* or explicit Self-

consciousness. Thus actual Self-consciousness appears always to be accompanied or environed by the un-selfconscious, from which suggestions come to it which stimulate the Mind to the framing and elaborating of suppositions or, as I have here called them, assumptions. This activity—the proper activity of Self-consciousness—is philosophizing, which therefore, though it can perfect, and assure itself of the intrinsic correctness of its procedure, can never ‘verify’ its garnered contents. This is a necessary reminder of its limitations, but on the other hand its realm extends far beyond those of Science or Truth, whose actually conquered province is much more restricted. Thus so much of the Real as has risen to explicit Self-consciousness is begirt with mystery, and it does not appear that it can ever actually be otherwise. Yet in this there is no return to the doctrine that Reality in itself falls beyond its grasp, for the circumambient dark is nothing for it but what is indefinitely penetrable by it, there being no reason to suppose that it contains aught impenetrable to it, as there *is* that it is inexpressible or inconvertible into Truth.

The frontiers of explicit Self-consciousness exist, but are in retreat or recede as it advances. This reflection may serve to bring about the acceptance of a suggestion or supposition concerning its nature which appears to me to commend itself as an improvement beyond what the word usually carries with it, fitting it for further and wider employment than is usual. In this amended form it is released from restriction to ‘awareness’ which appear but as a case of it. This is that Self-consciousness should be taken to mean that character of a whole, in virtue of which the total nature at once descends into and so dwells dividedly in every genuine particularization or particle of it, and also retains its total character as such accompanying each such particularization or particle. In this use of it I am accustomed to speak of self-complicity as the essence of the matter, whereby I seem to recover or refresh the original sense of *consciousness*, and to bring out the identity of consciousness and conscience, which in English usage has been unfortunately broken in two. Certainly it appears to me to be in our usage to find Self-consciousness

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where there is no longer left explicit awareness, but where such involution or implication of the whole in and with its parts remains. That, so to speak, is the point, the point of light, in our notion of Self-consciousness.

This self-luminous, self-illumining, and self-illuminated point (which is also a region) *is* Mind actual and active. Mind is the name used of it, when a higher is contrasted with a lower degree of it, and what is then taken to be lower and as enclosing or environing it (the rest of the Real) is still spiritual, and indeed still mental. So taken this other or outer is bound to the inner, and that in endless co-operation or interaction: it is at once the deposit or creature of the central energy and the stimulus of it to further effort and output. Thus the distinction between Mind and the circumambient mental or non-mental is not a separation (and coupling) of disparate factors in experience, but only an appearance *bene fundatum*. But if the distinction be made, it is Mind that 'mind' inherits, or as of right possesses, a superiority over the rest: it represents the spirit of the whole. Hence it knows, while the rest (relatively) ignores and in its ignorance but ministers to knowledge. It might appear that thereby what is not Mind acquires a title to represent the spirit of the whole as active or practical, but this is not so. Mind as knowing is also and *eo ipso* creative, and creation is the superlative of action. Here, too, the non-mental is the less active, the less free or unhindered. What we call 'action' is here, too, ministerial to action proper. There is action *in* knowing (which is creating), and we wrongly restrict the Will (and volition) to such 'action' as is supposed to take place in the relative dark. Habitually we do so (unwittingly) restrict it, and doing so slide into mis-suppositions about it, and in the end mistake our nature and what surrounds it, ourselves and our world.

It is necessary here explicitly to state that such mistakes are not mistakes concerning a nature other than and transcending our nature, but concerning a nature which is in us (though not in us alone). What is spoken of is not a Spirit beyond all spirits, but one which is in all spirits, which is us and which we are. What is contended is that we know and in knowing

create, create what we know and know what we create. With this explanation I continue to speak of Mind (without either the definite or the indefinite article).

Mind, then, as the representative of the spirit of the whole, at once knows and creates whatever in any sense is. Hence it at once creates and knows all minds, and in doing so imparts to them its nature which then is theirs. Whatever 'limitation' this multiplication, distribution, and sharing imports, it does not disnature what is bestowed and "enjoyed." Hence it is neither on the one hand a merely general nor on the other hand a merely particular commission. Were it otherwise, between mind and Mind, and so between mind and mind, there would subsist only an external likeness, and so between them there could be only the semblance and not the reality of intercommunication, reciprocal action, and mutual understanding. No, each mind must be supposed endowed with powers cognitive and active, at once genuinely universal and genuinely individual or individuated. From its cognition or its enactment nothing is excluded by its universality or its individuality, but all is included, nor again does either character extrude the other; on the contrary each aids the other. There is no deed so individual and none so world-wide and eternal that we cannot enact it, and no object or fact so individualized or so integrated that it must escape our knowledge, and the combination of individuality and universality in one need not and cannot withdraw that one from the scope of our active or cognitive powers. Nor, lastly, need or can these several powers clash irreconcilably the one with the other. The whole of the Real is ours (because it is Mind's), and therewith the provinces of moral goodness and business success (of all welfare and all wealth), of all beauty and all intelligibility (and so of all truth). The Real—the whole Real—in all its reality and ideality is our patrimony, and all our experience, history, and existence consists in the usufruct and fruition of our rightful possessions—the exploitation and enjoyment of what is ours.

These are some of the main suppositions which I have come to make and still trust in. They are not, and do not profess

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to be, more than suppositions; they are made and maintained by 'supposing,' an activity which in scientific and perhaps in philosophical circles is held to be of no great account. But they are, and claim to be, no less than suppositions, foundations, τῶ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις. As here imperfectly worded, they are offered—offered for trial—as being what appears to me sound and secure bases upon which to erect the superstructures of Æsthetics, Logic, Economics, and Ethics, and upon them the higher and more habitable story where the Sciences carry on their inexhaustibly useful labours, and, last of all, the study within which the Historian records and interprets the whole advancing text of human experience. No finality or absoluteness is claimed for them, but rather is in principle disclaimed. But even the temporary adoption or maintenance of them calls for a radical reconstruction (not demolition) of what is rested upon them. Though no earthquake or landslide need be expected, widening rifts and cracks in the old walls, tiltings here and tumblings there, are obvious enough, and the invitations to build out upon shifting sand and quaking morass must be firmly and steadily declined. There is never too much (but almost always too little) examination of proposed sites, that is, of the fundamental principles or bases of thought. It is a work which can scarcely be done alone, it goes on by converse and even controversy, by disclosure and collation of suppositions, and all one man can do is to contribute his quota, submitting it to criticism or, as I have said, to trial. To anyone who has found others more trustworthy, all he can do in exchange for similar help is to propound his own, asking for them no more and no less consideration than he is prepared to give to the proposed substitutes, saying

*si quid novisti rectius istis,
Candidus imperti, si non, his utere mecum.*

CHIEF WRITINGS

- Knowing and Acting* (Inaugural Lecture, 1910).
On Feeling (Aristotelian Society, Proceedings, 1914).
Is there a Mathematics of Intensity? (ibid. 1918).
The Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile (ibid. 1920).
The Nature of Art (1924).

VALUE AND REALITY

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VALUE AND REALITY

THE contribution which I have endeavoured to make to philosophy is concerned mainly with the significance of ethical ideas.¹ For the most part ethics, and in general the whole region of values, have been treated by philosophers either simply for their own sake or with a view to practical issues, and their investigation has been regarded as supplementary to, rather than as an essential part of, the problem of knowledge and reality. On the other hand theories of reality have been constructed in exclusive dependence upon the data derived from sense-perception and the cognitive conditions required for understanding these data, without any account being taken of the facts of value and the appreciation of values. This procedure has indeed frequently been challenged, or dissatisfaction has been felt with its results; and then an appeal has been made to a neglected aspect of things: types of metaphysical theory have been rejected because they fail to satisfy the emotional longings or spiritual aspirations of man, and ideas of worth or value, omitted in the formation of systems, have been introduced afterwards to decide between competing intellectual views.

The opposition to 'Intellectualism' has its roots here. "The heart has its reasons which the reason knows not." Now these reasons of the heart may be dealt with in more than one way. They may be allowed to give a 'passional' decision on ultimate questions, thus asserting their right to take their own course and to brush reason aside should it stand in their way. But this method of procedure is tantamount to giving up philosophy

¹ See, in particular, *Moral Ideas and the Idea of God*, 1918, 2nd ed., 1921.

altogether ; for philosophy is always a thinking consideration of things, and its only instrument is reason : if 'reasons of the heart' are allowed to decide against philosophy, then we must give up thinking philosophically. Another way remains open, however. The 'reasons of the heart' are themselves facts in the life of mind, and are based on the more elementary facts of appreciation or experience of value. It is only by an abstraction made in the interests of science that these value-experiences are disregarded in our attempts to understand the facts and processes of nature. They are as much part of the data of experience as sense-perceptions, and require to be taken into account when we pass from the scientific theory of nature to a philosophical view of reality as a whole. The real defect of 'intellectualist' theories, therefore (and it is a defect which belongs to some theories not commonly described as 'intellectualist'), does not lie in their effort to think out the facts thoroughly and in a rational manner, but in the incompleteness of their view of the relevant facts.

We must take into account what we appreciate as well as what we apprehend—values as well as facts. In the wider sense of the word these values are also facts—they belong to our experience—but they are not relevant to the conceptual scheme under which science is able to describe natural phenomena. Science is therefore justified in ignoring them, but in a complete theory of reality their nature and status must be investigated.

From this point two sets of problems emerge—one concerning the nature of the value-judgment and of values ; the other concerning the type of philosophical theory which results when values are taken into account as factors in reality.

The theory of value has been investigated for many years by a number of writers, and their results diverge greatly. Disputes begin at the outset, for it is frequently held that values and the appreciation of value are 'subjective' in a sense in

which things and the perception of things are not. It is chiefly, although not exclusively, from the point of view of Naturalism that this contention is made; and it must be allowed at once that if the theory of Naturalism were valid the whole argument which I have worked out would fall to the ground. It is characteristic of Naturalism to regard 'natural' phenomena as the primary factors out of which the life of the spirit was grown, and at the same time to "interpret the more developed by the less developed." In this way the validity of ideas and values is made to depend upon their genesis. Of this theory, however, it is perhaps unnecessary to speak here, though I have written a good deal about it, especially in its ethical relations.¹ But, even when Naturalism is set aside, the doctrine of the subjectivity of value remains. It is stated in various ways, but always seems to involve the view that value is dependent upon the subject experiencing it in a way in which what we call the objective world is not dependent on the subject experiencing it. If this is so value cannot be taken as a clue for the interpretation of objective reality.

In what sense, if any, then, is it true that value is subjective? The judgment or feeling or (to use the most general term) the experience of value is, of course, subjective; but so is the experience of any other object: and this does not make the object subjective. We experience both the blueness and the beauty of the sky, and we formulate the results of our experiences in the assertions that 'the sky is blue' and 'the sky is beautiful.' So far there can be no ground for saying that the blueness is a quality of the object, but that the beauty has nothing objective

¹ In *The Ethics of Naturalism* (1885, 2nd ed., revised and enlarged, 1904) I have examined various forms of naturalistic ethics, and in particular the ethical significance of the theory of evolution. The same subject is further discussed in *Recent Tendencies in Ethics* (1904), pp. 36-84, and in an article on "Evolutionary Ethics" published in *The Quarterly Review* for April 1909. A discussion of the general philosophical significance of the theory of evolution may be found in "The Interpretation of Evolution," a paper read before the British Academy on November 24, 1909, the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species*. This paper is published separately and also in the *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1909-10.

about it. If any such ground can be discovered it must be the result of a further analysis ; and analysis is said to support the view that value is subjective. It is held that, when I make a judgment of value, the ground of the judgment is a certain affective or conative experience of my own. When I say, for example, that the sky is beautiful, the judgment is derived from my experience of being pleasantly affected by the sight of the blue sky—or perhaps from the conative experience of desiring the continuance of this vision ; and accordingly the reference is to a state of my own mind. Value is, therefore, subjective ; its appreciation is on a different level from the apprehension of things and qualities and relations in the objective order.

Such is the argument, but on scrutiny it betrays a certain weakness—a failure to distinguish between the origin of a judgment and its reference. The origin of the value-judgment may lie in the affective or conative experiences of the individual mind passing the judgment, but its reference is to something beyond that individual mind. The judgment does not mean that I, the subject judging, experience pleasure or desire, but that something is good or beautiful or worth desiring. The judgment may be mistaken, but that is its meaning ; and, if the objective reference is without justification, then we are always blundering in all our value-judgments by giving them an objective reference to which they have no valid claim. Further, the distinction between our appreciation of value as subjective and our apprehension of things as objective cannot be maintained. If the appreciation of value arises out of affective-conative experiences it is equally true that our apprehension of things arises out of sensation. In this respect appreciation of value is on the same level as perception of things. If the former is concerned solely with our own feelings or desires, then and for the same reason there is no knowledge of objective reality, but only of our own sensations.

If this position be adopted it will imply something more than subjective idealism, something more even than solipsism. It will mean that the object of each momentary experience is just

that momentary experience itself. Perhaps the position may be maintained without self-contradiction ; but it is a position from which no advance can be made in the direction of organized knowledge, and besides it rejects the *prima facie* meaning of experience. Experience is always of something other than the experience itself ; it refers to an object which is not to be identified with the process of experience. The subject of the experience is in touch with something other than itself—an object ; both common knowledge and science presuppose this, and philosophy is unable to dispense with the presupposition.

These considerations lead to the conclusion that the question of the genesis of the value-judgment and the question of the genesis of knowledge generally are on the same level, and that the relation of genesis to validity is the same in both cases. Genesis does not really affect validity, though it may, in certain cases, suggest a line of inquiry into the nature of the validity which can justly be claimed. And perhaps the present is such a case. It is clear that there is a difference between the process of appreciating value and that of apprehending things and their relations. The former depends upon an affective and conative attitude towards the objective world, whereas in the latter we try to adopt a purely cognitive attitude. The separation of these subjective attitudes of affection, conation, and cognition is not primitive and it is never complete. It is only gradually that knowledge comes to be comparatively free from intermixture with feeling and desire, and then the subject, interested in knowledge for its own sake (that is, with a new feeling for knowledge itself), disregards those qualities and relations of the object which appeal to the more primitive emotions and desires. In this way he is able to contemplate the object as not merely an other but an independent other—something to which the subject makes no difference and which makes no difference to the subject except that it changes his ignorance into knowledge. Hence a kind of objectivity which the moralist or the artist would hardly be inclined to claim for his outlook on the world. They are interested in just those aspects of things which appear to be irrelevant and confusing from the special

point of view of the man of science ; and their interest in these aspects cannot be separated from the appeal which they make to feeling and desire. It is through his affective-conative consciousness that he is able to appreciate them, but he does not necessarily value them by their reference to his *own* feeling or desire. It is enough that they are connected with a complex which includes conscious beings, that is, subjects of feeling and desire as well as of thought.

Value is not merely subjective ; but we are now able to see why it has been often held to be so. Objectivity is regarded as something found (or perhaps created) by thought, and the thought-process itself has been so carefully studied in its common characteristics that it has been stripped of all traces of particularity due to the individual minds in which it operates ; it is itself objectified ; whereas the particularity of other mental factors, such as feeling and desire, is never lost sight of, and these factors are always recognized as subjective. Now when we speak of anything as good or as beautiful (and these are the most familiar though not the only kinds of value-judgments) we seem to attribute a character to the thing which appeals directly to feeling or desire. These undoubtedly are states of a subject, and consequently value is thought to be subjective in a sense in which ' things ' apprehended are not. This result, it seems to me, is a consequence of the objectification of thought. At any rate, it is invalid, and that for two reasons. In the first place, as I have already pointed out, the apprehension of things is rooted in sensation, just as the appreciation of value may depend upon feeling or desire ; and sensation is just as subjective (something belonging to the experient) as feeling or desire. And, in the second place, the value appreciated need not belong to the subject appreciating any more than the thing apprehended belongs to the mind apprehending it. The reference which value may have to feeling or desire is not (or need not be) to the feeling or desire of the subject who appreciates it or passes judgment about it ; it is (or may be) to feelings or desires of persons who are as objective to the subject in question as are physical things. Intrinsic values do, as a matter

of fact, always require persons as their bearers ; nothing is ultimately of worth for its own sake except persons or some quality or state of a person. This holds, I have argued, of the so-called ' higher ' values of Goodness and Beauty ; it holds also of Truth, for the truth to which we assign value is an intellectual harmony between the mind of man and the order of reality.

There are other values than these. But they are instrumental—qualities or processes which are productive of value rather than themselves values ; or approximations, the promise of something higher, like many of the qualities which have survival-value in a biological sense ; or factors which in combination with other factors have intrinsic worth. Of this last class pleasure is, it seems to me, an instance ; for pleasure heightens any value, rounds it off, as it were, and gives it an apparent completeness ; and yet pleasure may be a factor in states of another kind, such as admiration of what is ugly or delight in efficient wickedness, so that it is not either an infallible index of value or by itself a value, and it may accompany situations where the value is negative.

Primitive experience contains the elementary factors both of appreciation of value and of apprehension of existing things : distinction between them arises later. But the recognition of the higher values emerges gradually in the development of the race and of the individual. When what we call fact and what we call value have been distinguished, the way is opened for two different views of experience—for that which terminates in science, as the term is commonly used, and for the contemplation of the worth or value which is found in or supported by life. Science again passes from the mere description of fact and process as they are apprehended by common sense to the formulation of general laws descriptive of these processes, and so to a formal or mathematical scheme which is descriptive of the processes of the world, and is at the same time capable of elaboration deductively. The theory of value lags far behind scientific theory in its advance ; perhaps it is not capable of the same degree of refinement ; but in it also it is possible to trace developments which bear some analogy to those of science. In it, too,

it may be possible to elaborate a formal theory in which the relations of its several concepts are systematically exhibited ; and this formal theory would have to be distinguished from the exposition of the kinds and degrees of value found or attainable in life. The reference to life—to personal life—is always present where value is predicated ; and it is this reference which marks the objectivity of value and at the same time distinguishes it from the objectivity of positive science.

In what sense, then, is value objective ? In the first place, it is objective because it is a characteristic which belongs to the personal life. This also is the reason why it has so often been held to be subjective ; but it has been held to be subjective because its personal reference has been misinterpreted. It is not a mere quality or character of the process of experiencing value or even of the person who has that experience. It is something which he finds to belong to personal life, whether in himself or in others. The goodness or beauty which a man sees and appreciates need have nothing to do with his own personal qualities ; it is not his own feeling or desire to which he refers when he appreciates it ; but it is something in the life of the persons who make up the world for him or at least much of his world. This whole world of personal life is something to which natural science may be indifferent. Science also has its rise in the personal consciousness, takes its first steps in the region of the particular, but it seeks general laws and formulæ of ever-increasing universality ; it spurns the individual ; and the conscious person is for it hardly even a puzzle, so far does he remain outside its range. But philosophy cannot be content thus to ignore individuality or the reality of the conscious persons in whom the life of the universe is manifested. Whether or not their reality is ' ultimate ' in a technical sense, it is only through our recognition of their status in the order of reality that we can reach any tolerable view of what is ultimately real. Persons must be regarded as belonging to the objective order, the order of reality ; and they are the bearers of value, for values are to a certain extent manifested in their lives and characters.

So far, therefore, we can see that value is something to be classed as objective. The goodness of the good man is as objective as the man himself. But this is not all that we must mean when we assert that value is objective. We find that life is a process of striving after values which are not yet attained, which in their perfection may never be attained—may even be unattainable—in the conditions of personal life so far as we are acquainted with them in experience. It is easy to see that the actual beauty and goodness and truth which experience reveals are objective; but what of the ideals which claim the allegiance of persons, without being manifested by them, which in actual life remain a 'not yet' and may be a 'never quite'? How and in what sense can we assert objectivity of them?

This question can be answered best by comparing ideals of value with the conceptions which are reached by science and are spoken of as 'laws of nature.' Formulæ such as the law of gravitation or the postulate of the conservation of energy are intended to describe in very general but exact terms certain physical phenomena and relations. It may be that their exactitude as descriptions of what happens has not been completely established; it may even be probable that there are certain limits to their universal validity; but their meaning and reference are objective not subjective. The objectivity claimed by moral laws and by ideals of value generally is similar. Its reference is not to the feelings or desires of the person who may formulate these laws or ideals. Nor, on the other hand, is their validity dependent on the extent to which they are realized in actual life—any more than the validity of the law of non-contradiction is affected by the contradictions present in the reasonings of some thinkers. At the same time, while the moral law and the law of nature are both objective, their relation to actual events is not the same. The law of nature describes actual events; unless it did so with a high degree of accuracy it would not be accepted as valid. But the moral law does not profess to describe actual conduct; its relation to it is not descriptive but imperative—the result of applying an ideal to a life which is still in process of modi-

fication or which can be conceived as different from what it in fact is. By their very nature moral values at any rate imply the possibility of not being realized in existence. The imperative of duty is an imperative because what ought to be is not always actual. But the validity of ethical principles, like all validity, is a validity for reality. And the reality for which ethical principles hold is the world of persons. The law which the person recognizes as valid for him is a law which tends to the end in which personality is conceived as reaching its true good. This is an ideal, and its attainment must be looked for in the gradual process by which character is built up and conduct brought into rational order. The moral agent is thus compelled to regard his true personality—the personality which ‘ought’ to be his—as consisting not in the actual features of the passing moment but in an ‘is to be’—in something to which he should attain and to which he can at least approximate.

Natural law and ethical principles are equally objective, but they differ in the objective orders to which they apply and in their modes of application. The laws of nature apply to the realm of existing things in space and time, and their validity consists in the accuracy of their description of events. Values apply to personal life, and their validity consists not in describing how persons comport themselves, but in expressing an ideal which they should realize.¹ This fundamental characteristic of the appreciation of value distinguishes it from the apprehension of existing things and their relations; it takes different forms corresponding to the different kinds of value—ethical, æsthetical, and intellectual; and it always implies this unique relation to existents, that they ought to be in such and such a manner or in accordance with the ideal.

If we are asked to define still further the nature of the objectivity which belongs to values, the answer must be that they are objective in the sense of belonging to—being a factor in or

¹ It should be noted that the verb ‘realize’ is used as equivalent to ‘bring into actual existence’; it should not be taken as implying that the ideal not yet brought into actual existence does not belong to ‘reality’ in the sense explained in the text. Cf. *Moral Values*, 2nd ed., pp. 212–13.

aspect of—the system of reality which it is the aim of philosophy to understand. As a summary of the argument on this head a somewhat long quotation may be permitted. What is said refers to moral values only ; but, *mutatis mutandis*, it will hold of other values also :—

“ In saying that moral values belong to the nature of reality two things are implied. In the first place, the statement implies an objectivity which is independent of the achievements of persons in informing their lives with these values, and is even independent of their recognizing their validity. Whether we are guided by them or not, whether we acknowledge them or not, they have validity : they ought to be our guides. This validity differs from the validity of laws of nature, inasmuch as the latter do actually express the constitution of reality in so far as it is material. Moral values hold for personal life in another way ; they ought to enter into its constitution whether they do so or not. Their reality has therefore been called imperative reality ; but the phrase does not explain anything. What is implied so far is that the validity of moral values—seeing it is not derived from their acceptance by the persons for whom they are valid—must have another source. In some way it must belong to the system or order of the universe. To see how this can be, we must look at the second implication of the statement that moral values belong to the nature of reality. Reality, whatever other manifestations it may have, is manifested in persons ; they are part of the real universe, and they come to form ideas of moral value and to some extent to frame their lives in accordance with them. Their lives are continuous efforts after a purpose or purposes ; and in their attainment of moral values the nature of persons receives an expression which grows in completeness as moral value is realized. That is to say, the objective moral value is valid independently of me and my will, and yet is something which satisfies my purpose and completes my nature.

“ The second implication of the statement shows us more clearly the way in which value belongs to reality. According to the former implication, the value is objective, but the kind

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of being which it possesses is conceived as something apart from the existing universe. But this second implication of the statement brings out a connexion. Values characterize personal life as completed or perfected; they are factors in the fulfilment of purpose, and purpose is an essential trait of personality. It is possible that they may never obtain complete realization in time. But, even so, they will express the limit towards which the nature of persons points and presses. In this way they belong to the sum total of reality as an existing system. And this connexion resembles that of law to fact in the causal system, with this difference: that the latter relation is exhibited at each instant of time, whereas the realized system of values is the limit towards which personal life tends in its temporal course."¹

II

These results have an immediate and important bearing on the general theory of reality. Reality cannot be adequately understood if it is regarded simply as a system of interacting forces or as an orderly process determined causally. Besides the realm of existing things and their orderly relations, it includes something more—the realm of values. Values have objective validity, and must therefore be taken into account in interpreting reality. And they are not separated from existence. They apply directly to conscious agents, and they are realized in the lives of conscious agents—lives which are immersed in a material environment and thus connected with the whole physical universe. The existing world, therefore, cannot be understood apart from them. At the same time their recognition adds complexity to the problem. For convenience we may speak of the order which science discovers in the existing world as the causal order; and in the system of values, which has also to be taken into account, we may restrict ourselves here to its leading kind and speak of the moral order. A theory of reality must recognize both the causal order and the moral

¹ *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, 2nd ed., pp. 238–9.

order, and try to reach some idea which will combine and harmonize them.

Even this statement is perhaps an undue simplification of the problem. The causal order and the moral order do not exhaust the complex system of conceptions required for the explanation of experience, and the relations of approximation which these conceptions bear to one another are also disregarded. They have been selected in order to bring out a certain opposition which is not lessened by pointing to intermediate or mediating conceptions, but requires for its solution a mode of understanding experience through which the two opposed systems can be reconciled. The problem, therefore, if somewhat simplified, yet admits of its fundamental nature being expressed by the question how it is possible to understand a world for which both the causal order and the moral order are valid.

Analysis alone does not suffice in this inquiry. The phenomena grouped under the causal order contain connexions of events which present an appearance of entire indifference to the requirements of moral law, so that the realm of nature seems to have only occasional and accidental contact with the realm of values and many points of discord with it. And the moral order, on its side, requires a regard for values which we do not find in nature regarded as a causal order. It follows, therefore, that from analysing these two disparate orders we cannot proceed to a unifying conception. And, if this were the only means by which thought progresses, the way would be altogether barred. But analysis is only one stage in the process which leads to the general conceptions either of science or of philosophy. Analysis has its limits. The complexity and subtlety of nature are an obstacle to our assurance that any particular analysis is exhaustive—that it has reached elements not capable of further analysis, and that all the elements are included; and an enumeration of its elements may fail to disclose the nature of the whole as a whole. When synthesis does nothing more than put together the elements which have been distinguished by analysis, it also inevitably fails to account for scientific philosophical conceptions. A more comprehensive view

of the whole is needed—a form of synthesis which is aided by analysis but not restricted by it, and which, keeping in sight the ‘togetherness’ of reality, may be called a synopsis.

In mode of operation synopsis resembles vision rather than discourse; it is an essential factor in the scientific imagination; and it has been deliberately adopted by many philosophers in their accounts of reality as a whole, and called sometimes ‘reason,’ sometimes ‘intuition,’ to distinguish it from understanding or the process of reasoning. There is no good ground for the view held by some philosophers that this synoptic attitude is opposed to analysis. On the contrary, the detailed knowledge of constituent factors which an analysis provides clarifies and widens the intuitive grasp of the whole; the view of the whole is not the same thing as the distinction and enumeration of its parts, but it may originate from, and its validity can be tested by its ability to include, the elements laid bare by analysis. This holds for every scientific theory which is not a mere transcript of facts (and no scientific theory is such). It holds also for the philosophical theory which attempts a more comprehensive synopsis—involving, it may be, a further effort of the scientific imagination—but is equally subject to the test of experience.

This test is even more exacting for philosophy than it is for science; for philosophy is concerned not with a given region of facts, but with the whole of experience or experience as a whole—not merely with the facts of sense-perception which intelligence has worked up into science, but also with appreciations of value which have been elaborated by ethics and æsthetics, and with the conscious persons who are the subjects or bearers at once of perception and thought and value.

These reflections indicate the way in which we may hope to reach an understanding of reality as a whole and the conditions to which such a world view must conform. It must be able to apply both to the causal order and to the moral order. These orders differ entirely in their laws; experience does not show any harmony between them, and yet they do not simply belong to different worlds, for they meet in the experience

of conscious minds who acknowledge the equal validity of both. A philosophy should be able to exhibit them as complementary aspects of a single reality, and systems of philosophy may be compared and judged by their success in this respect.

Values, if the account already given is correct, have a place in the objective order of reality, and they are realized only in the minds of conscious agents. The theory of reality must find room for these values and for their realization, and the competency of Naturalism as a philosophy cannot be maintained. We must look to a theory which interprets reality idealistically, so that the region of values and the persons in whom these values are manifested may have their due place in the scheme recognized. But Idealism is a word of many meanings—through which, however, a single leading difference may be traced. According to one view the real is the object of intellect, not of sense-perception, for intellect alone reveals the unchanging essence of things, whereas sense-perception presents a transitory and subjective appearance. The objects of intellect may be called 'ideas,' as by Plato (and hence the term Idealism), but 'order' or 'law' may perhaps more nearly express the meaning which a modern theorist would give them. On the other hand is the view, represented principally by Berkeley, that the only reality is mind or spirit (so that it is often named Spiritualism or Mentalism), and that all other things are ideas in some mind—finite or infinite. For the former type of theory the last word is order, law, or some similar term; for the latter it is mind. It is not the case, indeed, that many philosophers keep tenaciously to one side only of this simple antithesis; the concepts of order and law lead on to that of mind, and mind is a bringer-about of order.¹ But the contrasted terms do indicate a contrast of types within idealist philosophies—between the idealism which tends to interpret reality as an order of objective or absolute thought and that which holds its essence to be of the nature of personality or of consciousness. It is further characteristic of the former type of idealism to emphasize the unity of reality, whereas the latter

¹ Cf. article on "The Two Idealisms," *Hibbert Journal*, vol. ii (1904).

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stresses the plurality of the centres of conscious life ; and hence the distinction between them is closely allied to a ruling distinction of philosophical theory—that between Monism (or Singularism) and Pluralism.

Both Pluralism and Monism are legitimate attempts to reach a synoptic view of reality as a whole. They have to be tested by their inner consistency as theories and by their ability to interpret the whole range of experience ; and this experience must be taken to include the realm of values as well as that of nature, while the recognition of values implies also the recognition of the conscious lives in whom alone value is realized. The forms of Pluralism which are relevant in this connexion all look upon the universe as consisting of a multiplicity of distinct selves or monads. Whatever is real has to be accounted for as the result of the activity of these monads operating either by themselves or—if interaction be acknowledged—in co-operation and competition. It is a commonplace of criticism that the characteristic difficulty of Pluralism is to give a satisfactory account of the unity or interconnectedness of reality. It may be possible to account for all the phenomena which are presented to selves as objects as being themselves monads or groups of monads of an order below the self-conscious ; but there is greater difficulty in explaining the status of the laws and order of these phenomena and of the conditions which determine our knowledge of them and practical dealings with them. Are physical and biological laws simply the product of the minds who discover them ? If so, we are unable to explain the fact that we are compelled to admit that they were and must have been valid long before their discovery ? If not, we are driven to confess that their status in reality is independent of their recognition by finite minds. It follows, therefore, either that the plurality of ultimate reals or monads is determined by an order which they have not produced and which yet controls their experience and destiny or else that this order is the order of a supreme monad or mind to which all others owe the order of their being.

This argument is independent of the special point of the

present discussion, which has regard to the objective significance of the realm of values. But it is reinforced by the latter. The Many of the Pluralist are not only determined by formal and causal relations which are other than they, and make them in some sense One ; they are also subjects in a realm of values. These values are not dependent for their validity on being manifested in the activity of the selves who make up the Pluralist's universe, nor even on their recognition by the consciousness of these selves. Here, then, is another order of being which we have to recognize alongside of our ultimate reals, which they did not produce and may not even recognize, which yet has a valid claim to dominate their activity, so that it is only by recognizing the claim of these values and by drawing inspiration from them that selves can reach the highest individual reality of which they are capable. It is in the midst of the causal order that selves act as they do act ; it is only by realizing in their own characters the moral order that their nature is completed or perfected. Accordingly, the Pluralist is again driven to admit into his scheme of things an order characteristic of objective reality which is not manifested and may even be unrecognized by any existing finite mind. If it is not the order of an infinite mind supreme over all others, how are we to explain its status in reality ? The Pluralist is forced away from his original position that finite monads are the sole ultimate constituents of reality, and has to admit either that these finite minds and other monads are surrounded and controlled by two orders of laws and values—different from one another and from the monads whose behaviour they regulate and whose character they may inspire—or else that finite minds are subordinate to a Supreme Mind which is the source of law and the home of all values. If he adopt the latter alternative he is a theist ; if the former, his thought wavers away from Pluralism in the direction of Monism.

The Monist has to face difficulties of an opposite but corresponding kind. He asserts the unity and connectedness of reality, but defines or stresses the unity in such a way as to make it hard to see how any distinguishable things are left in the universe

and in need of connexion. It is easy to speak of diversity in unity, but it is not so easy to do justice to both aspects. The Pluralist, emphasizing the diversity and finding therein all that is ultimately real, was brought up against unifying principles which had to be admitted but refused to fit his initial assumptions. The Monist, to whom the unity of reality is the fixed point of certainty, has to give some account of it in its nature as one ; and, if he goes beyond the blank assertion that his Absolute is ineffable, he has to ascribe attributes to it, saying that it is thought, or extension, or harmonious, or perfect. But he never succeeds in showing how it comes to appear or to express itself in the particular modes of the phenomenal world—or even in particular modes at all. The downward way of the Monist is as uncertain and treacherous as the upward way of the Pluralist. In spite of his protestations, the Monist is in truth the essential Dualist. For his Absolute stands over-against the world of finite selves and of nature. He must recognize both, even although the latter be called ‘mere appearance’ or even just an illusion : an appearance is an appearance of something to someone ; an illusion is someone’s illusion about something. But the two cannot be brought together in his thought. Strictly, his Absolute is indeterminate, for ‘determination is negation,’ but he will consent to speak of it as harmonious and perfect, though he is no longer confident that it is thinking and extended. Now, whatever else the world of selves and nature may be, it is not perfect, and it contains much disharmony ; so that the unity and the diversity are left in unrelieved dualism—unless it should turn out that the unity consists not in a colourless Absolute but in one creative and controlling Mind.

If we admit the objective significance of the ethical aspect of reality, Monism is faced with a new difficulty. For not only the order of existents—of finite minds and of nature—but also the moral order has to be regarded as an expression or manifestation or appearance of the Absolute. The two orders, which have been called causal and moral, are different in nature and to a large extent in the phenomena to which they do or

would lead. Yet they meet in the mind of man, which is at once immersed in a physical mechanism and akin to the higher values. Monism has to show how the all can be regarded as one in spite of this fundamental divergence. When it attempts to preserve the unity of its interpretation of things it tends to regard either the realm of values or the realm of existence as of questionable reality. It may give a naturalistic or it may give a purely intellectualistic explanation of reality and reduce values to subjective appearance; or, recognizing the eternal values, it fails to show how nature and finite minds are integral parts of the same universe.

All these difficulties arise from various forms of the opposition between the one and the many; and both Pluralism and Monism strive in vain to meet them. But they can be solved in principle if we regard the unity of the universe as consisting not of impersonal order or of 'bloodless categories,' but as a Supreme Mind to whom finite minds and their environment owe their reality. The Supreme Mind or God will be conceived not merely as a Creator but as the essence and source of all values, and as willing that these values should be shared by the free minds who owe their being to him. The whole visible world may indeed be regarded as an image of the Eternal; but it is a temporal image, not a photograph. It is only in time and by the kind of agency that time makes possible that finite minds can attain to the values of which they are capable; ¹ and, if freedom itself is a value or heightens other values, they must achieve these values by the slow process of trial and error in the midst of an environment which does not make the way too easy for them.

Clearly, a view of this sort assumes the validity of such conceptions as those of purpose and freedom, and a defence of these postulates cannot be entered upon here, though it has been attempted elsewhere. Even with these postulates it is not contended that the events of the world and the careers of particular minds can all be explained and 'justified.' We

¹ As regards this point, reference may be made to an article on "Time and Reality" in *Mind*, April 1923.

have far too little knowledge of existence and its final issue to make possible anything more than a general principle of interpretation ; and it would be presumptuous to imagine that the purpose of the existing universe is exhausted in the fortunes of the human race.

The result of the argument is that a view of reality which gives impartial recognition to the realm of values as well as to that of existents cannot dispense with the idea of God. Through this idea only can experience as a whole be interpreted. This result, it is true, has been reached without bringing into consideration one region of experience, namely, religious experience. Every type of philosophy tends to be accompanied by an attitude, emotional and practical as well as cognitive, in which the individual subject faces the issues of life. Religious experience is, of course, independent of any explicit philosophy ; but it falls within this general scheme, as a response of the whole soul or mind to that which is highest in its experience. We find here, accordingly, a department of experience which cannot be ignored and which has to be reckoned with in a final philosophical view. Religious experience is not allied with one form of theory only. At times and in some persons it may seem to suggest a pluralistic scheme of things, as with the worshippers of a plurality of gods or other heavenly beings. Monism, again, is connected with a profound development of the religious consciousness, and mystical experience has often seemed to find its most fitting theoretical expression in a pantheistic doctrine. Theism, therefore, is not the only view which may claim to do justice to the facts of the religious consciousness ; and a difficult and delicate inquiry would be needed if one were to estimate the bearing of religious facts upon the validity of different philosophical theories. This inquiry cannot be entered upon here, but I think that its result would be to show that the religious consciousness attains its most perfect development in the worship of the one God who is the source of all reality, and that in this form alone it is in complete harmony with the moral consciousness.

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THE FREEDOM OF MAN

By A. E. TAYLOR

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BIOGRAPHICAL

Color che ragionando andaro al fondo
s'accorser d' esta innata libertate,
però moralità lasciaro al mondo.
Onde, pognam che di necessitate
surga ogni amor che dentro a voi s' accende,
di ritenerlo è in voi la potestate.

DANTE : *Purgatorio*, xviii, 67-72.

It is a rule of good breeding, says Dante, not to speak of oneself without necessity. I trust that I shall not offend against this principle of reticence unduly by the few brief remarks I propose to make.

I could not say precisely when and how my interest in philosophical questions was first aroused. I remember as a very small child being worried by the solipsistic doubt whether the whole choir and furniture of heaven and earth (including my own parents !) might not be the fancies of a dream, and I myself the only real existent. Later on, as a schoolboy, I suffered acute distress for a time from a similar doubt whether all recognized distinctions between good and bad might not be unfounded and subjective prejudices. When I went up to the University of Oxford in 1887 I had already some acquaintance with the philosophy of Berkeley, was fascinated by what I had read of Plato (especially the *Phaedo*), and curious about Kant, of whom I had learned something vaguely in my schooldays from sundry essays of De Quincey. Like most thoughtful lads of my time I had been distressed by what I had learned of the conflict between the theology I had been taught and the supposed results of evolutionary science and Biblical criticism. What I looked for in philosophy was some sane defence of convictions which I felt were essential for the conduct of life against what seemed to be the disintegrating influences of scholarship and biological science. When I began to read philosophy seriously in 1889, the influence of T. H. Green's work was still predominant in Oxford. My attention was directed by my tutors primarily to Green and Bradley and to Kant as interpreted by Green and Caird ; on my own account I also made further study of Plato and Aristotle and, to a lesser degree, of Kant and, as best I could, of Hegel. For the time I was carried off my feet by

Bradley (particularly by the *Ethical Studies*), though I found an insoluble puzzle from the first in what seemed to be T. H. Green's conception of a world composed of relations between terms of which we could say nothing, except that they were the terms of the relation. On the whole, however, I seemed to have found what I was in search of, a view of things which would protect the realities of religion and ethics against all danger from "naturalistic" attacks. I was then not alive to what I now think the great danger of the whole Hegelian way of regarding things, that it dissevers the "eternal verities" from all contact with "historical" actuality. Metaphysics, for the time, seemed to absorb all interest in the given and historical. When I became a Fellow of Merton in 1891 I had the opportunity for a few years of steady and uninterrupted study, chiefly given to the attempt to understand Hegel and Aristotle as well as my old "master" Plato. Above all I had the advantage of daily intercourse with Bradley, whose influence, exercised in many ways, must count for the most potent to which my own thinking has been subjected and the most beneficial. Among the many debts I owe to Bradley, not the least were the recommendation he early gave me to study Herbart as a wholesome corrective of undue absorption in Hegelian ways of thinking, and his repeated exhortations to take empirical psychology in earnest. These studies in the end led to a natural reaction against what now seemed to me the unhistorical character of the philosophy on which I had been feeding myself. The reaction towards the empirical and given continued, along with a new interest in the principles of physical science, provoked by the writings of E. Mach and others, during the years in which I was associated at Manchester with Professor Alexander (1896-1903), a period also fruitful for me in leading to a serious study of the great seventeenth-century thinkers, Galileo, Descartes, Leibniz. The "pan-mathematism" of Leibniz, like that of Plato, fascinated me deeply; even now that I am convinced that pan-mathematism, like absolute Idealism, is incompatible with a full sense of the "historical," I am keenly conscious of the attraction and cannot avoid thinking it the right and proper goal of the sciences of physical nature. I suppose that at this time of my life I was not far from developing into a kind of "Positivist," though it was at the end of the years to which I have referred that I came for the first time strongly under the influence of the work of Professor James Ward, to whom I owe a great debt of thankfulness for teaching me to appreciate more fully the meaning of "history" and from whom, in particular, I learned the impossibility of eliminating contingency from Nature. By the end of these seven years I began to discover that a change was coming over my way of looking at things. I read Plato

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again, in the light of Leibniz, and found the tendency to empiricism and positivism passing away without any loss of the interest I had acquired in the empirical and the ideas and methods of the sciences.

For some years, while I was at McGill University, Montreal (1903-1908), this process was gradually working itself out. I think I may date almost from my return to Great Britain in 1908 my arrival at certain convictions which had slowly been shaping themselves and which still remain with me very definitely. One is the conviction that the business of metaphysical philosophy is, in a way, a modest one. It has to be content to recognize that in the sciences, in history, in morality and religion it is dealing with a reality which is in the end simply "given" and not to be explained away. Its concern is with the various intellectual interpretations of the "given," and its supreme task is not, as I once used to suppose, the "unification of the sciences," but the necessarily imperfect and tentative reconciliation of the exigences of scientific thinking with the imperative moral and religious demands of life. It has not to invent an improved substitute for historically real religion and morality, but to fathom as much as it can of their significance. There is no special infallibility about metaphysics and its methods are necessarily "dialectical" in the Aristotelian sense. It seems to follow that there can be no final "metaphysics," and that the temptation of all others which a student of the subject should avoid as he grows older is the temptation to have a "system" which leaves no unexplained mystery at the root of things. And it becomes a question whether, after all, the main service of metaphysical study to the mind is not to "liberate it from prejudices" and thus to prepare it to receive illumination from sources outside metaphysics. Whether this mental attitude is the right one or not, I only mention as influential in leading me to adopt it, besides the Neo-Platonists and the great mediaeval philosophers to whom I have been led so late by study of the Neo-Platonists, in particular the writings of Baron F. von Hügel. I should be ungrateful to the memory of a profound thinker if I did not add that the influence of Reid's writings has come late into my life, but is not the less felt for that. And I am glad to record the benefit which, like others who have been in touch with him, I owe, in more ways than I can enumerate, to stimulation received from contact with the unwearied thought of Professor Alexander. I would also specially acknowledge my indebtedness to the work of Bernardino Varisco. But indeed I hope I may (with all becoming modesty) copy one utterance of Leibniz. There is perhaps none of my associates and contemporaries from whom I have not learned much, and often most from those whose conclusions I am least able to accept.

THE FREEDOM OF MAN

WE may fairly say that, with the recent removal of Mr. F. H. Bradley from our midst, the last of that remarkable group of men who made philosophy once more a living and potent force in the final third of the nineteenth century has vanished from this region of temporality. Green, the Cairds, Lewis Nettleship, William Wallace, Adamson, Bosanquet, Bradley—they all now belong to history and the past, and the historians of thought will, no doubt, soon be busied with the attempt *dresser le bilan* of their work in neat and tabulated form. There will yet have to be an audited “statement of accounts”—so much of abiding achievement on the credit side against so much in the way of questions unraised or left undecided or decided wrongly on the debit side. Whether, on the closure of the whole account, there is to be a surplus or a deficit, we of to-day, to whom many or most of these eminent men have been known in the flesh as teachers or friends, shall hardly be called on to say. We are still too near them to make an impartial and final estimate of their influence on thought for good and bad. Yet we are also already far enough removed, perhaps, to scrutinize some of the items which the auditor of the future will have to take into his reckoning, and it is to one of these items I would now direct attention.

The cause for which the whole distinguished group stood, so far as Ethics is concerned, was an ancient and an honoured one. The chief part of their united work was to continue the age-long war of believers in genuine morality and real obligation against every kind of naturalistic substitute; to expose once again, with special reference to the positivists and evolutionists of their generation, the inherent flimsiness of all theories of morality which treat man simply as one part of nature, one

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animal among the rest, making up by cunning what he lacks in physical strength or elaborately pre-formed instincts, human good as computable in terms of purely secular satisfactions, human duty as having no authority more august than the sanctions of the law-court and the ambiguous voices of popular applause and reprobation. Like Plato, or Cudworth, or Clarke, or Butler, or Kant, they stood for an "eternal and immutable" morality against the morality of acquiescence in the fashion of an age. At least, this was the ruling temper of the members of the group who occupied themselves seriously with the problems of Ethics. If there were some among them whose opposition to secularism in morals was less marked, they tended to leave Ethics alone and to concern themselves more specially with work in ontology, or the "theory of knowledge," or, it may be, with practical schemes of "social reform," and to leave the fundamental problem of the determination of the true character of human good on one side. Thus the natural affinities of the "men about Green" in Ethics are with the great British "rationalist" moralists from Cudworth to Price, who set themselves, in reply to Hobbes on the one side and the sentimentalists on the other, to argue that "things are good and bad," as Cudworth puts it, "by nature" and not "by will" or by "mere command," and that law and social custom are not the sources of morality, but, so far as they have themselves a rightful claim on our respect, created by and derived from morality, its effects not its causes, at best "true shadows" thrown by a light which is not of this world. In a word, the moral doctrine of the school is in the direct line of descent from the great Platonic tradition as christianized by Augustine and mediated by the great scholastics and their successors, the representatives of Anglican divinity at its best, from Hooker to Butler.¹

¹ I do not know whether I may be thought anywhere in these pages to be dealing a little harshly with the distinguished men who were my own immediate teachers. If I have fallen into this fault, my apology must be that I feel strongly the duty of championing against their neglect or unsympathetic criticism the whole great succession of British moralists from Cudworth to Price. Green's references to Butler, in particular, impress me as curiously wanting in appreciativeness.

Yet there is one point of *prima facie* importance on which *Ethical Studies* and the *Prolegomena to Ethics* seem to show marked divergence from the earlier tradition of the asserters of "eternal and immutable" morality. Before Green and Bradley entered the lists against Stuart Mill, Spencer, and Lewes, it had commonly been regarded as indispensable to the cause of rationalism to insist on *liberum arbitrium*, "freedom of the will." The denial of our possession of a real *libertas* or *indeterminatio arbitrii* had regularly been taken by mediaeval and modern moralists alike to amount to the repudiation of any real responsibility for our acts, and therefore to the rejection of unconditional obligation, and consequently to be subversive of the foundations of genuine morality. Bradley and Green, on the other hand, no doubt profess to hold a doctrine of human freedom, but their main anxiety appears to be to protest that, whatever they themselves mean by the freedom of man as a moral agent, they do not mean what "libertarians" have meant, if indeed libertarianism has any intelligible meaning. The "scientific determinist" is also formally condemned by both Green and Bradley, but in a way which inevitably suggests that in his case the condemnation is very much of a "formality," and that the critic is at heart inclined, after all, to come down on his side of the fence. Younger moralists who have drawn their inspiration largely from Green, notably Dr. Rashdall, have in fact openly avowed the determinism which is at least nominally disguised in Green himself. The most distinguished moralists of the late nineteenth century who expressly ranged themselves on this issue with Cudworth, Clarke, and Price, Professor Henry Sidgwick and Dr. James Martineau, stood outside the Oxford group and had very different immediate intellectual antecedents. Both these eminent libertarians were inclined to be sharply critical of all the utterances of the "Oxford idealists" about morality, and have, in their turn, been far too little appreciated by Green and the most eminent of his associates. It is notable, again, that the emphatic libertarianism of Kant's conception of the "noumenal" freedom of man as a moral agent, with

the conclusions to which it leads, has always provoked the sharpest criticism of the whole group conveniently, if inaccurately, named by opponents the "Anglo-Hegelians," and that this attitude is as strongly marked in Green, whose own inspiration seems to have come much more from Kant than from Hegel, as in Bradley and Bosanquet, who appear always to have read Kant through Hegelian spectacles. You may remember that Sidgwick closes a long and patient attempt to discover Green's precise attitude on the issue with a humorous complaint that it appears to be devised with a view to the twofold satisfaction of agreeing with the moralist in asserting Freedom and with the "scientific thinker" in denying it, and again that, in the brilliant essay which is perhaps the most suggestive contribution of the whole group or school to the discussion of Freedom, Mr. Bradley only disposes of the "determinist" as an initial step to a much more vigorous rending of the "indeterminist."

To some extent this curious change of front on the part of the advocates of "eternal and immutable" morality is explained when we remember that the issue at stake itself had changed between the time of Cudworth or Clarke and that of Green and Bradley. The concern of the earlier moralists is, before all things, with the antithesis between "liberty" and necessitation from without. When Hobbes actually *defined* "the will" as the "last appetite in deliberation," and deliberation as a mere see-saw of conflicting "appetites," he virtually denied that there is any such act as choice. Hence, against him, it had to be shown, first that choice is a genuine specific experience, and next that there is a real moral difference between choosing to do a thing because you judge the doing of it to be good and doing it because you are terrified by the menaces of a human or superhuman despot. But by Green's time the "leviathan" had ceased to be taken seriously in moral theory. The issue was no longer between liberty and necessitation or compulsion, but between determination from within and the absence of such intrinsic determination. The question is now not whether "to be morally obliged" means to be coerced by a "leviathan" (or frightened by a Bombastes Furioso) or not,

but whether it means to exhibit conformity to a rule expressive of the way in which your own character reacts to typical features of its "environment." Now, if I first say that I can make real choices, and that consequently menace and threat never amount to downright compulsion, and then add that there is a formula which adequately describes my own personal moral character, and that knowledge of this formula would make it possible to calculate the line of action I shall take in a difficult situation, exactly as the astronomer calculates an eclipse or a transit of Venus, the first of these statements is not on the face of it inconsistent with the second. There is no reason, it might be urged, why a moralist cannot be at once a libertarian and a complete determinist, especially when we remember that the more intelligent determinists are quite ready to admit that the "elements" of a person's path of conduct are so complex and so little known that successful calculation from them not only is impossible in practice, but may very likely always remain so.

Whether a statement of this kind, intended to safeguard the interests of the moralist without damping the aspirations of the naturalistic physicist, would have been accepted by Green and Bradley as fairly representing their own mind is more than I should like to determine. There are utterances in the opening essay of *Ethical Studies*¹ which indicate that it would not have satisfied Bradley in 1877, and we might reinforce them by an appeal to the vehemence with which *Appearance and Reality* maintains that all the positions of the various sciences *must* inevitably be "infected with error," and that to an unknown degree. It should follow that both physicist and moralist *must* be in error somewhere in their assertions, though we do not know just where or to what extent. But if each of two conflicting theories contains a wholly unknown amount of error, no ingenious "reconciliation" which leaves both

¹ Cf. *Ethical Studies*, pp. 14-17, on the difference between "rational" and "irrational" prediction. I should say at once that I can hardly divine from what source Bradley derived the version of the doctrine of Free Will which he criticizes. It does not seem to me to be that of any serious libertarian.

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standing is likely to conduct us to truth. On the other hand, I do not recollect that Green ever commits himself to any position inconsistent with the proposed "reconciliation," and it is certain that some such view has found widespread and hearty acceptance among the younger men whose thought has been most influenced by Green and Bradley, and has come very near general adoption as the admitted solution of an age-old problem. Anglo-Hegelian philosophers of the first distinction have not usually been generous, sometimes have been markedly ungenerous, in their estimate of Leibniz; Kant has, nominally at least, always been their *δεύτερος θεός*. But their treatment of the problem of freedom has nearly always been very much more on the lines of Leibniz's *Théodicée* than on those of Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*.¹

With some trepidation I would venture to reopen the old dispute, the most important in the whole range of moral psychology, and to suggest that its true solution is not to be sought along these lines. More particularly, the suggestions I want to make are three: (1) that the conception of *liberum arbitrium* has a much deeper significance for Ethics than it was fashionable in Green's day or has been fashionable since to allow; (2) that the combination of a *genuine* libertarianism in Ethics with a *thorough* determinism in the realm of natural science is not really feasible; (3) that "scientific determinism" has only got a foothold in the philosophy of the natural sciences themselves by a mistake. My first contention, as you will note, amounts to a return from the fashionable Hegelian and Leibnizian position to that of the *Critique of Practical Reason*; the second and third are meant as a vindication against Kant himself among other moderns of the good old Greek and

¹ In view of the character of some of my later references to Leibniz, I must say once for all that Leibniz seems to me to have stated with perfect accuracy propositions which are only in place in a libertarian philosophy, but to have misapplied them in a wholly deterministic way. Thus he more than once confuses the statement that we are often unconsciously biased in our comparative estimates of good with the very different statement that we *never* judge without bias, exactly as he commits the parallel exaggeration of asserting that a pendulum *never* really comes to rest.

scholastic doctrine of real contingency as a characteristic present everywhere in "nature." When I have done what I can to indicate very briefly the reasons which lead me to support these positions, I propose to bring this essay to an end by equally brief references to certain practical issues of the first moment which seem to me to be arbitrarily foreclosed by any moralist who allows himself to make terms with "scientific determinism." The ultimate metaphysical issue at stake, which, as so often happens, is also the supreme practical issue of the whole discussion, will then only emerge at the close of the argument.

I. LIBERUM ARBITRIUM.

It is unfortunate that the student of to-day, who comes to his subject through *Ethical Studies*, the *Prolegomena to Ethics*, and later work chiefly or largely inspired by the teaching contained in those volumes, usually has no notion, or at best a very hazy notion, of the very meaning of the phrase *liberum arbitrium* or *libertas arbitrii*. Both Green and Bradley, to say nothing of writers like Dr. Rashdall, have, I believe, been fatally misled by the unhappy passage in which Locke, as part of his more general attack on "faculty psychology," attempts to cover these phrases with verbal ridicule.¹ I should like, if time permitted, to elucidate the real sense of the much misunderstood phrases by going back to the classic statement of the doctrine by St. Thomas in the *Contra Gentiles*² and the exposition of that statement in immortal verse given by Dante in the seventeenth and eighteenth cantos of the *Purgatorio*. But we may profitably retrace our way to the meaning of the great Dominican doctor by starting from a consideration of the well-known saying of a later thinker, *indifferentia infimus*

¹ *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ii. 19, §§ 14, 24, 31, 40.

² *Summa c. Gentiles*, ii. 73: quod autem voluntas sit causa contingens ex ipsius perfectione provenit, quia non habet virtutem limitatam ad unum, sed habet in potestate hunc effectum vel illum, propter quod est contingens ad utrumlibet; iii. 85: corpora caelestia non sunt causae voluntatum et electionum nostrarum.

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gradus libertatis.¹ To understand the point of the remark we need, of course, to remember from the outset that the word *libertas* is being used for something which is a characteristic universally of *moral* beings and proper to them. It is not meant to include under the head of *libertas* the mere capacity of spontaneous or internally initiated movement which we find, apparently, to some degree, in the least intelligent and most irresponsible animals. Still less is there any reference to that purely illusory freedom which is all Spinoza allows to man in the famous and flippant utterance that "a stone which was aware of its falling would think itself free."² We may, if we please, speak of the stone as "falling freely under gravity," but we must not equivocate so where the issues under consideration are ethical. "Freedom" such as this could be no foundation for recognition of accountability, responsibility, merit, and demerit. The saying is meant to refer to freedom in a sense in which it has a significance for morality; mere spontaneity, mere initiation of response from within, is intended to be left out of consideration. The words have also a further important significance. The "lowest degree" of freedom which deserves to be called *moral* is implicitly contrasted with other

¹ Descartes, *Meditat.* iv: *indifferentia quam experior cum nulla me ratio in unam partem magis quam in alteram impellit est infimus gradus libertatis.*

² Spinoza, Ep. lxxii (Bruder) 4: *Porro concipe iam, si placet, lapidem dum moveri pergit, cogitare et scire, se, quantum potest conari, ut moveri pergat. Hic sane lapis, quandoquidem sui tantummodo conatus est conscius et minimum indifferens, se liberrimum esse et nulla alia de causa in motu perseverare credet, quam quia vult. Atque haec hominum illa libertas est quam omnes habere iactant.*

One should take note of the absurd "presentationalism" implied in this passage. Spinoza plainly regards our own fundamental *conatus* as one "object presented to our notice" among others. I believe it may be said that the average "man of science" gets at his "determinism" as follows: He fancies that he observes and "correlates" the volitions of his fellows as he might facts about crystals or germs. His deterministic scheme in the first instance recommends itself as a description of the conduct of his neighbours. Then he remembers that he too is a "neighbour" or "other" from their point of view, and therefore includes his own volitions in the scheme. If he *started*, as he should, with his own personal experience of willing and choosing, he would probably never dream of "determinism" at all.

degrees of moral freedom which we are to recognize as "higher." *Libertas arbitrii* is to be taken as the minimum *necessary* condition of even beginning to live the specifically moral life ; it is not to be the *sufficient* condition of morally good life. To have it is, in itself, no more than to be on the right side of the boundary between subjects capable and subjects incapable of having moral predicates, commendatory or damnatory, enunciated of them. The problem is to ascertain what is the indispensable minimum of equipment which entitles its possessor to rank as a "moral" being, a member of what Kant calls the "kingdom of ends" and Leibniz more appropriately "the kingdom of grace."

Freedom, as we have often been told, is primarily a negative conception. To be free is always to be free *from* something, *not* subject to some impediment. We can see that this is true of that highest degree of freedom which we attribute only to a subject who is already in fruition of complete spiritual goodness. Such a being would be free in the sense that he would be unimpeded in his pursuit and enjoyment of the highest good by ignorance of its nature, over-estimation of inferior goods, deflection from his devotion to the best by outbreaks either of unreasonable cupidity and avarice, or of craven fears of what loyalty to the highest might cost him in the way of endurance, or by relapse into mere sloth and indifference. And finally he would be free from all external influences of every kind which could impede steady and perfect enjoyment of the highest. If we take such a conception of freedom *au pied de la lettre*, it is manifest that, since finitude of itself necessarily stands in the way of absolutely complete fruition of a perfect and infinite good, such a freedom can belong to no "creature" ; it could only be attributed in its plenitude to "a being infinite and eternal." Even if we demand nothing more than that the wholly "free" being shall be able to enjoy the perfect good in act up to the measure of *its* own nature, still possession of such freedom as this would clearly demand not only the *non posse peccare* but also an absolute and final harmony of the individual with every element of his "environment."

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Such a freedom plainly transcends any conceivable condition of man in the world of temporality and mutability where our present lot is cast. We may aspire to it and hope for it, and to do so much is already to be a member of the kingdom of "grace," but very certainly it is not under earthly conditions to be had in actual possession. If it is our heritage, it is at least a heritage into which our entrance is delayed until we shall be "yonder," as Plotinus says, in "glory" as Christians have said, finally and utterly. Meanwhile we have to look for the minimum of freedom compatible with spirituality somewhere between this, which is the negative side of "deiformity," full fruition of the plenitude of good, and that mere spontaneity which we share with the animals. The question is where between these two limits the freedom of the man who has barely begun his pilgrimage to perfection is to be found.

The mediaeval answer is that the minimum is to be found in *libertas arbitrii*. The very phrase should have been sufficient proof that by "freedom of the will" the libertarian does not mean, as Green and Bradley seem to think,¹ "motiveless choosing." That would amount to pure haphazard or caprice, and would thus be only another name for downright irresponsibility. Such capriciousness might perhaps be called *libertas*, but it would have no right to the name *libertas arbitrii*, "freedom of will." For will means the same thing as choice, explicit or implicit,² and choice is never without a "motive," or, what is the same thing, a "reason," though, as Leibniz rightly insisted, my "reasons" for my choice may often be most imperfectly apprehended even by myself.

¹ *Ethical Studies*, pp. 9-11; *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 6.

² I add this qualification to exclude from consideration the case of purely "impulsive" action. So far as an act really is merely impulsive, it seems to me we cannot speak of either will or freedom (in the specifically moral sense) in connection with it. The business of developing character is a process of escaping from domination by "impulses." Thus Aristotle's distinction between the "willed" and the merely "voluntary" seems to me vitally important. On the case of the man who decides beforehand that he will trust in a certain situation to the "impulse" of the moment when the situation has become actual (e.g. that he will not prepare a discourse but speak as "the spirit moves him"), see the note at the end of this essay.

If I choose *A* rather than *B*, when either may be had, this can only be because at the time of choosing I judge *A* good and *B* not good, or at least not so good as *A*. In what sense, then, can we say that a choice is a *free* choice? St. Thomas's explanation seems to me to go to the root of the matter. When I am "deliberating" between *A* and *B*, he says, that is, while I am still making the comparison of their respective goodnesses on which my act of taking the one and refusing the other will ensue, my will is "indetermined to either alternative." When the comparison is over and the estimate "*A* is better than *B*" passed, this indetermination ceases; my will is *now* determined, or to speak in the more accurate terminology of our own psychology, *I* am determined to take *A* and leave *B*, and what I am determined by is this judgment of relative worth. In other words, what is demanded as a minimum condition of moral accountability is that I shall be able to make an *impartial* estimate, correct or otherwise, of the two relative values. It is not the case that whenever I attempt such a comparison some secret influence, the violence of a present desire, the persistence of an old opinionative prejudice, the effects of my past habits, hereditary non-rational bias, or what you please, tilts the scales of the balance. Of course, we all know that all these sources of bias do exist and may interfere with our estimates, but precisely because we are aware of the fact, a prudent man sets himself to discover these sources of prejudice and to eliminate them. Admit simply that the elimination can sometimes be achieved, that sometimes at least we act as we do because we have made an impartial comparative judgment about the relative value of two goods of which we cannot have both, and in principle you have admitted all that clear-headed libertarians mean by the "freedom of the will."

It is not pretended that we find it easy to eliminate the influence of vehement passion or long-established habit or native tendency, or that the elimination is not harder in some cases than in others. We must expect to find that the power of making impartial judgments of good is a power which can be extended by habitual attention and practice and contracted

by negligence and disuse. But if the power itself once exists, we have no right to set limits *a priori* to the control it may acquire over the direction of life where it is diligently exercised. "Indetermination of the will" will be a truth in two senses. We can, and all of us sometimes do, make comparative judgments of good which are not "determined" by non-rational bias, and further, the capacity of doing so can be steadily extended by diligent exercise to cover an even wider "domain."

Now there seems to be no reasonable doubt that this power of unprejudiced estimation of good and bad exists; it is the strength of the *prima facie* evidence for its existence which explains the repugnance regularly excited by all theories of necessitation and "scientific determinism" in men of practical common sense who have no special theory about conduct which they are resolved to defend at all costs. And it may be urged that any argument which goes to prove that what we suppose to be such impartial judgments are always inspired by unconscious prejudice *must* prove too much if it proves anything. If our judgments about good and evil are often warped by unconscious bias, the same thing is notoriously true about our judgments on other matters. We are all prone to fallacies of non-observation or mal-observation, of confusion and irrelevance; again, it is no easy task for each of us to detect the special types of fallacy to which he personally is most susceptible and to learn to avoid them. If we push the argument from liability to bias to its extreme conclusion, it should yield the consequence that no one has ever been convinced of the truth of *any* proposition by an impartial consideration of the evidence for it. And this is just the last thing the "scientific determinist" himself would be prepared to allow. He expects me to accept his deterministic conclusion as *proved* by the strength of his reasoning, but on his own principles he ought to hold that when I am said to be "convinced" by his argument, I never really am his convert at all; I have yielded not to the probative force of his reasoning, but to the non-rational strength of some secret bias in myself. And similarly with all other cases of apparent "conviction." There is as much or as little

ground for finding in non-rational bias the ground of all our comparative judgments of good as for tracing back all our scientific beliefs to congenital bias in favour of arguments which "beg the question" or have "undistributed middles." Yet, so far as I know, the theory has never been carried to this perfectly logical extreme. We are credited in general with the capacity for being convinced by rational considerations, and a mere arbitrary exception is made for the case in which the issue under consideration is one of good and bad. On the whole, then, there is no more serious reason to doubt our ability to form impartial judgments of the goodness of divers objects of pursuit than to doubt our ability to form such judgments in general. No reason can be produced for denying the indeterminateness of the will *ad utrumque* during deliberation which could not be equally valid as a ground for disabling human judgment on all topics whatsoever.¹

It might be said that neither Green nor Bradley ever formally denied "indetermination" in this sense, though both on occasion speak as though "freedom of will" meant motiveless caprice, and that all I am claiming has been openly affirmed with great emphasis by Rashdall, a declared "determinist." It would seem, therefore, that the essence of the libertarian case cannot be an affirmation at which avowed anti-libertarians do not scruple. But I would ask you to look at the matter a little more closely. The assumption of "indetermination during deliberation" may clearly be restated in the form given to it by Sidgwick: "the perception or judgment that an act is *per se* the right and reasonable act to be done is an adequate *motive* to perform it." The difficulty to my own mind is to know whether Green or Bradley would have admitted the formula of indetermination in this equivalent transformation. Bradley's opinion can only be collected by confrontation of numerous incidental utterances scattered over the whole body

¹ These considerations apply, as I venture to think, with peculiar force to Leibniz's persistent attempt to use libertarian formulae to cover a determinist meaning. If "the pendulum is never at rest," how, on Leibniz's principles, do we ever contrive to form a conclusion about anything strictly "according to the evidence"?

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of his writings, Green's has to be gathered from the long and perplexing division of the *Prolegomena* concerned with the relation of will to desire. To my own mind, in both cases the result is unfavourable to a really libertarian interpretation. Both philosophers *seem* to hold that in all choice there is a strictly non-intellectual factor supplied by what William James calls our "passional nature." The omnipresence of this factor is only very thinly disguised by Green's metaphysical language about the "reason" which *selects* out of the "solicitations" thus supplied the particular one with which the rational agent is to "identify himself."¹ It certainly *seems* to be by implication denied that "reason," our nature as *intelligent*, can ever of itself directly initiate action without the "backing" of non-rational appetite. This doctrine, which I must agree with Sidgwick in finding characteristic of the *Prolegomena*, involves a breach in principle with the Platonic-Aristotelian moral tradition of which Green and Bradley seem to be unaware.

In the *Republic* Plato has been careful to attribute to each of the famous three "figures" or "parts" in the soul its own characteristic *ἐπιθυμία*, and the familiar Aristotelian saying that "mere thinking originates no movement" (*διάνοια αὐτῇ οὐθὲν κινεῖ*) is not intended to contrast thought by itself with thought *plus* unintelligent appetite, but thought *in genere* with specifically *practical* thought, thought of a good to be achieved, as we see if we read to the end of the sentence (*διάνοια αὐτῇ οὐθὲν κινεῖ ἀλλ' ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ*

¹ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, §§ 120, 143, 146 *al.* On the other hand, a different and truer conception is suggested in § 126, where Green says that it cannot be admitted "that those desired objects which are of most concern in the moral life of the civilized and educated man are directly dependent on animal susceptibilities at all." But even here we note (a) the qualification introduced by the "directly," which indicates a certain willingness to "hedge," (b) the still more curious and unjustifiable qualification implied in the reference to the "educated man" (as though the blessing on those who *esuriunt et sitiunt iustitiam* had been addressed to "men of education"); (c) Green's abstention from any express admission that "reason" can *per se* supply a motive to act. Contrast the language of Price (*Review of the Principal Questions of Morals*, c. 8), "an affection or inclination to rectitude cannot be separated from the view of it."

Thought of *this* kind, according to Aristotle, does "motivate." It is our judgment of good which inspires our specific human appetite rather than non-rational appetite which secretly dictates the judgment (ὁρεγόμεθα διότι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖ διότι ὁρεγόμεθα). Hesitation on this point seems to me at least unconscious disloyalty to the cause of genuine morality; it opens the way at once to the "scientific" suggestion that every judgment of good is based in the end on mere *libido*, that "I ought" is only a disguised way of saying "I should like."

As a matter of common experience it seems patent that, on the contrary, the "I like," if felt at all, is often enough felt as a mere consequence of the judgment "I ought." When a man is offered the choice of continuing at a post to which he feels himself equal and where he is happy, or accepting a new one with responsibilities which he cannot fully gauge and involving the breaking up of an established circle of friends and associates, it may well be that before weighing the relative goodness of the alternatives proposed to him he is honestly unable to say which course he "likes best." There may be attractions, there are certain to be repulsions to overcome, on both sides, and it is not until a comparison has been made in which all personal likes and dislikes have been discounted that it is possible to say "I should like to go" or "I should like to stay." At the outset you can only say indeterminately, "I should like to take the course which on consideration I think most to the glory of God and the good of man, but as yet I do not know which course that is." Or, to put the point in another way, since what is distinctive of man is that he is an *intelligent* animal, it is only accordant with his nature that he should have one standing "bias," the bias, *ceteris paribus*, in favour of what he judges to be *per se*, apart from all incidental personal relishes and distastes, the reasonable thing.¹ Where

¹ Reid and Kant thus seem to me right in holding that mankind regularly prefer to do what they believe to be right, *unless* there is a strong inducement to act otherwise. Even those who least scruple to tell lies to suit their convenience regularly prefer to tell the truth when truth-

the formulae of Green and his associates seem to me dangerous from the point of view of practical morality is that they take no adequate account of this standing human bias in favour of the reasonable. Presumably under the influence of J. S. Mill and the Utilitarians, whom they naturally wished to confute, as far as possible, from their own premisses, they tend to put all the "appetitions" between which "reason" is to "select" on one level. What is needed to bring them into full accord with the general libertarian tradition of rationalistic Ethics is a completer appreciation of Aristotle's doctrine of *rational* appetite, or, what comes to the same thing, an unqualified acceptance of the psychological conception of "ascending levels of conation."

If you neglect this doctrine, you are committed, as Green was, to the task of proving the most ideal aspirations of the saint or hero to be no more than "transformations" effected by intelligence on what are by origin "animal wants."¹ But I should maintain that no amount of "transformation" of an *animal* want by intelligence could ever yield, for example, the hunger and thirst after righteousness. What a mere animal hungers and thirsts for is simply meat and drink, and I do not see how the "supervening" of intelligence on *such* a want could ever result in anything more than the elaboration of cunning devices for securing plenty of highly agreeable meat

speaking is *equally* convenient. If this were not so, "motiveless" lying would be much more common than it is. Any man, even the laxest, feels that a lie needs some special justification; truth-speaking needs none. Reid, *Of Judgment*, c. 6: "It may always be expected that they [mankind] will have some regard to truth and justice, so far at least as not to swerve from them without temptation." Compare Kant's remarks about the "worst villain" (größter Bösewicht), *Fundamental Principles*, p. 89 (Eng. Trans.).

¹ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, §§ 88-91. I believe Green's language hardly does justice to what must have been his thought, in respect of the *qualitative* difference between the "wants" of an animal and human "desire." Verbally he seems to make the difference no more than that in man the feeling of the "want" is accompanied by a consciousness of "self" as a permanent wanter who has had other wants in the past and will have still others in the future. Yet he must really have been alive to the fact that the truly significant difference is in the kind of thing wanted. Cf. the express statements of *Prolegomena*, §§ 125-126.

and drink. If some men have come to hunger and thirst after righteousness, it is because there never has been a time in the history of *men* when they hungered and thirsted solely, like animals, for meat and drink. To admit that *human* appetite has ever been solely appetite for the satisfaction of "animal wants" ought to lead you in the end to an ethic of "this world" in which "comfort," gross or refined, ranks as the *summum bonum*. The schoolmen who taught that our simplest appetitions for what look to be the most material satisfactions are in *us* blundering and tentative expressions of the aspiration to "deiformity" ¹ seem to me in the right of it against anyone who teaches that the aspiration to "deiformity" is a transformed "animal want." And again I should say that the failure to do justice to the originality of "rational" appetite in man is responsible for much of the hostility of the eminent writers of whom I am speaking to the Kantian ethic just on the point where it seems to me to be strongest, its so-called "formalism," ² a necessary consequence of the fact that it is an Ethic for *rational* beings, who, as such, possess a true *liberum arbitrium*.

¹ Dante, *Paradiso*, ii, 19 :

La concreata e perpetua sete
del deiforme regno cen portava
veloci, quasi come il ciel vedete.

² Kant seems to me to be saying only what all sound morality must say, when he insists, as against the view that the difference between a morally good and a morally bad will is merely that the good will succeeds, the bad fails, to attain one and the same end, on the point that the difference in question must be intrinsic and therefore a formal character of the will itself. His unfortunate mistake is that, owing to his ignorance of Greek thought, he does not see that in the end the "form" and the "final cause" coalesce. Hence he forgets that the real question does not concern the end *attained* but the end *willed* and aimed at. This is not the same in the case of the good and the bad will, except that *κατ' ἀναλογίαν* the good man and the bad may both be said, in a sense, to aim at "felicity"; but "felicity" means very different things to the two.

Cf. Dante, *Purgatorio*, xvii, 133 :

Altro ben è che non fa l'uom felice ;
non è felicità, non è la buona
essenza, d'ogni ben frutto e radice.

2. FREEDOM AND "DETERMINISM."

On the question whether "scientific determinism" is really incompatible with the recognition of *liberum arbitrium* I may be briefer. I hold that it plainly is so and I think the case may be argued effectively from either end. If we start by recognizing that it is fundamental for morality that a "responsible" agent should be able to find an adequate motive to action in the perception of a given act as the right and reasonable thing to be done, it must follow that, on any theory which makes my present judgment of good the *necessary* consequence of earlier acts or events, there never is any act of unbiased comparison of alternatives on their own merits; hence the freedom demanded for moral responsibility can never be more than a dream, a *bellum somnium* no doubt, but one which, after all, has come through the ivory gate. It does not in the least mend the matter to be told, as one is told by Dr. Rashdall and others, that the past to which one is fettered is one's own past. What morality demands is that the *present* perception of an act as good and obligatory should be a sufficient condition of its execution. If the cause of my present conviction that the act is good and obligatory is always completely contained in the facts of my own past, if I only think *A* good now *because* I have formerly thought *A'* and *A''* good, then, say what you may, I am making no independent comparative judgment. It is not my reverence for the law of right or of God which is expressing itself in my act. The act is no more the expression of a dutiful spirit than the utterances of a man "possessed" are the expression of his own thought. I am tied to a something, call it my past history, my ancestry, my "metaphysical self," or what you please, which is not really me, and so long as I am under the compulsion of such a tyrant my condition is not bettered by the name you give the tyrant; John or Charles or James or the *souveraine canaille*, it is all one. Whatever we may think on other grounds of Kant's solution of the problem, he has at least the merit of making it plain that hopeless slavery to the past does not cease to be slavery because the past is to some extent

of my own making. Frankenstein's monster was of his making, but Frankenstein was no more free than the victims of Mezentius.

We may urge the same considerations from the other end. Whatever formula you choose to express your "determinism," your statement must contain as much as this. What happens at present is a definite one-valued function of something which has happened at certain specifiable dates in the past. This conception of practical dependence is always involved in the attempt to explain what we mean by a "scientific law." If the function is not one-valued for a given value of the "time variable," then, from the standpoint of natural science you are confronted with the very kind of indetermination physical science is concerned to banish from its formulae. If our choices are no more than "events" falling, with all other events, under the purview of natural science, it is inevitable that we should assume that functional dependence of the kind I have indicated is valid for them. We might indeed hold—though this would in the end involve all the difficulties of Kant's mythological single act of extra-temporal choice by which a man's whole character and destiny is irrevocably fixed—that the "arguments" of the functions are themselves antecedent choices, but our broad common-sense recognition of the intimate connection between our actual choices and other events which are not choices seems sufficient to negative such a view. Or you might hold, with the thoroughgoing naturalist, that none of these "arguments" are choices, or again you might adopt some intermediate position. In any case, the one view which is precluded on principle by determinism is the view, indispensable to morality, that the whole and sufficient "motive" for any act *can* be found is its now discerned goodness and reasonableness *per se*.¹ What we mistakenly call choosing

¹ I do not say "must be found." I may rationally choose that which already has an independent attractiveness for me. E.g., I may at once feel hungry and judge that it is right and reasonable to eat. But my point is that we need not be "attracted" by anything beyond the reasonableness of an act when we choose to perform it. If *A* asks *B* why he did so-and-so, and *B* replies, "Because it was obviously the reasonable

will, in fact, be making the discovery that no choice is left us. In every act of our lives we shall be in a position to say, *Gott helfe mir, ich kann nicht anders*, and the reason why *ich kann nicht anders* will be not that I know that *was anders* would be sin, but that certain things have occurred in the past.

I need not waste many words on exposing the fragility of the "determinist" combination which leads to this melancholy conclusion. It has been originally designed to deal with mere "natural events," to enable us to say how certain processes may be expected to go on, *so far as they are not modified by our interference*. When Du Bois-Reymond illustrated the conception by saying that a preternaturally gifted mathematician, like the fabled "demon" of Laplace, would need only to give the appropriate values to the time-variables of his equations in order to discover "whether when Pericles was embarking for Aegina there was a solar eclipse visible in Peiraeus, or when England will have burned her last ton of coal," he forgot that his two examples are not *in pari materia*. When England will have burned her last ton of coal may reasonably be held to depend on the intelligence and public spirit of generations of miners, mine-owners, Trade Union officials, and statesmen, and it is not obvious that any information on such matters can be extracted from the differential equations of the physicist. For my own part, I should say that it is a glaring *petitio principii* to assume that intelligent and purposive *acts* can be dealt with as "events" at all. Since they "occur," no doubt they are "events," but they may very well be much more than mere events, and the something more may make formulae devised to deal with events which are only events useless when applied to *acts*. Conceivably every attempt to exhibit genuine acts as functions of mere past events might always lead to mathematically ambiguous results. The physicist bent on bringing human conduct under his formulae might unwillingly thing to do," *A*, supposing him to be satisfied of *B*'s sincerity, will not feel that any further explanation is necessary. He understands why *B* acted as he did. If he does not himself think the act obviously reasonable, he may go on to say, "Why do you think it reasonable?" But he will not ask, "Why should you do what you think reasonable?"

be forced by the indeterminate character of the resulting equations to acquiescence in Pope's dictum,

Who, binding Nature fast in Fate,
Left free the human will,

and thus led to profitable critical meditation on the range of validity of his own interpretation of causality.

Whatever might happen to the physicist, common experience shows that the physiological psychologist can only reconcile the facts of human life with the conception of the complete functional dependence of present choice on the past by assuming a whole elaborate mechanism of "sub-conscious" mental dispositions, or possibly "unconscious" physiological pre-dispositions, which may lie dormant and beyond discovery for a lifetime until the special situation adapted to arouse them into action arises.¹ Vast hypothetical assumptions of this kind, incapable of verification, are always open to the suspicion of being mere fictions gratuitously invented to help out a defective theory in its difficulties. On the face of it, every fresh act of choice seems to be something akin to a new "creation," and it does not really add anything to the explanation of its newness to suggest that it is a manifestation of something which was there all along but "latent." What light is thrown on St. Paul's "day of Damascus" when we are told that the persecutor Saul must already have had a "latent disposition" to turn Christian which was not present in his fellow-inquisitors? Is this more than a mere restatement of the fact to be explained, that Saul was converted while his associates in the expedition were not? If we take it as a real explanation and then go on to construct a spiritual biography in which Saul is credited with an actual history of mental conflict and represented as instigated to his acts of violence

¹ Cf. Bradley's remarks about the man who "falls in love" violently for the first time in advanced age, *Ethical Studies*, p. 49. Further, the "occasion necessary to awaken the disposition into act" may *never* arise. The elderly man, after all, may *not* "fall in love." In that case, is it easy to believe in the reality of a "latent disposition" which *never* emerges from its latency? Is *purely* potential being anything but another name for not-being?

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by a desire to stifle his own growing suspicion that the "Galilean" might, after all, be in the right of it, what guarantee have we that this interpretation is more than a romance of our own making? (In this particular case, in fact, the historical presupposition looks to be all the other way. It seems to have been the very suddenness and completeness of the reversal of attitude which led St. Paul to feel that he had not been left to himself in the matter, but had been swayed by an actual and overwhelming irruption into the normal course of his psychical life coming from the transcendent and "wholly Other." Hence his repeated reference to himself as a "vessel of election" and a *predestined* apostle to the Gentiles.¹)

The point I am anxious to make, then, may be finally stated as follows. The interests of practical morality imperatively demand that *time* shall be real and that there shall be a real irreversibility of temporal direction. To the "Laplacean demon" it may make no difference in principle whether he is engaged in anticipating the future or in reconstructing the past. But in the moral order, the reality of time and its irreversibility are presuppositions. Moral victory and moral defeat would be alike impossible in a timeless world, and in a world in which time-order was reversible the one would be indistinguishable from the other. Whatever may be the case with time as a characteristic of "nature," time as a feature of our moral life absolutely *must* be marked by an irreversibility of direction which makes it impossible to assimilate "real duration" to a spatial "dimension." And from this very demand for the reality and irreversibility of temporal order in the moral life, it follows that moral responsibility demands as a condition of its genuineness that human acts shall be

¹ Yet—and this is really the point—the men who have felt most vividly this sense of the irruption of the "supernatural" into the course of their lives seem also always to have felt equally strongly that "obedience to the heavenly vision" was an act of free, unconstrained assent, human "consent" thus co-operating with "free grace." God is held to "give" grace, not to force it on one. Cf. the stress laid by the thinkers of the mediaeval Church on the courtesy and free assent of the Virgin (*fiat mihi secundum verbum tuum*) to the Incarnation. It was held that Mary might have refused; her consent was consequently "meritorious."

genuinely contingent: it must be said of all "motives" of choice between one specific good and another that they "incline without necessitating,"¹ that the assent we give to them is a "free" and unconstrained assent. If the conception appears a paradox, at least it is a paradox forced upon us if we take the moral life of man seriously.

3. REAL CONTINGENCY.

It is not really surprising that a scheme, like this of the unambiguous functional dependency of the later on the earlier both for its occurrence and its whole specific character, devised originally in the exclusive interests of *natural* science, should

¹ The phrase is best known from its frequent recurrence in Leibniz, who, perhaps, in view of his determinist bias, was not strictly entitled to use it. Its origin is earlier. St. Thomas (*S.c.E.* iii, 89) quotes from St. John Damascene the words *ea quae sunt in nobis Deus praenovit sed non praedeterminavit* and appends the explanation: *quae sunt in nobis divinae determinationi non esse subiecta quasi ab ea necessitatem accipientia*.

It has been maintained, on the other hand, that the apprehended goodness of the object of choice does necessitate choice in those who apprehend it. "We needs must love the highest when we see it." If this only means that, as Socrates and Plato held, he who sees the good *will* pursue it, I have no quarrel with the statement. But I think the use of the word "necessitate" is misleading. It puts choice of the apprehended good on a level with assent to a conclusion validly inferred from self-evident premisses. The latter I should say is "necessitated." In such a case, there is no freedom to *refuse* assent, and consequently assent given is not free assent. But a judgment "this is good" or "this is a higher good than that" never seems to me to have complete self-evidence. It involves an act of faith of a moral character, and cannot be presumed to be evident *omnibus, semper, ubique*. *Quoad nos* moral judgments are not self-evident. As Aristotle said, you need to be already a good man to find them evident. And you have already exercised moral choice throughout the process by which you become good.

The view of St. Thomas and Dante is that we must distinguish the appetite of "one's proper good" *in genere* from appetite of this or that determinate object as one's proper good. The first is necessitated and merely "natural"; it is the second which is specifically moral and non-necessitated. I cannot help desiring my own felicity; I can help identifying my felicity with, e.g., sensual ease or unlimited material wealth. It is here, in the judgment "there is something much better for me than having a good time or becoming a millionaire," that the act of faith of which I have spoken comes in.

break down when we try to apply it to the acts of beings with a *moral* nature. But we may go further and ask whether it is necessary in physical science itself to regard the scheme as realized in its perfection even in purely physical events. (By "purely physical events" I mean here events not in any way dependent on purposive human interference.) If we mean by "laws of nature" formulae expressing such complete functional dependence of later events on earlier events and *on nothing else*, it may be doubtful whether science ever has established or ever will establish a single "law of nature." It is too often forgotten that complete dependence does not mean merely that if the earlier events had not happened, the later would not happen either. It is also meant that the complete character, the "what," of the later event is wholly dependent, no less than its "that," on the "what" of the earlier. Hence it is pertinent to remember that no science can ever claim to be able to calculate any concrete event in the whole of its concrete individuality. The correlations we establish are never between a whole concrete event and other concrete events; they are always correlations between selected universal characteristics of the one and similar characteristics of the other. Thus, to consider the study in which calculation has been brought to its highest pitch of exactness, the astronomer is popularly said to be able to calculate eclipses of the sun for remote times past and future. But an eclipse of the sun is not the whole of a concrete event; it is a partial component of a number of very complex events. The astronomer may tell me that at a given date the moon will be in the direct line between a certain region of the earth's surface and the solar disc. He cannot as yet tell me whether at a given spot in that region, on that occasion, the sky will be clear and observation possible. To go back to Du Bois-Reymond's example, the astronomer may be able to tell me "whether there was an eclipse of the sun visible at Peiraeus as Pericles was embarking for Aegina." He simply cannot tell me whether the sky was unclouded or, if it was, whether Pericles saw the eclipse, and, if he did, how it impressed him. *Conceivably*, I suppose,

meteorology might hereafter be developed to such a degree of accuracy that it would be possible to ascertain that the weather conditions made it possible for Pericles to be aware of the obscuration of the solar disc by the moon, though I should presume that this is indefinitely improbable. But even so, this leaves the concrete event undetermined in all but one or two of its simplest characteristics. To know the concrete event, I should need to know, e.g., whether Pericles was looking at the sky or was too deeply occupied in attending to the last instructions he had received from the *ecclesia* or in taking leave of Aspasia to have eyes for what was going on, what was the tonnage of his vessel, whether it had its full complement of hands, what the sailors were saying to one another as they lowered the gangway, and what comments Socrates and Chaerephon, if they were looking on, were making on the scene.

Even this is not all. Even the conjunction of the two partial event-constituents—eclipse visible, embarkation of Pericles—cannot be said to be constatable with absolute certainty. It is out of the question to date an event in ancient history such as an embarkation of Pericles to the hour and minute, and an eclipse is an affair of minutes. I suppose, also (speaking under correction), that there must be some margin of possible error in the dating of a remote eclipse itself. Thus, it may be confidently asserted that there was a total eclipse of the sun visible in Asia Minor on May 12th, o.s., 585 B.C. But—I only ask the question, not knowing the answer—is the astronomer prepared to say to the hour and minute of that day exactly when the eclipse would be visible from the market-place of Miletus or from the piece of ground where the Medes and Lydians were fighting?

If the past, in its full detail, would seem to be thus irrecoverable, it is even more clear that the future cannot be anticipated in detail. No doubt an astronomer can tell me on what days, if any, there will be solar eclipses visible from Edinburgh in the year 2024 (*supposing*, that is, that the *cursus ordinarius* of nature continues so long without unforeseeable disturbance). But I see no reason to think that any powers of observation

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and calculation would enable him to tell me what will be the concrete event of which such an eclipse will be a partial constituent, e.g., whether there will then be an Observatory at Edinburgh or an Astronomer-Royal for Scotland to make observations, and if there is, whether he will be tall or short, dark or fair, and what his name will be.

These reflections may seem trivial, but the principle they illustrate is far from trivial. As Leibniz said long ago, the course of events does not depend exclusively on "laws." You might conceivably have a world where the "laws of motion" are exactly what they are in our actual world, and yet its detail might be different in every particular.¹ To use the language of Chalmers and Mill, we have to appeal in all our explanations of the actual not only to "laws" but to "collocations." Science, which hates to accept anything whatever as mere bare "given fact," is always trying, with much success, to reduce the "collocations" with which it starts as given to mere consequences of "laws." But every success in such reduction is achieved at the price of acquiescence in some assumption of an earlier and more ultimate "collocation." Without "collocations" which have to be taken as "brute fact," as there we do not know how or why, the functional dependences we call "laws" would reduce to functions without any arguments and would thus become as insignificant as the symbol f or ϕ before a blank. Here we clearly come upon an inevitable limit to the whole work of scientific explanation. As M. Émile Meyerson has argued in his recent brilliant work *l'Explication dans les Sciences*, the paradox of scientific explanation is that it gets rid of the unexplained and in that sense *irrational* in one place only on condition of reintroducing it somewhere else. Thus, as M. Meyerson says, it is a sort of standing scandal to the scientific mind that the whole movement of things should

¹ Thus in Leibniz's own infinity of "possible worlds" the laws of motion are supposed to be the same for each (since he held that the formulae which state them are "analytical" propositions). What is different as between one such world and another is the "collocations." (Though how this difference is compatible with his other dictum that *all* true propositions are analytical is a further question.)

not have a periodic rhythm. Why does not the "universe" have a period? Why is there no cyclical recurrence, no "great year," as we see there are lesser years? The "principle of Carnot" removes the apparent "irrationality." It makes us, up to a point, see why the whole course of nature never repeats itself. But the same principle of Carnot, while it removes one "irrational," introduces another; it requires us in our explanations to start with a distribution of thermal energy which is infinitely improbable. In a still more recent work, *La déduction relativiste*, M. Meyerson makes the point of his criticism still plainer. What gives the "generalized theory of relativity" at once its fascination for the physicist by instinct and the repellent character it has for the average non-scientific man is precisely that it seems to eliminate the ultimate "irrational," stuff, "first matter," from scientific theory. It achieves what the greatest of all rationalists among modern philosophers, Descartes, dreamed of three hundred years ago, the identification of "matter" with "extension." To the mind bent on "scientific explanation" this reduction of matter to extension has all along been the conscious or unconscious aim of intellectual endeavour, because to such a mind geometry inevitably appears as something inherently rational and self-explanatory. From the days of the Pythagoreans and Plato geometrical demonstration has always appeared to be the ideal type of complete rationality. Hence the apparent necessity, driven home by the work of Newton, of recognizing matter and gravitation as ultimates in physics, has never been admitted without reluctance. The demand to be shown a "cause of gravitation," which Newton himself, as we see from the famous concluding *Scholium* to the *Principia*, felt as strongly as any one, would only be satisfied in the end by the formulation of a body of laws of motion which will actually include the gravitation-formula as a constituent or immediate consequence, and such a reformulation of the laws of motion obviously amounts to a complete resolution of "matter" into extension. The extraordinary welcome which the work of Einstein and those who have followed him has received is

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manifestly due to the fact that the "generalized relativity theory" carries out this programme and eliminates the two great outstanding "brute facts" of physics, gravitation and matter.¹

And yet, when we come to reflect a second time, even in this latest refinement of theory, the "irrational" has not been finally subdued. In identifying matter with space, we have had to desert the old Euclidean conception of space itself as something everywhere uniform in pattern. We have had to amalgamate space and time, and the consequence is that the space or space-time of the new physicist is variegated and non-uniform. A geometry which will fit one small region of it will not equally fit all regions. If we want our geometry to be exact, it has to be an "infinitesimal" geometry, valid only for regions of vanishing smallness. As it is metaphorically put, the four-dimensional "space," to call it so, of the new physicist is full of wrinkles, and the different wrinkles are not even all replicas of one single pattern. Hence the "irrational" breaks out again. We have to take it as a "brute fact" that there is a "wrinkle" of such and such magnitude and character in just such a region of the space-time continuance. Why the "wrinkle" should be here and not "a little further on" and why it should be neither more nor less wrinkled than it is, we cannot say; we have to sit down with the fact. No doubt if the Einsteinian physics are permanently adopted by men of science some attempt will yet be made to "explain" these facts. But we can easily see that if ever they are explained it will only be by reference to something else which must be taken as "given" by reflecting that the *complete* explanation of everything, the resolution of all "collocations" without remainder into "laws," would be equivalent to the deduction of the detail of the real world from a pure and simple nothing. A fully "explained" world would be indistinguishable from pure non-being.

There are certain conclusions, not drawn by M. Meyerson, to which his reasoning seems to me to point irresistibly.

¹ Meyerson, *La déduction relativiste*, c. 5.

Chalmers has often been harshly criticized for his alleged uncritical readiness to make the necessity of including unexplained "collocations" in our scientific accounts of the natural world into an argument for the existence of God as their author. But I think it must be owned in fairness that his reasoning was at least unanswerable as a proof that rigid "determination by laws" from "data," "the given," "brute fact," amounts to a proof that contingency or indetermination is just as much a feature of nature and of every part of nature as determination by laws. When it is urged against the libertarian that his doctrine implies, as I admit it does, the reality of the contingent, he is fully entitled to reply that this should be regarded as a presumption in its favour. On a clear inspection contingency is found to be a universal character of whatever is temporal and mutable. The only being in which contingency could have no place would be one which contained entirely within itself its own *raison d'être*, and, by consequence, the *raison d'être* of everything else. Such a being could be neither any lesser part or constituent of nature, nor the "whole" of nature, if we can intelligibly talk of a whole of nature. It would be the God of the "ontological" proof, a source of nature, but an absolutely transcendent and supernatural source, as a real man might be said to be a transcendent source of his own shadow or his own portrait. (The man is the source of both shadow and portrait, but he is not himself either a shadow or a portrait.)

In man, made in the image of God, may we not see the same transcendence in a diminished and contracted form? Things, once given a particular "collocation" of them, are tied down by the fact of the collocation and the laws of their interconnection to a determinate course of behaviour; man, dependent as he is on his own past and his environment, never is completely tied, unless he is actually coerced by physical violence, and physical violence has no power over the interior act of will. At the worst man, not under actual physical constraint, always has the alternative "do this—or take such and such consequences," and he can opt to face the consequences. Hence the libertarian formula that "motives" incline without necessitating.

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But the formula is only justified if we grant that the only complete determination in moral matters is one which issues from our judgments of good and bad, not one which precedes and causes them. Let me end with two practical corollaries.

(a) On any of the current determinist theories, "hard" or "soft," it would seem to follow that for any one of us there are virtues which he certainly cannot attain, sins which he cannot avoid, temptations which he cannot resist. It is an easy stage from this position to the further one that an intelligent elder friend and monitor might be able to tell me in advance which are for me the unattainable virtues, unavoidable sins, and irresistible temptations. Now what would be the practical consequences if shrewd and experienced educators undertook to convey this knowledge to their pupils? I can hardly doubt that they would be moral sloth and contented unrepenting sinning on the largest scale. All of us who have the cause of practical morality at heart would pretty certainly agree that the observant teacher ought at least to make it a point of conscience to keep such dangerous knowledge locked up in his own breast. Indeed, I believe we should go further. We should hold that in actual intercourse with his juniors the determinist preceptor would be morally bound to commit the pious fraud of teaching them that no temptation is irresistible, no sin necessitated, no height of virtue inaccessible. Yet a conscientious man would surely feel very uneasy at the prospect of finding himself committed, as a matter of duty, to habitual lying for good ends. He might, indeed, take refuge in Bradley's remark that we can never be absolutely certain that a given wrong-doer has become incapable of amendment and may therefore in practice charitably treat him as capable of reclamation. But we must remember that in the determinist's mind there is such a point at which a man becomes hopelessly reprobate, and though you may not absolutely know that I have reached that point, you may have shrewd and reasonable suspicion. If one has such suspicions, it is almost impossible to keep them from betraying themselves, especially where they concern those with whom we have to do most intimately, and then the mischief

is already wrought. It is our moral duty, as it seems to me, if there is an equally reasonable theory of the nature of moral action which makes it possible to believe, as well as to say, that no man is utterly irredeemable and no vice of blood or habit wholly unconquerable, to opt for the more hopeful view. We ought to think nobly and not meanly of the soul. The more nobly we think of it, the nobler is the response of another human soul to our treatment of it likely to be.

(b) "Scientific determinism" is a purely "this-world" and secular doctrine. To include it into our Ethics means that we confine ourself from the outset of our practical philosophy to a "this-world" view of man's destiny and man's good. All the factors regarded by the scientific determinist turned moralist as influencing the course of men's actions are factors which belong exclusively to the secular and naturalistic order. The windows of a determinist Ethics are resolutely shut against all irradiations from the supernatural and eternal. Of course I am not proposing that it should be simply presupposed, without reason assigned, that there are such irradiations and that man is a denizen of an eternal as well as of a temporal world. But there is much in human life, including all the thoughts and feelings which have inspired religion in all its forms, which must be dismissed unexamined as mere illusion if our interior life is to be made part of the natural order pure and simple. I do most earnestly protest that it is intolerable presumption in a moralist to assume *ab initio* that there are not influences at work in man's soul (the free grace of God, grace given in response to the prayer of faith, or mediated by the great Christian sacraments, or, for the matter of that, by many another channel) of which, from the nature of the case, scientific determinism can take no account.¹

Such an Indeterminism as I would advocate naturally does not simply *assume* that these influences from beyond "nature" are real. On that question the last word must remain with those who have received the gifts, and it is, no doubt, a logical *possibility* that the class of "recipients of grace" is empty.

¹ For "He giveth not the spirit by *measure*."

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But Indeterminism, unlike Determinism, is not wedded to the view that the natural order is the only order there is. Its windows are open to the spiritual sun, if spiritual sun there be, not shuttered and barred against it. It *need* not be content with any good thing less than "deiformity" as its "good for man." It can contemplate, as no doctrine which, under any disguise, subjects man's will to circumstance can, a day when it may be said to such creatures as each of ourselves :

Libero, dritto e sano è tuo arbitrio,
e fallo fora non fare a suo senno ;
perch' io te sopra te corono e mitrio.

To translate undying poetry into prose, the man who has won his full moral freedom is the man who is *dominus sui*. But if a creature is ever to become *dominus sui* in act, he must from the first enjoy a corresponding potentiality. What the required potentiality is has been stated by the same supreme poet whom I have just quoted in words to which I can add nothing and from which I would take nothing away.

"Iudicium medium est apprehensionis et appetitus : nam primo res apprehenditur, deinde apprehensa bona vel mala iudicatur, et ultimo iudicans prosequitur sive fugit. Si ergo iudicium moveat omnino appetitum et nullo modo preveniatur ab eo, liberum est ; si vero ab appetitu quocumque modo proveniente iudicium moveatur, liberum esse non potest quia non a se sed ab alio captivum trahitur. Et hinc est quod bruta iudicium liberum habere non possunt, quia eorum iudicia semper ab appetitu preveniuntur."—DANTE : *Monarchia*, i, 12, 4-5).¹

¹ I may be asked whether a man who "acts on impulse" is not free. I should have said that if he acts simply on natural impulse he is not free : domination by impulses is a dreadful servitude. But what then of a man who reflectively determines that in a given case he will not plan his precise words and acts in advance but act as he feels moved to do when the need for action arises ? Well, (1) this choice itself is deliberate, not impulsive, and (2) I should say he would be morally safe only on condition that *his* impulses had already been so disciplined to the "rule of the mean" that they are no longer *mere* impulses, suggestions of the moment, but really embody and issue from a whole life of serious rational choice. They are "last" rather than "first" impressions.

A BIOLOGIST'S PHILOSOPHY

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BIOGRAPHICAL

I WAS born in East Lothian in 1861, with hereditary inclinations to the study of Natural History, also with strong theological traditions. From the village school I passed to Edinburgh University, where I followed the then fixed M.A. course with many science classes in addition. I owe more than I can say to the teaching of Patrick Geddes, especially to his insistence on the relations of biology to other disciplines. After some theological study, mingled with more science, I went to work under Haeckel at Jena, by whom I was greatly influenced, though afterwards rather in the direction of reaction. Later on I studied zoology under Schulze in Berlin, and was incidentally much impressed by Pfeleiderer's lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. With much reading of Spencer and other evolutionists, I combined experience at various marine biological stations, always taking a keen interest in open-air "natural history." In 1887 I started teaching zoology in the extra-mural School of Medicine in Edinburgh, where I remained till I was appointed in 1899 to the Chair of Natural History in the University of Aberdeen. I have also held various Lectureships: Thomson Lecturer, United Free Church College, Aberdeen; Bross Lecturer, Lake Forest University; Gifford Lecturer, St. Andrews; Morse Lecturer, Union Theological Seminary, New York; Terry Lecturer at Yale.

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THIS is simply a frank, and probably rather naïve, presentment of the synoptic view which comes to one after forty years and more of biological observation and reflection. It is not a philosophy of biology, which would mainly mean a systematic criticism of such biological categories as organism, development, heredity, and evolution. That has been essayed from different points of view in Driesch's Gifford Lectures (*The Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, 1908), Johnstone's *Philosophy of Biology*, 1914, and other works; and it continues to-day, as it must. But the point of this paper is rather to indicate how a discipline in biology, including obviously reflection on its categories or central concepts, colours the synoptic picture one tries to make of all orders of facts. Perhaps one may venture to say, furthermore, that the would-be philosophical view here sketched—sincerity perhaps its chief value—is deeply influenced not merely by experience in biological investigation and reflection, but by an intimate sojourning with Animate Nature. For convictions come in the school of the woods and the shore as well as in the laboratory. Perhaps Huxley would have modified his view of Animate Nature if he had been more of a field-naturalist.

§ 1. THE AUTONOMY OF BIOLOGY.

The biologist sees before him—very clearly because his science is *central*—three great orders of facts: (1) the domain of non-living things, the cosmosphere; (2) the realm of organisms, the biosphere; and (3) the kingdom of man and his societies, the sociosphere, *sit venia verbo* or *verbis*. These three distinguish-

able orders of facts appear to require different conceptual formulæ for their satisfactory description, for an organism is a new synthesis compared with a nebula or a crystal, and a human societary form is more than a crowd of mammals—more even than a herd. Everyone agrees that there is a chemistry and physics of the living body—legitimate, illuminating, and promiseful ; but they do not serve to describe to us the behaviour, the development, or the evolution of the living creature. Bio-physics and bio-chemistry are indispensable, but they are not exhaustive when we think of the animal as a whole. They are what Comte called the legitimate materialisms of the subject. We agree with Driesch's conclusion, without necessarily accepting all his arguments, that Biology is autonomous. It must have a laboratory to itself, where the newness of the living creature is not lost amongst the properties of colloids and the powers of ferments—fundamental as these are. Similarly, while mathematics, chemistry, physics, and biology have their place as legitimate materialisms in the study of sociology, which often needs them badly, the biologist has a fellow feeling with the sociologist who claims autonomy for his young science. For man is a new synthesis compared with even the highest mammals, and his society is an incipient new synthesis too. The ductless or endocrinal glands are very influential in the life of the individual, but to say that they "determine the personality" is an illegitimate "biologism." The beaver village and the ant-hill are alike admirable, but to regard a human society as only a herd to the third power is a false simplicity—another "biologism," or illegitimate materialism.

Before leaving the picture of the cosmosphere enveloping and interpenetrating the biosphere, and similarly of the biosphere enveloping and interpenetrating the sociosphere, it is interesting and of some importance to notice that the spheres cut into one another. Thus in his domestication and cultivation achievements man takes a big slice of the biosphere into his kingdom. The domestic dog is not scientifically interpretable apart from its partnership with man, and it is not fanciful to say that man has instilled something of himself into the garden rose, not to

speak of the apple. But a minus intersection is illustrated when man stupefies a wild animal or impoverishes the biosphere by his ruthless exterminations. Still worse, however, is that kind of intersection that is illustrated when the animal gets the upper hand in man, when the biosphere is allowed to encroach on the sociosphere, when there is degeneracy and abrutisement. What is decent in a chimpanzee is unspeakably abominable in man.

We must not labour the point, but it is of value to picture the boundaries of the three spheres or ellipses as swaying and inter-osculating. When the white ants build a great termitary, or the coral-polyps a barrier-reef a thousand miles long, they are taking part of the cosmosphere into their realm; on the other hand, an animal or a plant may take so much of the inorganic into itself that it seriously reduces the bed of the living stream, and life becomes a slender rill, as in some corals and calcareous Algæ. So men may over-cultivate their animal nature—their imperfectly humanized bodies—the bathos being what St. Paul referred to in the scathing words, “whose God is their belly.”

§ 2. DESCRIPTIVE NATURALISM.

The biologist, as such, holds firmly to *descriptive naturalism*, which does not necessarily imply interpretative naturalism. He seeks to describe what happens in terms of the factors given in the experimentally verifiable system of things. He does not feel sure that he has as yet come to know all these factors, but he is radically opposed to every attempt to eke out empirical factors with subsidies from transcendental treasuries. He must keep to one universe of discourse at a time, and thus he does not sympathize with the suggestion of Alfred Russel Wallace and others that “spiritual influxes” have operated at intervals in assisting the evolving organism over difficult stiles. That new aspects of reality have from time to time emerged, the biologist sees clearly; but mysterious as these may remain, it is safer to say that we do not understand them, than to attempt

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a mixed description in terms of formulæ partly empirical and partly mystical. To attach great importance to the mental aspect of life would not of course be mystical, for we are sure that "mind" often counts for much, or even most; but to lug in a "spiritual influx," as if there were two worlds, is a kind of joukery-pawkery from which the ordinary biologist recoils.

Biology is built up, as far as possible, by reflection on the impersonal data of observation and experiment. It is summed up in descriptive formulæ, some of which have to include at present unanalysed terms, such as "development" or "variation," while others are lowest common denominators, such as colloidal protoplasm in the course of metabolism.

§ 3. THE ORGANISM AS A HISTORIC BEING.

As the biologist sees before him an ever-changing phase of a process of becoming, his formulations must have a genetic or historical form. Even the more static sub-sciences, such as anatomy and taxonomy, have to be studied historically. The dry bones live in the glow of evolutionist morphology. The biologist is always saying to himself: "Becoming, Being, and Having Been." Darwinism has brought about this dominance of the kinetic over the static outlook.

Yet it is not merely that the biologist sees all his organisms in flux; he has hold of something deeper—that the organism is essentially a historic being. That is to say, one of its insignia is a capacity for enregistering the past. W. K. Clifford was one of the first to state this open secret: "It is the peculiarity of living things not merely that they change under the influence of surrounding circumstances, but that any change that takes place in them is not lost, but retained, and, as it were, built into the organism to serve as the foundation for future actions." It is one of Bergson's services to have emphasized the same idea: "Its past, in its entirety, is prolonged into its present, and abides there, actual and acting." This fundamental idea has an individual and a racial application. In the individual

lifetime there is a somatic enregistration of experiences, in addition to such cerebral engrams as may be the protoplasmic analogues of true memory. Thus in discussing the behaviour of the starfish, Jennings says: "The precise way each part shall act under the influence of the stimulus must be determined by the past history of that part; by the stimuli that have acted upon it, by the reactions which it has given, by the results which these reactions have produced (as well as by the present relations of this part to other parts, and by the immediate effects of its present action). We know as solidly as we know anything in physiology that the history of an organism does modify it and its actions—in ways not yet thoroughly understood, doubtless, yet none the less real." This is part of what is meant by "organic memory" in the individual. Whether its enregistrations can have a specific and representative effect on the germ-cells, and thus influence the offspring in the same direction, is the still undecided question: Are individually acquired somatic modifications transmissible? For emphasis on individual enregistration—one aspect of "organic memory"—we owe much to the physiologist Hering and to Samuel Butler. In his theory of the Mneme, Semon carried the idea to its neo-Lamarckian limit, maintaining that individually acquired engrams could repercuss specifically on the germ-plasm, and thus become racial assets or liabilities. Professor E. W. MacBride is perhaps the most distinguished living champion of a revised Lamarckian position. See his *Heredity* (1924).

But when Weismann and Galton made the idea of germinal continuity clear, thus explaining how it is that like tends to beget like, they also showed how unsatisfactory and unconvincing was the evidence in support of the view that somatic modifications can be entailed, even in a slight representative degree, from parents to offspring. Then it became necessary to think of some other way in which the organism, racially considered, is a historic being. Thus many biologists saw the organism hereditarily endowed not with dints and imprints due to peculiarities of "nurture," but with the initiatives or new departures originated by previous generations of implicit

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organisms, that is to say germ-cells. No one doubts that a germinal novelty—due perhaps to some shuffling of the hereditary cards before or during fertilization—*may be* continued in subsequent generations. The possibility is implied in the idea of germinal continuity; and everyone knows that particular new departures, like night blindness and brachydactyly, may persist for many generations. If the new departure is such that it seriously handicaps the explicit organism, which has always to play its hereditary hand of cards, then it cannot last long. On the other hand, if the new departure is advantageous to the organism and is heritable, it is likely to be added to the racial treasury. Our present point is that even if there is no further evidence suggesting the transmission of acquired characters, and if the critics explain away the few cases which at present point in the direction of such transmission, the organism remains a historic being, the custodian of all the past germinal variations that have been thoroughly approved of in the struggle for existence. We have lingered over this characteristic of living creatures because it is one of the most distinctive. Rightly appreciated, it colours the whole of biology, and the philosophical picture that the biologist paints.

§ 4. DIFFERENT MODES OF BECOMING.

Lack of clearness is often due to having too few words, and that is well illustrated by the badly over-worked word *evolution*, which is applied in so many fields widely different from one another. If we qualify it by using the adjective “organic,” what precisely do we mean? Organic evolution is a natural process of continuous racial change in a definite direction, in the course of which distinctively new individualities arise, take root, and flourish, alongside of or in place of the originaive stock. When several different parts of the organism are evolving simultaneously, it will be necessary to say “in a definite direction or in several definite directions.”

But it seems to make for confusion when this term “organic evolution,” which is a racial concept, is mixed up with the

term "development," which most biologists are now careful to restrict to the *individual becoming*—e.g. the ontogeny of the chick out of the egg, the frog from the tadpole, the moth from the chrysalis. In a recent lecture on "The Concept of Evolution," Joseph trounces the biologists for their vague and ambiguous use of the word, but he proceeds in a deliberate way to mix up "evolution" and "development," and this does not seem to us to make for progress. Organic evolution is a process of racial becoming or phylogeny; development is a process of individual becoming or ontogeny; and it was one of Haeckel's great services to correlate the two, saying that ontogeny tends to recapitulate phylogeny. He was not, of course, the initiator of this idea, but he was one of its clearest expositors.

We would suggest that, except for conversational purposes, the word "history" should be restricted to the kingdom of man. For while the idea of organic evolution expresses in some measure a projection of the concept of human history on Animate Nature, the differences between organic evolution and human history are in kind, not merely in degree. For man is more or less aware of his past history, but theirs is hidden from the beasts; and although all active organisms share in their own evolution, they do not rise to the level of deliberately controlling it as man seeks to do. The most that animals do is to work towards a concrete personal end. Thirdly, while there are some instances among animals of permanent products that last for several generations, as in a termitary, or a beaver-can, these are not more than slight anticipations of what is so characteristic of mankind—the growth of a social heritage, from another point of view, social environment, in which some of the gains of the past are enregistered, hardly less efficiently than others are continued in the germ-plasm. For these and other reasons, therefore, we see that the concept of organic evolution is distinctively different from that of human history. Only confusion of thought can result from the promiscuous use of analogous terms which may be kept apart without any pedantry.

When we think of another kind of becoming—that of the

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solar system—we recognize great differences as compared with organic evolution. For in the majestic process by which the earth and the other planets were differentiated from the parental sun, there was no elimination or appreciable loss. There was a re-arrangement of the Energy-Matter, but no long-drawn-out process of sifting, such as we find in Natural Selection. It is characteristic of Organic Evolution that many organisms which share in the struggle do not enter into the promises. There have been many lost races and many transient species—on even to Neanderthal Man, who was no ancestor of ours, but a transient collateral. Perhaps some word like *genesis* would serve for the *cosmic* becoming.

The processes in the domain of things that remind us most of the organismal are (a) the radio-active changes and (b) the achievements of the synthetic chemist. As to the radio-active transmutations, we know, for instance, that the metal uranium slowly disintegrates, through a succession of stages, into helium gas and a form of lead. This might be compared to the transformation of species. But while lead is quite different from its parent or ancestor uranium, we know that the transmutation is very quantitative. It implies no more than changes in the numbers and dispositions of the electrons and protons of which all kinds of matter consist. Perhaps, however, if we knew enough, we should see that the change from one species to another is not so qualitative as it seems; in some cases it may merely mean the rise of a new protein.

It is noteworthy, however, that in the world to-day the chemico-physical clocks seem to be all running down, whereas the living clocks are able to wind themselves up. Uranium dies slowly into lead, but lead does not wind itself up again into uranium. It looks as if the time of chemical synthesis in Nature was over for the present, except where the chemist insists on being a little creator. For *he* can certainly wind up the clock and evoke a great complexity out of relatively simple materials. The new carbon-compounds that he makes have some resemblances to new species, and one might compare the synthetic chemist to a Mendelian breeder who grafts the desira-

bilities of a new variant on to the stability of an old stock. Where the comparison leaves us in the lurch is that we do not know what in the natural world of non-living things could take the place of the creative chemist in the laboratory, or even of Natural Selection in the realm of organisms. But our simple point here is that it makes for clearness to keep separate terms for the different processes of becoming, for they certainly differ as much as they agree. Organic evolution, individual development, human history, cosmic genesis, and chemical transmutation are all very different.

§ 5. THE LIMITATIONS OF BIOLOGY.

Like every other science, Biology is self-limited in its aim—which is descriptive or formulative. Since the days of Kirchhoff, let us say, this has been increasingly recognized, that science aims at formulating what goes on, at summing up the routine of our experience in what are called Laws of Nature. The only kind of “explanation” that science offers is that reached by reducing complex phenomena to simpler terms, or by saying that this puzzling event is a particular case of chemical law No. 5 and physical law No. 7, or by showing a remarkable result to be the outcome of a long genetic-developmental or evolutionary-process.

But it will not do to think of this *descriptive* rôle of science too narrowly. (1) Thus the formulation in terms of thought-economizing “laws” usually requires previous analysis, in the course of which the data are reduced to their lowest common denominator (or denominators if they are heterogeneous). In this process of reduction there is a risk of some fraction of reality being lost sight of, as when the enthusiast over the rôle of tropistic behaviour gets rid altogether of a “mind” that counts. (2) The descriptive account that science gives cannot remain merely a formulation of what is; it must also be historical or genetic, for the world is in flux. Moreover, the account of becoming must be causal as well as modal. Thus it is a slow business to change palæontography (modal descrip-

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tion) into palæontology (causal ætiology); or embryography, which is the relatively easy description of a sequence of developmental stages, into true embryology, which Roux called *Entwicklungsmechanik*. (3) It is often said with some dogmatism that science has nothing to do with the question "Why?" Its only business is to formulate the way in which particular configurations or collocations come to be as they are. Its questions are "How" and "Whence." Now this is the kind of methodological statement that comes naturally from experts in the exact or kinematical sciences. For in chemico-physical sciences, presumed to be fundamentally mechanical, the questions "How" and "Whence" suffice, except when we insist on taking a large evolutionary view. But in bio-psychological sciences, where we have to deal with purposive individuals, the scientific description is inadequate unless we also ask the question "Why?" Whenever there is individuality, actions have a significance in relation to the persistence and well-being of the creature. The indignant cat stands up to the obtrusive dog, and we can give a reasonable account of what takes place—the emotion whatever it may be, the nervous thrill, the excitation of the supra-renal bodies, the increased secretion of adrenalin, its rapid distribution by the blood, the consequent contraction of the minute muscles that make the hairs stand on end! But our description is unsatisfactory unless it includes reference to the usefulness of the reaction. Of course the cat does not deliberately bring it about, but there is a "why?" to be asked and answered before we have made sense of what we see. In the course of many generations the reaction has been found to pay. It is granted at once that we ask a scientific, not a transcendental "why?" We do not inquire into the ultimate significance of events; there is no attempt at philosophical interpretation.

The unscientific are apt to be bluffed by the apparent completeness of the scientific description, and there is no doubt that it often attains to a close fit with reality. This is proved by the basis it affords for prediction—for prediction that comes true. But the biologist is dealing with very complex syntheses

compared with stars and crystals and dewdrops in the domain of non-living things. Hence there is much experimental indeterminism. The biologist can predict the almost certain reaction to an often-repeated stimulus; with Mendel to help him, he can describe as well as count his chickens before they are hatched. Yet Biology remains in considerable part a very inexact science. Three good observations will suffice for predicting the return of a comet, but ten times that number will not tell us how the cat will jump. The individual counts in Biology, and is a purposive agent. The whirligig beetles on the pond transcend the stars in their courses.

We need not dwell on the limitation involved in having still to take "organisms" as given. It is not known how they arose; and the biologist has not fathomed the essential secret of life. He may have his conviction that the first living creatures emerged from amidst colloidal organic slime activated by ferments; but he does not know almost anything about it. Perhaps the most important fact that he knows is the discovery of Baly and his collaborateurs that light shining on water and carbon-dioxide can synthesize first formaldehyde and then sugar, and that the formaldehyde can be induced in the light of a quartz mercury lamp to unite with nitrates, thus forming nitrogenous carbon-compounds approaching the proteins which are characteristic of living matter. Abiogenesis is knocking at the biologist's door, and yet with all he knows of the properties of colloids and the metabolism of proteins, he cannot as yet, even in imagination, synthesize his primitive organisms, or tell us what it is that enables the *Amœba* to respond effectively to its environment and continue as a going concern that trades with time. It is open to biologists to say: "We shall push Bio-chemistry and Bio-physics for all they are worth, but since these do not at present adequately describe the whole life of the creature, we shall complete our scientific thought-model by utilizing the simplest expressions of the residual phenomena as we find them in the primitive unicellular organisms. And, of course, we must throw in something analogous to our own 'mind,' for we cannot get that out of colloids." It is no

reproach to biologists that they should argue in this way, but as long as they postulate irreducibles, such as "irritability," "enregistration," "growth," "reproduction," "development," and "variability," they must not speak of there being "one science of nature."

The biologist, as biologist, catches the fishes which the meshes of the net he uses are adjusted to catch, and if he is frank with himself he must be continually impressed with the abstractness of his science. If he has arranged the meshes so that they will only catch metabolism, he cannot directly demonstrate the presence of mentality in his sea. Especially as field-naturalist, he is continually impressed with that practically omnipresent quality of organisms which we call beauty; this is a real part of his experience, and yet it is only in small measure relevant to his biological descriptions, for instance in connection with preferential mating. Beauty is one facet of what the biologist studies, and yet biological methods can hardly measure even its angles. Thus in dealing with great complexes like *Animate Nature*, especially, as we have said, when he sojourns in their midst, and has, like Fabre, "more than a passing love of things that glide in rushes and rubble of woody wreck," there rises in his mind the conviction that his subject is too big for isis scientific methods. He is inclined to think that scientific inquiry is only one of the roads to truth, that there are other rights of way—one of them being the path named Feeling. The beauty of the scenery is irrelevant to the geologist, even when he is discovering how the scenery came to be; and yet to the geologist as man and philosopher the beauty is as real as the petrography.

§ 6. METHODOLOGICAL VITALISM.

The biologist has to steer between a metaphysical Scylla and a materialistic Charybdis. Scylla has still many heads, of which "entelechy," "vital force," and "élan vital" are three. Charybdis is still voracious, in reducing to a lowest common denominator everything that she can suck into her whirlpool.

Which is to be most avoided—using a metaphysical label, a mere “*x*” to tie up the uniquenesses of life—or caricaturing the organism as an ingenious penny-in-the-slot machine, with an intermittent safety-valve whistle, called mind? ¹

Careful steering finds the passage called methodological vitalism. This does not postulate any “vital force” or “entelechy”; nor does it try to coerce the organism into the framework of “mechanism.” What it says is this: There is a chemistry and a physics of the organism—more power to them!—but when they have finished their ledger of surface tensions, adsorptions, capillarities, gelations, solutions, ionizations, oxidations, reductions, hydrations, fermentations, and so forth, the description is inadequate. The baby has been emptied out with the bath. It is indeed the play of Hamlet with the part of the Prince of Denmark left out.

So far as we are aware, there is no single vital phenomenon that has as yet received adequate chemico-physical description, though corners or fractions of vital phenomena have been satisfactorily re-described in lower than biological terms. Here Dr. J. S. Haldane’s researches and reflections are of great importance. Perhaps no vital phenomenon has been more brilliantly studied than the contraction of muscle, but would the latest discoverers say that they can give a matter-and-motion account of what takes place? This holds *a fortiori* when we pass to a large integrated phenomenon such as the migration of swallow or salmon. Much is known in regard to these periodic mass-movements, but even if we knew ten times as much again, should we be able to dispense with the biological concept of the organism as a historic being, in whom a racial as well as an individual past lives, actual and acting? This is methodological vitalism, that when we have made the most of the legitimate materialisms, the physics of the organism and the chemistry of the organism, we must use distinctively biological categories, such as the capacity of enregistering experience.

Some biologists would say that what is lacking is a recognition

¹ See *Biology*, by Geddes and Thomson, Home University Library, 1925.

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of the psychical aspect of the organism ; and this is particularly true in regard to the higher reaches of animal behaviour, though less obviously true in regard to development. It may be that all biosis is really psycho-biosis, but this is speculative positive vitalism, whereas we are defending in the first instance the broader and more matter-of-fact position of methodological vitalism, that the synthetic and genetic description of organisms which biologists seek to work out, requires specific biological concepts. It is plain that this kind of vitalism holds good for the beanstalk as well as for Jack, though we cannot say much about the psychical aspect of plants.

§ 7. THE MENTAL ASPECT OF THE ORGANISM.

Especially in the open air, amid life as it is lived in Nature, the biologist is impressed with the mental aspect of organisms. The more intimately we know animals, the more does " mind " seem to count, though more critical methods have made observers less indiscriminately generous than they were before experiments began. Pioneers like Lubbock and Romanes, initiators like Lloyd Morgan, and critics like Loeb and Watson, deserve our gratitude for setting the science of animal behaviour on its feet. Some recent studies, like those of Köhler on chimpanzees, show an abundance of intelligent behaviour, which cannot be described without using psychological terms. Chimpanzees are heavily handicapped by their slender capacity for " image-forming " and by their very poor vocabulary, but when we picture them piling boxes on the top of one another to reach a banana on the roof, or fitting one piece of bamboo rod into another to retrieve some fruit outside the cage, and inventing a dozen similar devices, it seems impossible to doubt their power of perceptual inference. Both for birds and mammals it is possible to cite many good instances of adapting old means to a new end, of profiting by experience, of tentative experimentation, of appreciating relations, of putting two and two together and apparently making a judgment. And apart from intelligent behaviour, there are the tides of feeling, expressed

at their finest in the song of birds. It seems legitimate to say that at many different levels in the animal kingdom, from the Amœba on the hunt to the elephant working with the forester, there is a recognizable mental aspect that counts. From psychical flashes in the Amœba there is an evolutionary ascent, with many offshoots from the main line, towards a dominant and continuous mental activity that *counts* in the life of the creature.

When we make a provisional inclined plane of the different kinds of animal behaviour, we see something like this: simple reactions to environmental stimuli and obedience to protoplasmic urges; engrained definite reactions and a "trial and error" method of testing these one after the other; a variety of reflex actions—simple and compound and concatenated; a great variety of tropisms or "forced movements"; some interesting intrinsic rhythms (correlated with the tides for instance) that have taken firm grip of the constitution; queer cases of individual experimentation below the level of intelligence (as in the brainless, indeed ganglionless, starfishes); a great stretch of varied instinctive activities, depending physiologically on inborn pre-arrangements of particular nerve-cells and particular muscle-cells, more complex than those for tropisms, but having in many cases, on the psychological side, a suffusion with awareness and even a backing of endeavour; and, much higher, on a different line of evolution, instances of intelligent behaviour which implies some understanding of the situation, and, unlike instinct, requires to be learned; then the individual habituation of intelligent activities; the subtle mingling of instinct and intelligence as in many of the ways of birds; and finally the rational behaviour occasionally illustrated by man, which implies conceptual inference or experimenting with general ideas.

It seems to us that an interesting general result is reached when we envisage the inclined plane of animal behaviour. We discern two main modes: (a) the expression of enregistered capacities for effective response, and (b) some individual initiative or fresh experimentation. It may be pardonable to make an

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imaginary diagram by holding an ostrich feather, with its ascending curve, so that half of the barbs rise upwards and the others sink downwards. The barbs on the upper side of the feather-shaft may represent the initiative and experimental activities of animals, while those on the lower side represent the activities that spring from engrained enregistrations or pre-arrangements of nerve-cells and muscle-cells. Then, if the diagram be not tedious, the convex or outer surface of the feather may serve to suggest the objective or metabolic aspect of behaviour, while the concave or internal (and more or less hidden) surface will typify the subjective or mental aspect.¹

On the one side of the plane or curve we rank the simple reactions, simple reflexes, compound reflexes, tropisms, constitutional rhythms, simple instincts, chain instincts, and habituated intelligent behaviour. On the other side we rank simple tentatives, "trial and error" procedure, non-intelligent experiments, experimental and associative "learning," and intelligent behaviour in the strict sense. Now it seems to have been one of the trends of organic evolution to enregister and automatize modes of behaviour which are of frequent recurrence and immediate survival value, thus leaving the organism free to make more initiatives should these be needed. Thus we understand why there are so many forms of activity that can now be more or less adequately described in terms of pure neurosis, as in the case of reflex actions and the obligatory movements called tropisms, which depend on inborn pre-established linkages between certain receptor, adjustor, and motor neurons, the last serving to stimulate and control the effector-muscles. But although these and similar activities are nowadays reflex rather than reflective, physiological rather than psychological, it is not to be hastily assumed that they were evolved without psychosis. Let us suppose that a new departure in behaviour-capacity arises as a germinal variation, perhaps with its psychical correlate even there, the explicit organism has to test it in everyday life, and in this critical utilization there may be invention and judgment, which

¹ See Thomson's *Biology of Birds* (1923).

eventually die away when the approval of what is good is consummated in automatization. In the same way a progressive improvement in the capacity for a particular kind of instinctive behaviour may arise germinally, and yet depend for approval by Natural Selection on the degree to which it is *intelligently* tested. Of course this must not be confused with the highly improbable theory of the origin of instincts from lapsed intelligence. The distinction between the automatized and the experimental lines of behaviour has considerable theoretical interest; it is an extension of Sir Ray Lankester's contrast between (a) the "little-brain types," rich in instinctive capacities and slow to learn, finding their climax in ants, bees, and wasps, and (b) the "big-brain types," poor in instinctive endowment, but eminently educable, reaching a climax in horse and dog, elephant and ape.

§ 8. THE EFFICIENCY OF MIND.

According to the extreme mechanistic schools, behaviour is, or will be, thoroughly describable in physiological language, i.e. in terms of protoplasm, which in turn comes to be physico-chemical. Even man is but an "adaptive mechanism," we are told by a physiological authority, who enumerates, however, among the functions of the mechanism "the fabrication of thought"—including, of course, the mechanistic theory. But this view is a contradiction in terms theoretically, and a contradiction of common sense practically. On the apsychic theory, that mind does not count, we may make much of horse and dog, but certainly not most. The evolutionary efficiency of mind is evident enough in the kingdom of man, the biologist sees the same among animals—in the search for suitable environments, in intelligent life-favouring devices, in persistent endeavour towards a distant goal, in training the young, in the conventions of animal societies, in the impelling influence of emotions, and in many other cases. Samuel Butler did great service in maintaining that cunning has often been more of a factor than luck.

There is, we admit, a strong school of extreme behaviourists, who describe animal behaviour apsychically. It is not that they deny the reality of mind; what they deny is that it functions as an appreciable factor in the behaviour they describe. Against this the majority of biologists would bring forward cases where there is analogical evidence that the animal acts on the strength of some psychical activity, such as is implied in a mental image or in a surge of emotion. In many cases there is analogical evidence of a *perceptual* purpose. Biologists of the field-naturalist type are almost never behaviourists, and while they are notoriously "tender-minded," one cannot ignore the argument that if Man is the only organism in whose behaviour mind counts, then he is an almost incredible intellectual Melchizedek. Some have denied that mind is a *vera causa* in organic evolution, and others have claimed it as the essential driving force in all evolutionary change. A middle position is defensible, that while there is a physiological driving force in organisms, alike in their everyday endeavour and in their age-long evolution, there is many an occasion when they are body-*Minds*, rather than mind-*Bodies*.

§ 9. BODY-*MIND* AND

It is impossible, so far as we can see, to evade the question of the relation of "Mind" and "Body," if it be a relation. But the biologist is inclined to regard it as a limiting problem for human intelligence as it is at present. He is not any longer prone to talk nonsense about mind being fabricated by matter; he would rather say that mind emerges from a fraction of reality—say a primitive Protist—in which mind was already in some form implicit. What he sees to be true in individual development, where mind has its epiphany in the course of the differentiation and integration of the young organism, he holds to be true of racial evolution. After all, Newton developed from a minute egg-cell, and yet colloidal matter cannot account for consciousness. The biologist cannot get away from the Aristotelian wisdom, that there is nothing in the end which was not present *in kind* in the beginning.

What appears clear to the biologist is the reality of the two aspects—mental and metabolic, psychical and protoplasmic, subjective and objective. The organism he studies seems at times chiefly mind-*Body* and at other times chiefly body-*Mind*. Yet how closely are the two aspects inter-related. Digestion seems referable to biosis, yet how much it may be improved by good news; reflection seems referable to psychosis, yet how much it may be hindered by dyspepsia. Of the close interdependence there is no doubt, and yet who does not know of what looks like the emancipation of the Psyche from the trammels of protoplasm. There are equally wise and competent biologists on the dualistic and monistic sides. It is true enough to say that "body" and "mind" are both scientific abstractions; that holds for all science. But here we study a nervous system with all its intricate metabolism, and there we study the inner life of thought, feeling, and purpose; both are real, how are we to think of them together? It seems at present almost like a temperamental dichotomy that separates those who picture the mind as a musician playing on his instrument from those who see mental activity and nervous metabolism as two aspects of the life of one reality, the organism. When shall the biologist be taught by the philosopher how to ask his question aright?

§ 10. THE HERESY OF PANPSYCHISM.

One of the oldest, and, according to some, most disreputable, of metaphysical speculations is panpsychism. It is the theory that there is nothing strictly *inanimate*. It may be that all the objects of our experience have two aspects, meta-kinetic as well as kinetic, mental as well as material, psychical as well as physical. To many it will seem preposterous to revive this old view. Yet we venture to submit four considerations.

(1) It must be noted that "matter" and "mind" are both abstract aspects of reality. Matter is a fish that is caught in a net whose meshes are specially adjusted to let mind slip through. (2) There is a long inclined plane in the expression

of mind in the realm of organisms. How gradual the dawn ! (3) There is another very gradual plane of expression in individual development. In Man how imperceptible—like the opening of a flower—is the emergence of mind from unrecognizable implicitness. (4) Moreover, if living organisms evolved from the not-living, then there must have been in the not-living the promise and potency of mind as well as of life. The statement that all came from the electrons and protons that made up the primitive nebula, must be supplemented by the older doctrine : “ In the beginning was Mind.”

If it be said that the modern cosmographer has no more need for “ mind ” in his account of the genesis of the earth than Laplace had for God in his nebular hypothesis, the answer must be that as long as one keeps to the physical world the Energy-Matter concepts suffice, but that one cannot get “ mind ” out of the nebula unless its primordium was already there. It may be noted in passing that when Laplace answered Napoleon’s question about the work of God in his *Celestial Mechanics*, by saying, “ Sire, I have no need of that hypothesis,” he was neither atheistic nor flippant. He was merely pointing out with perfect clearness that the scientific investigator should never try to speak two languages at once. There is only confusion when we mix up empirical descriptive formulæ in terms of lowest common denominators with transcendental interpretative formulæ in terms of the greatest common measure.

According to the suggestion of immanent psychism there is throughout all creation a meta-kinetic aspect, the analogue of mind in man and in all the more effective animals. This has not, of course, anything in particular to do with the religious vision of a Spiritual Order, or with the religious belief that behind all there is the Will of God, a Divine Thought, perhaps a Divine Imagining—a grand conception which has sometimes suffered from the anthropomorphic corollary that the Creator may occasionally have to underpin the electrons and protons, or other works of His hands.

It may be said that there is not much trace of mental or meta-kinetic activity in plants. Yet we may think of these as

remaining in the mental slumber of germ-cells and embryos, and of vegetative animals like zoophytes and corals. It may be that the extraordinary beauty of flowers and corals is an expression of their dreaming mentality. Perhaps the beauty of crystals and precious stones is also an expression of their meta-kinetic aspect? But the reader is not likely to be a believer in the objectivity of beauty!

§ II. ORGANIC EVOLUTION.

It is generally believed that the solar system arose from an immense diffuse nebula. If life and mind came out of it, there must have been more in it than "met the eye." It cannot have been that hoary myth called "a fortuitous concourse of atoms."

After countless ages of whirling round alone, the sun, condensed as the centre of the nebula, came under the influence of another and a greater star, which appeared in the vicinity, if one can speak of vicinity. The attractive influence of this passing stranger—somewhat nebulously known, we fear—had a very serious effect on the sun. From opposite sides there were drawn out the arms of an enormous spiral nebula, as if by a colossal double tide. On the great arms there were formed knots or nuclei which became the earth and the other planets. In some such way the solar system arose, and has continued as a unity on its inconceivable journey towards "the apex of the sun's way." In this journeying through space, at the rate of some twelve miles per second, it has possibly passed at diverse times into new cosmic environments—cosmic clouds consisting of widely extended diffuse matter in space. Such transits might have very interesting effects on the solar system and on the earth.

In any case, from being gaseous the earth became liquid, and then began to solidify from the crust inwards. The experts tell us that the consolidation of the earth must have occurred at least a thousand millions of years ago. With the cooling of the crust, the formation of an atmosphere and a hydrosphere

became possible, and with the establishment of a meteorological cycle and the beginning of weathering the cradle of life was ready. Henderson's *Order of Nature* (1917) and *The Fitness of the Environment* (1913) give a luminous account of the convergence of conditions which made the life of organisms possible. There was a friendly conspiracy, which in man's preparations we should call well-thought-out. But "preparation" is not a scientific idea; all that we know scientifically is that the physico-chemical pre-conditions were very suitable for the rise and progress of life. Was it nothing more than analogous to big rivers favouring the growth of great cities?

Whether from the enchanted dust of the earth, or by some beneficent bolt from the blue (possibly in passing through a cosmic cloud), living organisms appeared upon the earth, and they have continued evolving for many hundreds of millions of years. What are the great impressions that rise in the mind when we try to envisage the sublime Becoming?

(1) We cannot shut our eyes to the wealth of resources, as though Nature were an artist strewing the studio with beautiful sketches. There are 25,000 named and known species of backboned animals, 250,000 named and known species of back-boneless animals, and each an individuality—itself and no other. (2) We are often prone to take organic evolution too prosaically, not realizing vividly enough its sequence of victories. What a stride there was from the unicellular or non-cellular phase of being to organisms with a body! What acquisitions are represented by the words—brain, blood, eye, hand! What advances are suggested by the adjectives "warm-blooded" and "viviparous"! How persistent the perfecting of integration along various lines—nervous, vascular, hormonal, and psychical! (3) Every organism is a bundle of fitnesses, and though the old particulate Argument from Design has disappeared before a reasonable account of how adaptations have been wrought out in the course of ages of varying and sifting, we are left with the broad fact that living creatures are so adaptable. (4) We see the hosts of life conquering every possible kingdom, from sea

to land, from earth to air, and insurgently claiming every niche of opportunity. The successive colonizations of the dry land—notably by worms, by air-breathing Arthropods, and by Amphibians, are stories eloquent of persistent endeavour and of great issues. Thus we see how the worm invasion led on to soil-making, the Arthropod invasion to the most important linkage in the world, that between flowers and their insect-visitors, and the Amphibian invasion to Reptiles, whence sprang the higher life of Birds and Mammals. (5) We picture the changes of the world-stage in the successive geological periods, and how these involved new motives in the drama and new pitfalls as well. For there has been an evolution of sieves as well as of material to be sifted. (6) We see the establishment of new inter-relations, increasingly subtle and widespread, so that nothing lives or dies to itself, and a web of life is woven. This external system of linkages plays an important part in sifting the nuances of variation, those that lisp “Sibboleth” are eliminated and those that say “Shibboleth” survive. In the external system of linkages there is, as in the inter-relations of human society, one of the guarantees of lasting advance, for retrogression is more difficult when diverse vital interests are involved. And the more systematization, the less there is of fortuitousness.

(7) The term Progress is no doubt bound up with man’s ideals, but there is something analogous to it in organic evolution—something that must be called the advancement of life. There have been blind alleys, wanderings in a circle, and actual retrogressions, but the large fact is something like progress. For unthinkable millions of years there were only backboneless animals; in the Silurian there appeared the first fish-like creatures; in the Devonian the first Amphibians—the first Vertebrates with fingers and toes, movable tongue, true ventral lungs, and vocal cords breaking the silence of Nature. For many ages Reptiles were the crown of creation; long afterwards there came Birds and Mammals. This is the broad fact of the ascent of life, and it meant more than increase in differentiation. It meant the appearance of finer forms of life, to a greater degree

masters of their fate. Organic evolution is characteristically integrative.

Perhaps we do not make enough of the fact that the phylogeny of animals discloses a growing dominance of the mental aspect—of intelligence and feeling. Organic evolution is an evolution of individualities—of what we might almost call personalities, if it were not better to keep that word for man.

A very important idea is that of the repercussion of evolving mind on evolving body. When the animal mind began to come to its own, it had in the individual lifetime a development which was in part, most thinkers will allow, considerably different from the development of the body. This is conspicuously the case with man. But as the animal mind developed it must have enriched its body and made it in some measure new. We are not thinking of the possible entailment of mental modifications, but simply of the repercussion of individual mind on individual body which made it possible for the organism to play more effectively its "hand" of hereditary cards. This is one of the ways in which mind may have worked as a *vera causa* not only in individual development but also in racial evolution. No doubt organic evolution has meant a shuffling of the chromosomes, with endless permutations and combinations of their "genes" or hereditary "factors," but this must be supplemented by a recognition of psycho-biosis. The shuffling of the hereditary cards is a useful metaphor in its way, but it does not do justice to the creativeness that is characteristic of evolving organisms. Mendel must be supplemented by Bergson.

In our ætiology we do not seem to have got far beyond the central Darwinian idea of the sifting and segregating of variations that crop up. But we know a little more in regard to the nature and origin of the variations that form the raw materials of evolution, and in regard to the conditions of their hereditary entailment. Noteworthy is the degree in which the fortuitous has shrivelled in biology. Variations are often definite and congruent with the past; the random is rare. Variations often look like experiments in self-expression on the part of the implicit organisms, the germ-cells. What they, the blind artists, turn

out, the explicit organisms have to test. Selection is often in relation to significant sieves in the web of life. The formula "struggle for existence" covers all the thrusts and parries that organisms make against environing limitations and difficulties, and must include, as Darwin said, the soft-lining of the nest as well as the sharpening of teeth and claws. Indeed, the struggle for existence is often an endeavour after well-being. It is bad biology to think of the struggling organisms as necessarily like fishes in a net; they often share in their own evolution, selecting their environment, for instance, as well as being selected by it.

Darwin made it quite clear that he meant by "the struggle for existence" not merely the jostling and elbowing around the platter of subsistence, but equally the endeavours that birds make to save their young ones in a cold summer or against the glare of an unusually strong sun. He meant not only the inveterate antagonism between the grass-eating herds and the carnivores hungry for warm flesh, between the small rodents and the birds of prey; he thought also of non-competitive endeavours which animals make to cope with drought and cold. He included not only the cannibalism in the cradle which is seen in the egg-capsules of the whelk, when the pioneers devour the laggards; he thought also of the mutual aid so deeply engrained among ants. He included not only the starving locust eating its neighbour and the fierce combats among rats in despair; he thought also of the mutual aid of gregarious and social animals and of the many other forms of co-operation in *Animate Nature*. His wide naturalist's experience made him not only clear in regard to the doom of the unlit lamp and the ungirt loin, but appreciative of the time and energy that animals expend in other-regarding activities which secure the safety and welfare of the offspring. More clearly than anyone since, Darwin realized that the descriptive formula "the struggle for existence" is to be used in "a large and metaphorical sense," that it includes endeavours to give the family a good send-off in life as well as internecine competition for food and foothold.

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No doubt there have been relapses from Darwin's shrewdness. There has often been too much red used in painting the picture, as when Huxley spoke of Nature as "a vast gladiatorial show" and "a dismal cockpit." Yet on the whole it is becoming clear that the Struggle for Existence is a formula for all the manifold efforts and answers-back that living creatures make against environing difficulties and limitations. It includes all the reactions which secure the welfare of self and kin. It is co-operative as well as competitive; and mutual aid often pays better than whetting teeth and sharpening claws. But many writers prefer to turn away from Nature itself to faded second-rate pictures, which were often obviously sociomorphic to begin with.

Biologists remain in thick mist as regards most of the "big lifts" in organic evolution. The formulæ of "mutation," "heredity," "selection," "isolation," and the like can, no doubt, be applied, but they do not as yet scatter the clouds. This is not surprising, since ætiology is still very young. Lloyd Morgan has done good service in frankly admitting that we cannot at present analyse these "creative syntheses" or "emergences." Just as the chemist cannot at present make clear how the combination of oxygen gas and hydrogen gas in certain conditions should result in such an extraordinary novelty as water, so it is, and more so, with the biologist at many a turn. The resultant is bigger than its components *seem* to account for. The mechanical comparisons do not fit. Progressive differentiations and integrations allow some new aspect of reality to express itself, as when birds evolved from reptiles, or when the brain of the higher mammals was fashioned, or when Homo emerged from among tentative men.

It often looks as if Nature were Nature for a purpose. In many ways, from the first, inorganic Nature has been extraordinarily "friendly" to organisms; broad organic foundations make lofty superstructures possible; there is a remarkable conservation of great gains; the whole of animate evolution reads like a commentary on the precept: test all things and hold fast that which is good. We admit the retrogressions of

parasites and sedentary animals ; but these are by-ways. They should not blind us to persistent evolutionary trends—towards a *Systema Naturæ*, towards the growth of intelligence and fine feeling, towards increased control, towards lives that are increasingly satisfactions in themselves, as we see when we compare birds with worms. But a purpose cannot reside in a system like Nature, it must be predicated of an Author ; and it must be thought of as transcending a purpose like ours—central reality as that is to us—much more than ours transcends the perceptual purpose of a clever creature, or the instinctive purposiveness of a hive-bee that is hardly so ingenious as it looks.

One does not seek to base any religious conclusion on biological data, but it is suggested that the facts in regard to Animate Nature are not incongruent with its religious intpretation as the expression of a Divine thought. No doubt there are discords and disharmonies—poignantly disclosed by John Stuart Mill, Huxley, and James ; but perhaps Lotze was nearer the truth in hearing “an onward advancing melody.” Perhaps the philosophers are sometimes open to the reproach of dealing with worn clichés of Nature, instead of with the facts themselves.

Man’s ideal of progress includes the two pre-conditions of health and wealth. But Animate Nature is all for health ; apart from man and parasites, disease is almost unknown in wild life. And Animate Nature also favours that mastery of energies—a food-store at its simplest—which allows of a certain freedom of action and conquest of vicissitudes. Beavers are in real sense wealthy.

But besides the (more or less partial) fulfilment of the pre-conditions of health and wealth, man’s ideal of progress means a balanced all-round movement towards a fuller realization of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. It is surely not far-fetched to point out that in the ascent that man has behind him there are great evolutionary trends towards these highest values. Animate Nature is all for beauty, and the exceptions prove the rule. Rewards go to clear-minded animals that face

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the facts and master them. The supreme rewards in the Animal Kingdom go to good parents, good lovers, good kin—the self-forged and the self-subordinating. To speak metaphorically, Nature crowns the raw materials of morality, and the momentum of evolution is not against man's best endeavours, but in line with them. Part of that momentum is literally operative within us, and why should evolution cease ?

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OUTLINE OF A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

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BIOGRAPHICAL

I WAS born in London in 1865, the youngest child of my parents, separated by some years from the nearest in age to me of my elder brothers and sisters. My father was a well-known London clergyman, who had been among the pioneers of the 'ecclesiological' revival of the 'forties, and the intimate friend at college of the hymn-writer, John Mason Neale. The life of the home in which I was brought up was inspired by the ideals of the Tractarian Movement, but of that movement as transplanted to Cambridge, of which University my father was a graduate and my mother's father had been a professor. My elder brothers were, however, at Christ Church, Oxford, to which (like myself later on) they had proceeded with close scholarships from Westminster School. The religion of my parents combined with a somewhat rigid ecclesiastical theory and with the high standard of morality and duty characteristic of English clerical households a love of beauty and culture which was quite remote alike from Puritan suspicion and from utilitarian contempt of these aspects of life. The requirement or even the approval of such an experience as is called 'conversion' in young people who were already Christian and had not wandered altogether away from the ways of right living had no place in their scheme of piety. It was the more unexpected that, though I had never come under 'Evangelical' influences, either at home or at school (where there was nothing in the 'Broad Church' atmosphere of Dean Stanley's Westminster to suggest the thought of such a spiritual crisis) or at Christ Church in my first year there, I passed, while a freshman, through an experience of this kind, which was a turning-point in my spiritual history. I shall here confine myself to its effects on my intellectual life. It found me sceptical after a youthful fashion, yet with a no less boyish pose of contempt for such heterodoxy as I found current among my contemporaries and a boyish pride in my knowingness about things religious; it left me with a profound conviction of the reality of God and of the duty of open-mindedness and intellectual honesty; a belief that it was the first of religious duties to keep one's ears open to any voice, from

whatever quarter, which might convey a message from God; a delightful sense of expectation of strange and wonderful things, though it might be stern and severe things, that any such voice might have to tell me. The influence of one to whom I, in common with many young men of my generation at Oxford, owed much in the way of help and encouragement in the spiritual life, Mr. (now Bishop) Charles Gore, told in the same direction; for, although a man already with strong and definite views of his own, he was of the very opposite temper to that which 'compasses sea and land to make a proselyte,' and always showed the most delicate and sympathetic respect for the right to intellectual and spiritual freedom of those with whom he had to do.

It was in this mood that I came, in 1886, to the study of philosophy for the School of *Literæ Humaniores*. I had, indeed, from early boyhood been of a speculative turn of mind. I remember well how, when quite a little child, the thought 'I—what do I mean by I?'—came upon me with the effect of a sudden and, for the moment, overwhelming shock. I was, long before I began to study philosophy as part of my prescribed work, familiar with the sense of loneliness in an infinite universe—the chapter on the 'Everlasting No' in Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus* appealed to me very strongly—and with depression due to the contemplation of life, not as 'a many-coloured dome of glass,' but as tinged with the greyness, the 'pale cast of thought,' so often thrown over it by metaphysical reflection upon a Reality which includes all and rejects nothing, and dwarfs into insignificance the myriad processes of change and development which begin, continue, and end within itself. When in such moods, history becomes to me a 'tale full of sound and fury, signifying nothing,' but my liability to them has been balanced, in respect of my interest in the past and its connection with the present, by a strong sense of the *continuity of history*, which was early aroused in me by Freeman's *Sketch of European History* and encouraged by Stanley's *Westminster Abbey*, and has been fostered by the opportunities of a life almost entirely spent, first at Westminster and then at Oxford, in the enjoyment of the corporate life of societies which, in their traditions and customs, handed on from generation to generation amid the same venerable surroundings, bring home this continuity, in a way hardly to be paralleled elsewhere, to the affections and imaginations of their members.

In my undergraduate days at Oxford the influence of Green, whose death had taken place only a few years previously, and whose posthumous *Prolegomena to Ethics* had just been published, was at its height, and for my own generation of Oxford men the

starting-point of our various philosophical developments is usually to be sought in the idealistic criticism of Mill and Herbert Spencer for which Green stood. This is true for the 'realists,' 'personal idealists,' and 'pragmatists' among us (if these nicknames may be used for the nonce), as well as for those who may seem to be more closely affiliated to Green's own type of philosophy.

The *Prolegomena to Ethics*, however, though I owed it much, was not the philosophical book which most influenced me during my undergraduate days; but a translation of Kant's *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten* (I did not read German till much later, and still do not read it with ease). The presentation herein of Morality as a 'categorical imperative' made an extraordinary impression upon me, reviving and reinforcing the sentiments of my 'conversion' of two years before, and leaving ineffaceable traces on all my subsequent thought. Moreover, my mind was, like that of all who are trained in the traditional Oxford course, being continually moulded by the intensive study of Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Ethics*, which is, as is well known, the characteristic feature of the old 'Greats' school.

I was so fortunate, during this period, as to come under the instruction of very eminent teachers. My initiation into regular philosophical studies I owed to Mr. (now Professor) J. A. Stewart; and on his leaving Oxford, while I was still but a beginner, for what the Americans call a 'sabbatical year,' his place as philosophical tutor at Christ Church was filled for the remainder of my time by Mr. (afterwards Professor) Cook Wilson, then Fellow and Tutor of Oriel College, a great teacher and a great thinker, whose decision not to publish anything until he could put the results of his philosophical investigations before the public in a form satisfactory to himself has unfortunately deprived it (owing to his death in 1915) of the advantage of being able to study as it deserved one of the most original and thorough pieces of thinking on logic and metaphysics that his generation had to contribute to the common stock.

From Wilson his pupils learned to look on philosophical questions not as opportunities for the display of cleverness or of literary elegance or for indulgence in vague enthusiasm, but rather as problems to be solved by a patient effort to think out what was implied in the experiences (often of the most everyday kind) which had suggested the questions. They learned also to distrust conventional terms and phrases, however sanctioned by general use or by the authority of great writers; one should always ask oneself precisely what one meant by them, and prefer, where possible, to express what one had to say in common and untech-

nical language. They were taught to think for themselves, not to repeat the thoughts of their tutor ; which, indeed, he was in no particular hurry to impart to them. In his approach to the 'realism' of his later years he departed, as Mr. Prichard has said, from the idealism which Green had made current in the generation of teachers to which Wilson belonged, 'with extreme hesitation and without emphasis'; and in the eighties most of us, I think, had very little suspicion in what direction his mind was moving. Although he in no sense neglected moral philosophy, or underrated its importance, he never claimed to have a gospel to preach ; yet the nobility of his character, his strict sense of duty, his frank admiration of all that was honest, just, pure, lovely and of good report, could not escape the observation of those who were often in his company. I did not cease to be his pupil when I took my degree, but remained in close touch with him down to the time of his death, to my very great advantage ; although my congenital incompetence in matters of mathematical and physical science, such as constantly occupied his attention, rendered me incapable of profiting by much that was most important and characteristic in his teaching.

It is a privilege for which Oxford teachers of philosophy cannot be too grateful that they have abundant opportunities of mutual criticism and interchange of thought in the society of a more considerable number of colleagues occupied in philosophical studies than could easily be found elsewhere. Of the group in whose company I have chiefly enjoyed this privilege—a group in which a great variety of opinion and interest has been represented—Cook Wilson was, while he lived, the centre. If I name three others, to whose discussion of philosophical problems I feel myself especially indebted—Professor J. A. Smith, Mr. H. W. B. Joseph, Mr. H. A. Prichard—it is not because they are by any means the only friends and colleagues from whom I have learned much. Looking back over nearly forty years of Oxford life, and noting the fluctuations of thought, the influence of individual thinkers or of schools, both within and without the University, upon the current of intellectual life among us, one perceives that there is material before one for an interesting chapter in the history of ideas ; but this is not the occasion for attempting to write it.

My own attention has of late been chiefly concentrated on the Philosophy of Religion, on which I have lectured for many years, and which now that, after thirty-three years' work at Magdalen College, I have ceased to be a college tutor and have been appointed to a chair founded by the munificence of Dr. Charles Nolloth for the advancement of this subject, has become my sole professional occu-

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pation. With the Philosophy of Religion, the mediæval studies which have served me as a recreative change of work during a good part of my life at Oxford, and have interested me as illustrating a topic always especially attractive to me, the history of ideas, can without difficulty be brought into connexion. To my preoccupation with this my chosen *Fach* I owed a privilege which I cannot end these notes without mentioning; the friendship, which I for many years enjoyed, of a distinguished man, a master in the spiritual life, whose religious genius, wide and various learning, and thorough philosophical culture made his friendship one of singular value to a student of the Philosophy of Religion, the late Baron Friedrich von Hügel.

My second series of Gifford Lectures was dedicated to a friend, without the mention of whose name I should have been silent concerning the personal influence whose effect upon my intellectual and religious life has been more continuous and powerful than that of any other. With Mr. C. J. Shebbeare—now the worthy successor of Bishop Butler in the rectory where the *Analogy* was written—I have from boyhood shared all my thoughts upon the problems of philosophy and theology. Our minds are cast in very different moulds; our opinions even on some questions of great importance are not coincident; but so close and intimate has been our intercourse that I owe scarcely less to him in respect to those matters on which we differ than in respect to those on which we agree; and it would be quite beyond my powers to attempt a detailed estimate of my debt, which is in any case greater than that for which I am under obligations to any other single person.

OUTLINE OF A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

IT is with very great hesitation that I respond to the Editor's invitation to give an account of my own philosophy, and that for two reasons. In the first place I am profoundly conscious that those convictions and opinions which I am in the habit of expressing in the course of my professional duties as a teacher, and which I have from time to time expressed also in print, are very far from forming a body of doctrine capable of systematic treatment, and that this is because they are held by myself tentatively, doubtfully, with a constantly present sense of dissatisfaction in the background, and under the threat of a complete intellectual revolution, the temptation to precipitate which is seldom long absent from my mind. In the second place I know that about many philosophical problems of the highest importance I have nothing to say, and that, in respect of them, I have either acquiesced in my own incompetence or disinclination to discuss them, or confined myself to noting rather than thoroughly studying and criticizing the views of others; at most to observing the place of such views in the history of thought and their affinities to other positions which have been adopted on these or kindred subjects.

I suppose that most philosophers are set upon their inquiries by a special interest in some one or other department of experience; some are thus interested in nature, some in art, some in history, some in conduct, some in religion; and with me it is certainly religion that has supplied me with my primary motive in philosophizing. The obvious danger which anyone in this case runs of making his philosophy a mere *ancilla theologiæ* and becoming an 'apologist' is perhaps to some extent counteracted by its very obviousness; and,

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whether I have escaped it or not, I have never ceased to be on my guard against it ; and I can honestly say that nothing is to me more unlovely, when detected, than apologetic masquerading as philosophy. On the other hand I have frankly allowed problems of a kind with which my experience has made me familiar, and for the study of which I believe myself to have the advantage which is given by temperamental sympathy with the states of mind to which they present themselves, to engross most of my attention, to the comparative neglect of others, which a good many years of teaching and discussion have taught me that I do not readily understand or greatly care about ; for example, those concerned with logical method and those relating to the nature of perception.

I accept the general results of the Kantian criticism, so far as it shows the impossibility of remaining content with the supposition that the world of our experience and of our science is revealed merely through sensation ; and the fact that the existence of natural science itself, as of any other kind of knowledge, is inexplicable if the methods which it uses in the investigation of objects are taken to be sufficient for the explanation of the whole of our experience, appears to me a sufficient refutation of what is called Naturalism. But, however successful in demonstrating the untenableness of an empiricism which treats the mind as merely passive and derives our ultimate principles of synthesis from the sensations which they synthesize, no criticism, as it seems to me, can, without self-contradiction, attempt to postpone knowledge to an inquiry into the nature of knowledge—a course at least as impracticable as the refusal to go into the water until one knows how to swim ; for the first principles of knowledge must be assumed in this as in any other inquiry, and without them one could not stir a step in it. That an *absolute* standard, not external but immanent, is implied in the very notion of truth, and in the fact that we can detect and correct error, appears to me to be beyond all question ; and, on this account, I cannot but reject altogether any doctrine of the relativity of knowledge which ignores this, and any system which, like Pragma-

tism, demands an external criterion of truth. I do not attempt here to elaborate the reasons which in my judgment establish this position ; they have been often expounded far better than I could expound them ; and the position itself is, unless I am greatly mistaken, substantially that of the majority of the great philosophers from Plato and Aristotle downwards.

This implies that the world which we know is rational ; and, on the same principle upon which we assume, as a postulate of our scientific inquiries, that for the fact whereof we can give no rational account there is notwithstanding a reason which would satisfy our intelligence if discovered, even though *we* have not the means of discovering it, a frank acceptance of our æsthetic, moral and religious experience as genuine experience and not illusion, would seem to involve a recognition of Beauty, of Goodness, and of Divinity as realities, the apprehension of which is involved in our dissatisfaction with what falls short of them, and which are progressively found to reveal themselves even where our first inspection finds them most obviously lacking. We may think of the history of art, with its ever-renewed discovery of the possibility of finding beauty where it seemed least promising to look for it—of the ‘soul of goodness in things evil’ to be perceived, ‘would men observingly distil it out’—of the revelation of God in what appears most God-forsaken, which for Christians is symbolized by the acceptance of the crucified Jesus as the Son of God.

The pursuit of such a line of thought, however, does of course presuppose, as I said above, the frank acceptance of our æsthetic, moral, and religious experience as genuine experience of a reality as independent of our minds as is the world revealed to us by the senses and interpreted by the natural sciences. And this is no easy matter. For there can, in the nature of the case, be no final answer to the suggestion that we have in these kinds of so-called experience a subjective illusion. A rejoinder that there is no final answer either to the suggestion that we have no more than this in our experience of the physical world is indeed possible, and cannot be rebutted ; but it is, I think, unquestionable that while this

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latter suggestion (to borrow Hume's remark about the arguments of Berkeley) may indeed admit of no answer, but also in the great majority of men produces no conviction, similar doubts about our æsthetic, moral, and religious experience are found to recur again and again even to the minds of those habituated to the contemplation and study of the objects with which they are concerned. It is true that, however disturbing this constant recurrence of doubt and misgiving may be to their peace of mind, such persons find no difficulty in assigning an explanation for it in the very nature of such experience, the distinctive character of which it is to require, at least for its maintenance in being, an exercise of voluntary adhesion to the object compared wherewith the subconscious synthesis or the act of attention which may be allowed to be requisite to the achievement even of an experience of sensible objects might be called involuntary. This is most obvious in the case of moral experience; but it is true also of æsthetic and religious experience, even where these take the form of Wordsworth's 'wise passiveness' or of the quietist's 'waiting upon God. But while the part necessarily played by the will in these departments of spiritual life accounts for the comparative instability of our sense of their reality, acquiescence in the belief that they are purely subjective and illusory cannot be reconciled with that unescapable consciousness of moral obligation, of a categorical imperative, upon the true character of which it is the immortal merit of Kant to have insisted more decisively and impressively than any other philosopher. It is no doubt true that Kant himself did not allow to our consciousness of beauty or to our consciousness of God the same self-accrediting authority and unquestionable validity that he accorded to our consciousness of the moral law written in our hearts. But, even if we do not go beyond his own position in respect of these, the admission of the claim on behalf of morality alone is sufficient to overthrow the naturalistic position which is assumed when our consciousness of physical objects is taken to reveal a reality independent of ourselves in a sense in which no other part of our experience can pretend

to do so. And to those who have once understood and admitted Kant's claim on behalf of Morality the final abandonment of belief in its justice will be not less difficult than it would be for all men consistently to indulge in scepticism respecting the existence of a physical world independent of our individual minds. We may recall the sagacious observation of Hume that "sceptical doubt, both with respect to reason and the senses, is a malady which can never be radically cured, but must return upon us every moment, however we may chase it away and sometimes may seem entirely free from it." "Carelessness and inattention," he goes on, "alone can afford us any remedy. For this reason I rely entirely upon them, and take it for granted, whatever be the reader's opinion at this present moment, that an hour hence he will be persuaded there is both an external and an internal world." The 'carelessness and inattention' which Hume recommends to us as the only cure for the malady of scepticism with respect to the senses and to that kind of use of reason of which he is here thinking, will not indeed cure the like malady of scepticism with regard to Goodness, to Beauty and to God; but that is because it is as much the nature of these to reveal themselves only to a conscious and personal interest as it is that of physical objects to obtrude themselves upon our attention, a failure of which in regard to them would indeed imperil the very continuance of our physical life, which is the basis and condition of our spiritual.

While Philosophy cannot, without committing suicide, abandon the quest of an ultimate unity within which may be embraced all the regions of Reality that are revealed to us in the several forms of experience already mentioned, the attempt to construe this unity in terms of any one of these forms would seem to fail. Naturalism can give no account of Morality or of Beauty that does not explain them away; but it is no less impossible to conceive how from ethical or æsthetic principles one could deduce the laws of number or of chemical combination; or again how one could be satisfied with a merely æsthetic ethic or a merely ethical æsthetic. The extremely

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abstract conception of Order can only be invoked with any hope of finding in it the supreme principle whereof Philosophy is in search if we forget that every department is ordered according to principles of its own with which no consideration of Order in general could have made us acquainted. It is possible, perhaps, to recognize in Plato's conception of the Form or Idea of the Good (remembering that 'Good' in this phrase means something much wider than '*morally* Good') the most suggestive attempt ever made to deal with the problem now before us. We should, I think, mean something by saying that the universe would be the '*worse* for being ordered, like a fairy tale, on principles of 'poetic justice'—that it is the better for including within itself the system of natural law with all its rigid determinism; that it is in the same sort of way *better* with the presence within it of moral struggle and heroic effort, or again of beauty and the endeavour to achieve it, than it would be if these were absent; and that thus Goodness, in the wide sense which Plato seems to give to the word, alone has the character which we require in the supreme principle of existence; it is not, like 'Being' or 'Order,' a mere abstraction from kinds of 'Being' and of 'Order,' whose intrinsic differences are not covered by it; nor does it belong itself to one of the great departments of experience, the disparateness of which gives rise to the very problem which is vexing us. Moreover, as Plato himself has observed, it belongs to the conception of Goodness that it requires the actuality of whatever falls under it. "He was good," he says in a famous passage of the *Timæus*, speaking in mythical fashion of a Creator of the world, "and therefore he grudged existence to nothing."

In thus attaching myself to Plato I am not unconscious of a very important difference between ancient and modern philosophy in regard to their respective theories of knowledge; a difference which must make it impossible—even were we disposed, with not a few of our contemporaries and with my own teacher, the late Professor Cook Wilson, to favour a certain reversion to the ancient position—to treat this last as though

it had not undergone the criticism to which it has been submitted by the great thinkers of the last three centuries.

Ancient philosophy takes, on the whole, what may be called the common-sense view of the relation in which the object of knowledge stands to its subject. Whether 'knowledge' be used to render the French *savoir* and the German *wissen* or the French *connaître* and the German *kennen*, whether we speak of knowing the fact that something is thus or thus, or of knowing the person or thing with which we are acquainted, we commonly imply that the fact or the person or the thing in question exists independently, not indeed necessarily of us or of our will in every sense—the fact may be due to our action, or the thing may be produced by ourselves—but independently of the act of ours or the process in us whereby it is known.

But we cannot say with the same assurance that this is generally the view of modern philosophy, which begins with Descartes' doctrine that the inexpugnable bed-rock of all certainty is the knower's knowledge of himself: *Cogito ergo sum*. For common sense, and on the whole for ancient philosophy also, just because it is taken for granted that the object of knowledge is independent of the act whereby it is known, the typical object is something unquestionably distinct from the knower or subject; and, although no doubt the object may sometimes be the subject's own self, this at once suggests that we have to do with something paradoxical and difficult to describe, since the independence upon the subject which is taken to be characteristic of the object seems to contradict its identity with it in this particular case. On the other hand, if, as by Descartes, the knowledge of one's own existence is taken to be the fundamental and typical knowledge, the difficulty appears to lie rather in understanding how one can know what is *not* oneself, and it seems to be less obviously true than from the other point of view it seemed to be, that the object cannot be brought into being by the act in which it is known, but must be presupposed to exist in order to be subsequently or at least simultaneously known. For plainly

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the act of thinking, the *cogitatio*, which, according to Descartes, is the primary and fundamental object, the apprehension of which is beyond all question knowledge, is actually the very self which is knowing, and not something in the self other than its present knowledge; since the *Cogito ergo sum* does not really guarantee the existence of anything in the self other than just this present act of thinking.

Now it is remarkable that both the ancient realism and the modern idealism, as we may call it, of which Descartes is the pioneer, find themselves hindered in carrying out their principles to the full by considerations which have their source in religious experience. It was (as we may trace in the history of the word 'idea' itself) by way of the problem of *divine* knowledge, which cannot be conceived of as waiting upon an independent object, that the doctrine of a mind creative of its object, a doctrine contradicting the realistic principle, arose in the bosom of the ancient philosophy. And, on the other hand, the most serious objection which has to be encountered by the identification of the human with the divine mind, which, although not intended by Descartes, was the inevitable outcome of the way of thinking inaugurated by him (and which is avowed in perhaps its most nakedly irreligious form by Croce in our own day, with his utter rejection of any God but the *Deus in nobis et nos*) lies in its ultimate incompatibility with the characteristically religious attitude of *worship*.

It is no doubt from a secret anticipation of this tendency, implicit in idealism, to work itself out into a denial of all such transcendence of the human spirit by the divine as will justify religious worship, that the Roman Catholic Church has clung so persistently to the Scholasticism which, remaining faithful to the ancient tradition, has constantly asserted the independence of the object of knowledge upon the act whereby it is known; and has even abandoned the Augustinian language, common in the earlier Middle Ages, which described the mind as even in natural knowledge illuminated by the Divine Word, and has condemned as theological error, under the name of Ontologism, a doctrine in holding which the great Catholic

Cartesian Malebranche believed himself to be a follower of Augustine and of the author of the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel.

But, if religious experience calls a halt to a tendency which, unchecked, would leave *worship* without an object or a rational ground, it is also impossible to admit that its demands upon philosophy are fully met by the affirmation of a God who, being only a part of the whole of reality, can be described as finite; and who, like all that is finite, must be transcended and transmuted in the Absolute. About the problem involved in the questions: Is God the Absolute? Is the Absolute God? my thoughts continually revolve, but I could not honestly say that I am satisfied with any suggestions that I can offer towards its solution. This problem is intimately intertwined, if it is not ultimately the same, with the yet more familiar difficulty of the compatibility of God's omniscience and sovereignty with man's freedom and initiative; and both with the 'vain, interminable controversy,' as Carlyle called it, about the origin of evil. In these regions of speculation one can perhaps scarcely hope to fare much better than the fallen angels in Milton, who "found no end, in wandering mazes lost."

In the experience of philosophic thought we encounter the paradox of the Absolute, by which we mean that ultimate unity within which the antithesis of subject and object must itself fall, becoming itself the object to a subject which yet, if it be the Absolute indeed, it must include within itself. With this paradox Philosophy—that is to say such philosophy as does not reject as unnecessary this conception of the Absolute, and (as I should say) in so doing cease to be philosophy—deals by recognizing in philosophy, that is, in itself, even when appearing (and we only know it as so appearing) as the thought of a finite mind, the self-knowledge of the Absolute—or if, with Spinoza, it prefer that word, of God—and saying of itself: "I am the eye, wherewith the Universe Beholds itself and knows itself divine."

Philosophy is consciously from the first engaged in the quest of that which is truly and ultimately real; but Religion is

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concerned with this same object, yet not at first consciously. That which characterizes from the first the object of Religion is a peculiar quality, which has been called *le sacré* or *das Heilige*, and is felt rather than understood somehow to contain within it the 'nameless secret of existence,' alike of our own and of that of the things about us. When we have reached the intellectual level at which the question can be raised, Religion can accept as its adequate object nothing short of the Supreme Reality, above and beyond which there can be nothing. And so the worshipper's own diversity from the object of his worship becomes something with which he is dissatisfied, just as the philosopher cannot conceive of himself otherwise than as included within the Absolute which he contemplates. And just as the philosopher is driven to regard his own knowledge as the Absolute knowing itself in him, so the religious man is led to recognize his own worship as due to a divine activity within his soul; and this recognition culminates in Christianity, according to which, as St. Paul expresses it: "God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, Abba, Father." Of the consciousness here described the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity is the translation into terms of theology, that is, of a philosophical account of religious experience. Accordingly, Christian prayer and worship are offered to the Father in the name, that is, as it were, in the person of the Son; and in this way the religious activity comes to be envisaged, in a manner which presents a close analogy with the philosopher's recognition that in philosophy we are vehicles of the self-knowledge of the Absolute, as a participation in the divine life, in the essential process or movement whereof the worship of filial love is an intrinsic and eternal factor.

Even in the case of Philosophy the questions arise—though we may perhaps come to the conclusion that they are by us unanswerable—whether there is any knowledge that falls outside of 'finite centres' (the phrase is used by Mr. Bradley); and, whatever reply be made to this, what account can be given of the existence of many 'finite centres' as organs of the self-knowledge of the Absolute. But in regard to the

analogous questions that present themselves in the case of religious experience it is less easy to acquiesce in an 'agnostic' attitude. I am convinced that Religion cannot, in the last resort, dispense with a transcendent object of worship; and the difficulty of reconciling the 'creation' (to use the traditional term) of finite persons, who in their religious experience find themselves in the presence of a Divine Majesty, with the eternal perfection of that Divine Majesty itself, is not diminished, but rather increased by the recognition, defended above, of the 'Word' or 'Son' as an integral factor in the divine life. For then it takes the form of a problem concerning the distinction of the eternal Word from the finite persons into whose hearts his Spirit of Sonship may be sent forth. To identify him with them, or to make him one, even though the chief or 'first-born,' among them is to surrender the very advantage which the doctrine of such a factor in the Godhead seeks to secure for our theology; to distinguish him as 'Creator' from them as 'creatures' is to treat their very existence as mere superfluities.

I think that considerations which abstract from the aspects of reality revealed in our moral, æsthetic and religious experience cannot help us here; but the saying, quoted above from Plato, that the Creator, being good, grudged existence to nothing, and the Christian doctrine that God is love, alike suggest a point of view from which the existence of 'finite centres' of intelligence and will no longer appears as merely paradoxical and enigmatic.

It is a principal reason with Croce for contemptuously dismissing Theism that it sets over against the real historical process, in which alone moral discrimination has meaning and application, the phantom of a perfect Being wherein all has been from eternity actual which notwithstanding is being accomplished over again in time. But the withers of Theism are unwrung by a criticism which does but state a characteristic of religious experience already perfectly familiar to those who accept it as a genuine revelation of Reality. "The paradox, 'To be realized because real,'" so the late Mr. Bosanquet

wrote to me less than a month before his lamented death, "is not a phrase but the real power of life." It is not the teaching of history, as might perhaps be antecedently expected—as by philosophical students of religion from the outside is sometimes indeed taken for granted—that belief in the eternal reality of perfection in God tends to discourage or weaken zeal for the improvement of the world. On the contrary, it is scarcely too much to say, with Mr. Bosanquet in the letter I have quoted just above: "That you only get zeal and effective 'works'—social and historical progress—where you have religious faith" and "the fullest work where you have the deepest and highest faith."

What is the object of the faith of which we can speak thus, and what is our ultimate justification for it? It is a satisfaction to me to be able to refer here to the admirable observations of Professor Alexander in his Gifford Lectures on *Space, Time and Deity* upon the religious sentiment or emotion and its object; observations which I can accept wholeheartedly, notwithstanding my inability to follow their author in his account of the nature of deity as a quality hereafter to emerge, of which the universe is already, so to speak, in labour, but to which it has not as yet given birth. I entirely agree that, as we are "assured of other minds through the social emotion," so we are assured of God "through a different response, the religious emotion"; a specific response, as he goes on to say, provoked in us by Reality, "which makes us aware, no matter in how primitive a form, of God," and which may be described as "a going out to something in the world with which we are in communion." Especially valuable, to my mind, is the distinction which Professor Alexander draws between our religious intercourse with God and the social intercourse with which we naturally compare it. He is surely right in holding that we must not look for the same kind of response from God as that the lack of which in commerce with our fellows would convince us that we were no longer in relations with them at all. No doubt we have here a fact that constitutes one of those trials of our faith which entitle it to be

described as a 'victory.' We remember the agonized cry which the apparent silence of God wrung from Carlyle: "He *does* nothing!" Yet we cannot accept to-day the test which Elijah is said to have propounded to the priests of Baal. An 'answer by fire' would rather raise new difficulties in our minds than satisfy those which we had before. Nevertheless, though there be 'no voice, nor any that answers,' we experience the divine response "through our own feeling" (to quote Professor Alexander again) "that devotion to God or worship carries with it its own satisfaction." But it is, after all (if I may repeat words which I have already written elsewhere on this subject), no new doctrine that in our relations with God we walk by faith and not by sight; and if we cannot here separate what is divine from what is our own as we can what is our own from what is our fellow-man's, this is at bottom because it is only by and in God's drawing of us and revelation of himself to us that we can either seek or find him.

The recognition of this difference between our intercourse with God in religion and that with our fellow-men in society may seem at first sight to be inconsistent with affirming *personality* in God. And there is, indeed, a line of thought sometimes connected with this affirmation with which it is really inconsistent. It is inconsistent with regarding the relation between the personality of God and that of one of ourselves as one of mutual exclusion in the same sense as that in which the relation between two human personalities may be said to be such; and it is therefore also inconsistent with the view, which goes naturally along with so regarding it, that the essence of the doctrine of divine personality lies in the supposition that God has a private life of feeling, will and knowledge, rather than in our religious experience of an intercourse with God possessing the 'warmth and intimacy' characteristic of our intercourse with our fellow-men. But if we allow that we can attribute personality to God only provided that we do so in a sense which permits of our dwelling in him and his dwelling in us as we cannot dwell in one another; and that the doctrine of divine personality is not an inference from

metaphysical or other non-religious considerations, but the theological expression of a fact of religious experience; then we shall also allow that personality cannot be attributed to God in precisely the same way as we attribute it to a fellow-man; and that the difference between the two cases corresponds to the important difference between religious worship and social intercourse to which Professor Alexander has lately, as we saw, called our attention.

Holding, as I do, that the doctrine of personality in God, although certainly not essential to religion—since there are great religions which do not teach it—is yet (as I have attempted to show in my *God and Personality*, pp. 248-9) the expression of a legitimate development of a feature often described as 'divine transcendence,' which is essential to religion, I wish to take all the more care to point out that it seems to me to be tenable only if it be understood in a manner which does not bring it into conflict with our religious experience at its best. Thus it must not, as I have just pointed out, be so taken as to be inconsistent with the immanence of God in the human soul, or with the absence in religion of what I may call the social response, except as mediated through one which is social in the ordinary sense of the word. Neither, again, must it be so taken as to expose us to a danger which was felt so acutely by Kant that it made him unable to find room for private devotion in a rational religion. It is one of Kant's greatest services to theology that, in his *Religion innerhalb der grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, he disallowed the existence of a class of duties, in our discharge of which, as owed to himself, God should be especially interested, as our sovereign is in the performance of our political, our parents or our children in that of our filial or parental obligations. In his desire to insist upon this point, he is indeed inclined to look upon the 'warm and intimate' relation to God in our experience of which I have placed the true ground of our doctrine of divine personality, as a dangerous illusion; dangerous because it may suggest to us the possibility of getting at God, if I may so express it, behind the back of the moral

law. There was no doubt a certain temperamental deficiency in Kant himself, which prevented him from doing justice to those aspects of Religion which distinguish it from Morality, and led him to represent it as merely an expressive, though not indispensable, symbolism of moral attitudes. We may admit that it is more than this, that it is indeed a level of experience higher or (if we prefer the metaphor) deeper than the strictly ethical; yet we ought, I think, to appropriate Kant's lesson, and studiously avoid in our theology any such danger as he indicated. The 'forgiveness of sins' is indeed a religious, not (in the narrower sense) an ethical doctrine; but, though it may and must *transcend*, it must not *ignore* the law of which the sins forgiven were the transgression.

But while I consider that the doctrine of Divine Personality can be so stated as not to involve denial of God's immanence in human souls or the attribution to him of an inner life of private thoughts and interests, I do not think it can be reconciled with the assertion that *human* personality is—to use a word which was accepted by Mr. Bosanquet as expressing his own view—merely *adjectival*. I shall not attempt to enter here upon the criticism of this highly important contention, to the examination of which I have devoted the penultimate lecture (on *Absolute Idealism and the Individual*) of my Gifford course on *Divine Personality and Human Life*. I will content myself with adding to what I have said the remark that in Mr. Bosanquet's discussion of the problem in question the claims to a relative substantiality with the Absolute, alike (against political individualists) of the State and (against Croce and Gentile) of that 'nature' whereof Wordsworth and Meredith are for Englishmen the prophets, obtain a more sympathetic consideration than do those of the individual human soul.

Neither Naturalism, that is, a philosophy based on natural science alone, nor a philosophy which, starting from criticism of such a Naturalism and adopting from the first the *impersonal* attitude of natural science, tends to minimize the importance of human personality as of all finite individuality, appears to be able to deal adequately with the mystery which, as the late

learned Dr. Merz pointed out in his very interesting essay on *Religion and Science*, we find confronting us alike when we explore the nature of the world of objects in the presence of which we stand and when we trace the origin of our consciousness of that world—namely, the mystery of Personality. A view of the world, on the other hand, which draws its main inspiration from a religious experience of the Christian type, will incline, I think, to find in human personality its principal clue to the ultimate nature of Reality.

The late Mr. Bradley devoted the concluding pages of his *Appearance and Reality* to a confession of 'ultimate doubts,' and I will venture to follow his example here.

Pascal in a famous passage spoke of himself as terrified by the infinite reaches of Space; it is rather the infinite reaches of Time by the dread of which my imagination is vexed. I am not unfamiliar with considerations by means of which it has been sought to remove or lessen this dread; but, even if the 'idealism' which makes Time the creature of Mind were less beset with difficulties than it is, it would not rob Time of its infinity; and, although no doubt mere succession, apart from real events, is but an abstraction, the conception of an unbeginning and unending procession of events is not the less baffling for that. To say that our minds are in Time is not indeed to tell the whole truth; for our consciousness of Time, as Green insisted, implies something in us which transcends Time; yet our minds, though I could not (with Locke and Professor Alexander) allow them to be in Space, are certainly always in Time. In his last book, Mr. Bosanquet has powerfully urged that the 'moralism,' as he calls it, which depends upon taking Time to be ultimately real, is essentially irreligious; nevertheless it would not be true to the historical facts in regard to Religion to view it as concerned only with the transcendence of Time by preoccupation with eternal values; for it is concerned rather with the realization of these eternal values in truly human, that is, in individual finite lives; and it is no easy matter to unite the conception of an *interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta possessio* (as Boethius

defines eternity) with that of a real human spirit which would seem to need Time as a field for possible activity. Nowadays the majority of philosophical students would probably be disposed to consider the problem of immortality as not a philosophical problem, properly speaking, at all; and I should myself agree that Philosophy has no means of foretelling future happenings, whether in this life or another. While, however (as I have stated more fully at the end of my Gifford Lectures on *Divine Personality and Human Life*), I find the doctrine of personal immortality not only in conflict with all appearances, but uncongenial to my own mood and temper, I cannot deny that, where stress is laid on personality in Religion, the belief in that doctrine seems naturally to arise; as may be illustrated from its history among Jews and Greeks alike. Nor is a religious view of the world, especially of a world wherein multitudes die without the consolation which Philosophy and Religion impart through the vision of a Good accomplished in the evils of their lot, easily compatible with the acceptance of death as the end of all separate being. Belief in immortality there may be apart from religion; and there may certainly be religion apart from an explicit and operative belief in immortality; but it is difficult to resist the impression that only in exceptional cases can religion, as the modern European understands religion, coexist with a definite conviction that all men, all nations, all civilizations and the race itself are doomed to perish out of the universe. Yet of this survival, under the conditions which obtain in the material world wherein our present lot is cast, there seems, to say the least, no probability; and the hope which is based upon the religious experience of a personal relation to the Eternal is the only hope able to assert for itself a claim to be entertained, the force of which must be proportional to the self-evidencing power of that conviction itself.

But the very notion of an eternally perfect Being, the ground of all existence (such as this faith presupposes) is rendered difficult by a serious and thorough-going acceptance of evolution or development as the form in which Reality manifests itself.

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For if this Being is itself in process of evolution, it cannot (so it would seem) be eternally perfect ; and if it be thought of as eternally perfect independently of the world which is being evolved, it is hard to conceive a 'sufficient reason' for the creation or existence of the latter. And, if this be true of evolution in any case, it is still more obviously so with evolution as we actually find it. And it is to be observed that these difficulties concern alike the God of Religion and the Absolute of Idealism. We may, indeed, dimly divine that a world wherein truth emerges from error, and goodness triumphs over evil, is better than one in which there should be no struggle and no victory. We have certainly no experience of a world of this latter kind, and we value very highly some things which such a world would seem necessarily to exclude. We must perhaps leave the matter there ; but it is idle to deny that there remains in our minds an impression of mystery and even of paradox. And this is more markedly so in the sphere of Religion. For one might have expected that here there might be an exception ; that here at least truth and goodness would be directly revealed apart from their opposites ; and no doubt it has often been held that this is actually the case. But it is surely impossible in view of the history of Religion to admit it ; or to deny that at least as much error has been mixed with truth, as much evil with goodness, as elsewhere ; even if we do not go the length of crying with Lucretius, in words which must often rise to the lips of those conversant with that history, *Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum*.

Such are, if I may so express it, the ragged edges—the very ragged edges—of 'my philosophy.' I make no pretence to have satisfied myself about the problems which I have indicated. Indeed, I believe that the problem of the relation of Time and of Evolution (taken seriously) to the eternity and perfection of God is that towards a solution of which it will be the chief task of the Philosophy of Religion in the immediate future to work. But the religious experience, in which, at every stage in the struggle with the difficulties which beset faith in God,

God is perpetually being rediscovered, refuses to be put aside as merely illusory, or as no more than an immature form of a philosophic apprehension which when mature can dispense with anything that can be properly called worship. And even in those in whom "the native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought," either through a conviction of the unreality of Time on the one hand or through impatience of its endlessness on the other, there remains a consciousness of a life to be lived, of duties to be done, which resists paralysis by such reflection. There is a profound truth contained in Kant's doctrine of the 'primacy of the practical reason' as concerned with the whole life of man, whereof the exercise of the theoretical activity is no more than a part; while, as I have elsewhere attempted to urge, his representation of the relation of Religion to Morality as merely symbolical is inadequate; the sentiment of reverence for the moral law written on our hearts assumes a form intellectually more satisfactory—despite the many other difficulties which this development may bring along with it—when it becomes a reverence for the God whom that law reveals.

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